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vPreface
In recent decades, levels of childlessness have been increasing rapidly in most 
European countries. German-speaking countries seem to be at the forefront of this 
development, as more than 20 % of the women living in Germany, Switzerland, and 
Austria who are now reaching the end of their reproductive period will remain 
childless. But other European countries, such as the UK and Finland, also report 
high levels of childlessness. Eastern and Southern Europe did not have high levels 
of childlessness a decade ago, but are now seeing steady increases. This book pro-
vides an overview of the recent trend toward a “life without children” across Europe. 
It seeks answers to questions like: What are the determinants of childlessness in the 
twenty-first century? Is there an unbroken trend in childlessness, or is there evi-
dence of trend reversals? How does the likelihood of remaining childless differ 
across social strata? To what extent do economic uncertainties affect childlessness? 
How do fertility desires evolve over the life course? To what extent does the situa-
tion of a woman’s partner affect her fertility decisions? How far can we push the 
biological limits of fertility? What role can assisted reproduction play in reducing 
childlessness? How many men fail to have children of their own? What impact can 
family policies have on fertility decisions? Can governments reverse the trend 
toward childlessness—and, if so, should they?
This book builds on the 2nd edition of the book Ein Leben ohne Kinder, pub-
lished by Springer VS in Germany in 2013. It contains six updated and completely 
rewritten chapters of its German-language predecessor. Additionally, this volume 
contains ten new chapters by internationally renowned authors. Scholars from vari-
ous European countries and the USA have contributed to the completion of this 
volume. We regret that we were unable to include any country study of a Southern 
European country. Unfortunately, the planned contribution on Italy was not ready 
on time for this edition. The “hot phase” of the editing process was in the summer 
of 2015, when the weather—at least in Berlin—was also very hot. During this 
phase, the editors exchanged numerous e-mails with the authors. Even though we 
were bothering our authors during their well-deserved summer vacation, it was 
always a joy to read and edit the papers. We would like to express our appreciation 
and thanks to the authors of this book for their diligence, patience, and support.
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It is not possible to complete such a complex volume without the support of 
people who provide a wide range of essential services. The editors want to express 
their gratitude to Miriam Hils, who greatly helped us with the language editing of 
the book. We thank Tom Hensel for taking on the nitty-gritty work of ensuring that 
the text and the figures are properly formatted. We also wish to thank Hannes 
Laichter, who checked the reference lists. This book project was generously funded 
by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Rostock. We would like 
to thank Frans Willekens and James Vaupel, who greatly supported this endeavor. 
Last but not least, we thank Evelien Bakker and Bernadette Deelen-Mans from 
Springer SBM NL, who initially suggested that we publish this book—many thanks 
for pushing us in the right direction.
Berlin, Germany Michaela Kreyenfeld
Braunschweig, Germany Dirk Konietzka
January 2016
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Chapter 1
Analyzing Childlessness
Michaela Kreyenfeld and Dirk Konietzka
1.1  Introduction
Increasing childlessness is only one of the many shifts in demographic behavior that 
have been occurring in Europe in recent decades, but in the public debate, it is prob-
ably the most ideologically charged of these developments. Some commenters have 
characterized increasing childlessness as an outgrowth of an individualistic and 
ego-centric society (Siegel 2013; The Guardian 2015), or have blamed childless 
women for the rapid aging of the population and for the looming decay of social 
security systems (Focus 2013; Last 2013). Meanwhile, commenters on the other 
side of this debate have called for a “childfree lifestyle” and have recommended 
“bypassing” parenthood (Mantel 2013; Walters 2012). From a feminist perspective, 
the decision to remain childless has been described as an expression of a self- 
determined life, as in previous generations a woman’s life had been constructed 
around the roles of wife and mother (Correll 2010; Gillespie 2003).
While this heated public debate has been simmering for years, scholarly research 
has provided a more neutral and fact-based assessment of the evolution and conse-
quences of childlessness in contemporary societies. The key topics in this area of 
research are, among others, the social stratification of childlessness (Beaujouan et al. 
2015; Koropeckyj-Cox and Call 2007; Wood 2016), the consequences of childless-
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4ness for labor market outcomes (Budig et al. 2012; Correll et al. 2007; Gash 2009), 
health (Kendig et al. 2007), and old-age well-being (Dykstra and Wagner 2007; 
Huijts et al. 2013; Klaus and Schnettler 2016; Zhang and Hayward 2001). Because 
of data limitations, most past research focused on female childlessness. However, the 
analysis of “male childlessness” has recently advanced to become a key area of 
research, too (Gray et al. 2013; Keizer 2010; Keizer et al. 2010; Nisen et al. 2014; 
Schmitt and Winkelmann 2005). Many of the prior longitudinal studies on childless-
ness and the evolution of fertility desires had been conducted using data from the US 
(Thomson 1997). Meanwhile, Europe is catching up with the US, as large-scale 
panel data are now available for many European countries. These data enable 
researchers to study how fertility desires change across the life course, how they are 
influenced by the partnership situation, and how they are related to the other domains 
of the life course (Berrington and Pattaro 2014; Keizer et al. 2007; Kuhnt and Trappe 
2015). Moreover, methodological and technical innovations have given rise to 
advances in the field. The longstanding interest in explaining the trajectories that lead 
to childlessness (Hagestad and Call 2007) can now be satisfied through the use of 
software packages, many of which now include sequence analysis techniques 
(Mynarska et al. 2013; Jalovaara and Fasang 2015). The biological limits of fertility 
and the scope of assisted reproduction in alleviating involuntary childlessness are 
also emerging as research topics (Sobotka et al. 2008; Velde et al. 2012).
This volume adds to the abovementioned research by presenting detailed country 
reports on long-term trends and socio-demographic differences in female and male 
childlessness. It also includes reports of results from recent European panel studies 
that map the evolution of fertility desires across the life course. Moreover, several of 
the chapters provide new evidence on the prevalence of assisted reproduction, and 
examine the consequences of childlessness for economic and psychological well- 
being. In this introductory chapter, we sketch the major conceptual issues that tend 
to arise in the analysis of childlessness (Sect. 1.2), and present a more detailed 
outline of the contents of this volume (Sect. 1.3).
1.2  Analyzing Childlessness – Issues and Conceptual 
Problems
1.2.1  Is Childlessness a (Post)Modern Phenomenon?
Since the mid-twentieth century, many western European countries have seen radi-
cal changes in demographic behavior, including increasing shares of permanently 
childless women and men. It seems tempting to regard this development as a dis-
tinctly new and “post-modern” phenomenon. While previous generations were 
pressed into parenthood by the influence of social norms and religious doctrines—
and by the lack of efficient birth control methods—the ability of current generations 
to “choose” whether to have children seems to be an achievement of post-modern 
life course conditions (Burkart 2007; Gillespie 2001; Mayer 2004). But is 
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between “voluntary” and “involuntary” childlessness? And how do current trends 
line up with long-term historical developments?
Historical demography tells us that in many European regions in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, 20 % or more of women remained childless. Childlessness 
used to be an integral part of what Hajnal (1965) described as the “Western European 
marriage pattern.” A relatively high age at marriage was typical for the western 
European family system, in which young adults left the parental household to work 
as servants and maids in the households of their employers (Wall 1998: 45). During 
that time they were obliged to remain single and childless (Ehmer 2011: 29; 
Mitterauer 1990). A high prevalence of childlessness has also been observed for the 
North American family system, where “the single adult was a significant part of the 
American population in the nineteenth and early twentieth century” (Rindfuss et al. 
1988: 61).
However, it is not only in pre-industrial times that we observe high levels of 
childlessness. There is also considerable evidence that a large share of the women 
who were born around 1900 remained childless. According to Morgan (1991: 782), 
25 % of US women of these cohorts were permanently childless. Rowland (1998: 
20) estimates for Australia that about 30 % of the women of the 1891–1906 cohorts 
had no children. Similar estimates are reported for European countries for female 
cohorts born at the beginning of the twentieth century (see also Berrington, Chap. 3; 
Burkimsher and Zeman, Chap. 6; Kreyenfeld and Konietzka, Chap. 5; or Sobotka, 
Chap. 2, in this volume). It is commonly argued that childlessness among these 
cohorts is related to the social and economic upheavals that followed the Great 
Depression of the 1920s (Rowland 1998). Although economic deprivation probably 
contributed to this development, other factors also played a role. For example, the 
heavily distorted sex ratios caused by World War II help to explain high levels of 
female childlessness among the cohorts born around 1920 (see Burkimsher and 
Zeman, Chap. 6, in this volume, who report childlessness by gender for these 
cohorts).
The following cohorts, born in the 1930s and 1940s, entered their reproductive 
ages in the 1950s and early 1960s, a period that has been retrospectively labeled the 
“Golden Age of Marriage” (Festy 1980). These cohorts married much earlier than 
the previous generations, and childlessness dropped to historically low levels: 
“Marriage had not been so close to universal nor taken at such an early age in 
Western Europe for at least two centuries” (Festy 1980: 311). The increase in mar-
riage and fertility rates during the 1950s and the early 1960s is commonly explained 
by a revival of traditional family values after wartime. The scholars of that time 
were nevertheless puzzled by that development (Parsons 1955). Veevers (1973: 203) 
even spoke of a “paradoxical decline of rates of childlessness.”
Starting with the birth cohorts born around 1950, the prevalence of childlessness 
increased (again) in many parts of Europe, and particularly in West Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and England/Wales (see Sobotka, Chap. 2, 
in this volume, for an overview see also Miettinen et al. 2015; OECD 2016). In 
other parts of Europe, and especially in southern and eastern European countries, 
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countries the shares of women who remain childless have been increasing rapidly. 
In Italy, for example, childlessness skyrocketed to 20 % among the cohorts born 
around 1965 (Tanturri and Mencarini 2008). Meanwhile, in Belgium, France, and 
the Scandinavian countries, childlessness has remained comparatively low. An 
exceptional case is Finland: in the Nordic context, Finland has always had relatively 
high levels of childlessness. Recent data for Finland show that childlessness in that 
country is still rising; thus, it appears that the gap between Finland and the rest of 
the Nordic states is expanding (see Rotkirch and Miettinen, Chap. 7, in this 
volume).
In his broad overview of fertility trends in 28 European countries, Sobotka 
(Chap. 2, in this volume) concludes that because of the recent increase in childless-
ness in southern Europe and in the former state-socialist central and eastern 
European countries, childlessness is converging at high levels in Europe. From a 
global perspective, significant developments can be observed in Asian countries, 
and particularly in Japan, too, where childlessness has been increasing among 
recent birth cohorts (Frejka et al. 2010; Raymo et al. 2015). However, we also see 
some signs of a reversal of this trend, as childlessness appears to be gradually 
declining among the younger cohorts in a number of countries, including the UK 
(see Berrington, Chap. 3, in this volume). The US also had high levels of childless-
ness for decades, but recent evidence indicates that the trend is reversing in this 
country as well (see Frejka, Chap. 8, in this volume).
1.2.2  Childlessness Across the Life Course
Research on childlessness has always faced challenges in formulating a clear defini-
tion of “permanent childlessness.” In qualitative studies, respondents who stated 
that they firmly reject parenthood were often categorized as childless, even if they 
were still of childbearing age at the time of the interview (Gillespie 2000: 228; 
Black und Scull 2005). But earlier quantitative studies also did not use any age limi-
tations in the analysis of childlessness (De Jong and Sell 1977; Baum 1983). The 
conclusion from these investigations that “childlessness is temporary and that child-
bearing may occur later in life” (1977: 132) seemed self-evident. The studies that 
followed failed to use universal definitions of permanent childlessness. In principle, 
researchers have to wait until female cohorts have passed a certain age before draw-
ing firm conclusions about the childlessness levels in these cohorts. However, the 
temptation to predict the childlessness levels of cohorts who are close to the end of 
their reproductive period is strong. The inability to imagine further increases in 
childbearing at later ages has led many researchers to use cut-off ages that are too 
low. As a consequence, these scholars overstated childlessness levels for the younger 
cohorts. The measurement of permanent childlessness among men is even more 
complicated, because a man’s reproductive period is less clearly defined than a 
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ity histories in social science surveys (Rendall et al. 1999).
In the literature, researchers commonly distinguish between “voluntary” and 
“involuntary” childlessness (Höpflinger 1991; Kelly 2009; Noordhuizen et al. 2010; 
Somers 1993; Veevers 1979; Wilcox and Mosher 1994). This distinction is often 
used to differentiate between biological and other reasons for childlessness, although 
many early studies also assigned unmarried women to the category of “involuntarily 
childless” (Veevers 1979: 3). Due to the strong relationship between age and fecun-
dity, and because whether an individual has a child depends not only on his or her 
own reproductive capacity, but also on the ability of his or her partner to conceive or 
father a child, it is cumbersome to generate clear-cut estimates on “involuntary 
childlessness” at the individual level. Survey data can also be problematic because 
people do not necessarily know whether they are able to have children. The growing 
availability of assisted reproduction has softened the boundaries between “volun-
tary” and “involuntary” childlessness even further. Despite these caveats, it has been 
estimated that about five to 10 % of each cohort remain childless for biological 
reasons (Leridon 1992, see also Berrington, Chap. 3 and Trappe, Chap. 13, in this 
volume).
An issue that has been debated in the literature is the relationship between fertil-
ity postponement and childlessness. While some scholars have claimed that child-
lessness can be best understood as an unintended series of fertility postponements 
(Rindfuss et al. 1988; Morgan 1991), others have argued that childlessness is a clear 
and conscious lifestyle choice. In the feminist debate, efforts have been made to 
eliminate the term childlessness and to replace it with the term “childfree.” 
According to these scholars, the term “childless” has negative connotations because 
the suffix “less” implies that “something is lacking, deprived, unfortunate” 
(Underhill 1977: 307); whereas the term “childfree” implies that childlessness is a 
deliberate choice to not have children (Gillespie 2000; Hoffman and Levant 1985). 
The recent availability of large-scale panel data has made it easier to generate more 
solid evidence on the evolution of fertility desires across the life course (see 
Berrington, Chap. 3, in this volume).
1.3  Patterns, Causes, and Consequences of Childlessness
This book provides an overview of recent trends in childlessness in European coun-
tries and the US. In Chap. 2, Tomáš Sobotka assembles data from 28 European 
countries and describes long-term trends in childlessness. He critically evaluates the 
potential of the different types of data (censuses, social science surveys, vital statis-
tics) that are commonly used to generate shares of childlessness. The paper shows 
elevated levels of childlessness for the cohorts born around 1900, and lower levels 
thereafter. In most countries, the 1940s cohorts had the lowest levels of childless-
ness ever recorded. In several of the western European countries, childlessness 
levels increased among the younger cohorts. The former socialist and southern 
1 Analyzing Childlessness
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convergence, as childlessness also appears to be increasing in the CEE countries. 
Moreover, signs of a trend reversal have been reported. Switzerland and England/
Wales were among the first countries where childlessness increased. For these coun-
tries, we see that childlessness is leveling off at values of around 20 %. These find-
ings suggest that the increase in childlessness in contemporary societies may have 
limits. However, Sobotka cautions against projecting childlessness for the cohorts 
who are still of childbearing age.
Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 in this volume contain country studies for major 
European countries. The first paper in this larger section is by Ann Berrington, who 
explores trends in childlessness in the UK. The UK has long had high levels of 
childlessness, but also relatively high cohort fertility rates. This pattern suggests 
that fertility behavior in this country is relatively polarized, with significant shares 
of people either remaining childless or having a large family. Berrington provides 
fresh evidence showing that the increase in childlessness rates has stopped, or may 
have even “gone into reverse” starting with the cohorts born in 1970. Using addi-
tional evidence from survey data, Berrington explores people’s stated reasons for 
remaining childless: while career planning is seldom given as a reason for remain-
ing childless, “not having found the right partner” is often cited. Berrington also 
presents evidence on the evolution of fertility intentions across the life course. She 
shows that the share of people who categorically reject parenthood is low. However, 
there is a significant share of people who are still childless at age 42, despite having 
said they intend to have children at age 30. It seems likely that a large fraction of 
these people are “lulled” into childlessness through ongoing postponement.
In the following chapter, Katja Köppen, Magali Mazuy, and Laurent Toulemon 
investigate long-term trends in female and male childlessness in France. They 
examine how childlessness varies by level of education and occupation. Compared 
to the UK, levels of permanent childlessness are rather low in France. It is also 
shown that highly educated women are more likely to be childless than their less 
educated counterparts. By contrast, childlessness does not differ greatly by level of 
education or occupation among men. Less educated men are, however, slightly less 
likely to have children; a finding the authors attribute to the difficulties these men 
face in finding a partner. As in the study by Berrington for the UK, Köppen and her 
coauthors emphasize the role of partnership dynamics in permanent childlessness. 
While rates of childlessness are low among people who have ever entered a union, 
many of the men and women who have never entered a union remain childless at 
later ages.
In the next chapter, Kreyenfeld and Konietzka explore trends in childlessness in 
East and West Germany. West Germany was among the “vanguards” of childless-
ness in post-war Europe. Starting with the 1950s birth cohorts, childlessness 
increased continuously, reaching levels of more than 20 % for the female cohorts 
born around 1965. In state-socialist East Germany, childlessness remained low. For 
the recent East German birth cohorts who entered their reproductive ages after 
German unification, permanent childlessness has been increasing gradually; a trend 
that is comparable to the patterns found in other former state-socialist countries. 
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childlessness levels by women’s educational attainment among recent West German 
cohorts. An investigation based on survey data explores the typical pathways into 
childlessness for recent cohorts (1971–1973) of women and men. The findings of 
this analysis support the evidence from France and the UK that particularly for men, 
the lack of a partner often leads to childlessness at later ages.
Marion Burkimsher and Kryštof Zeman provide an overview of the development 
in childlessness in Austria and Switzerland. Together with (West) Germany, they are 
among the western European countries that report having high levels of childless-
ness and low cohort fertility rates. In Austria and Switzerland, childlessness 
increases strongly with level of female education. As the authors have access to data 
on long-term trends, they are also able to provide estimates on childlessness by level 
of education for the cohorts born around 1900. Very few of these women progressed 
to tertiary education, and if they did, they mostly remained childless. According to 
the authors, for these cohorts of women tertiary education was a “life calling similar 
to the calling to commit to a celibate life in the church.” For the subsequent cohorts 
in Austria and Switzerland, educational differences in childlessness levels have nar-
rowed considerably. However, some differences in female childlessness by educa-
tional attainment remain: for example, for the cohorts born around 1960, about 35 
% of the tertiary educated women have remained childless. Estimates of childless-
ness among men show only small differences by education. Again, less educated 
men are more likely to be childless than highly educated men.
Anna Rotkirch and Anneli Miettinen explore trends in childlessness in Finland. 
In the European context, Finland’s childlessness patterns have long been seen as 
paradoxical. While the other Scandinavian countries—Norway, Sweden, Iceland, 
and Denmark—have regularly reported low levels of childlessness, Finland has his-
torically had elevated levels of childlessness. The recent findings presented in this 
chapter provide further evidence of this trend, as the authors show that about 20 % 
of the women who are now reaching the end of their reproductive period have 
remained childless. Childlessness levels are highest among the least educated 
women and men, and have increased the most for this group in recent years. Thus, 
in Finland the educational patterns in childlessness are much more similar for men 
and women than in other European countries. However, the authors also show that 
in Finland the lack of a (marital) partner is strongly correlated with remaining child-
less. However, childlessness within unions has been increasing over time, too.
The following chapter by Tomáš Frejka is the only paper in this volume that goes 
beyond European borders to present evidence for the United States. The author 
shows that as in many European countries, in the US childlessness was elevated for 
the cohorts born around 1900. Black women of these cohorts were particularly 
likely to have remained childless. Frejka attributes the elevated childlessness levels 
among these women to their economic, social, and health-related disadvantages. 
Among the subsequent cohorts, childlessness dropped for all groups, and especially 
for the black population. Starting with the cohorts born in the 1940s, black women 
have been more likely to have children than white women. Among the cohorts born 
in the 1960s, childlessness has gradually declined, particularly for white women. 
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Within the context of this volume, this chapter provides important insights into 
long-term developments in childlessness in industrialized countries. It is important 
that we understand whether the trend reversal is unique to the US, or whether the 
patterns in the US indicate that childlessness is about to start declining in other 
“high childlessness countries” as well.
While the previous chapters provided long-term overviews, Chaps. 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13 and 14 examine the determinants of childlessness in contemporary Europe. The 
contribution by Gerda Neyer, Jan Hoem, and Gunnar Andersson explores the asso-
ciation of education and childlessness in Austria and Sweden. While prior analyses 
often used broad categories to group different levels of education, these authors take 
a more nuanced view, and investigate how field of education relates to childlessness. 
While in Sweden childlessness does not greatly vary by level of education, it is pos-
sible to single out professions with very high levels of childlessness. For example, 
librarians and hotel and restaurant workers are particularly likely to be childless. 
Conversely, women who are educated in the field of health seldom remain childless. 
In Austria, we find a very strong educational gradient in childlessness. Among 
tertiary- educated women of the 1955–1959 cohorts, about 30 % have remained 
childless. In Austria, some heterogeneity has been found within the different educa-
tional groups. Among the highly educated social scientists, for example, childless-
ness is almost 40 %.
In their study, Hildegard Schaeper, Michael Grotheer, and Gesche Brandt take a 
dynamic perspective on the relationship between education and fertility. The data 
for this analysis come from the panel studies of higher education graduates con-
ducted by the German Centre for Research on Higher Education and Science Studies 
(DZHW). The data contain detailed monthly employment histories of East and West 
German women who graduated from a university in Germany. The findings indicate 
that East Germans are more likely to have children during education, and that East 
German university graduates are significantly younger at first birth than their West 
German counterparts. However, Schaeper and her coauthors also report a conver-
gence of behavior among the cohort who graduated from university in 2009. The 
multivariate analysis, which draws on event history modeling, shows that stable 
employment is generally seen as a prerequisite for family formation by highly edu-
cated women in Germany. However, there is also a group of women who have a first 
child despite being subject to “long periods of precarious employment and insecure 
occupational prospects.”
In the following study, Kuhnt, Kreyenfeld, and Trappe also applied a longitudi-
nal perspective to the analysis of fertility in Germany. Using data from the first six 
waves of the German Family Panel, they explore how “fertility ideals” vary across 
the life course. Fertility ideals were operationalized by asking respondents to report 
their desired number of children “under ideal circumstances.” On average, people 
said they want to have about two children. However, the authors show that the 
desired number of children declines more rapidly with age for women than for men. 
The further multivariate analysis explored the factors that lead to a change in fertil-
ity ideals. The most important factor that is found to influence fertility ideals is the 
birth of a child; thus, people seem to adjust their fertility ideals as their family 
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grows. Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to have much influence on 
fertility ideals.
Laura Bernardi and Sylvia Keim present evidence from a qualitative study in 
East and West Germany. The sample was made up of women who were highly 
qualified and in full-time employment. At the time of the interview the women were 
still childless, but wanted to have children. They were asked to report on their atti-
tudes toward having children and combining work and family life. The results show 
that East and West Germans have very different ideas about how they wish to orga-
nize their future family life. The typical “male breadwinner model” was more prev-
alent in the narratives of the West German respondents, whereas the East German 
women took it for granted that they would continue to work after becoming a par-
ent. The chapter provides evidence that different perceptions of what constitutes 
parenthood and family life have persisted after German unification.
The contribution by Heike Trappe explores the prevalence of assisted reproduc-
tive technologies (ART) in Germany. The author notes that in 2012 about 14,000 
children in Germany were born following the application of assisted reproduction 
technologies. While acknowledging that the use of assisted reproduction has 
increased over time in Germany, Trappe argues that the German legal context has 
inhibited the wider use of ART. She observes, for example, that some groups—
including cohabiting couples, same-sex couples, and singles—do not have the same 
access to ART as married couples.
Patrick Präg and Melinda C. Mills complement the chapter by Trappe by provid-
ing a rich overview of the prevalence of ART and the related rules and regulations 
in Europe. They show that access to and the prevalence of assisted reproduction 
vary greatly across countries. The most liberal of the European countries are 
Denmark and Belgium, where the costs of couples and individuals undergoing ART 
are largely covered. The restrictions imposed in other European countries can be 
evaded by crossing borders and seeking out ART in more liberal countries. However, 
the authors raise concerns about social justice, as people with lower incomes may 
be unable to travel to access ART. Furthermore, they point out that the high levels 
of ART that are available in some countries of Europe demonstrate that ART can 
influence levels of total fertility.
The last three chapters of this volume address the psychological and economic 
consequences of childlessness for later life outcomes. Renske Keizer and Katya 
Ivanova investigate the consequences of having children for men and women in the 
Netherlands. Children seem to impact men’s life satisfaction indirectly. A deteriora-
tion in partnership quality seems to affect the well-being of childless men more 
strongly than that of men with children. It appears that having children buffers some 
of the adverse effects that being in a low-quality partnership can have on physical 
and mental ill health.
Tatjana Mika and Christin Czaplicki investigate the role of motherhood for old- 
age income in East and West Germany. Using linked survey and register data, they 
show that having children can greatly affect a woman’s lifetime employment pro-
file. The differences in employment directly transfer into differences in old-age 
income. The authors of this study observe a significant motherhood penalty for 
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old- age income in West Germany, but not in East Germany. In Germany, women’s 
pension are highly subsidized, as a woman automatically collects pension points for 
each birth. Although these transfers are rather generous, they are not sufficient to 
close the gap in old-age income between mothers and childless women.
Marco Albertini and Martin Kohli investigate how the elderly receive and give 
support within their social networks, and the extent to which they are engaged in 
charity work. The authors make distinctions between the elderly based on parental 
status. Their findings indicate that childless elderly people greatly contribute to the 
functioning of their social networks, and that—contrary to widely held stereo-
types—they do not receive a disproportionate share of transfers. Instead, they are 
actively involved in charity work and in maintaining their social networks. By con-
trast, the people who have children, but have lost contact with them, are shown to be 
the most likely to be in need of support.
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Chapter 2
Childlessness in Europe: Reconstructing 
Long-Term Trends Among Women Born 
in 1900–1972
Tomáš Sobotka
2.1  Introduction
In most parts of Europe, childlessness and non-marriage were common phenomena 
during the course of the demographic transition (Rowland 2007), and contributed to 
the fertility decline in the late nineteenth century and in the first four decades of the 
twentieth century. More recently, the decline in fertility among the cohorts of 
women born in the 1950s and 1960s has been accompanied by rising childlessness 
levels (e.g., Frejka and Sardon 2004). Most of the social, economic, and cultural 
trends of the last 45 years appear to steer women away from having children. Easy 
access to modern contraception—including to emergency post-coital contraception, 
which first became available in the late 1990s—has vastly expanded the ability of 
couples to decide whether and when to become parents, and has arguably made it 
more likely that they will choose to remain childless (van de Kaa 1997). While the 
educational attainment of women lagged behind that of men well into the 1980s, 
women are now more likely than their male counterparts to earn a tertiary degree in 
all countries of Europe except Switzerland (VID 2014). Moreover, women currently 
have relatively high rates of labour participation, even in the countries of southern 
Europe, where in the past the majority of women remained outside of the labour 
market (OECD 2011; Thévenon 2009). While young women now almost univer-
sally expect to be employed throughout their life (Goldin 2006), family policies and 
employers have only partly adjusted to women’s new aspirations. Also their male 
partners have yet to fully adjust: although men are now more involved in parenting, 
cooking, and housework than in the past (Hook 2006), there is still a large gap in the 
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amount of unpaid work done by men and women, and especially by fathers and 
mothers. This “incomplete gender revolution” (Esping-Andersen 2009) forces some 
women to make difficult choices between having a career and being a parent 
(Thévenon 2009). The nature of the labour market has also changed in recent 
decades: as the market has become more competitive, more demanding, and less 
secure, younger women and men are often working in temporary and poorly paid 
stop-gap jobs (McDonald 2002; Mills and Blossfeld 2005). This lack of secure 
employment had led many young adults to postpone marriage and parenthood.
In addition, the broad-based shift in values related to reproduction and marriage, 
and the related changes in partnership behaviour known as the “second demographic 
transition” (Lesthaeghe 2010), can also be expected to lead to higher rates of child-
lessness. In their analysis of European survey data, Merz and Liefbroer (2012) 
found that approval of voluntary childlessness was closely related to the progression 
of the second demographic transition, with respondents in Norway, Denmark, and 
the Netherlands expressing the most positive views on voluntary childlessness.
Some observers have suggested that childlessness has become the status most 
compatible with contemporary society. A single individual unhindered by family 
commitments is the winner in the race for the greatest career and material success 
in life (McDonald 2002). According to Beck (1992: 116), “the ultimate market 
 society is a childless society.” Such an alarmist perspective can, however, be coun-
tered by pointing to the low shares of survey respondents who declare that childless-
ness is their reproductive ideal (Miettinen and Szalma 2014; Sobotka and Beaujouan 
2014; see also Kuhnt et al., Chap. 11, in this volume). In most countries, the share 
of younger men and women surveyed who express a firm intention to remain child-
less stays low. In their analysis of Eurobarometer data, Miettinen and Szalma (2014) 
reported that between 2008 and 2011 the share of female respondents aged 18–40 
across the European Union who said they did not intend to have children was 
unchanged, at 5 % (see, however, Sobotka and Testa 2008 for some contrasting 
examples based on a different survey). Rather than being consistently planned from 
a young age, childlessness is often driven by a mix of adverse circumstances and 
adjustments to unforeseen events, such as infertility, poor health, not having a right 
partner, and partnership dissolution (Gray et al. 2013; Heaton et al. 1999). Many 
women and men of reproductive age therefore adopt a strategy of perpetually post-
poning childbearing (Berrington 2004), which increases the likelihood that they 
will gradually become adapted to their “childfree” lifestyle, and will eventually lose 
interest in having a child (Rindfuss et al. 1988; Veevers 1980). On the whole, it 
appears to be much more common for childless adults to express uncertainty about 
their reproductive plans than to claim they have chosen to be childless (Ní Bhrolcháin 
and Beaujouan 2011).
But are the theoretical expectations about rising childlessness in Europe actually 
supported by empirical trends? Is childlessness reaching unprecedented levels, as 
alarmist warnings that Europeans are no longer willing to reproduce appear to 
suggest? And is the prevalence of permanent childlessness becoming increasingly 
the same across Europe? Although a vast body of literature has examined period and 
cohort fertility trends across Europe, empirical research on childlessness among 
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women and men is typically limited to studies of individual countries. Several 
 cross- country studies published in the past decade generated broad evidence that 
may be used to address these questions. These studies were based on census and 
register data (Rowland 2007), cohort data derived from reconstructed series of 
period fertility rates (Dorbritz and Ruckdeschel 2007; Frejka and Sardon 2004), or 
a mixture of different data sources (Miettinen et al. 2015). In this study, I take 
advantage of the rapid growth in recent years in the availability of data on cohort 
fertility and cohort parity distribution. By combining different datasets, I aim to 
provide the most detailed evidence to date on childlessness in Europe. I reconstruct 
the long-term development of childlessness in 30 European countries among women 
who were born between the beginning of the twentieth century and 1972. I discuss 
the trends in individual countries and broader European regions, the degree of his-
torical continuity, and the main reversals in trends. I also analyse shifts in the geo-
graphic differentiation in childlessness, as until recently there was a clear east-west 
divide, with central and eastern Europe having unusually low childlessness levels. I 
focus on permanent childlessness among women, as the available data on men are 
much more limited, and are of uncertain quality (see below). In conclusion, I sug-
gest that the childlessness levels among women born around 1970 are not unusually 
high when compared with those of their counterparts born in the early twentieth 
century.
2.2  Data and Methods
2.2.1  Reliability of Childlessness Estimates
Data on childlessness can be derived from different sources, including census and 
survey data that ask respondents about their number of children ever born, register 
data that include the childbearing or parenthood histories of the resident population, 
and vital statistics data on births by birth order that make it possible to reconstruct 
cohort fertility trends over long periods of time. Because each of these sources has 
potential advantages and drawbacks, there has been considerable uncertainty about 
childlessness estimates. Even very similar data sources (such as two consecutive 
censuses) can yield large differences in estimates of final childlessness in the same 
cohort of women. These discrepancies have been attributed to slight differences in 
the questions asked about the number of children, migration between censuses, dif-
ferential mortality, and selective non-response.
Because the degree of uncertainty about the prevalence of final childlessness is 
particularly high among men, who can reproduce for a much longer period of their 
life than women, and for whom the relevant data are frequently missing, this study 
concentrates on childlessness among women. Even among women, a key issue is 
deciding at what point in their life course childlessness can be seen as permanent or 
almost final (Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2007). Because of advances in assisted 
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reproduction, European women are now more often having their first child after age 
40, and a few women have even given birth in their 50s or 60s. The Eurostat data-
base (2015) recorded 334 cases of women having a child at age 50 or older in 2013; 
such cases were much rarer until the early 2000s. But the important question is at 
what age the number of first births becomes so small that it no longer makes a real 
difference in childlessness estimates. The same dataset shows that of the first births 
in the European Union in 2013, 15.4 % were to a mother over age 35, and 2.8 % 
were to a mother over age 40; this share falls to 1.1 % after age 42 and 0.1 % after 
age 46. Thus, it can be argued that childlessness among women is virtually perma-
nent by age 46, and that, with a small degree of uncertainty, the final number can be 
established among women by age 42, when 99 % of first births have been realised.
As census data are available for some countries up to 2011, and vital statistics 
data are available up to 2013 or 2014, childlessness can be reliably estimated for 
women who were born around 1970 or earlier. Thus, the current analysis does not 
look at the experiences of the more recent cohorts, who have been in their peak 
reproductive years since around 2000. A number of previous studies attempted to 
make projections of final childlessness for the cohorts of women who, at the time, 
were in their late 30s or even younger, typically using the most recent period first 
birth rates to estimate the share of women who would have their first child in the 
future (e.g., Dorbritz and Ruckdeschel 2007; Frejka and Sardon 2004; Morgan and 
Chen 1992; Sobotka 2005). The accuracy of these predictions was mixed, with 
many studies overestimating the levels of final childlessness in recent cohorts. The 
biggest challenge researchers faced was in capturing the process of the recovery of 
postponed first birth rates at late childbearing ages, as the number of first births 
among women who were over age 35 was rising. The simplest projection method 
used—i.e., freezing the most recently observed period first birth rates—typically 
resulted in an underestimation of the first birth rates at these ages, and thus an over-
estimation of the levels and rates of increase of childlessness among the youngest 
cohorts. It can therefore be argued that predicting cohort childlessness is problem-
atic, as the results are often misleading (Rindfuss et al. 1988). However, these stud-
ies often employed projection methods that were too simple, and relatively little 
effort has been put into determining which projection methods yield the most reli-
able estimates (the paper by Morgan and Chen 1992 is the main exception).
2.2.2  Data Sources on Permanent Childlessness: Drawbacks 
and Advantages
Before discussing the data used in this study, I outline the general advantages and 
disadvantages of different data sources on childlessness. These observations pertain 
to most of the historical data analysed here. In recent years, these distinctions 
between different data sources have been becoming more artificial, as register-based 
data are increasingly used to generate population census results (register-based cen-
suses) as well as vital statistics records.
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Population Census Data which include responses to the question on the number 
of children ever born, usually cover the entire female population of reproductive and 
post-reproductive ages (typically, ages 15+). These data also constitute the most 
accessible source of information on permanent childlessness. They typically cover 
the whole population (although some censuses, e.g., the Polish census of 2002, 
asked only a selected sample of women about family and reproduction), and thus 
allow detailed cohort-by-cohort comparisons of childlessness. As the censuses 
often collect information on a large number of socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the population, these data can also be used to conduct a detailed 
analysis of the main factors associated with childlessness (e.g., Burkimsher and 
Zeman, Chap. 6, in this volume), including educational attainment (Brzozowska 
et al. 2016).
Census data can, however, be affected by higher or lower mortality among child-
less women, giving a distorted picture of permanent childlessness among older 
women, especially if they experienced higher mortality during their reproductive 
ages or lived through wars and major upheavals. Because census data (like survey 
and register data) provide only a snapshot of the “current population”, they offer no 
information on women who left the country, while providing data on family size of 
women who recently moved into the country, including children they gave birth to 
before migrating. The influence of migration can be addressed with more detailed 
analyses that take into account women’s migration status, but the data needed to 
conduct such analyses are often not published or available. Moreover, in a census a 
woman may misreport the total number of children she has (especially if one or 
more of her children died in infancy or childhood), or may fail respond to the ques-
tion on the number of children she has ever had. The rate of non-response is often 
not proportionally distributed with respect to parity: especially in countries where 
childlessness is perceived as being undesirable, childless women often do not 
respond to the question on the number of children they have.1 Whether there is a 
bias in reporting can be determined by checking the correlation between the share 
of women who are childless and the non-response rate in the data. When this cor-
relation is strong, it is safe to assume most of the non-responses are due to childless 
women who failed to report their status. If it is assumed that all of the missing 
responses came from childless women, a simple adjustment can be made (El-Badry 
1961). As this adjustment is likely to produce estimates of childlessness that are 
unrealistically high, more sophisticated imputation methods, including those based 
on regression techniques, are preferable. Such methods have, for example, been 
used to estimate childlessness in German micro-census surveys (e.g., Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2015). Finally, population censuses only rarely ask men about the num-
ber of children they have.
1 This bias can be further strengthened by the questionnaire design. For instance, in the Czech 
Republic, childless women frequently leave the response on children ever born blank instead of 
writing “0” in the respective box (Zeman 2013).
2 Childlessness in Europe: Reconstructing Long-Term Trends Among Women Born…
22
Survey Data Generally, survey data have the same strengths as census data, but 
have additional weaknesses. As these data are often based on a small sample of the 
population (typically, several thousand respondents), cohort childlessness estimates 
made on the basis of these data are unstable and unsuitable for more detailed analy-
ses. In addition, because many survey samples are not representative of the total 
female population with respect to family size, they may provide biased estimates of 
childlessness. In particular, survey non-response can produce distorted estimates of 
childlessness. The challenges of collecting survey data on childlessness are best 
illustrated by a discussion by Murphy (2009) and Ní Bhrolcháin et al. (2011). They 
attempted to explain a sudden rise in childlessness reported in some rounds of the 
UK General Household Surveys, and discussed a range of possible explanations, 
including differential response rates, changing non-response rates, changing sample 
designs, deliberate misreporting, and changes in survey procedures. Overall, it is 
preferable to use large-scale surveys with low non-response rates, as these surveys 
can eliminate the biases typical of surveys with smaller sample sizes.
Collecting data on childlessness among men is even more challenging, partly 
because men tend to underreport their children from previous marriages and part-
nerships (Rendall et al. 1999), and partly because they have a longer reproductive 
period. Thus, the only sources of data on childlessness among men are often smaller 
scale surveys, such as the Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) conducted in the 
1990s and the Generation and Gender Surveys (GGS) conducted since the early 
2000s (e.g., Miettinen et al. 2015).
Population Register Data In Europe, a number of countries, including Nordic 
countries, Baltic countries, the Netherlands and Slovenia, have established popula-
tion registers that contain records on demographic events for all of the residents in 
the country. These are in theory the most accurate and efficient sources of informa-
tion on childlessness. Because they can be merged with other registers, they provide 
a broad scope for detailed analyses of the determinants of childlessness (for an 
excellent analysis of the educational gradient in childlessness and cohort fertility in 
the Nordic countries, see Andersson et al. 2009). However, using demographic reg-
ister data for analysing childlessness has two main limitations. The first is that it is 
difficult to cover the reproductive histories of the entire population, especially those 
of migrant women, for whom the number of children they gave birth to before arriv-
ing in the country may not be known or reported. A partial solution to this problem 
is to measure fertility and childlessness only among women who were born in the 
country. The second limitation pertains to data access: to ensure the protection of 
data and confidentiality, many countries make accessing their register data difficult, 
and often also costly. Thus, obtaining register-based data on childlessness is not 
easy in countries that do not routinely publish these estimates.
Vital Statistics Data Statistical offices of almost all European countries now col-
lect data on live births by age of the mother, year of birth of the mother, and birth 
order of the child. In combination with the official estimates of the female popula-
tion by age and year of birth, these data can be used for estimating fertility rates by 
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the child’s birth order and age of the mother. These data can then be cumulated over 
long periods of time and used to estimate cohort childlessness and parity distribu-
tion. This approach has often been used in the past, including by Frejka and col-
leagues (e.g., Frejka and Sardon 2004, 2006, 2007; Frejka et al. 2010), Heuser 
(1976), Sobotka (2005), and Dorbritz and Ruckdeschel (2007). The estimates of 
childlessness and parity distribution based on period vital statistics data are also 
featured in the Human Fertility Database.
However, approaches based on cumulating time series of period vital statistics to 
obtain childlessness data also have several drawbacks. The first one is obvious: to 
reconstruct the entire childbearing history of a single birth cohort, it is necessary to 
accumulate over 30 years of fertility data, starting from around age 15. Such long 
time series often are not available, either because birth order is not continually 
reported in birth records, or because in the past many countries collected birth order 
information only for women who gave birth within marriage. Several countries, 
including Germany and the United Kingdom, have only recently started collecting 
data on biological birth order. Childlessness estimates derived from the period data 
are also very sensitive to the quality of birth order statistics. Data quality problems, 
such as a high share of births with an unknown birth order, the publication of the 
birth order for 5-year age groups only (this practice was common in the past in some 
of the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union), and the incorrect 
or inconsistent reporting of biological birth order (this practice is common in 
France) make the resulting cohort childlessness estimates volatile and often useless. 
Furthermore, period data only contain the records on births that took place in the 
country: fertility for emigrants is included, but only before the date when they left 
the country, and the reproductive histories of immigrants are ignored up to the date 
when they arrived in the country. Thus, the cohort fertility histories created in this 
way are somewhat artificial, and may not reflect the actual childlessness of the resi-
dents in countries with high immigration or emigration, especially if the fertility 
behaviour of migrants differs from the behaviour of the “stayers”. Finally, the esti-
mates of the female population distribution by age might be strongly affected by 
incomplete reporting of migration. For instance, incomplete reporting of emigration 
can affect statistics on the entire female population of reproductive age (as is the 
case for some countries of central and eastern Europe (CEE) with high levels of 
emigration, including Poland) or of specific population groups, such as immigrant 
women (as is the case for Germany; Pötzsch 2016). This in turns inflates the regis-
tered number of women of reproductive age, which leads to an underestimation of 
period and cohort fertility rates, and, consequently, to an overestimation of child-
lessness. For these reasons, childlessness estimates based on period vital statistics 
should be used with caution. While such estimates may accurately reflect the aver-
age level of childlessness in the long run, they may be unstable or have implausibly 
low values for some cohorts. This is, for instance, the case in the estimated time 
series of lifetime childlessness in the Human Fertility Database for some CEE coun-
tries, including Bulgaria and Estonia (HFD 2015a).
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Census or large sample survey data are often used in combination with the 
subsequent vital statistics. This approach, which is frequently used in this chapter, 
makes use of the comprehensive picture of childlessness among many different 
cohorts provided in the censuses, and then extends it using more recent data cover-
ing the period for which the census records are not available.
To illustrate the extent to which different data sources often yield different esti-
mates of final childlessness, let us consider the data for Romania and Spain pre-
sented in Fig. 2.1, or the different estimates of childlessness for the United States 
discussed by Frejka (Chap. 8, in this volume). The data for Romania are mostly 
drawn from censuses taken between 1977 and 2011, although the data from the 
2002 census are combined for the younger cohorts with the vital statistics data for 
2002–2013. While the censuses of 1992 and 2002 closely overlap and give very 
similar estimates of final childlessness, the census of 1977 gives lower childlessness 
estimates for the women born in the 1920s, whereas the most recent census of 2011 
gives much higher estimates of childlessness for the women born in the 1920s–1950s. 
For instance, women born in 1927 had a childlessness rate of 15 % in the 1977 cen-
sus, of 18 % in the censuses of 1992 and 2002, and of 23 % in the most recent 
census of 2011. It is unlikely that selective emigration plays a role in this discrep-
ancy (as it is implausible that women with children would have been leaving the 
country at a higher rate than childless women). Likewise, it is unlikely that women 
with children would have had a mortality rate that was so much higher than that of 
childless women that their share in the population of older woman would have 
declined so rapidly. Similar discrepancies can be found in the data for Spain: the 
more recent census data for 2011 show higher rates of childlessness than the 1991 
census data, and the childlessness rates reconstructed from vital statistics records 
are much lower (and are also less stable) than they are in both census datasets. In 
this case, immigration might have played some role, as Spain experienced an 
unprecedented wave of immigration between the late 1990s and 2010 (Verdugo and 
Swanson 2011): the higher childlessness estimates in the more recent census likely 
reflect the fact that many female immigrants to Spain were childless when they 
arrived in the country.
2.2.3  Country Coverage, Data, and Assumptions Employed
This study presents childlessness estimates for European countries with populations 
over one million; in total I have assembled datasets for 30 countries. I could not find 
reliable data or longer time series for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Latvia, Macedonia, and Serbia; these countries are therefore not included in the 
analysis. For the United Kingdom, data are available for England and Wales only. 
Because eastern and western Germany were separate countries in 1949–1990, and 
continue to have distinct fertility patterns, I analyse the data for these two regions 
separately, alongside the dataset for Germany as a whole. To capture the main dif-
ferences between major parts of Europe, I also study trends for six larger European 
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Fig. 2.1 Estimates of permanent childlessness in Romania and Spain among women born in 
1900–1972; a comparison of different data sources. Notes: HFD Human Fertility Database 
(2015b), VS vital statistics (Sources: see Appendix 1)
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regions that have had distinct fertility patterns in the past (Sobotka 2013): western 
Europe, the Nordic countries, southern Europe, the predominantly German-speaking 
countries of Europe (Austria, Germany, and Switzerland), central Europe, and a 
broad region of eastern and south-eastern Europe. The latter two regions are com-
posed of the former state-socialist countries of central and eastern Europe (CEE).
For most of the countries, I have found multiple datasets on permanent childless-
ness (see the examples for Romania and Spain in Fig. 2.1). Combining them allowed 
me to reconstruct long-term series of cohort childlessness. However, having multi-
ple datasets for identical cohorts also meant that I had to select some datasets over 
others, as I present only one figure for each of the analysed cohorts in each country.2 
In the selection procedure I followed a set of simple rules, which were based in part 
on the data issues and preferences outlined above. The selected datasets are listed in 
Appendix 1. The selection rules are as follows:
• Longer data series that show permanent childlessness for many cohorts are 
preferred.
• The time series that overlap closely with other available data (e.g., Romanian 
census data for 1992 and 2002 in Fig. 2.1) are preferred.
• The more stable datasets that show “plausible” ranges of childlessness are pre-
ferred (specifically, datasets that exclude data suggesting that childlessness lev-
els are below 4 %, as these levels are implausible given that the permanent 
sterility is 2–3 %). This means giving preference to census data over vital 
statistics- based estimates. The drawback of this approach is that the availability 
of census data for the most recent round of censuses in 2011 is limited, as many 
countries either switched to conducting the census based entirely on population 
registers and other administrative registers, which often do not allow for the 
reconstruction of the parity structure of women (e.g., in Austria); or the organis-
ers decided not to include the question on the number of children ever born in the 
census.
• Survey data are used only when the datasets are large, and only for countries 
where population-based datasets were unavailable (France and Germany).
• A hybrid approach of combining census data (mostly for the censuses around 
1991 and 2001) and the time series based on vital statistics for the subsequent 
period is used to derive an estimate of childlessness for the most recent period 
(usually for 1 January 2014).
Age Ranges I present childlessness estimates as “final” when they pertain to 
women aged 42 or older; for some CEE countries, I have also included data for 
women aged 41, as these countries still have very low first birth rates among women 
at higher ages. In six countries (Austria, the Czech Republic, England and Wales, 
Italy, Spain, and Switzerland) I have used a simple trend projection based on the 
first birth probabilities by age to estimate permanent childlessness among women 
2 I considered the option of presenting multiple datasets for the same cohort, but this would make 
cross-country and regional comparisons more difficult, and would also require much more space 
for data presentation, exceeding the scope of this study.
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who were born prior to 1972, and for whom the data were available up to ages 40 or 
41. At these ages the potential margin of error for such a projection is very small—
well below the degree of uncertainty in estimates of childlessness levels based on 
different data sources. The census and survey data considered in the analysis were 
for women who were under age 80 at the time of the census, as above that age the 
selectivity due to differential mortality was assumed to be too large.
Redistributing Women with Unknown Parity When the number of women with 
unknown parity was available in the published datasets, they were usually assumed 
to have the same parity distribution as the women whose parity was recorded. 
Therefore, childlessness was computed only for the women for whom the parity 
distribution was reported. Usually, this assumption was not critical for estimating 
childlessness, as in most countries the share of women with unknown parity was 
typically below 1 %. However, in many of the available datasets the number of 
women with unknown parity distribution was not reported, and it is often unclear 
whether any specific assumptions for these women were applied by the national 
statistical offices that processed and published these data. Finally, some census data 
show that there is a close correlation between the share of childless women and the 
share of women with unknown or unreported birth order; in these cases, all of the 
women with unknown birth order are assumed to be childless (see Appendix 1).
Main Data Sources The data sources selected for each of the countries are detailed 
in Appendix 1. For some countries, the data came from census tabulations or other 
estimates published by national statistical offices or were provided by the research-
ers working with these datasets (see Appendix 1 and the acknowledgements). Here 
I outline the main sources, which were used for multiple countries. For the census 
data, there are two key sources: the census-based tabulations of the parity distribu-
tion of women provided in the input datasets in the Human Fertility Database (HFD 
2015b), and the tabulations of the parity distribution of women aged 40–80 by 
cohort and education provided in the Cohort Fertility and Education database (CFE 
2015; Zeman et al. 2014). The HFD census-based tabulations were available for 11 
countries and territories: Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, eastern 
Germany, Lithuania, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.3 The CFE 
data were available for Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain.
In addition to the census data, the HFD also contains annual register-based or 
official estimates of the parity composition of women by age for Finland, Hungary, 
the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. These estimates were used for selected years 
in this study (Appendix 1). The key sources of the childlessness estimates based on 
vital statistics are the Human Fertility Database (2015a) and the author’s own 
3 These data are not part of the main HFD “output” datasets, as their purpose is to provide estimates 
of the parity distribution of women of reproductive age, serving as an input for constructing fertil-
ity tables in the database.
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 computations based on the Eurostat online database (2015). In theory, the time 
series of period data on fertility by birth order from the Human Fertility Collection 
(HFC 2015) can also be used to generate estimates of lifetime childlessness, but for 
most European countries these estimates either cover relatively few cohorts or are 
too unstable to be used for that purpose.
2.3  Long-Term Developments in Childlessness in Europe: 
Evidence for 30 Countries
The presentation of long-term developments in childlessness in 30 European coun-
tries is nested within six broader regions that reflect the major geographic and cul-
tural divisions of Europe, but also the geopolitical division of east and west that 
prevailed in Europe until 1989. These divisions are apparent in European fertility 
patterns, including childlessness (e.g., Sobotka 2011). In the next section, I sum-
marise the major regional differences and discuss the between-country heterogene-
ity in childlessness in Europe.
In western Europe, childlessness trends have followed an asymmetric U-shaped 
pattern, starting from very high levels among women born in the first quarter of the 
twentieth century, reaching low levels among women born in the mid-1940s, and 
then rising again, especially among women born in the 1950s (Fig. 2.2). The level 
of childlessness reached around 25 % among French women born around 1900, 
Belgian woman born in 1910, and Irish women born in 1925 (earlier data are not 
available). Childlessness levels then declined substantially, to 10–14 % among the 
early- to mid-1940s cohorts, most of whom had their first child in the 1960s, i.e., 
during the later stages of western European baby boom. The subsequent increases 
in childlessness were steepest in the Netherlands and England and Wales, whereas 
in France the level of childlessness rose gradually; today France has the lowest 
childlessness rate in the region, of 14 % among women born in the second half of 
the 1960s. Among the 1960s cohorts there was a clear stabilisation in childlessness 
levels, with England and Wales even reporting a decline; among the late 1960s 
cohorts, 16–19 % of women in Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, and England and 
Wales remained childless (see also Berrington, Chap. 3, in this volume).
The childlessness patterns were similar in the Nordic countries, starting from 
high levels around 25 % among women born around 1910 (data available for Finland 
and Sweden only) and reaching much lower levels among those born in the 1940s. 
As in France, childlessness levels then increased gradually (see Köppen et al., 
Chap. 4, in this volume). Among women in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden who 
were born in 1970, the childlessness levels are 12–14 %. In Finland childlessness 
rates rose more sharply, with one out of five women born in 1968 remaining child-
less (see Rotkirch and Miettinen, Chap. 7, in this volume).
The three predominantly German-speaking countries, together with southern 
Europe, make up the group of countries with the highest levels of childlessness in 
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Fig. 2.2 Childlessness among women born in 1900–1972; western European and Nordic coun-
tries (in %). Notes: For each country and cohort only one data source was selected; the alternative 
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(Sources: detailed sources by country are listed in Appendix 1)
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Europe. In the German-speaking countries, childlessness increased sharply among 
women who were born in the 1950s and 1960s, and has been especially prevalent 
among women who have a tertiary education (Sobotka 2012). In Switzerland and 
Germany, the rates of childlessness exceeded 20 % in the late 1960s cohorts. In 
Germany, the fertility patterns in the eastern and in the western parts of the country 
have long been distinct, partly mirroring the broader differences between the former 
state-socialist countries and other regions of Europe (Goldstein and Kreyenfeld 
2011; Kreyenfeld 2004; see also Bernardi and Keim-Klärner, Chap. 12, in this vol-
ume). Until recently, levels of childlessness were far lower in eastern than in west-
ern Germany: just 8–12 % of eastern German women born between the 1930s and 
the early 1960s were childless. While the results of the micro-census surveys of 
2008 and 2012 indicate that this east-west gap had become much smaller among the 
1960s cohorts (Fig. 2.3), western German women of the late 1960s cohorts had the 
highest childlessness levels in Europe; of around 25 % among those born in 1969. 
Over the past century, childlessness trends in western Germany have followed a 
U-shaped pattern: the level was around 26 % among the cohorts born in the early 
twentieth century, declined to less than 13 % among the mid-1940s cohorts, and 
then almost doubled among the women born over the next 25 years. But while 
recent estimates showing that 23–24 % of German women born in the late 1960s 
have remained childless seem high, these figures are actually lower than many esti-
mates based on the smaller sample survey data analysed prior to the recent rounds 
of the micro-census surveys (e.g., Dorbritz and Ruckdeschel 2007). In Switzerland, 
it appears that childlessness levels peaked at around 22 %, and were lower among 
women born around 1970. However, these estimates are partly based on vital statis-
tics, and are not fully in line with evidence from other data sources (for a more 
detailed analysis, see Burkimsher and Zeman, Chap. 6, in this volume).
In southern Europe, the long-term childlessness trends in the two largest coun-
tries, Italy and Spain, were similar: the childlessness levels were around 25 % 
among the cohorts born in the early twentieth century, declined gradually to around 
11–12 % among the cohorts born in the early 1950s, and then increased sharply 
among the cohorts born in the 1960s and early 1970s, surpassing 20 %. This pattern 
reflects that the decline in fertility in southern Europe occurred later than the 
decreases observed in western and northern Europe, but also that the decline has 
been more severe in the south: among women born in 1972, the completed fertility 
rates in Italy and Spain are estimated to be the lowest in Europe, at 1.45 and 1.43 
children per woman, respectively. Greece appears to be on a similar trajectory. By 
contrast, the level of childlessness in Portugal is considerably lower, estimated at 
around 12 % among women born in 1968. While the country currently has the low-
est period total fertility rate in Europe, of 1.21 in 2013, this development is not yet 
reflected in the childlessness trends examined here. In addition, it appears that the 
cohort fertility decline in Portugal has mainly been characterised by a rapid spread 
of one-child families, with an estimated 36 % of women born in 1968 having only 
one child (computations based on Human Fertility Database).
In central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe, childlessness trends differed 
sharply from those in other parts of Europe among women born in the 1940s to 
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 mid- 1960s. Among these cohorts, childlessness levels were not only very low 
 (estimated in most countries at 5–10 %); they were also much more stable than in 
the rest of Europe, where childlessness was rising. This pattern can be seen as one 
of the key features of reproduction under state socialism in the CEE region in the 
1950–1980s. A wide range of social and economic factors contributed to this pat-
tern of universal family formation: low average age at marriage and childbearing, 
negative attitudes towards childlessness, insufficient availability of modern contra-
ception (which resulted in large numbers of unplanned pregnancies and “shotgun 
marriages”), the relative predictability of the life course, the lack of labour market 
competition, and the relatively consistent availability of institutional childcare 
(Sobotka 2011, 2015). With some exceptions (especially in Romania), childlessness 
was rare among women of all educational groups, suggesting that labour market 
participation did not pose a major barrier to family life in the region (Brzozowska 
et al. 2016).
Some CEE countries stand out for their particularly low levels of childlessness: 
among women in Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Russia who were born in 
the 1950s (and thus had their first child mainly in the 1970s or the 1980s) the levels 
of childlessness were 5–6 %; or just a few percentage points above the estimated 
level of lifetime sterility (Leridon 2008). The highest childlessness levels in the 
CEE countries among these cohorts, of around 9–10 %, were recorded in Estonia, 
Romania, and Slovakia. These levels were, however, still well below those in most 
other parts of Europe. However, childlessness levels are higher among the youngest 
CEE women analysed, especially among those born at the turn of the 1960s and 
1970s, who realised most of their reproduction in the post-communist transition era 
of the 1990s. While childlessness has been rising in all of the CEE countries, par-
ticularly sharp increases have been observed in Romania: according to a recent 
estimate, around 15 % of Romanian women born in the early 1970s are childless. 
This estimate is, however, tentative, as it is based on cohort fertility rates recon-
structed from period vital statistics. These computations involve estimating the 
female population of reproductive age who are resident in the country in each year, 
which can be particularly challenging in countries with high rates of emigration, 
such as Poland and Romania (Sect. 2.2.2) (Fig. 2.4).
2.4  Diversity and Contrasts in Childlessness Trends: 
Countries and Broader European Regions
The analysis of childlessness trends for all countries presented above may not 
clearly illustrate the main differences between broader European regions. Figure 2.5 
shows changes in childlessness in Europe, averaging data for all available countries, 
and also depicts regional averages of childlessness for the six broader regions anal-
ysed above. These regional averages are based on data for selected countries for 
which long-term series were available. This analysis is also accompanied by selected 
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summary indicators of cross-country heterogeneity in childlessness in Europe in 
selected cohorts born between 1900 and 1968 (Fig. 2.6).
These data provide clear evidence that childlessness levels were high across 
Europe in the course of the demographic transition, in line with the findings of 
Rowland (2007). Women who were born in the early twentieth century had very 
high childlessness levels, as the family formation plans of many women were dis-
rupted by the economic depression of the 1930s and by a lack of male partners after 
the First World War. Childlessness levels of women born between 1900 and 1911 
approached or exceeded 20 % in all of the 13 countries with available data except 
Slovakia.
In various European countries and regions, the pattern of childlessness over the 
past century was U-shaped. In most countries, the lowest levels are observed among 
women born around 1940. These women were starting a family in the prosperous 
era of the early- to mid-1960s; a time when most women still fully embraced the 
“traditional” family model based on marriage and the strong division of gender roles. 
On average, only around 10 % of European women of these cohorts remained 
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tries). Notes: European average is an average level of childlessness in all countries for which data 
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Appendix 1)
T. Sobotka
35
childless (Fig. 2.6). A higher childlessness rate, of around 14 %, can be observed in 
only three countries: Ireland, Finland, and Switzerland. Paradoxically, the lowest 
levels of childlessness were reached at the same time among the cohorts who were 
experiencing the baby boom in western countries, and among the cohorts in eastern 
Europe whose fertility rates were declining to low levels (van Bavel et al. 2015).
The regional trajectories in Fig. 2.5 also suggest that some of the differences in 
childlessness between the eastern and the western parts of Europe preceded the 
geopolitical division of the continent that emerged after World War II. The CEE 
countries consistently had childlessness levels that were below European average, 
including among women who were born in the mid-1920s, many of whom had their 
first child before the new reproduction patterns of the state-socialist era were estab-
lished during the 1950s.
While childlessness eventually increased in all of the regions, the timing of this 
rise differed considerably. In western Europe, including in Austria, western Germany, 
and Switzerland, the increase in childlessness began among women born in the 
1940s. In the Nordic countries, the increase started among women born in the early 
1950s, and then progressed much more slowly. In the south, the rise in childlessness 
started among women born in the 1960s. In the CEE countries, childlessness first 
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started to rise among the cohorts born in the late 1960s (Fig. 2.5). Because of these 
differences in the onset of the increase in childlessness, the east-west gap in child-
lessness levels was most pronounced among women born between 1950 and 1965, 
although the differences between countries were large (Fig. 2.6). For an illustration, 
consider regional differences observed among women born in 1968: the average 
level of childlessness in the CEE countries (10 %) is below the lowest childlessness 
level in other parts of Europe (12 % in Denmark), and is well below the average 
level across non-CEE countries (18 %). These differences are also observed in the 
ranking of European countries with the lowest and the highest childlessness levels 
among women born in 1940 and 1968 (see Fig. 2.7): all of the countries with the 
lowest childlessness levels are located in the CEE, with Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic and Russia having the lowest levels.
Finally, a distinction can be made between regions where childlessness seems to 
be levelling off or even declining slightly among the cohorts born in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s (western European countries, Nordic countries, Austria, Germany, 
and Switzerland), and regions where childlessness has been rising rapidly, and is 
likely to continue to increase (southern European and CEE countries).
How closely is childlessness correlated with completed fertility? Do countries 
with high childlessness rates also have low cohort fertility rates? Previous research 
has suggested that among women who were born in the early and mid-1960s, there 
is a weak correlation between low fertility rates and high levels of childlessness 
(Dorbritz and Ruckdeschel 2007: Figure 9, Miettinen et al. 2015: Figure 10c). In 
Fig. 2.8 we can see that among women who were born in 1968, the strength of this 
correlation varies by region: no correlation can be observed in the CEE countries 
(or if there is a correlation, it runs in the opposite direction), while in the rest of 
Europe the expected correlation is found, but it is not very strong. The main outlier 
is Ireland, which has both a high completed fertility rate (2.17) and a relatively high 
childlessness rate (19 %).
2.5  Discussion and Conclusions
This study has provided the most detailed reconstruction to date of long-term 
childlessness trends among women in Europe. But because the analysis is based on 
diverse datasets, the cross-country comparisons cannot be precise, and a degree of 
uncertainty about the exact levels of childlessness remains, especially in countries 
where different datasets provide contrasting estimates of childlessness, and in coun-
tries that have been experiencing intensive migration. It is beyond the scope of this 
article to give a detailed account of all of the alternative datasets available, but these 
uncertainties should be taken into account when analysing the presented data.
This limitation notwithstanding, the main findings of the analysis are robust and 
clear. Europe has experienced a U-shaped pattern in permanent childlessness among 
women born between 1900 and 1972. Among the cohorts born in the early twentieth 
century, the childlessness rates were high (typically more than 20 %) in all of the 
countries for which data are available except Slovakia. Childlessness levels then 
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steadily declined, and were lowest among the 1940s cohorts. Relative to the 
 childlessness levels among both the older and the younger cohorts, the levels among 
these cohorts were low (Rowland 2007). The timing and the intensity of the subse-
quent increase in childlessness varied substantially by region. One clear and persis-
tent regional difference was between the former state-socialist countries, where 
childlessness was rare, and the other regions of Europe, where childlessness was 
much more common. Although the CEE countries did not have high cohort fertility 
rates, motherhood was almost universal there, and voluntary childlessness was not 
normatively approved. However, the data for women born in the late 1960s and the 
early 1970s, who reached adulthood in the period when the state-socialist political 
systems in the CEE were collapsing, suggest this long-standing difference is now 
eroding. Some of the CEE countries, including Croatia, Hungary, and Romania, 
have experienced rapid increases in childlessness, matched only by the sharp 
upturns in childlessness in southern Europe. In contrast, the trend towards increas-
ing levels of childlessness appears to be levelling off—and in some cases (e.g., in 
Switzerland and England and Wales) even reversing—in much of western Europe, 
the Nordic countries, and the three predominantly German-speaking countries of 
Europe.
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I have not analysed the specific factors that have contributed to the between- 
country differences in childlessness levels, and to the increase in childlessness 
among women born in the 1950s and 1960s. Very generally, it appears that the 
factors that have contributed to declines in cohort fertility have also been driving 
trends in childlessness. Two broad sets of institutional influences can be highlighted. 
First, whenever women face difficulties in combining paid employment with par-
enthood because of limited childcare, inflexible work conditions, long work hours, 
and unhelpful partners, childlessness is likely to increase. Highly educated women, 
who have the strongest career prospects, and who thus face the steepest opportunity 
costs if they have children, are especially likely to remain childless under these 
conditions. Countries such as Germany and Spain—and to some extent the United 
Kingdom, where the cost of childcare is very high—fit this pattern. Second, child-
lessness is also on the rise in countries where labour market conditions are poor: i.e., 
unemployment is high, a large percentage of the working-age population are in 
temporary employment, a large share of young adults are neither in education nor 
working, and the rate of self-employment is high. Under these circumstances, many 
couples postpone and even forgo parenthood and they often cannot afford the type 
of housing they would need to start a family. Until recently, these conditions were 
mainly found in the countries of southern Europe (Adserà 2004). Now, however, 
these conditions are also prevalent in many ex-socialist countries of central and 
eastern Europe.
At the same time, however, childlessness trends appear to have a stronger norma-
tive underpinning than changes in cohort fertility: in countries where voluntary 
childlessness is not generally accepted, childlessness is still relatively infrequent, 
especially among women, who often face strong social pressure to have at least one 
child. This normative pressure was widespread in CEE countries until recently (see, 
e.g., Merz and Liefbroer 2012; Sobotka 2016), but it also helps to explain the low 
childlessness levels observed among some religious and ethnic minorities in coun-
tries where childlessness is otherwise relatively common and accepted. The broad 
acceptance and prevalence of voluntary childlessness is closely linked with low 
religiosity (e.g., Abma and Martinez 2006; Tanturri and Mencarini 2008; Burkimsher 
and Zeman, Chap. 6, in this volume). In addition, there is a high degree of historical 
and cultural continuity in childlessness levels over time (Morgan 1991), which sug-
gests that countries where childlessness was widespread in the past are also likely to 
have high childlessness rates in the future, as younger women and men are socialised 
in conditions in which childlessness is common and generally accepted.
Will childlessness rates continue to increase; and, if so, by how much? It is 
important to note that recent childlessness levels are still well below the historical 
highs in most of the analysed countries, and that current childlessness levels are not 
as high as might be anticipated, considering the range of interconnected factors 
outlined in the introduction that may be expected to encourage women and men to 
remain childless. Among the women born in the 1970s and the early 1980s, child-
lessness is likely to increase especially in southern and central-eastern Europe, 
whereas it may stabilise in other regions. Childlessness levels are likely to be high-
est in the southern European countries, especially in Italy and in Spain; and possibly 
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in Greece, for which reliable recent data are unavailable. In these countries child-
lessness levels are over 20 % among the early 1970s cohorts, and may eventually 
reach 25 % if the increase in childbearing intensity at higher reproductive ages 
slows down or stops. Outside of Europe these high childlessness levels may be 
exceeded in some East Asian societies, especially in Japan, for which Frejka et al. 
(2010) have estimated that childlessness levels are close to 30 % in the late 1960s 
cohorts.
Future research should examine more rigorously the reliability of different data 
sources on childlessness, and the main sources of errors and distortions in these 
datasets. An important source of uncertainty about future childlessness lies in the 
interplay between fertility postponement and the ability of couples and individuals 
to realise their childbearing plans later in life. The mean age at first birth among 
women has exceeded 30 in Italy, Spain, and Switzerland; and is approaching this 
boundary in many other European countries. The share of women who are still 
childless at ages 35–40, when infertility becomes an important limiting factor 
(Menken et al. 1986), has risen rapidly in much of Europe. For instance, in Spain 35 
% of women aged 35 were childless in 2011, up from 16 % in 1991 (computations 
are based on census data). Many of them are likely to experience infertility by the 
time they decide to start a family, and thus may need to use assisted reproduction, 
which is costly and rather ineffective at higher reproductive ages (e.g., Wang et al. 
2008; see also Trappe as well as Präg and Mills, Chap. 14, in this volume). This 
trend is likely to contribute to an increase in involuntary childlessness. This pattern 
of “perpetual postponement” may also be associated with stronger fluctuations in 
childlessness levels in the future. Compared to past generations of women, most of 
whom had their first child at a relatively young age, and thus could postpone parent-
hood decision in difficult times, the current cohorts of women will have less “extra 
space” left for postponing motherhood if they encounter adverse circumstances. 
When times are tough, many women might be running a race against the biological 
clock that they are likely to lose.
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Chapter 3
Childlessness in the UK
Ann Berrington
3.1  Introduction
Interest in Britain in the causes and consequences of childlessness has grown since 
the 1980s in response to the increase in voluntary childlessness from very low levels 
in the 1960s and early 1970s (e.g., Baum and Cope 1980; Campbell 1985; Kiernan 
1989). Some early authors characterised childlessness as “a mode of ultimate femi-
nism” (McAllister and Clarke 2000), and early studies focused on women who had 
been married for at least 10 years but had had no children (e.g., Kiernan 1989). 
More recently, scholars have used a life course approach to investigate the parental 
background and life course factors associated with fertility intentions and outcomes 
(McAllister and Clarke 2000; Berrington 2004; Kneale and Joshi 2008; Simpson 
2009; Berrington and Pattaro 2014). From the outset, researchers in this area have 
struggled with the difficulties inherent in defining and measuring voluntary and 
involuntary childlessness, in differentiating between those who wish to postpone 
childbearing and those who do not want children, and in understanding how indi-
viduals’ viewpoints change across the life course (Baum and Cope 1980; Iacovou 
and Travares 2011).
Relative to the rest of Europe, Britain is a particularly interesting case because it 
is one of the countries where overall aggregate levels of fertility are high (with a 
completed family size of around 1.9 births per woman), but levels of childlessness 
are also high (at around 20 %) (Coleman 1996; Berrington et al. 2015). This chapter 
provides new empirical evidence for Britain which can help us better understand 
this apparent contradiction. We add to the existing knowledge on this topic in a 
number of ways. First, we examine how the educational gradient of childlessness 
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has changed over birth cohorts. Second, we examine childlessness trends for both 
men and women using a unique cohort study of individuals born in Britain in one 
week of April 1970. Using prospective data collected from this cohort during their 
adult years, we investigate how the childbearing intentions of individuals who are 
childless at age 30 are associated with the likelihood of remaining childless at age 
42. Finally, we examine the reasons given for not (yet) having had children among 
those who are childless at age 42.
3.1.1  A Continuum of Childlessness
Traditionally, a distinction has been made between people who are involuntarily 
childless as a result of biological infertility, and people who are voluntarily child-
less. However, this distinction is not necessarily clear-cut, since, for example, indi-
viduals who are not fertile may be accepting of their childless situation (McAllister 
and Clarke 2000). Involuntary childlessness can arise for reasons other than health 
problems. The terms “childless by circumstance” or “social infertility” (which 
describe those who do not have a suitable partner, or who have a partner who does 
not want children) are used both in academic research (e.g., Carmichael and 
Whittaker 2007) and more generally (e.g., Black and Scull 2005; Day 2013). Indeed, 
while one member of a couple may be infertile or choose not to have children, for 
the other member this inability or unwillingness to have children may represent a 
circumstance which he or she has not chosen (Carmichael and Whittaker 2007). 
Several authors have suggested that there is a continuum of childlessness (Letherby 
2002; McAllister and Clarke 2000). On one end of the continuum is a small group 
who report from a young adult age that they do not want to have children; the so- 
called “early articulators” (Houseknecht 1987). Qualitative research has suggested 
that such women often feel they do not have an affinity for babies or young children. 
There is less support for the idea that these women are making their decision to 
remain childless to protect a high-powered career (McAllister and Clarke 2000; 
Carmichael and Whittaker 2007). At the other extreme are women who are childless 
due to a medical condition. In between is a group of women who intended to have 
children, but who ended up with no children because of their circumstances 
(McAllister and Clarke 2000; Carmichael and Whittaker 2007; Keizer et al. 2008). 
There is also a category of women who never made a conscious decision about 
whether to have children. These women have sometimes been referred to as being 
“ambivalent” about childbearing. For these ambivalent women, childlessness is the 
consequence of having chosen to follow a particular life pattern, rather than of a 
decision made at an easily identified point in time.
Of particular relevance in the UK context is the association between the rise in 
childlessness and the increased mean age at entry into parenthood, particularly 
among more educated women (Berrington et al. 2015). As more couples delay 
childbearing, the issue of declining reproductive capacity with age becomes increas-
ingly important. In addition, as more young adult women spend extended periods in 
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education or pursuing career opportunities that have recently opened up to women, 
they may repeatedly decide to postpone childbearing, and thus drift into childless-
ness (Merz and Liefbroer 2012). Such individuals, who express a positive fertility 
intention but postpone childbearing until it is “too late”, are described by Berrington 
(2004) as “perpetual postponers”. Recent UK data confirm that very few individuals 
report that they wish to remain childless, including people who are still childless in 
their thirties (Ní Bhrolcháin et al. 2010; Berrington and Pattaro 2014). Some of 
these men and women will not be able to have the children they desire, due to age- 
related infecundability. It is difficult to quantify exactly what proportion of women 
who try to have their first baby at older ages will not succeed. Recent estimates 
show that rates of sterility rise after age 35 and especially after age 40, and that this 
increase is due not only to difficulties in conceiving, but to increased rates of fetal 
loss at higher ages (Leridon 2008; Eijkemans et al. 2014).
In summary, childless men and women are a very heterogeneous group. Both 
“active” and “passive” decision-making occurs across the life course which results 
in some individuals not having children (Gillespie 1999). Individuals can move 
along the childlessness continuum over time as their own life course develops 
(Baum and Cope 1980; McAllister and Clarke 2000). As Miettinen (2010: 20) 
noted: “For many, the decision not to have children may be a consequence of a pro-
cess, where childbearing is postponed due to reasons related to relationship, per-
sonal considerations as well as financial and work-related constraints until it is too 
late to have children.”
There is a risk when studying childlessness that the researcher will inadvertently 
characterise men and women without children as somehow lacking or as deviating 
from the norm. Some commentators prefer to use the term “childfree” rather than 
“childless”, thereby emphasising that many couples who decide not to have children 
are making a positive choice to, for example, have more freedom and disposable 
income than families with children typically have (McAllister and Clarke 2000; 
Carmichael and Whittaker 2007). In this chapter, I use the term childlessness in its 
demographic sense to describe a person who has not had a biological child of his or 
her own, while noting that many individuals, especially men, act as social parents to 
children who may not be their own biological children.
Much of the previous work on childlessness has focused on women only. This is 
partly due to data constraints. The data published within the vital registration sys-
tem generally only links births to the mother’s characteristics (ONS 2014), while in 
many surveys (e.g., the British General Household Survey) only female respondents 
are asked questions about their past fertility. It is, however, important to consider 
men’s experiences of childlessness as well (Jamieson et al. 2010). Choosing not to 
become a parent may not be equally socially acceptable for men and women (Rijken 
and Merz 2014). Furthermore, the factors associated with remaining childless are 
likely to differ by gender, as there are gender differences in, for example, the oppor-
tunity costs of childbearing. Moreover, although decisions about childbearing are 
often made jointly by a couple, the interaction of the partners’ desires and intentions 
is rarely examined. Qualitative research for the UK suggests that ambivalent women 
can be swayed either way by their partner’s views (McAllister and Clarke 2000), 
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while quantitative research using longitudinal data indicates that when the inten-
tions of the partners conflict, the probability of having further children is reduced 
(Berrington 2004). Among childless couples, research has generally shown that 
women’s intentions are stronger predictors of entry into parenthood than men’s 
intentions.
3.1.2  Aims of This Chapter
This chapter provides new insights into trends in childlessness by using an approach 
which compares findings for men and women and for individuals with different 
educational backgrounds. The following research questions are examined: How 
have childlessness levels changed across birth cohorts of women, and how do rates 
differ according to level of education? What proportion of childless individuals in 
their thirties say they intend to have children? Does this share differ by gender or 
level of education? What proportion of these “postponers” go on to have a child by 
age 42? How does this share vary by gender, education, and partnership history? 
What reasons do people give for not having had a child by age 42? How do these 
reasons vary by gender, level of education, and partnership history?
3.2  Data Sources
Three data sources are used: vital registration data, retrospective fertility histories 
from a series of cross-sectional surveys, and longitudinal prospective data collected 
within a national birth cohort study. Below, we describe the latter two data sources 
in more detail. The vital registration data are a long time series of data on the pro-
portions of individuals who remain childless. The data, which are provided by the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS 2014), are based on births registered in England 
and Wales. However, these data are available for women only, and are not broken 
down according to any socio-economic characteristics.
3.2.1  Retrospective Fertility Histories from the General 
Household Survey and the United Kingdom Household 
Longitudinal Study
In order to examine how educational differentials in childlessness have changed 
over cohorts, we use a specially constructed dataset which combines data from 
repeated retrospective surveys of women carried out between 1979 and 2009 
(General Household Survey Time Series dataset (Beaujouan et al. 2014)). This dataset 
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is augmented by retrospective fertility data for recent cohorts collected within the 
first wave of the United Kingdom Household Panel Survey (UKHLS) (Knies 2014). 
Both the General Household Survey and the UKHLS collect information on respon-
dents’ educational attainment upon leaving full-time education and their retrospec-
tive childbearing histories, and both surveys have been used to examine educational 
differentials in the timing and quantum of fertility in Britain (Ní Bhrolcháin and 
Beaujouan 2012; Berrington et al. 2015).1 Childlessness estimates are based on 
responses from women aged 40–49 at the time of the survey. Women’s highest 
qualification upon first leaving education (i.e., at the end of continuous education) 
provides the best available indication of educational attainment prior to entry (or 
potential entry) into motherhood.2 The analyses presented here use four categories 
of education: less than secondary level, secondary level, advanced level, and aca-
demic degree or equivalent. A secondary-level qualification is equivalent to a 
school-leaving qualification typically earned at age 16. An advanced-level qualifi-
cation is typically earned at age 18, and is generally required for entry into a tertiary 
(university) educational institution. The interpretation of changing educational dif-
ferentials in fertility over time is made more complex by the changing composition 
of the British population by education. The proportion of the female population who 
have either no qualifications or who failed to earn any secondary-level qualifications 
at the end of compulsory schooling (generally at age 16) decreased from 64 % of 
women born in 1940–1949 to just 18 % of women born in 1960–1968. Over the 
same cohorts, the proportion of women who earned an academic degree or another 
higher-level qualification increased from 9 to 20 %.
3.2.2  Prospective Data from 1970 British Birth Cohort
Prospective longitudinal data are needed to examine fertility intentions and their 
association with subsequent fertility behaviour. The UK is fortunate to have a num-
ber of birth cohort studies that have followed respondents from birth to adulthood. 
Data collected from people born in Britain in 1946 and 1958 have provided us with 
new insights into the parental background and life course factors associated with 
intentions to remain childless and childbearing outcomes (Kiernan 1989; Kneale 
and Joshi 2008; Berrington and Pattaro 2014). In this chapter, we use data for men 
and women born in Britain in one week of April 1970 (BCS70) who have been fol-
lowed up in multiple waves of data collection through childhood and early 
1 The data are weighted to take account of survey design and non-response (Beaujouan et al. 2011; 
Knies 2014).
2 We recognise that the level of educational attainment among some women is a result of their 
childbearing patterns: i.e., some of the youngest mothers may have had to leave full-time education 
as a result of becoming pregnant.
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adulthood to age 42 (Elliott and Shepherd 2006).3 We focus on individuals who 
were childless at age 30 (3209 childless men and 2603 childless women). Overall, 
60 % of men and 46 % of women born in 1970 were childless at age 30, but far 
higher proportions of academic degree-educated men and women were childless at 
age 30 (80 % of academic degree-educated men and 69 % of academic degree- 
educated women). This gap reflects the tendency among individuals with a higher 
level of education to postpone childbearing.
At age 30, the respondents were asked the following question: “Do you intend 
to have any children?” The possible answers were: “yes”, “no”, and “don’t know”. 
At age 42, the respondents were asked to provide details of their achieved fertility. 
The analyses in which we compare fertility intentions with outcomes are restricted 
to the respondents who were present in both the age 30 and the age 42 waves. 
Of those respondents who reported being childless at age 30, 73 % of the men and 
80 % of the women also participated in the survey at age 42.4 The respondents who 
were childless at 42 were given a showcard of possible reasons for not having had 
children (see Appendix). The respondents were invited to tick as many reasons as 
were applicable. Those who ticked more than one reason were then asked to identify 
the reason they consider most important. In this chapter, I focus on the most impor-
tant reason given.
3.3  Childlessness Trends in the UK
3.3.1  Historical Trend in Childlessness
Figure 3.1 shows for England and Wales the percentages of women born between 
1920 and 1983 who were childless at age 30 and at the end of their reproductive 
period. Levels of childlessness at the end of the childbearing period were very low 
among women born in the 1940s. Childlessness started rising among later cohorts, 
and then stabilised among women born in the 1960s. For example, just 9 % of 
women in the 1946 birth cohort, but 18 % of women born in 1968 (the most recent 
cohort to reach age 45), had not had a child by the end of their childbearing years. 
Childlessness first started to increase among the cohorts born in the 1950s, who 
were also the cohorts who first started postponing childbearing (Office for National 
Statistics 2014). These two trends are related, and later in this chapter we examine 
the achievement of fertility intentions among “postponers”.
3 Since this is a birth cohort study of those born in Britain in 1970, the sample is primarily white 
British. No attempt is therefore made to examine ethnic differences in childlessness. Further 
details of the on-going study can be found here: http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/
4 Response rates were slightly higher among degree-educated men and women (80 % and 85 %, 
respectively). Thus, more advantaged socio-economic groups may be over-represented in the rea-
sons for childlessness.
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The current levels of childlessness are not, however, historically unprecedented. 
As has been shown for many other European countries (Dykstra 2009) and the 
United States (Morgan 1991), there is evidence in the UK of a U-shaped pattern of 
childlessness among birth cohorts. Historically, more than one-fifth of the popula-
tion of England and Wales were childless, largely as a result of non-marriage 
(Hajnal 1965).
Historically in Britain, there was a tradition of late marriage, and high propor-
tions of the population never married. These trends were characteristic of the West 
European Marriage Pattern, as described by Hajnal (1965). In the early twentieth 
century, high levels of non-marriage were associated with imbalances in the sex 
ratio resulting from excess male emigration and male mortality during the First 
World War (Kiernan 1988; Dykstra 2009). Additionally, as noted by Holden (2005), 
non-marriage may have become economically feasible for middle- and upper-class 
women due to the availability of jobs in light industry, services, and businesses in 
urban areas.
What differentiates the patterns of contemporary cohorts from those of historical 
cohorts is that today the high levels of childlessness at age 30 are associated with the 
postponement of the start of parenthood to older ages. The share of women who 
were childless at age 30 rose from 18 % of those born in 1946, to 42 % of those born 
in 1968, and to 46 % of those born in 1983. The data suggest, however, that levels 
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of postponement and childlessness are no longer increasing, and may have even 
gone into reverse, with the proportion women who are childless at 30 peaking 
among those born in the mid-1970s.
3.3.2  Educational Differentials in Childlessness in the UK
Figure 3.2 shows the proportions of British women who were childless at age 40 
according to birth cohort and highest educational level upon first leaving full-time 
education. The positive educational gradient in childlessness existed in all birth 
cohorts starting with women born in the 1940s. The proportion childless among 
respondents with a tertiary education is roughly double that among respondents 
with no or less than secondary qualifications (i.e., the least educated). Over time, the 
educational gradient has increased very slightly as a result of faster increases in 
childlessness among women with tertiary education. Thus, among British women 
born in the 1960s, 22 % of university graduates, and 10 % of the least educated 
group remained childless.
These strong educational differences have tended to fuel discussions in the 
media, with commentators frequently asserting that many highly educated women 
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in Britain are choosing to remain childless in order to “pursue a career”, or that they 
have postponed starting a family in response to the conflicting demands of their 
career, and “have left it too late” to have a child (McAllister and Clarke 2000; 
Hadfield et al. 2007). In the following sections, we examine the likelihood that 
highly educated women intend to remain childless, and how their intentions com-
pare with those of their male counterparts.
3.4  Fertility Intentions and Childlessness
3.4.1  Fertility Intentions
Studies using a number of different data sources have consistently shown that very 
few British men and women intend to remain childless—at least if we take survey 
responses on intentions at face value (Berrington 2004; Ní Bhrolcháin et al. 2010; 
Berrington and Pattaro 2014). Research indicates that the proportion of individuals 
who intend to remain childless increases with age, as individuals adjust their inten-
tions according to their lived experiences (Berrington 2004; Iacovou and Tavares 
2011). Nevertheless, in the UK a large share of individuals who are still childless in 
their thirties express a strong desire to have children. This is consistent with the 
notion that individuals are postponing their childbearing to later ages, rather than 
rejecting parenthood altogether (Ní Bhrolcháin et al. 2010; Berrington and Pattaro 
2014). Table 3.1 below presents the childbearing intentions at age 30 of childless 
men and women born in Britain in 1970, according to their highest level of 
qualification.
Table 3.1 Intention to have a child according to highest level of education among 1970 British 
Cohort Study members who were childless at age 30. Row per cent
Yes
Don’t 
know No
Self/partner not able  
to have children
Number of 
cases
Men
Less than secondary 57.2 22.8 16.3 3.7 754
Secondary 62.6 21.5 13.1 2.8 1044
Advanced 64.1 22.0 11.5 2.4 460
Tertiary 69.3 19.3 10.2 1.3 945
Total 63.5 21.2 12.8 2.5 3203
Women
Less than secondary 58.1 18.9 15.0 8.1 434
Secondary 63.2 14.3 14.4 8.0 810
Advanced 66.8 17.1 11.8 4.3 397
Tertiary 67.6 19.5  9.7 3.1 958
Total 64.5 17.4 12.4 5.7 2599
Source: Author’s analysis of BCS70
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Around 3 % of men and 6 % of women said that either they or their partner were 
unable to have children. The percentage who reported infertility problems was 
much higher among respondents with lower levels of education, reflecting a selec-
tion effect whereby less educated men and women who remain childless at age 30 
are a select subset of the population with lower levels of education, who typically 
start their childbearing at earlier ages (Kneale and Joshi 2008; Berrington et al. 2015).
Overall, the respondents’ childbearing intentions at age 30 differed little by gen-
der: around two-thirds of both men and women who were childless expressed an 
intention to have at least one child, 12 % said they do not intend to have a child, 
while around 20 % said they are unsure. Tertiary-educated childless men and women 
were more likely to express a positive intention, while those with the least education 
were more likely to express a negative intention. The majority can therefore be clas-
sified as postponers i.e., they have a positive intention to have a child, but they 
remain childless. However, the fact that 20 % of the group are uncertain suggests 
that circumstances could easily play a role in shaping their decision.
3.4.2  Fertility Outcomes
Figure 3.3 examines the question of whether the respondents who were childless at 
age 30 had entered parenthood by the time they were interviewed in 2012, when 
they were age 42. Once again, there is remarkable consistency in the findings for 
childless men and women. Fertility intentions at age 30 were a good predictor of 
fertility outcomes: around 30 % of those who said they intend to have a child 
remained childless at age 42, compared to around one-half of those who said they 
are uncertain in their intentions, and around three-quarters of those who said they do 
not intend to have a child. Half of both male and female postponers—i.e., those who 
said they intend to have children—went on to have two or more children. Of those 
who did not intend to have any children, 11 % of men and 18 % of women went on 
to have at least one child. Thus, the fertility intentions of the respondents were both 
under- and overachieved, but the levels of underachievement were higher. Men and 
women with uncertain intentions appear to have behaved in a similar fashion: com-
pared to respondents with positive intentions, they were more likely to have 
remained childless or to have had just one child, and they were less likely to have 
had a second child. In further analyses (not shown) highly educated men and women 
are found to be more likely than less educated individuals to achieve their positive 
intentions for childbearing at older ages. This is consistent with earlier findings 
(Berrington 2004; Berrington and Pattaro 2014), and is likely to be related to the 
selection effect whereby individuals from lower educational groups who remain 
childless at age 30 are more likely to have other socio-demographic characteristics 
(e.g., health problems) associated with a lower likelihood of becoming a parent.
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3.4.3  Partnership Experience and the Likelihood of Achieving 
Intentions
An important pathway through which positive fertility intentions remain unrealised 
is partnership experience (McAllister and Clarke 2000; Berrington 2004; Carmichael 
and Whittaker 2007; Berrington and Pattaro 2014). To gain a better understanding 
of this dynamic, let us look at BCS70 cohort members who were childless and had 
never lived in a co-residential union at age 30, but who had a positive intention to 
have a child. Table 3.2 shows the percentage of this group who remained childless 
by their partnership status at age 42. Of course, we cannot tell from these data the 
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Table 3.2 Percentage 
childless according to 
partnership status at age 42. 
1970 British Cohort Study 
members who were childless 
and had never had a 
co-residential union at age 
30. In per cent
Men Women
Never married no partner 92 81
Never married currently cohabiting 50 52
Currently married 20 23
Divorced, separated, widowed, 
currently no partner
43 27
Divorced, separated, widowed, 
currently cohabiting
40 75
Civil partnership/ex civil partnership 100 50
Source: Author’s analysis of BCS70
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extent to which partnership status had a causal effect on childlessness, since both 
partnership formation and childbearing are likely to be influenced by other factors, 
such as the respondent’s health status, work ambitions, and attitudes regarding fam-
ily formation. Nevertheless, the table clearly shows that partnership experience 
plays a key role in childlessness over the life course. The vast majority (nine out of 
ten men and eight out of ten women) of those who were never married and did not 
have a co-residential partner at age 42 remained childless. By comparison, about 
half of those who were in a cohabiting relationship at age 42 remained childless. 
The group most likely to have achieved their fertility intentions were those who 
married after age 30 and remained married at 42; only one-fifth of this group 
remained childless. In comparison, levels of childlessness were higher among those 
who married after age 30 but subsequently separated.
3.5  Reasons for Remaining Childless
Of the BCS70 respondents at age 42, one-quarter of the men and just under one-fifth 
of the women had never had a biological child of their own. Consistent with our 
earlier findings for women based on the General Household Survey/Understanding 
Society Survey (Sect. 3.3.2), we observe a strong positive educational gradient in 
the proportion childless among women: one-quarter of female university graduates 
born in 1970 remained childless, compared to 15 % of women with less than sec-
ondary qualifications.5 However, among the male cohort members, the differences 
by educational level in the proportion childless were much smaller (27 % of male 
university graduates were childless at 42, compared to 23 % of men with less than 
secondary-level qualifications).
3.5.1  Work and Careers Not Reported as the Main Reason
Table 3.3 shows the reasons given by childless respondents at age 42 for why they 
had not (yet) had children. Recall that respondents were asked to tick the possible 
reasons, which are shown in the Appendix. Three main reasons dominate the 
responses. The most common reason was that the respondent had not wanted 
children (cited by 28 % of men and 31 % of women). The second most common 
reason was that the respondent had never met the right person (cited by 23 % of men 
and 19 % of women). A similar share of women cited health reasons: i.e., that they 
or their partner were infertile, or had some other health problem. Men were less 
likely to cite their own infertility as a reason for childlessness.
5 For this analysis only, educational attainment is measured at age 42 so as to maximise sample 
size.
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Other reasons were less prevalent. A small share of respondents (3 % of men and 
4 % of women) said their partner did not want children, which reminds us of the 
importance of the couple in childbearing behaviour. A significant minority, 18 % of 
male and 12 % of female childless respondents, did not tick any reason.
Some respondents agreed with the statement that they had wanted children, but 
had not got around to it, which suggests ambivalence about childbearing. Just 3 % 
of men and 2 % of women cited being focused on their career as their main reason 
for remaining childless. In further analyses (not shown), we compare the reasons 
given according to the highest level of education. While childless university gradu-
ates were slightly more likely than others to have responded that they were focused 
on their career, the shares were still only 4 % of men and 3 % of women. These 
findings are in stark contrast to the prevailing tone of media discussions, which 
often portray childless women as being too focused on their career.
In fact, we see two main differences in the distribution of reasons for childless-
ness based on the highest level of education. First, health reasons were cited by a 
higher proportion of the least educated women. Second, both male and female uni-
versity graduates had a greater tendency than respondents with less education to 
report that they had never met the right person: 30 % of male and 34 % of female 
university graduates gave this response, compared with 19 % of men and 28 % of 
women with less than a secondary education.
Table 3.3 Most important reason for remaining childless. 1970 British Cohort Study members 
who remained childless at age 42. Column per cent
Men Women
Not wanted children 28 31
Never met right person 23 19
Own infertility 3 12
Other health reason 2 4
Partner’s infertility 4 3
Wanted children but not got around to it 6 5
Partner did not want children 3 4
I have been focused on my career 3 2
Financial/housing situation would have made it difficult 2 2
Other reason 2 2
Partner has been sterilised/vasectomy/hysterectomy 1 1
Partner already has children & does not want more 1 1
In a same-sex partnershipa 1 0
Did not want to compromise relationship 1 0
No particular reason 18 12
Don’t want to answer 2 3
Total 976 (100 %) 845 (100 %)
Source: Author’s analysis of BCS70
a“In a same-sex partnership” was one of the write-in responses that respondents added to the list of 
possible answers (see the Appendix)
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3.5.2  The Importance of Having a Partner
Table 3.4 presents the reasons for remaining childless by legal marital status at age 
42. We show the pattern for women only, since the findings for men are very similar. 
Those women who had been married but who had remained childless were more 
likely than women who had never married to say either that they had not wanted to 
have children, or that there were health reasons that had prevented them from hav-
ing children. By contrast, among those who had never married, almost one-third 
said they had never met the right person, and another 30 % said they had not wanted 
to have children. Interestingly, the proportion of respondents who reported that their 
partner had not wanted children was slightly higher among those who were divorced 
or separated; at around 6 %. The divorced, separated, and widowed group were also 
quite likely to say they had not met the right person.
3.6  Discussion
This chapter has provided new insights into childlessness in Britain by showing how 
the overall trend masks considerable educational differences in the likelihood of not 
having children. Unlike in some other European countries, such as the Netherlands 
(van Agtmaal-Wobma and van Huis 2008) and Norway (Andersson et al. 2009), 
educational differentials in childlessness are not narrowing over time, but remain 
large, and are even increasing slightly. Today, tertiary-educated women are roughly 
twice as likely as women with low levels of education to remain childless. 
Table 3.4 Most important reason for remaining childless according to legal marital status at age 
42. Female 1970 British Cohort Study members who were childless at age 42. Column per cent
Married Div./Wid./Sep. Never married
Not want children 34 26 30
Health reasonsa 32 24 12
Wanted but not got round to it 5 5 5
Partner did not want children 3 6 3
Never met the right person 2 14 31
I have been focused on career 3 4 1
No particular reason 10 11 12
Other & don’t knowb 6 8 4
Don’t want to say 4 3 2
Total 264 (100 %) 111 (100 %) 452 (100 %)
Source: Author’s analysis of BCS70
aHealth reasons includes “own and partner’s infertility”
bOther includes “financial and housing worries”, “partner already had children”, “did not want to 
compromise relationship”, and “in a same-sex partnership”
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The co- existence in Britain of relatively large completed family sizes (of around 1.9 
children per woman) with high levels of childlessness results from different 
childbearing patterns within different sub-groups of the population (Berrington 
et al. 2015). High levels of childlessness among tertiary-educated women are being 
offset by relatively high rates of progression to third and fourth births, especially 
among mothers with the lowest levels of education (Berrington et al. 2015). The 
cohort fertility rates for women born in the 1980s suggest that childlessness, both at 
age 30 and upon completion of childbearing, may no longer be increasing. Thus, we 
may not see in Britain the very high levels of childlessness currently observed in 
countries like Austria and Italy.
Levels of childlessness, at least at age 42, are higher among British men than 
among British women, although it is of course possible for men to enter fatherhood 
at older ages. Nevertheless, a significant minority of men will remain childless. 
Educational differentials in childlessness are much smaller among men than among 
women. The proportion of men without children is high both among more educated 
and less educated men, though we might speculate that the pathways through which 
this occurs differ according to socio-economic status. Consistent with Demey et al. 
(2014), we see a significant minority of socio-economically disadvantaged men 
who are not given the opportunity for family formation. Quantitative evidence from 
the 1970 and previous 1958 British cohorts (Berrington and Pattaro 2014) and qual-
itative evidence from Jamieson et al. (2010) suggest that for some men (particularly 
socio-economically disadvantaged men), finding a partner can be very difficult, 
which leads indirectly to unfulfilled childbearing intentions. While some women 
with low levels of education are unable to fulfil their childbearing intentions between 
ages 30 and 42, the share among women is much smaller than it is among men.
Our findings regarding fertility intentions and outcomes for the 1970 British 
birth cohort suggest that relatively few men and women are rejecting parenthood. In 
terms of the “continuum of childlessness”, this so-called “certain group” (or “early 
articulators”) who declare that they do not intend to have children are a minority 
(around about one in eight of those who are childless at age 30).6 The majority of 
both men and women are “postponers”, as at age 30 just under two-thirds of child-
less men and women express a positive intention to have a child. There is a substan-
tial group of childless men and women who report having uncertain fertility 
intentions. Some of these respondents would probably fall into the “ambivalent 
group”, as described by McAllister and Clarke (2000), who have not explicitly con-
sidered whether they intend to have children. Other uncertain respondents may have 
considered their ideal family size, but remain uncertain about having a child because 
they are unsure of their situation. For example, they may not know whether they 
will have a suitable partner who also wants children, or whether childcare will be 
available. The significance of uncertainty in fertility intentions has not received 
the attention it should (although see Berrington 2004; Ní Bhrolcháin et al. 2010; 
6 We note that there may be a social desirability effect whereby British respondents may be unwill-
ing to express a desire to remain childless, as British society and media tend to have a pro-natalist 
bias (Hadfield et al. 2007).
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Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 2011). Evidence from the 1970 cohort suggests that 
those who are uncertain have an intermediate chance of having a first birth: i.e., in 
between those who have a negative intention and those who have a positive inten-
tion. Thus, if those who were uncertain had been included in the group with positive 
fertility intentions, there would have been a lower level of agreement between inten-
tions and outcomes. Moreover, uncertain intentions might reflect the fact that inten-
tions for childbearing can be affected by period circumstances, such as partnership 
status and the availability of childcare, some of which could be affected by social 
policy changes.
Consistent with findings from earlier UK and US cohorts, respondents both 
under- and overachieve their intended fertility (Morgan and Rackin 2010; Berrington 
and Pattaro 2014), but childless postponers are more likely to underachieve: overall, 
30 % of those who were childless at age 30 and who said they intend to have a child 
were still childless at age 42. Interestingly, this share is almost identical for male 
and female postponers. It is of course possible that the respondents’ intentions were 
modified between ages 30 and 42 in response to circumstances such as partnership 
experiences and work situations. Consistent with Berrington (2004), we find that 
the percentage of postponers who achieved their intentions was higher among men 
and women with higher levels of education and those who married (and stay mar-
ried). Over one-third of postponing men with no or secondary-level qualifications 
remained childless at age 42.
Morgan (1991) cautioned against viewing childlessness as a modern phenome-
non, and suggested that the reasons why people are childless today may not be very 
different from those of previous generations. In this British cohort, childless respon-
dents gave a variety of reasons for not having had a child at age 42: around three in 
ten said they “had not wanted children”, and two in ten said they had “never met the 
right person”. Health issues were also frequently cited, especially by women, who 
were more likely than men to have reported their own infertility problems. It would 
be useful to know the extent to which these health problems were associated with 
the postponement of fertility and age-related declines in fecundability. If health 
played an important role, the association between increased postponement and 
increased childlessness among cohorts born from the 1950s onwards may be par-
tially causal.
Comparatively few men and women reported that they had not had children 
because they had “not got round to it” or were “focused on career”. The finding that 
career demands do not play a large role in the decision to remain childless is consis-
tent with previous research for the UK, Australia, and Finland (McAllister and 
Clarke 2000; Carmichael and Whittaker 2007; Miettinen 2010). The reported rea-
sons for childlessness are similar across genders and levels of education, but differ 
more by partnership history. Finding and staying together with an appropriate part-
ner appears to be a key element in childbearing decisions.
This study has a number of limitations. The type of evidence collected in quan-
titative surveys is limited, and individuals’ statements about the number of children 
they want are likely to be subject to social desirability effects and post-hoc rationali-
sations. The chapter presents intentions as measured at age 30, and outcomes at age 
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42. It would be interesting to know how individuals’ intentions change between 
ages 30 and 42 in response to life course events. Second, while this study is novel in 
that childlessness data are available for both men and women, the data do not pro-
vide information about couples. As childbearing is generally a couple-level activity, 
one would ideally want to investigate the preferences and constraints of both part-
ners. Finally, many of the reasons offered to respondents in the BCS70 question-
naire for not having had children are negative, such as being in poor health or not 
having found the right partner. Ideally, the reasons offered should also include posi-
tive pull factors of being childfree, such as having more freedom and disposable 
income (Gillespie 2003). Around 30 % of childless women ticked the “not wanted 
to have children” box but this still leaves open the question of why they did not want 
to have children.
In summary, childlessness increased first among the cohorts born in the 1950s, 
who were also the first cohorts to start postponing childbearing. Postponement and 
childlessness may be causally related, e.g. through reduced fecundity with age, but 
both are also manifestations of underlying changes in women’s lives, such as oppor-
tunities for women to develop a career, the availability of reliable contraception, and 
increased partnership postponement and instability (Murphy 1993; Hobcraft and 
Kiernan 1995; Thomson et al. 2012).
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 Appendix
Most Important Reason for Remaining Childless Showcard.
1970 British Birth Cohort Study, Age 42 Questionnaire.
 1. Infertility problems
 2. Partner sterilized, had vasectomy/hysterectomy
 3. Other health reasons
 4. I have not wanted to have children
 5. I have wanted to have children but not got round to it
 6. I have been focused on my career
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 7. I have never met the right person to have children with
 8. My partner has not wanted to have children
 9. My partner already has children and has not wanted more
 10. I have not wanted to compromise my relationship with my partner
 11. My financial situation would have made it difficult
 12. My housing situation would have made it difficult
 13. No particular reason
 14. Other reason – please write in:__________________________
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Chapter 4
Childlessness in France
Katja Köppen, Magali Mazuy, and Laurent Toulemon
4.1  Introduction
Current discussions on decreasing birth rates, high rates of childlessness, and a lack 
of support for working parents in some European countries often cite France as an 
example of a country with a successful family policy. Compared with most other 
western European countries, France not only has higher maternal labour force par-
ticipation rates; it also has higher fertility rates. As the average French woman has 
two children, the birth rate in France is higher than in any other European country, 
except for Iceland and Ireland (Eurostat 2012a). Less than 15 % of women in France 
remain childless; a share which is considerably lower than those of women in neigh-
bouring countries like England, Switzerland, or Germany. In this article, we will 
attempt to explain why parenthood is still a standard part of the biography among 
French men and women. After providing an overview of the institutional regulations 
and family policies, we will present the most important demographic indicators of 
childlessness, and look at how they differ by social group.
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4.2  Institutional Framework and Family Policies
When seeking to explain the high fertility rates and comparatively low childlessness 
rates in France, scholars often cite the country’s extensive and well-developed child 
care system and generous family benefit system, which provide tax deductions and 
financial support to families with many children (Ehmann 1997; Becker 2000; 
Fagnani 2002; Letablier 2002; Köppen 2006; Thévenon and Luci 2012). These high 
levels of state support and family-friendly measures can be traced back in history. 
France experienced a rapid drop in fertility much earlier than most countries, as 
birth rates were falling even in the nineteenth century. French women born in the 
middle of the nineteenth century had an average of 3.4 children. During the same 
period, women in France’ neighbouring country Germany had an average of 5.4 
births, which was higher than the European average (Festy 1979: 49). Since then 
family policy in France has always had strong pro-natalistic elements. Even today, 
this bias is apparent in the promotion of large families and the relative neglect of 
one-child families in French family policy (Schultheis 1988: 92).
Some contemporary family benefits in France can also be traced back to charity 
programmes of Catholic enterprises during the nineteenth century: for example, 
child allowances, support of proprietary, and the work-free family Sunday evolved 
from voluntary benefits offered by employers (Spieß 2004: 51). During this period, 
so-called compensation funds were established to compensate wage earners for the 
burdens associated with rearing and caring for children. After employees went to 
court and demanded that these initially voluntary benefits were made mandatory in 
work contracts, the benefits became a standard part of regular wage employment, 
and these programmes increasingly came under state control. First, family compen-
sation funds, which took over the payment of family benefits from companies, were 
founded in 1920. A large proportion of employees had to join these funds in 1932. 
In response to the on-going decline in the population, the Code de la Famille stan-
dardised and regulated the hitherto non-governmental, corporate-based family pol-
icy in 1939. Today, family benefits are organised and financed through the Caisse 
Nationale d’Allocation Familiale (CNAF), the bureaus in charge of distributing 
family benefits. One-third of the funding of the CNAF comes from the government, 
and two-thirds comes from employer contributions and tobacco tax proceeds (Spieß 
2004).
Another factor that helps to explain contemporary family policies in France is 
French laicism. The state in France has a strong legal mandate to intervene and 
participate in family matters and childcare arrangements. In particular, childcare is 
supported and subsidised by the state. There are historical reasons for this high 
degree of government involvement in family arrangements. To attenuate the influ-
ence of the Catholic Church on family and education and to ensure that children 
were raised as loyal republican citizens, the French government took over control of 
the educational system in the late nineteenth century. In 1881 a public educational 
system based on republican-secularist principles was established in France (Veil 
2002: 1). As children are seen in France as the “future of the nation” (Letablier 
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2002: 171), the state is considered responsible for their well-being, health, and edu-
cation. The government aims to provide equal opportunities to all children, regard-
less of their parents’ income. The principle that childcare should be state-supported 
is also based in moral concepts regarding the relationship between state and church. 
The church lobbied for Catholic and conservative values, whereas the state advo-
cated republican values: i.e., the principles of égalité et liberté. To ensure that 
women do not have to leave the labour market when they become mothers, the state 
supports them by providing adequate childcare (Letablier 2002).
Having children is not seen as a reason for quitting work or reducing work hours. 
Although attendance is not obligatory, currently almost all French children between 
the ages of three and six attend preschool, the écoles maternelles. Thus, preschool 
is an established institution in France. The majority of children attend preschool 
between 8.30 a.m. and 4.30 p.m., and some preschools offer care after those hours 
(the so-called garderie). Most of the écoles maternelles are state-run and free of 
charge; however, parents have to pay a small amount for lunch and care after the 
official closing time (Letablier 2002: 172). In addition to public services, there are 
other forms of childcare in France. Childcare for children younger than 3 years of 
age is especially diverse, and is dominated by privately organised domestic child-
care arrangements. The government provides financial allowances and tax deduc-
tions that offset the costs of employing a registered day-care professional (assistante 
maternelle agree). These benefits are available for dual-earner parents with children 
under 6 years of age who employ a registered day-care professional. Parents can 
also engage a nanny (nourrice), who may perform household work in addition to 
providing childcare. In this case as well, parents can apply for governmental assis-
tance and make use of tax deductions (Becker 2000: 231f.). Children in compulsory 
education in France attend school all day. School starts at 8.30 a.m. and usually 
finishes at 4.00 or 4.30 p.m., interrupted by a break for lunch, which is paid for in 
part by the parents. Children in pre- or primary schools may attend after-school care 
programmes. However, as there is no school on Wednesday afternoons, parents may 
be forced to find alternative childcare arrangements, work part-time, or use the 35-h 
limit on working hours in France to take a half-day off on Wednesdays.
The cost of childrearing is reduced in France and parents are encouraged to 
return to work soon after giving birth not just by a comprehensive system of child-
care, but also by a system of monetary benefits for families. In France, monetary 
incentives to remain home after the birth of the first child are comparatively low. 
Child benefits and paid parental leave have long been available to two-child families 
only. Before 1994, only families with at least three children were eligible for these 
allowances. However, since 2004 parents with one child also receive a basic allow-
ance for the first 3 years and paid parental leave.
In France, under the principle of family splitting, the family’s tax burden is 
reduced based on the number of children. In this system families with at least three 
children and high-income households have the highest level of tax relief (Dingeldey 
2000: 76). Thus, large families with dual-earner parents benefit the most from tax 
deductions.
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This historically evolved system of comprehensive and reasonably priced child-
care, lower taxes for large families, and high levels of acceptance of and apprecia-
tion for children in French society are among the reasons why France has relatively 
high birth rates, but also high levels of labour market attachment among women, 
and among mothers in particular. The dilemma of how to combine work and family 
that many women still have to face is thus less pronounced in France, but also the 
social pressure to have children is stronger in France than in most other western 
European countries (Debest and Mazuy 2014).
4.3  Female Employment
In recent decades the share of women who have a high level of education has been 
increasing in Europe. At the same time, female employment rates have been rising 
continuously. Table 4.1 displays the development of maternal employment in France 
for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2013. Labour force participation rates increased 
steadily over this period, even among mothers with three and more children. In 2000 
there is a noticeable decline in the rate of employment among mothers with two 
children, including those with one child under age three. This decrease has been 
attributed to changing parental leave regulations. Since 1994 women who gave birth 
to a second child could apply for paid parental leave. Before this point, only women 
with at least three children were eligible for paid leave. Younger and less educated 
women in particular took advantage of the paid leave option, and one-third of the 
applicants have been unemployed (Reuter 2002: 19).
The abovementioned changes in parental leave were apparently introduced to 
encourage women to withdraw from the labour market, at least for the years imme-
diately after the birth of their second child (Reuter 2002: 19). In this context, another 
aspect worth mentioning is the high unemployment rate among French women. 
Unemployment is higher among women than among men, even though women are 
more likely to work in the public sector, which tends to be less affected than other 
sectors by unemployment (Toulemon and de Guibert-Lantoine 1998: 4). Young 
women in particular are at risk of becoming unemployed. In 2010, 23.7 % of all 
French women younger than age 25 were unemployed (Mansuy and Wolff 2012). In 
Table 4.1 Labour force participation rates of mothers who live in a partnership, by number of 
children and age of youngest child, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2013
1990 1995 2000 2013
Under 
3 3–5
Under 
3 3–5
Under 
3 3–5
Under 
3 3–5
No. of children
One child 76.6 83.2 79.8 82.9 81.3 85.5 83.0 89.8
Two children 66.3 75.7 68.0 78.3 56.5 81.4 68.6 86.9
Three and more children 31.7 43.8 32.6 56.2 36.1 60.2 43.6 73.0
All 61.2 68.0 64.3 72.6 61.6 76.2 68.9 84.1
Source: Avenel and Roth (2001) and Guggemos and Vidalenc (2014)
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contrast, the unemployment rate of this particular group of women in Germany 
(eastern and western Germany combined) was just 8.8 % (Federal Statistical Office 
of Germany 2012).
However, in France a comparatively large share of women are in full-time 
employment. During the first half of the 1990s, less than 25 % of French women 
worked part-time, and almost 30 % of these women would have preferred to work 
full-time if given the choice. Recently, female part-time employment rates have 
increased slightly in France, but they are still lower than those in many other 
European countries (Eurostat 2012b).
4.4  Fertility and Ideal Family Size
As in most western European countries, a rather traditional view of family life dom-
inated in French society until the 1970s: a family consisted of a male breadwinner 
who had to provide for his wife and at least three children. Since the beginning of 
the 1980s, alternative forms of private living arrangements have become increas-
ingly important, and non-marital unions with children have become a permanent 
feature of everyday life. Almost 58 % of all children born in the year 2014 had non- 
married parents. In this respect, France and Scandinavia are quite similar: i.e., 
becoming a parent is no longer automatically associated with marriage.
France has one of the highest birth rates in Europe. Since 1975 the total fertility 
rate has been rather stable, at an average of 1.8 children per woman, and recent 
numbers indicate that the TFR has risen to two children per woman (Fig. 4.1). Even 
from a cohort perspective, French fertility is exceptionally high. For French women 
0.0
0.5
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2.0
2.5
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3.5
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Calendar year
Fig. 4.1 Total fertility rate, France 1960–2014, provisional numbers for 2013 and later (Source: 
Council of Europe (2004), Richet-Mastain (2006) and Bellamy and Beaumel (2015))
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born in 1960, the cohort fertility rate is 2.1, which is basically replacement-level 
fertility (Mazuy et al. 2014). Moreover, childbearing intentions, as reported in social 
science surveys, are comparatively high in France. When people are asked about 
their ideal number of children, the scores are highest in France, Ireland, Finland, 
and Great Britain (Toulemon and Leridon 1999; Goldstein et al. 2003). In France, 
most men and women say two or three is the ideal number of children, and the aver-
age preferred family size is 2.6. Less than 5 % of French respondents see childless-
ness as the most favourable living arrangement (Toulemon 2001b). By contrast, the 
ideal family size in Germany is below two; the lowest number in Europe (Dorbritz 
and Ruckdeschel 2012).
4.5  Childlessness
4.5.1  How Is Childlessness Measured in France?
Three sources are available to estimate childlessness in France: the census, official 
registration, and survey data. We encounter certain problems when seeking to mea-
sure childlessness in France. The registration office in France does not register the 
births by their biological order (Toulemon 2001a). Therefore, vital statistics data do 
not provide information on the evolution of childlessness. Yet it is possible to get 
comparatively reliable information on the development of childlessness for France. 
Since 1982 the National Institute for Statistic and Economics Studies (INSEE) has 
conducted a series of surveys on family life in which 1–2 % of all women in France 
are interviewed. These women are also asked about their number of births. On the 
basis of these surveys it is possible to estimate the complete fertility histories of 
women born during the twentieth century. However, reliable information about the 
final number and order of births can be obtained only for women aged 45 and older, 
and with a small degree of uncertainty for women above age 40. For cohorts born 
after 1975 only estimations can be made, since they have not yet completed their 
fertility. In addition to these surveys, a yearly census has been conducted in France 
since 2004. Previously, census data had been collected every 8–9 years, and the last 
census year was 1999. Due to the survey structure of the census (a rolling system in 
which only part of the population are interviewed each year), the initial results were 
published in 2008, and have since been updated each year.
For most of the following analyses, we use the enquête Famille et logements, a 
representative survey on family life which has been conducted parallel to the 2011 
census, and contains life histories of around 360,000 men and women. For the 
period estimates of mean age at first child birth, we used combined information 
from the 1999 family survey, the civil registration system, and the French census.
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4.5.2  Development of Childlessness
In a first step, we display the mean age at first childbirth as an indicator of the post-
ponement in childbearing. Subsequently, the focus will be on the development of 
childlessness in France.
When we look at the mean age at which women became mothers for the first 
time, we can clearly see a postponement to higher ages: the mean age at first child-
birth increased from 24 years in the 1970s to 27.7 years in 1998 and to 28.1 years in 
2010 (Table 4.2). Despite this shift to having children at older ages, the postpone-
ment of childbirth has not been associated with increasing shares of childlessness: 
11–13 % of all women born 1960 in France remained childless (Toulemon and 
Mazuy 2001; Masson 2013). France not only holds a top position in overall fertility; 
it also has the lowest share of childlessness in western Europe.
Figure 4.2 displays the development of family size according to a fertility projec-
tion (Toulemon and Mazuy 2001). This projection is based on the 1999 family sur-
vey, and is updated here using the 2011 estimates.1 For women born between 1935 
1 According to the 2011 survey, the proportion of women who are childless is higher than we would 
have predicted given the results of the 1999 EHF survey. In the 2011survey a minimum of 12 % is 
reached for cohorts 1935 and 1955, and infertility increases to 13 % for women born in 1960 and 
to 14 % for those born in 1965. However, based on the 1999 survey we assumed that the proportion 
childless would be as low as 10 % among the 1940–1960 cohorts. We believe that the 1999 survey 
partly overestimated cohort fertility due to a non-response bias (whereby childless women are 
more prone to avoid filling out a form). On the other hand, the data for the cohorts born before 
1950 may become less reliable in 2011, when cohorts were 12 years older than in 1999, due to 
differential mortality and out-migration. We thus transformed our projection using the mean of 
both surveys estimates for the 1920 cohort, the 2011 estimate for the 1960 cohort, and similar 
assumptions on trends for more recent cohorts. For the sake of simplicity, we use the 2011 survey 
only when we compare subgroups within the population, as for older cohorts the social differences 
are similar.
Table 4.2 Mean age at first 
childbirth, France 1960–2010
Calendar year Mean age at first childbirth
1960 24.1
1965 23.8
1970 24.0
1975 24.4
1980 24.9
1985 25.7
1990 26.6
1995 27.4
1998 27.7
2010 28.1
Source: Numbers for France 1996–1998: 
INSEE, enquête Étude de l’Histoire Familiale 
1999 – Toulemon and Mazuy (2001); numbers 
for France 2010: INSEE, civil registration and 
population estimates – Davie (2012)
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and 1955, childlessness stabilises at around 12 % (11 % for cohorts around 1945). A 
slight increase can be observed for women born after 1960, and the proportion 
childless increases to 15 % among women born in 1980. The majority of women in 
France have at least two children. Starting with the 1930 cohort, the share of women 
with large families (four or more children) has been decreasing, and the share with 
two children has been increasing. However, smaller shares of women born after 
1960 had only one child than had three children. The high number of three-child 
families can most likely be explained by French policies that support large 
families.
Figure 4.3 displays the shares of women who are childless by birth cohort and 
age. Due to the lack of men after the First World War (Onnen-Isemann 2003), almost 
one-quarter of the women born at the beginning of the twentieth century remained 
childless. Childlessness decreased to constant and stable low levels in the following 
cohorts, and started to increase again among women born after 1960. However, reli-
able numbers for the final shares of women who are childless cannot be estimated 
since not all women born during the 1970s had reached the end of their reproductive 
life in 2011. Nonetheless, it appears that rates of childlessness are lower in France 
than in most European countries, and that the increase in childlessness has slowed 
due to the increase in fertility in the 2000s (Toulemon et al. 2008).
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Fig. 4.2 Number of children, women in France, birth cohorts 1920–1960, in per cent (Source: 
INSEE, enquêtes Étude de l’Histoire Familiale 1999 and Famille et logements 2011; Toulemon 
and Mazuy (2001) and authors’ update)
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4.5.3  Differences in Childlessness by Education 
and Occupation of Women
The transition to parenthood differs by education. Compared to women with higher 
levels of education, less educated women become mothers earlier and more fre-
quently. Women with less education also have a high probability of having a child 
in a first union, whereas highly educated women are more likely to have a child in 
the second or third partnership episode. Lone parenthood after first childbirth is also 
more common among less educated women. The higher the level of education, the 
longer the duration of the partnership is likely to be before the birth of the first child 
(Mazuy 2006). As in other countries, women with a university degree are most 
likely to be childless.2 The high proportion of university graduates who are childless 
is not a novelty, as highly educated women who were born before World War II also 
had high rates of childlessness (Fig. 4.4a). The exceptionally high rates of childless-
ness among highly educated women are partly attributable to their tendency to have 
their first child at a higher age, but also to the amount of time they live without a 
partner. These women tend to be older at their first union, and are more likely than 
less educated women to remain single (Robert-Bobée and Mazuy 2005; Masson 
2013). In the more recent cohorts, women with low levels of education have higher 
2 French levels of education are defined as follows: (1) Collège = first 4 years of secondary educa-
tion from the ages of 11–15; 2. CAP-BEP = vocational high school after collège, duration 2–3 years; 
(3) Baccalauréat = baccalauréat diploma that leads to higher education studies or directly to profes-
sional life; (4) Sup = all higher education studies such as bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral 
programmes.
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Fig. 4.3 Share of childless women in France at ages 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, and 50, birth cohorts 
1928–1982, in per cent (Source: INSEE, enquête Famille et logements (2011), own estimations)
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Fig. 4.4a Proportion of childless women in France by level of education (in per cent), birth 
cohorts 1928–77 (Source: INSEE, enquête Famille et logements (2011), own estimations). Among 
cohorts born after 1972 (under age 38 at 1-1-2011), the proportions childless or who never lived in 
a union may decline after the survey
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Fig. 4.4b Proportion of childless women in France (in per cent), among women who have ever 
lived as a couple by level of education, birth cohorts 1928–1977 (Source: INSEE, enquête Famille 
et logements (2011), own estimations)
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rates of childlessness than women with short secondary education. This appears to 
be because the least educated make up a growing proportion of the women who 
never enter a union.
If we only consider women who are living or have ever lived as a couple, the 
degree of childlessness decreases for all women, regardless of the level of educa-
tion. However, the proportion of childlessness is still higher for women with a 
 university degree (Fig. 4.4b). The data for the cohorts born in 1973–1977, who were 
aged 33–37 at the time of the survey, are still provisional, especially for more edu-
cated women, who may have a first child after the survey.
Childlessness varies not only by level of education, but also by occupation. 
White-collar employees are more likely to remain childless than blue-collar work-
ers, self-employed women, or women who have never been in employment. The 
lowest level of childlessness is observed among women who have never been 
employed or who work as farmers (Fig. 4.5). Again, the overall share of women who 
are childless decreases when we exclude women who have never been in a union 
(Fig. 4.6). But although the relative differences in childlessness between the single 
occupational groups become smaller when only women who ever lived as a couple 
are considered, the rates of childlessness are still higher among women in higher-
level occupations than among women with a lower occupational status.
Fig. 4.5 Proportion of childless women in France by occupation, birth cohorts 1928–1977 
(Source: INSEE, enquête Famille et logements (2011), own estimations)
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Fig. 4.6 Proportion of childless women in France, among women who have ever lived as a couple 
by occupation, birth cohorts 1928–1977 (Source: INSEE, enquête Famille et logements (2011), 
own estimations)
4.5.4  Men and Childlessness
When we try to interpret permanent childlessness among men, certain problems 
arise. Whereas births can almost always directly be assigned to the respective mother, 
this is not always the case for men. Around 2 % of all children are not recognized by 
their biological father. On the basis of survey data, this results in an overestimation 
of biological childlessness for men (Toulemon and Lapierre- Adamcyk 2000). In 
addition, our analyses confirm that men tend to be older than women at first child-
birth. Moreover, after a union disruption men may lose touch with their children, and 
may then become reluctant to refer to them in the survey, especially if they have 
almost never lived with their children or have no contact with them. Almost 60 % of 
women born around 1945 have been mothers at age 25, but only 40 % of men had a 
first child at this age (Fig. 4.7). The gender differences are estimated at around 2 % 
for the birth cohorts 1930–1945, and increase for younger cohorts.
Another reason for gender differences in childlessness are imbalanced partner 
markets, in which either men or women are overrepresented. Men born in France 
after 1940 remained childless to the same extent as women if they had ever lived as 
a couple. However, single men displayed a much higher rate of childlessness. A 
major reason for this pattern may be gender-specific immigration patterns. In the 
past, more men than women migrated to France, resulting in an excess of male 
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 marriage partners of reproductive ages. Among cohorts born after 1955, migration 
by sex is more balanced. Nevertheless, more men than women remain single 
(whereby more men than women experience many unions), which in turn leads to 
higher rates of childlessness among men. Moreover, union disruptions are more fre-
quent among men, and some men lose touch with their children (Toulemon 1996: 8).
Among men, the effect of education on childlessness is the opposite of that 
among women. Like for women, the data for the cohorts born in 1973–1977 are still 
provisional. There are almost no differences in the levels of childlessness by educa-
tion, except among men with a low level of education, who tend to be more likely 
to remain childless (Fig. 4.8). If men who have never lived in a couple relationship 
are excluded, less qualified men are as likely as better educated men to become 
fathers (Fig. 4.9). The high proportion of men with a low level of education who are 
childless is mainly due to their partnership status. They are more likely to be 
excluded from the marriage market, which hampers their chances of starting a fam-
ily; while the opposite used to be the case for less educated women (Toulemon and 
Lapierre-Adamcyk 2000; Mazuy 2002). Over time, social differences based on the 
level of education are decreasing more rapidly among men than among women. 
Among recent cohorts, women with a low level of education have reduced risks of 
entering a union, and, as a consequence, are more likely to remain childless than 
women with secondary or tertiary education (Fig. 4.4a, Toulemon 2014). This trend 
is related to the increasing proportion of couples in which the woman is more edu-
cated than the man; a trend that has been observed in many countries around the 
world (Esteve et al. 2012). As it has become increasingly necessary to have two 
incomes to maintain a household, women with only a basic level of education and 
Fig. 4.7 Share of childless men in France at ages 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, and 50; birth cohorts 
1928–1982 (Source: INSEE, Famille et logements (2011), own estimations)
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Fig. 4.8 Proportion of childless men in France by level of education, birth cohorts 1928–1977 
(Source: INSEE, enquête Famille et logements (2011), own estimations). Among cohorts born 
after 1972 (aged less than 38 years at 1-1-2011), the proportions childless or who never lived in a 
union may decline after the survey
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Fig. 4.9 Proportion of childless men in France who have ever lived as a couple by level of education, 
birth cohorts 1928–1977 (Source: INSEE, enquête Famille et logements (2011), own estimations)
0
10
20
30
40
1928-32 1933-37 1938-42 1943-47 1948-52 1953-57 1958-62 1963-67 1968-72 1973-77
College
CAP-BEP
BACC
SUP
K. Köppen et al.
91
comparatively bad income prospects have lower chances of finding a suitable part-
ner and eventually becoming a mother.
There are marked differences in the levels of childlessness of different occupa-
tional groups. The higher a man’s occupational status, the less likely he is to remain 
childless3 (Fig. 4.10). Men who are farmers, blue-collar workers, or low-level white 
collar workers are more likely to remain childless than men who are self-employed 
or who work in higher-level white-collar occupations. In recent cohorts, childless-
ness has increased in all of the groups except for farmers, as this group is getting 
smaller, more selected, and more educated (a secondary diploma is now required to 
get the necessary loans for farming). While in the past a large share of farmers 
remained unmarried, this is no longer the case among recent cohorts. The differ-
ences between the various occupation groups have become smaller and the share of 
men who are childless has decreased, if only the men who have ever lived as a 
couple are considered (Fig. 4.11). Thus, it is again the elevated share of single men 
that contributes to the increase in childlessness in most occupational groups.
3 More than half of all men who have never been employed remain childless. Due to a strong selec-
tion of these men who have never worked and due to the very small sample size, we do not display 
them in the graph.
Fig. 4.10 Proportion of childless men in France by occupation, birth cohorts 1928–1977 (Source: 
INSEE, enquête Famille et logements (2011), own estimations)
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Fig. 4.11 Proportion of childless men in France who have ever lived as a couple by occupation, 
birth cohorts 1893–1966 (Source: INSEE, enquête Famille et logements (2011), own 
estimations)
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4.6  Conclusion
Our aim in this article was to present an overview of the development of childless-
ness in France, and to describe some of the underlying institutional trends. In west-
ern Europe, France has some of the smallest proportions of men and women who 
remain childless. When asked about their ideal number of children, only a very 
small share of French men and women say they do not want to have any children at 
all (Debest and Mazuy 2014). This is probably related to France’s system of state- 
supported family benefits and its well-developed childcare system. The French state 
and French society strongly promote and support the reconciliation of work and 
family life, but the social pressure to have children also remains strong.
However, the extent of childlessness differs between social groups: i.e., between 
birth cohorts, between men and women, and between different educational and 
occupational groups. For men and for women, childlessness is increasing in younger 
birth cohorts independent of their level of education or their occupational status. 
Whether this increase in childlessness is permanent or is due to a postponement of 
the first childbirth is not yet entirely clear. While the age at first birth in France has 
been increasing, birth rates have not been decreasing. Thus, it is possible that a non- 
negligible share of those men and women who are still childless at ages 35+ may 
still have children in the future.
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One of the reasons why the childlessness rate is higher among men than among 
women is that problems arise when measuring the number of children men have. 
Imbalances in the partner market can also account for the higher rate of childless-
ness among men. Yet married men are as likely as married women to remain child-
less. Partnership status is thus a decisive parameter of the extent of childlessness. 
Men and women who have never lived in a couple relationship (either a marriage or 
a non-marital union) are much more likely to remain childless than those who live 
in or have lived in a union. Since more than 90 % of all men and women are or have 
been in a relationship, a large share of childlessness can be traced back to those 10 % 
who have been without a partner or remained single until the time of interview.
Despite the family-friendly conditions that help women combine work and fam-
ily life, highly educated women in France are still more likely than less educated 
women to be childless, despite the fact that they now as likely to live in a couple 
relationship. During the period of life in which many women start a family, women 
who are earning a university degree are still in education or are trying to establish a 
career. The older they get, the more likely it is that their initial desire to have chil-
dren, if any, will turn into involuntary childlessness due to infertility, or will be 
given up in favour of pursuing other goals. However, the differences by education 
are currently becoming smaller in France, mainly because the least educated women 
are more likely to remain childless.
In contrast, there are only slight differences in rates of childlessness by education 
among men. Men with low qualifications are more likely to remain single, and for 
that reason are also more likely than highly educated men to remain childless. This 
pattern can be observed for different occupational groups as well: blue-collar  workers 
and low-level white-collar workers are the most likely to remain childless, as they are 
more likely than other occupational groups to have a precarious employment status 
or a low income. Among men in France, having an unstable economic situation leads 
to the postponement of marriage and family formation, which may result in child-
lessness (Oppenheimer 1988; Mills and Blossfeld 2003; Pailhé and Solaz 2012). 
Persistent high unemployment, an increase in the prevalence of part- time jobs, and 
the economic demand for dual-earner households may exacerbate feelings of eco-
nomic uncertainty. This insecurity could lead young people to postpone childbear-
ing, which may in turn lead to an increase in childlessness among younger cohorts.
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Chapter 5
Childlessness in East and West Germany: 
Long-Term Trends and Social Disparities
Michaela Kreyenfeld and Dirk Konietzka
5.1  Introduction
It is a well-established historical fact that childlessness has been a frequent phenom-
enon in Western Europe for centuries. Historical demography has found ample evi-
dence that it was not uncommon for 20 % or more of a cohort to never marry, and 
in most cases these unmarried people remained childless (Hajnal 1965). In Germany 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the feudal order restricted the mar-
riage behavior of the serfs, who needed to seek the consent of their “seigneurial 
lords” to get married (Mitterauer 1990). In the nineteenth century, when the feudal 
order had been overthrown in many of the German states, opportunities to get mar-
ried improved. Nonetheless, the authorities continued to restrict access to marriage 
for people who were “considered to be in an unfavorable economic situation or 
otherwise socially undesirable” (Knodel 1967: 280; Matz 1980). The formation of 
the German Empire and the introduction of civil marriage in 1876 did not provide 
universal access to marriage, either. Marriage restrictions (Ehebeschränkungen) 
were not abolished in Germany until 1919 (Knodel 1967). In addition to the legal 
regulations that governed marriage and fertility behavior, economic and political 
conditions heavily influenced historical trends in childlessness. The significant 
events of the first half of the twentieth century that contributed to high levels of 
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childlessness among the relevant cohorts were the Great Depression and the World 
Wars I and II (Schwarz 1991).
In Germany, as in other parts of Europe, a range of legal, economic, and social 
conditions shaped historical trends in childlessness. What makes the German case 
interesting is the more recent history since the mid-twentieth century, when Germany 
was divided into two opposing political systems. In the state-socialist German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), the centrally planned economy guaranteed stable and 
predictable employment paths. Furthermore, social and family policies that were 
often ridiculed in the West as being “pro-natalistic” encouraged early childbearing 
and the full-time integration of mothers into the labor market. West Germany’s 
social policies were geared towards the male breadwinner model, and the trade 
unions adhered to the principle of family wages for male employees. Family poli-
cies, in particular the system of joint taxation and the coverage of non-working 
spouses in the public pension and health care systems, are the key characteristics of 
a regime that was never seriously interested in the integration of mothers into the 
labor market. Pro-natalism was rejected in West Germany, not only because it was 
misused during the Nazi period, but also because the government wanted to take a 
clear political stance against the pro-natalist orientation of East Germany’s family 
policies. A statement by the first West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer reflects 
the attitudes towards family policies that were prevalent among West German politi-
cians during that period: “Kinder bekommen die Leute immer” (“People will always 
have children”).
When Adenauer made his famous statement, the fertility patterns in the two parts 
of Germany were quite similar. In the 1960s, the age at first birth was low, and the 
total fertility rate was around replacement level in both East and West Germany. 
However, the behavioral patterns in the two parts of the country started to diverge in 
the 1970s; and, from a cohort perspective, for women and men born in 1950 
onwards. Among the cohorts born in 1950–1964, the share of women in East 
Germany who would remain childless held steady at around 10 %, whereas the 
share increased from 10 % to around 20 % in West Germany. The growth in child-
lessness in West Germany was accompanied by a steady rise in the age at first birth, 
a postponement of marriage, and an upsurge in cohabitation. Retrospectively, West 
Germany emerges as one of the “vanguard countries” in Europe in the trend towards 
high levels of childlessness. Other countries—and especially the countries of 
Southern Europe—started following this pattern later (see Sobotka in this 
volume).
The legacy of having lived under two very different regimes is still deeply 
entrenched in the fertility patterns and living arrangements that we observe in con-
temporary Germany. Compared to West Germans, East Germans are less likely to 
remain childless, are younger at first birth, and are far more likely to have children 
in a cohabiting union or as a single parent (Huinink et al. 2012). The correlation 
between socioeconomic characteristics and childlessness also differs between East 
and West. In East Germany, there are only small differences in childlessness rates 
by women’s level of education; whereas in West Germany, highly educated women 
were far more likely than less educated women to remain childless. This elevated 
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childlessness of the West German female academics has attracted considerable pub-
lic and media attention, and was probably an important motivation for recent policy 
reforms, including the expansion of public childcare and the reform of the parental 
leave benefit system (Elternzeit). However, there is also evidence that behavioral 
patterns have shifted among the most recent cohorts, and that the educational dis-
parities are narrowing for the younger cohorts of West German women.
In this paper, we aim to describe recent developments and to integrate them into 
a larger historical, economic, and social-political framework. The reminder of this 
paper is structured as follows. In the next section (Sect. 5.2) we present data from 
census and vital registration systems that elucidate long-term trends in childlessness 
in East and West Germany. In Sect. 5.3 we analyze the disparities in female child-
lessness between different socioeconomic groups using micro-census data. Due to 
the paucity of information on male fertility in the official data, we complement the 
official data with estimates on the number of children by gender based on social 
science survey data, and illustrate the major pathways that have led to childlessness 
among recent birth cohorts in Germany. In Sect. 5.4 we draw a conclusion.
5.2  Childlessness in German Census and Micro-census Data: 
Long-Term Trends in Childlessness
There is a dearth of official data on childlessness in (West) Germany. Census data, 
including the recent register based census of 2011, do not include the number of 
biological children ever born. Moreover, the only census that surveyed the number 
of children of married women is the one conducted in 1970. Although estimates of 
childlessness from these data may be too high because they do not include births to 
unmarried women, the census of 1970 is one of the rare sources that gives us an 
impression of the long-term trends in childlessness in West Germany.1 The esti-
mates from these data show that childlessness was elevated for women born in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Further evidence that there were ele-
vated levels of childlessness among the cohort born around 1900 comes from East 
German statistics (also Table 5.1). Unlike the censuses in West Germany, the East 
German census of 1981 collected the number of children ever born for the entire 
population, regardless of marital status.2 These data confirm that more than 20 % of 
the East German women born in 1902–1909 were childless.
1 Fertility estimates of census data have limitations. Most importantly, they do not cover the fertil-
ity behavior of the people who had died or had emigrated prior to the date of the interview. While 
this is a well-known problem of estimates based on census or micro-census data, it is aggravated 
for the West German census of 1970 because of the high death rates during World War II (including 
the mass killings of the Jewish population), large-scale resettlement (particularly from the former 
eastern German territories), and the high rates of emigration during and following the war.
2 Like the West German census of 1970, the East German census of 1971 collected the number of 
children for married women only.
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The cohorts born around 1900 (in both East and West Germany) experienced 
economic deprivation in the aftermath of World War I and the Great Depression. 
While having experienced economic and social hardship certainly played a role in 
the high levels of childlessness in these cohorts, deprivation was not the only con-
tributing factor. A potential factor that is seldom mentioned in this context is female 
emancipation. This is surprising, as the scholars of that time were very concerned 
about the growing share of women who were “earning their own livelihood” 
(Brentano 1910: 376). The cohorts born in the late nineteenth century would have 
entered adulthood during a period when new employment opportunities for young 
women were emerging in the growing service sector in the Weimar Republic of 
Germany (Zeeb 1915).
The most significant event that affected the life course of the following cohorts 
was World War II. As a result of the upheavals during and after the war—including 
resettlements, mass emigration, high rates of imprisonment, and the excess death 
rates among soldiers—the sex ratio among these cohorts was highly distorted. For 
example, for the West German cohort born in 1920, there were only 73 men to 100 
women at age 36 (Human Mortality Database 2016). Thus, the lack of a marital part-
ner was probably a key element in the family behavior of this generation of women.
Apart from censuses, long-term trends in childlessness are commonly generated 
based on vital statistics data. Among the prerequisites for using such data are that 
the biological order is available from the vital registration system, and that this 
information is collected for a sufficiently long period of time. Unfortunately, West 
German vital statistics do not fulfill these criteria.3 In the absence of better 
3 The vital statistics were not changed to include biological birth order in the registers until 2008. 
Since 2009, the new registration system has been fully implemented. Although this reform mod-
ernized German vital statistics system, it does not enable the system to generate cohort estimates 
of childlessness until several decades in the future. In order to estimate the share of ultimate child-
lessness by birth cohort among women, order-specific birth information for the reproductive histo-
ries of an entire cohort must be collected. This means that the German registration system will 
produce the first estimates of childlessness for the cohorts born in 1994 who reached age 15 in 
Table 5.1 Childlessness of women in per cent, West German census of 1970 and East German 
census of 1981
Cohorts 1895–
1904
1905–
1909
1910–
1914
1915–
1919
1920–
1924
1925–
1929
1930–
1934
1935–
1939
–
West 
Germany
33 33 28 25 25 25 22 18 –
Cohorts – 1902–
1909
1910–
1914
1915–
1919
1920–
1924
1925–
1929
1930–
1934
1935–
1939
1940–
1944
East 
Germany
– 22 17 17 18 16 12 10 9
Note: West German data come from the Volkszählung 1970 BRD (own estimates conducted by 
Sebastian Böhm at GESIS, Mannheim). Only marital births were queried in these data. Furthermore, 
because foreigners were not asked in the census about their number of children, this group was 
eliminated from the analysis. The East German data come from the Volkszählung 1981 DDR. These 
data were provided upon request by Olga Pötzsch (Federal Statistical Office Germany)
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 alternatives, researchers had estimated childlessness by combining survey and vital 
statistics data (Birg et al. 1990; Kreyenfeld 2002). For East Germany, superior data 
are available, as the vital statistics of the GDR had included biological birth order. 
It is one of the ironies of German unification that this practice was discontinued in 
1990 because East Germany had to adopt the German Federal Statistics Law. 
Nevertheless, during its 40 years of existence, the vital statistics of the GDR pro-
duced data for a period that is long enough to allow us to calculate the share of 
ultimately childless women for several cohorts of women. These data, together with 
the estimates from the West German data, are presented in Table 5.2. They show 
that in East Germany 11 % of the 1940 cohort were childless, and that this share 
declined to less than 10 % for the subsequent cohorts. In West Germany, by contrast, 
11 % of the 1940 cohort remained childless, but childlessness increased gradually 
among the subsequent cohorts, reaching 19 % for the 1955 cohort.
Micro-census data are a further source for generating fertility indicators, includ-
ing the prevalence of childlessness by birth cohorts of women (and, ideally, of 
men).4 In the German micro-census, women aged 15–75 are asked every 4 years 
2009, when the reform was first implemented. Thus, the first official estimates on ultimate child-
lessness from the German registration system will be generated in 2043, when this birth cohort 
reaches age 49.
4 In Germany, the questionnaire of the micro-census is governed by law, and requires the approval 
of the German Bundesrat. The inclusion of the question on the number of children was preceded 
by a lengthy debate over the sensitivity of the item. Among the arguments that were made against 
Table 5.2 Number of children by birth cohorts of women (in per cent) and mean number of 
children. Vital statistics (East Germany) and combined vital statistics and survey data (West 
Germany)
Cohorts 1940 1945 1950 1955
East Germany
Childless 11 8 7 8
One child 26 29 30 27
Two children 35 42 47 48
Three and more children 28 21 16 18
Total 100 100 100 100
Mean number of children 1.98 1.87 1.79 1.84
West Germany
Childless 11 13 14 19
One child 26 30 31 27
Two children 34 35 35 36
Three and more children 29 22 20 18
Total 100 100 100 100
Mean number of children 1.97 1.78 1.70 1.62
Source: For East Germany, data were provided upon request by Jürgen Dorbritz (Bundesinstitut für 
Bevölkerungsforschung). Data for West Germany are estimates based on Kreyenfeld (2002)
Note: For the West German 1955 cohort, the estimates are up to age 40 only
5 Childlessness in East and West Germany: Long-Term Trends and Social Disparities
102
how many biological children they have.5 The question about the number of 
children was included in the micro-census for the first time in 2008, and for the 
second time in 2012 (see also: Bujard 2015; Bujard et al. 2015; Dorbritz 2015; 
Naderi 2015). The parity distribution that is generated using these data is displayed 
in Table 5.2. The table shows that childlessness has been rising in West Germany 
starting with the 1940s cohorts. Of the most recent cohorts, those born in 1965–
1969, 22 % have remained childless, which suggests that childlessness has increased 
steadily starting with the cohorts born in the 1940s. By contrast, in East Germany 
female childlessness levels stalled for the 1940–1959 cohorts, and increased only 
slightly thereafter. Hence, childlessness levels in East Germany are still substan-
tially lower than those of West Germany. However, the increase in childlessness 
among the recent birth cohorts indicates that the differences in the birth patterns of 
the two parts of Germany have become smaller.
Examining the childlessness trends in East Germany is instructive when seeking 
to understand how radical changes on the macro level transfer into cohort-specific 
behavioral patterns. The cohorts who were most affected by the economic and politi-
cal transformation in the aftermath of unification were those born between 1965 and 
1969. They experienced the early stages of their employment careers in the 1990s, 
and thus during the period when the East German economy was being privatized. In 
the course of privatization, many factories were closed, unemployment was high, and 
work schedules were reduced. Yet despite these challenging economic conditions, 
only 17 % of these cohorts were childless; a considerably smaller share than that of 
their West German counterparts. One explanation for this relatively low level of 
childlessness is that many of the women in these cohorts had their first child before 
German unification; while a second explanation is that these cohorts were still in the 
mid- or late twenties when the Berlin Wall came down, and could thus delay child-
bearing without getting to close to the biological limits of fertility. The East German 
case illustrates that even severe economic upheavals do not necessary lead to an 
increase in childlessness, and that the extent to which economic conditions affect 
childlessness depends on the “fertility regime”. Since the fertility regime of East 
Germany was characterized by universal and early childbearing, childless women 
had the “biographical leeway” to postpone childbearing until conditions improved.
the inclusion of this question were, for example, that the micro-census is a household survey. The 
opponents also argued that during the interview situation a man (or a woman) may be forced to 
report having a child whom he had, up to that point, successfully concealed from his spouse. Still 
other opponents raised concerns that a question on the number of children would create distress for 
people with deceased children. A further argument was that a woman who had deposited her child 
in a “baby hatch” would be forced to report a birth she would like to keep anonymous.
5 Unfortunately, the question on the number of children is one of the few non-obligatory questions 
in the German micro-census. Unlike most of the other questions, which respondents are required 
to answer by law, people are free to choose whether to provide this information. Missing cases 
were largely imputed by the German statistical office, but sensitivity analyses of competing impu-
tation methods have, unfortunately, never been conducted. Nevertheless, compared to estimates 
from social science surveys, estimates from micro-census data are presumably relatively reliable 
due to the high case numbers and the low unit non-response of these data.
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5.3  Social Disparities in Childlessness
5.3.1  Childlessness by Level of Education
In the public debate, concerns have been raised about the elevated rates of childless-
ness among female university graduates in West Germany. Some of these esti-
mates—e.g., that 40 % or more of these women are childless (see e.g.: Der Spiegel 
2005)—are greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, there is firm evidence from multiple 
sources that female university graduates in West Germany are more likely to remain 
childless than their less educated counterparts (see e.g., Duschek and Wirth 2005; 
Schmitt and Winkelmann 2005). In Table 5.3 we provide new evidence on female 
childlessness by level of education in East and West Germany based on an analysis 
of data from the German micro-census of 2012. Migrants have been omitted from 
Table 5.3 Number of children by birth cohorts of women (in per cent) and mean number of 
children. German micro-census 2012
1940–
1944
1945–
1949
1950–
1954
1955–
1959
1960–
1964
1965–
1969a
Germany
Childless 12 13 15 18 20 22
1 child 25 27 27 25 24 25
2 children 40 40 41 40 39 37
3 and more 24 20 17 18 17 16
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Mean number  
of children
1.89 1.76 1.69 1.67 1.60 1.54
East Germany
Childless 10 10 10 10 13 17
1 child 28 30 29 27 32 34
2 children 40 44 47 48 43 36
3 and more 22 17 14 16 13 13
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Mean number  
of children
1.87 1.73 1.72 1.75 1.61 1.52
West Germany
Childless 12 14 17 20 22 24
1 child 23 27 26 24 22 23
2 children 40 39 39 38 38 37
3 and more 25 21 19 19 18 17
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Mean number  
of children
1.90 1.76 1.68 1.64 1.59 1.54
Note: East Germany, including East Berlin
aAged 43–47 in 2012
Course: Micro-census 2012 (own estimates)
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this analysis because migration background is an important confounder in the asso-
ciation between education and fertility (see also Naderi 2015, and Table A2 in the 
Appendix for a calculation by migrant status). We distinguish between women with 
a tertiary degree, with a vocational training degree, and with none of these certifi-
cates. This distinction differs slightly from the ISCED classification that is com-
monly used in cross-national comparisons, but it is particularly well suited for 
mapping differential labor market opportunities in Germany, which tend to reward 
tertiary education and vocational education and training more than general second-
ary education (Konietzka 2003).
The findings displayed in the table support the notion that childlessness levels 
are indeed high among female university graduates, especially among the cohorts 
born in 1940–1944: 25 % of the women with tertiary education, but only 13 % of 
those with a vocational training degree and 9 % of those without a degree remained 
childless. It is, however, important to note that only a small fraction of the women 
in these cohorts received tertiary education (see Table A1 in the Appendix), whereas 
the women of the following cohorts greatly profited from the educational expansion 
in Germany. Even though in all of the cohorts women with a university degree were 
the most likely to remain childless, the table shows significant changes in this pat-
tern over time. Most importantly, it is clear that for the youngest cohorts the levels 
of childlessness among university educated women have not been increasing, even 
though the levels have been rising among the other educational groups, and espe-
cially among those who did not earn a degree. This means that educational differ-
ences in levels of childlessness are narrowing over time. The West German cohort 
born in 1965–1969 will probably be the first for whom female education explains 
only a very small share of the differences in childlessness at later ages.
In East Germany, the differences in childlessness rates by level of education are 
small. We even see that women without a degree are more likely to remain childless 
than women with a university or vocational training degree. It is important to note, 
however, that East Germany was a much more homogeneous society than West 
Germany. On the one hand, the state-socialist policies pushed people to earn at least 
a vocational training degree. Thus, the share of individuals who never earned a 
degree was very low, and represented a selective group of people who probably also 
suffered from health impairments (see Table A1 in the Appendix). On the other 
hand, access to university education was highly rationed and directed by the state 
authorities. Despite the selectivity of the university graduates in the older East 
German cohorts, levels of childlessness were very low among female university 
graduates. Even among the 1965–1969 cohorts, East German women with a univer-
sity degree are less likely to be childless than less educated West German women.
Table 5.5 reports the results from analyses based on alternative operational defi-
nitions of education. In order to guarantee significant case numbers of individual 
categories, we grouped the 1960–1964 and 1965–1969 cohorts into a single group 
and restricted the analysis to the West German sample. The upper part of the table 
contains the results by whether the woman has a vocational or a university degree. 
Similar to the results from Table 5.4, educational differences are small. When the 
analysis of women’s childlessness is based on their school-leaving certificates (sec-
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ond part of the table), we find a clear negative educational gradient. In the last part 
of this table, we have combined the two types of operational definitions of education 
into seven different categories. This system of classification results in a very uneven 
pattern: in addition to women with a university degree, women whose highest 
degree was the Abitur are found to have high levels of childlessness. It is likely that 
the educational careers of women who have the Abitur, but who never earned a 
vocational training or university degree, were disrupted. These women may have 
entered and exited education, and never settled into a stable employment career, and 
for this reason remained childless.
Table 5.5 Childlessness in 
per cent. West German 
women without a migration 
background. Cohorts 
1960–1969
Vocational or university education
No degree 23
Vocational degree 22
University degree 32
School level degree
Low (Hauptschule or less) 20
Medium (Realschule) 22
High (Fachhochschulreife, Abitur) 30
Combined degrees
No degree & low schooling 22
No degree & medium schooling 21
No degree & high schooling 32
Vocational degree & low schooling 19
Vocational degree & medium schooling 22
Vocational degree & high schooling 29
University degree 32
Source: Micro-census 2012 (own estimates)
Table 5.4 Childlessness of women by birth cohorts and education (in per cent). Women without 
migration background. German micro-census 2012
1940–
1944
1945–
1949
1950–
1954
1955–
1959
1960–
1964 1965–1969a
West Germany
No degree 9 12 15 18 21 25
Vocational degree 13 14 17 19 21 22
Tertiary degree 25 24 28 31 32 31
East Germany
No degree 9 13 17 26 28 29
Vocational degree 9 9 8 8 10 14
Tertiary degree 13 16 13 14 18 23
Note: aAged 43–47 in 2012. Women with a migrant background were excluded from this table
Course: Micro-census 2012 (own estimates)
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5.3.2  Childlessness Among Men and Women
To further explore the socioeconomic gradient in childlessness, we analyzed esti-
mates from the German Family Panel pairfam, the results of which are shown in 
Table 5.6 (for details on this data see: Huinink et al. 2011; Kreyenfeld et al. 2012). 
The sample was restricted to West German men and women of the 1971–1973 
cohorts who were at least 40 years old at the last interview (on average age 41) and 
who were born in Germany. Although the German Family Panel oversamples East 
Germans, the number of childless East Germans of these cohorts is too small for a 
meaningful investigation. Thus, as a separate analysis of the East German patterns 
was not feasible using these data, the table shows the results for the West German 
respondents only. The findings presented in the table only partially support the prior 
evidence of the micro-census, as women without a degree are found to be substan-
tially less likely to remain childless than the other two groups. This difference may 
stem from the different operational definitions of education in these data. It should 
also be noted that these cohorts are, on average, age 41 at the time of censoring. It 
seems likely that the highly educated have a greater probability of having children 
at higher ages; thus, the differences in childlessness levels between the less edu-
cated and the highly educated may narrow further over time.
With regard to gender differences in childlessness, we observe that 25 % of the 
women, but 33 % of the men are childless at age 41 (which is the average age at 
censoring in the sample). It is well known that men start the family formation pro-
cess later than women, and the biological limits of fertility are often considered to 
be less fixed for men than for women. Thus, there is every reason to believe that the 
male respondents are more likely than the female respondents to have children past 
the date of the interview. Other potential explanations for the gender difference are 
that childless men are not well covered in the survey data, and that when they are 
covered they are more likely than women to provide faulty reports on their number 
of children (Rendall et al. 1999). Because we have no external sources to validate 
male fertility, we can only raise this concern, but have no remedy to cure it. More 
clarity exists regarding the educational gradient in childlessness. The findings dis-
Table 5.6 Childlessness by education. West German Cohorts 1971–1973. German Family Panel 
(pairfam). Column per cent
Women Men
No degree 20 36
Vocational degree 25 36
University degree 25 28
All 25 33
Sample size 800 617
Note: The sample includes women and men aged 40 and older at the time of the interview. Migrants 
are excluded from this analysis. Estimates are weighted by the combined designs and post-stratifi-
cation weight d1ca1weight
Source: German Family Panel pairfam, waves 1–6 (years 2008/2009–2013/2014)
M. Kreyenfeld and D. Konietzka
107
played in the table suggest that there is a negative educational gradient in childless-
ness among men. While a large share of the men with a vocational degree or with 
no degree have no biological children, the percentage of university educated men 
who are childless is substantially lower.
Unlike other types of demographic behavior, such as divorce, teenage pregnancy, 
or non-marital childbearing, childlessness cannot be inherited, and thus passed on to 
the next generation. However, the number of brothers and sisters a person has may 
influence his or her ideas about family behavior. Thus, in Table 5.7 we display the 
results of an analysis of the degree of childlessness by the number of siblings. We find 
that there is indeed a strong association between these two parameters. Women and 
men who come from larger families are less likely to remain childless than women 
and men who were raised as only children. This evidence suggests that a decline in the 
number of children in each family could result in an increase in childlessness among 
the next generation. However, this is only an association that does not control for the 
many characteristics that may be correlated with the number of siblings, such as 
parental education and the value orientations of the parents and their children.
A characteristic that must be considered in this context is religious affiliation, 
which has been shown in prior investigations to explain fertility differences in con-
temporary as well as in past societies (Berghammer 2012). The data from the German 
Family Panel support this association (see Table 5.8). If we look at the female respon-
dents, we can see that 32 % of those who have no religious affiliation, but just 23 % 
of those who have a religious affiliation, are childless. A more subtle analysis in a 
multivariate framework (not shown here) indicates that the effect of religiosity is 
stable to the inclusion of further covariates, such as education and number of sib-
lings. For men, the differences in levels of childlessness by religiosity are smaller, 
and insignificant. An aspect that this simple cross-tabulation does not explore is the 
interaction of having children and religious practices and affiliations over the life 
course (for a longitudinal analysis of religiosity in Germany, see Lois 2010).
Table 5.7 Childlessness by 
number of siblings. West 
German cohorts 1971–1973. 
German Family Panel 
(pairfam). Column per cent
Women Men
No siblings 33 44
1 sibling 23 35
2 siblings 32 31
3 and more siblings 16 25
Sample size 800 618
Note: The sample includes women and men 
aged 40 and older at the time of the interview. 
Migrants are excluded from this analysis. 
Estimates are weighted by the combined 
designs and post-stratification weight d1ca-
1weight
Source: German Family Panel pairfam, waves 
1–6 (years 2008/2009–2013/2014)
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In most cases, childlessness is not the result of a single decision, but is instead 
the outcome of an accumulation of actions and decisions in the various domains of 
the life course (Hagestad and Call 2007; Jalovaara and Fasang 2015). In addition to 
his or her employment and educational careers, an individual’s partnership process 
is likely to affect whether he or she remains childless. Thus, in Table 5.9 we show 
the results of the analysis on levels of childlessness by marital and partnership sta-
tus. It is hardly surprising that men and women who were single at the time of the 
interview have a much higher probability of being childless than married women 
and men. Marriage and childbearing are “tied events” (Hoem and Kreyenfeld 2006; 
Nave-Herz 2006) in West Germany, and people often get married in anticipation of 
having children. While it may seem obvious that there is a strong correlation 
between marriage and childlessness, it is surprising to see how closely the two are 
correlated: 12 % of the married women and 13 % of the married men are childless, 
whereas among the never married, about 75 % of the men and almost 70 % of the 
women are childless.
Table 5.8 Childlessness by 
religious affiliation. West 
German cohorts 1971–1973. 
German Family Panel 
(pairfam). Column per cent
Women Men
Religious affiliation 23 32
No religious 
affiliation
32 36
Sample size 801 618
Note: The sample includes women and men 
aged 40 and older at the time of the interview. 
Migrants are excluded from this analysis. 
Estimates are weighted by the combined designs 
and post- stratification weight d1ca1weight
Source: German Family Panel pairfam, waves 
1–6 (years 2008/2009–2013/2014)
Table 5.9 Childlessness by 
marital status. West German 
cohorts 1971–1973. German 
Family Panel (pairfam)
Women Men
Never married 68 77
Married 12 13
Divorced or 
widowed
21 16
Sample size 800 611
Note: The sample includes women and men aged 
40 and older at the time of the interview. Migrants 
are excluded from this analysis. Estimates are 
weighted by the combined designs and post- 
stratification weight d1ca1weight
Source: German Family Panel pairfam, waves 
1–6 (years 2008/2009–2013/2014)
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5.3.3  Pathways to Childlessness
Marriage and the partnership status in the abovementioned analyses refer to the 
characteristics of the respondent at the date of the last interview. Because parents 
may be more hesitant to dissolve a union than childless couples, being single at 
the time of the interview may not be the cause, but the consequence of not having 
children. In order to explore how the marital and partnership trajectories relate to 
later life childlessness, we present sequence index plots in the following (Abbott 
1995). To improve the comparability of the plots, we have drawn a sample of men, 
women, childless individuals, and individuals with children. All four groups con-
tain 50 randomly selected cases. Their union histories are displayed in Fig. 5.1. In 
the figure we distinguish between episodes (a) of being single; (b) of being in a 
cohabiting union without being married; (c) of being separated, widowed, or 
divorced; and (d) of being in a marital union, irrespective of whether the partner 
lives in the same household.
The figure shows that childlessness is closely related to the individual’s partner-
ship biography. The childless women, and particularly the childless men, were sin-
gle for much of their twenties and thirties. Only a small fraction of the childless men 
have been married over a longer period of time (for a detailed study on childlessness 
of married couples, see Rupp 2005). In addition to observing that a large share of 
the childless individuals are permanently single, we can see that a large fraction of 
the childless men and women moved in and out of a (cohabiting or marital) union. 
Overall, there seem to be two dominant pathways to childlessness: having a  turbulent 
partnership biography and being permanently single. The latter pathway is more 
typical for men than for women.
While the patterns for childless men and women differ, this is not the case for 
men and women with children. The primary difference between the sexes in this 
context is that men tend to enter cohabitation later than women. For both sexes, 
periods of cohabitation are typically of short duration. The large majority of the men 
and women who eventually have children turn their cohabitation into a marriage in 
West Germany.
5.4  Summary
In this paper, we have provided an overview of the long-term trends in childlessness 
in East and West Germany. We have also explored the socioeconomic differences in 
childlessness and how they have changed over time. For East Germany, we find only 
little differences in childlessness by female education. East German women of the 
birth cohorts 1940–1969 mostly had their children before unification when child-
bearing was almost universal and women integrated into the labor market full-time. 
In West Germany, there is a strong educational gradient of female childlessness. 
University educated women are substantially more likely to remain childless than 
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medium or lowly educated women. A very significant development is, however, the 
narrowing of childlessness by education among the recent female birth cohorts in 
West Germany. While childlessness among the highly educated has stalled for the 
recent cohorts, it has continued to increase among the other educational groups, and 
particularly among women who never earned a university or a vocational training 
degree. A possible explanation for this finding is that highly educated women have 
profited more than less educated women from recent policy reforms, such as the 
expansion of public day care and the reform of the parental leave benefit system in 
2007. It may also be the case that less educated women are gradually losing out on 
the partner market. This finding would appear to confirm evidence from other coun-
tries that the lack of a partner often leads to childlessness among less educated 
women (Jalovaara and Fasang 2015, see also Berrington in this volume). If this 
interpretation was correct, it would stand in contrast to prior speculations that the 
lack of a partner was the typical pathway into childlessness for the highly educated 
women in Germany (Der Spiegel 2005).
The investigations that have been presented in this paper have many limitations. 
One of the limitations is that findings were sensitive to the classification of educa-
tion. Moreover, education was only measured at interview and did not capture the 
educational biographies that may or may not have led to a specific educational out-
come. Related to that we have pointed out the problems of correctly classifying a 
person who got a high school degree (Abitur), but never continued to receive a uni-
versity or vocational training certificate. These people are very often childless, most 
likely because of their disruptive educational careers.
Some of the findings that we have generated in this paper were hard to inter-
pret. In particular, it seems difficult to understand why childlessness is continu-
ously increasing among West German women with a vocational training degree. 
More nuanced analyses by type of education would certainly lead to a better 
understanding for the elevated childlessness among this large group of women 
(see Neyer et al. in this volume for analyses by field of education using Swedish 
and Austrian data). We also explored pathways into childlessness my means of 
sequence analysis in this paper. It was shown that permanent singlehood as well 
as turbulences in the partnership history are strongly associated with childless-
ness. However, this part of the analysis remained very explorative. The results 
confirm that a partnership is a prerequisite for having children, but the causal 
direction, in particular how fertility preferences influence partnership dynamics, 
was not explored.
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 Appendix
Table A1 Level of education by birth cohorts (in per cent). Women without migration background. 
German micro-census 2012
1940–
1944
1945–
1949
1950–
1954
1955–
1959
1960–
1964 1965–1969*
West Germany
No degree 30 23 18 14 13 11
Vocational degree 63 68 69 72 72 73
Tertiary degree 7 9 13 14 15 17
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
East Germany
No degree 12 7 6 5 4 4
Vocational degree 79 82 78 79 80 80
Tertiary degree 9 11 15 15 16 16
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Micro-census 2012 (own unweighted estimates)
Note: *Aged 43–47 in 2012
Table A2 Childlessness of women by birth cohorts and education (in per cent). All women 
(including those without migration background.) German micro-census 2012
All
West Germans East Germans
No migration 
background
Migration 
background
No migration 
background
No degree 17 23 8 28
Vocational degree 19 22 12 12
Tertiary degree 28 32 21 21
Source: Micro-census 2012 (own un-weighted estimates)
Note: Due to the small numbers of migrants in East Germany, we did not distinguish the East 
German sample by migration background
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Chapter 6
Childlessness in Switzerland and Austria
Marion Burkimsher and Kryštof Zeman
6.1  Introduction
For several reasons, Switzerland and Austria are of interest to researchers analysing 
the factors that influence levels of childlessness. The countries are similar in terms 
of population size, standard of living, and socio-economic setting. The Alpine 
regions have traditionally had rather high levels of childlessness, with a significant 
proportion of women and men remaining single (Viazzo 1989). The current popula-
tion of Switzerland is about 8.2 million, of whom 65 % are German-speaking, 23 % 
are French-speaking, and 8 % are Italian-speaking. As each canton has its own 
official religion and language(s), there are French- and German-speaking Catholic, 
Protestant, and secular cantons. In the age range 20–39 a third of the population has 
foreign citizenship. These immigrants come not only from the neighbouring coun-
tries of Germany, France, and Italy, but also from ex-Yugoslavia, Portugal, and 
Spain. Austria has a slightly larger population, at 8.6 million, and the official lan-
guage is German, with 89 % of the population speaking German as their mother 
tongue. The proportion of foreigners in the country is less than half that of 
Switzerland, with immigrants from Germany and the countries of ex-Yugoslavia 
and Turkey being the most numerous. Around 20 % of women in Switzerland who 
have reached the end of their reproductive years have no children, while the corre-
sponding figure in Austria is a little lower, at around 18 %. In Switzerland, the share 
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of the population who are childless has never been lower than 14 % even for the 
cohorts who lived through the baby boom years, whereas in Austria it dropped to 
around 12 %. These levels and trends are similar to those of some countries in west-
ern Europe (the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands) and a few overseas 
developed countries (the United States, Japan), but are very different from cen-
tral and eastern Europe, which have much lower rates of childlessness.
This chapter examines the differentials in fertility outcomes across sub- 
populations in the two countries, drawing on census and survey data. Specifically, 
we examine the variations in levels of childlessness by cohort, educational attain-
ment, religion, migration background, and current place of residence in the country. 
We also provide insights into differences in fertility desires in the two countries.
6.2  Institutional Setting and Data
6.2.1  Institutional Setting
In Austria, the parental leave period is up to 3 years, and because the conditions for 
taking this leave are relatively generous,1 it is widely used. Only one-third of moth-
ers with children under age three are in the labour force, well below the OECD 
average of 41 % (OECD 2014). Just 21 % of children under age three were in public 
day-care in Austria in 2012, which is the lowest proportion among all of the western 
European countries. As childcare in Austria is administered by municipalities, there 
are big disparities in childcare provision between the regions. The availability of 
day-care has been increasing in Vienna, and the proportion of children under age 3 
who are enrolled has grown from 17 % in 1995 to 35 % currently. Participation rates 
have generally been high for children aged 4–5, and have recently increased consid-
erably among 3-year-olds, from 40 to 50 % in the 1990s to 81.5 % in the 2012/13 
school year (Statistics Austria 2013a). Women in Austria have a legal right to reduce 
their working hours to part-time after having a child, and many women take advan-
tage of this option. Among couples with children ages 0–14, the proportion of fami-
lies in Austria with one parent working full-time and the other working part-time 
was 44 % in 2011, the highest share amongst all OECD countries except for the 
Netherlands with 60 % (OECD 2014). Public spending on the family is very biased 
towards cash benefits (such as parental leave and child allowances) rather than ser-
vices (pre-school childcare, or policies to help parents combine work and childrear-
ing). As Neyer and Hoem (2008: 94) noted, “Austria represents a conservative, 
gendering welfare state which supports mother’s absence from the labor market”.
In Switzerland, by contrast, there is less public support for new families. 
Maternity leave is only 14 weeks and childcare facilities are scarce and expensive, 
especially in the German- and Italian-speaking areas of the country. High incomes 
1 Since 2008 parental leave in Austria has been made more flexible, with three variants of duration 
of 18/24/36 months, which offer different levels of monthly allowances, of 800/624/436 EUR.
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and the widespread availability of part-time jobs only partially offset the challenges 
facing couples with small children; the opportunity costs of a break in employment 
to have a child are higher in Switzerland than in most other countries. The female 
labour force participation rate of women aged 25–39 has been increasing, and was 
85 % in 2014. While 80 % of employed women living in a household with child(ren) 
under the age of 15 are working part-time, the corresponding proportion of men 
with young families who are working part-time remains low, but increased from 
3 % in 1992 to 10 % in 2014 (Federal Statistical Office 2015a).
6.2.2  Data
In this chapter, the primary data source for Switzerland is the full population census 
taken in the year 2000. The census asked both women and men to state the number 
of children they had ever borne or fathered. The question on number of children was 
not compulsory, and around 3 % of women did not respond. This proportion was a 
little higher for men, and was markedly higher among young and elderly people, 
who may have considered the question irrelevant. Foreigners also had an elevated 
non-response rate, of around 7 %.
Austria has similar census data, which in 1981, 1991, and 2001 included fertility 
data. Women aged 16 and over were asked to report the number of live-born chil-
dren they had ever had. Because of the way the census question was posed, there 
were some discrepancies in the proportion of respondents who said they were child-
less among comparable cohorts between the 1981 survey and subsequent surveys 
(Zeman 2011). For this chapter, we mainly use the 2001 census data.2
Birth registration data for the years since the last census, together with popula-
tion estimates from registers, allow for the calculation of age- and birth order- 
specific fertility rates, and thus enable us to make on-going estimates of cohort 
fertility. For Switzerland and Austria, these base data are available in the Human 
Fertility Database (2015).
Surveys of various sizes and spheres of interest are used to complement the cen-
sus and birth registration data for both Switzerland and Austria. In 1994, Switzerland 
participated in the multi-national Fertility and Families Survey (FFS). More up-to- 
date information was gathered in 2013 with the Families and Generations Survey 
(FGS). This survey, which had a sample size of over 17,000, included information 
on family sizes and fertility intentions, along with many other demographic vari-
ables. Another on-going survey that offers insights into fertility in Switzerland is the 
Swiss Household Panel (SHP). In Austria, a micro-census of around 22,500 house-
holds is performed four times a year, and includes many socio-economic variables, 
with a focus on the labour market. Special modules asking about the number of 
2 Census data on parity by level of education, origin, and cohort are available in the Cohort Fertility 
and Education database (Zeman et al. 2014).
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children and fertility intentions (Kinderwunsch) are included about every 5 years 
(1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2012). In this chapter we use the individual 
micro-data from the micro-census wave of the fourth quarter of 2012.
6.3  Childlessness by Socio-economic Characteristics
6.3.1  Changing Levels of Childlessness by Birth Cohort
Figure 6.1 shows the trends in cohort fertility for Austria and the corresponding 
proportions of women born between 1920 and 1960 who were childless. In earlier 
generations, the rates of childlessness were even higher: among the cohorts born in 
the 1880s and 1890s, around one-third of the women remained childless in both 
Switzerland and Austria (Viazzo 1989). In traditional societies a substantial propor-
tion of the population did not marry for a variety of reasons. For example, many 
people were discouraged or prohibited from marrying by family inheritance sys-
tems; poverty and the inability to raise enough money to marry; choosing to enter 
into religious orders; or legal restrictions on the right to marry for members of the 
lower classes (Mantl 1999). In addition, a significant proportion of married women 
remained childless because, for example, they suffered from infectious diseases or 
were infertile, their pregnancies ended in miscarriage or still-birth, or they were 
widowed or separated from their partner for long periods of time (Ehmer 2011).
Fig. 6.1 Proportion of women who were childless, cohorts 1920–1960 (left scale) and completed 
cohort fertility (right scale) by birth cohort, Austria (Source: Census 2001, own estimates)
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The lowest level of childlessness in Austria, at around 12 %, was reached for 
women born in 1938. The childlessness rates among subsequent cohorts increased 
steadily, rising to around 18 % for women born around 1970. In 1984, only 11 % of 
first births occurred after age 30, and just 0.3 % of births occurred after age 40. In 
2013, the corresponding figures were 45 % and 2.3 %, which represents a signifi-
cant shift. As women are postponing the birth of their first child to increasingly high 
ages, the risk of infertility is rising, and is only partially offset by the increasing 
availability of assisted reproductive technology (ART). In Austria, public health 
care provides subsidised ART to infertile women, and 2 % of live births resulted 
from the use of ART in 2010 (ESHRE 2014).
Switzerland has fertility data for both men and women (see Fig. 6.2), and while 
the levels and trends in Switzerland are similar to those of Austria, they are not 
identical. The lowest childlessness rates were for the 1932 male cohort and the 1936 
female cohort. It is interesting to note that for the cohorts born before 1940 child-
lessness was higher for women, but among the more recent cohorts childlessness 
has been higher for men. There is no clear explanation for this shift. It is possible 
that men of earlier generations would seek a new partner if their first wife did not 
bear them a child, as the pressure to produce an heir, especially in rural communi-
ties, may have been significant. Among more recent generations, the situation may 
be reversed, as an increasing proportion of less skilled men are failing to find a 
partner. The different life courses and work constraints of male and female immi-
grants and low skilled workers, and how they have changed over time, may also 
explain the differential.
Fig. 6.2 Proportion of men and women who were childless, cohorts 1920–1960 (left scale) and 
completed cohort fertility (right scale), Switzerland (Source: Census 2000, own estimates)
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The baby boom was associated with a double peak in period fertility rates. In 
Austria, the highest TFRs were 2.75 in 1940 and 2.82 in 1963, while Switzerland’s 
peak TFRs were a little lower, at 2.62 in 1946 and 2.68 in 1964. An upsurge in early 
births was a major cause of the temporal peaks in period fertility; whilst postpone-
ment, together with the decline in large families, has depressed period rates since 
the baby boom. Although the period trends were similar in Austria and Switzerland, 
the cohort fertility trends in the two countries were rather different. In Austria there 
was a peak of 2.5 children on average, for women born in the mid-1930s, followed 
by a decline to 1.75 for the 1960 cohort (Fig. 6.1). In Switzerland the average family 
size was quite stable at around 2.2 children for the cohorts born up to the mid-1930s. 
Subsequent cohorts then experienced declines to the current level of around 1.75.
6.3.2  Childlessness by Education
A large number of studies have shown that, for women, having more education is 
associated with lower overall fertility and higher rates of childlessness (for a general 
overview, see Skirbekk 2008; for Austria, see Neyer and Hoem 2008, Prskawetz 
et al. 2008, Sobotka 2011; for Switzerland, see Coenen-Huther 2005, Sauvain- 
Dugerdil 2005, and Mosimann and Camenisch 2015; for other countries, see Wood 
et al. 2014). For an analysis of the link between childlessness and field of education, 
see the chapter by Neyer et al. in this volume.
Over the past century, educational levels have been rising, particularly for 
women. In Switzerland, for example, the proportion of women who have tertiary- 
level education increased from 6 % of those born in 1930, to 13 % of those born in 
1950, to 21 % of those born in 1970, and it is still rising. The corresponding figures 
for men born in 1930, 1950, and 1970 are 24 %, 30 %, and 33 %, respectively. We 
might expect to find that with higher education becoming more prevalent, the repro-
ductive behaviour of highly educated women would become less differentiated 
from that of less educated women. Interestingly, Austria has seen such a conver-
gence (Fig. 6.3), whereas Switzerland has seen a divergence (Fig. 6.4). Austria dif-
fers from most other developed countries in that men are still more likely than 
women to enrol in tertiary education; whereas in most other European countries, 
including in Switzerland, women now outnumber men in higher education.
The 1981 Austrian census showed that around 60 % of the women born in the 
1890s and early 1900s who had a tertiary education were childless: thus, their deci-
sion to pursue a higher education was effectively a “life calling” similar to the call-
ing to commit to a celibate life in the church. Among the cohorts born after the 
Second World War in Austria, there has been a convergence in childlessness rates 
between women at the upper two educational levels, and between women at the 
lower two educational levels; the differentiating factor is whether or not a woman 
graduated from secondary school with a high school diploma (Matura) (Fig. 6.3). 
This pattern may be caused by Austria’s early educational streaming of pupils after 
the fourth year of elementary school into either vocational training or a higher 
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Fig. 6.3 Proportion of women who were childless by birth cohort and level of education, Austria. 
Note: The primary level includes ISCED 1997 levels 0–2; the lower secondary level includes 
ISCED levels 3B and 3C; the higher secondary level includes ISCED levels 3A and 4; and the 
tertiary level includes all ISCED levels of 5 and 6 (Source: Census 2001, own estimates)
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Fig. 6.4 Proportion of women who were childless by birth cohort and level of education, 
Switzerland. Note: The primary level includes ISCED 1997 levels 0–2; the lower secondary level 
includes ISCED levels 3B and 3C; the higher secondary level includes ISCED level 3A; and the 
tertiary level includes all ISCED levels of 5 and 6 (Source: Census 2000, own estimates)
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 secondary and university track, with limited opportunities to transfer between the 
two. This educational system has been described as being “segregated by gender 
and social class” (Neyer and Hoem 2008: 107).
Figure 6.4 shows the incidence of childlessness for women of different educa-
tional levels in Switzerland. Among women with a low educational level, the rates 
are similar for Switzerland and Austria, at around 15 % of the current generation 
completing their childbearing. However, for women with tertiary education, the 
rates of childlessness differ considerably between the two countries: one-third of 
these women in Switzerland are childless; whereas in Austria only around one- 
quarter are childless, which is similar to the rate for women with higher secondary 
education. Moreover, unlike in Austria, in Switzerland the two secondary education 
groups recently converged at a level of about 20 %. In Austria there are now two 
distinct groups: moderate rates of childlessness among women with primary or 
lower secondary education, and higher rates of childlessness among women with 
tertiary or higher secondary education. In Switzerland, however, three groups have 
emerged: moderate rates of childlessness among women with primary education, 
higher rates of childlessness for those with secondary education, and the highest 
rates of childlessness for women with tertiary education.
The differentials in childlessness by education for men are much smaller than 
those for women (see Fig. 6.5 for Swiss data). Among the older generations, lower 
educated men had the highest rates of childlessness, most likely caused by poverty. 
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Fig. 6.5 Proportion of men who were childless by birth cohort and level of education, Switzerland. 
Note: The primary level includes ISCED 1997 groups 0–2; the lower secondary level includes 
ISCED levels 3B and 3C; the higher secondary level includes ISCED levels 3A and 4; and the 
tertiary level includes all ISCED levels of 5 and 6 (Source: Census 2000, own estimates)
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There is a transposition in ranking among younger men, with an intermediate level 
of academic attainment being associated with the highest levels of childlessness. It 
was still possible that the men born after 1955 (who were under age 45 at the time 
of the census) could father a child.
6.3.3  Childlessness by Religion
Back in 1994, the Swiss FFS found that religiosity was associated with different 
views on the benefits of having children (Coenen-Huther 2005). The findings indi-
cated that compared with respondents who were active in their faith, those with no 
religious affiliation were less likely to believe that having children offers benefits 
such as joy and satisfaction, partnership consolidation, and continuation of the fam-
ily line. In addition, the respondents who did not attend religious services were less 
likely to see children as a potential support when elderly, or as a continuation of life 
after their death. It is, therefore, not surprising that religiosity has an impact on 
fertility outcomes.
Both Austria and Switzerland are more religious than many other western 
European countries, with up to one-quarter of all adults regularly attending a reli-
gious service. In Austria the majority religion is Catholic; 61 % of Austrians are 
members of the Catholic Church, whilst around 5 % are members of Protestant 
churches. In Switzerland there is a more even split between the Catholic and the 
Reformed (Protestant) denominations, and affiliation with these churches is mixed 
across both regional and linguistic lines. In both countries the proportion of the 
population with no religious affiliation is growing, and young people attend reli-
gious services much less frequently than older people (Burkimsher 2014). In 
Switzerland, religious affiliation was recorded in the 2000 census. For Austria, cen-
sus data from 2001 is available for women in Vienna, obtained as part of the WIREL 
project (see Acknowledgements).
There is a close relationship between educational level and religious affiliation. 
Most notably, those who classify themselves as having “no religion” have, until 
recently, been more concentrated among the highly educated. Recent evidence sug-
gests, however, that among the younger generations (those born after the 1960s) this 
link is weakening or even reversing.
In general, the differences between Catholics and Protestants in rates of child-
lessness are slight in both Switzerland and Austria. However, very significant differ-
ences appear when we look at the non-religious. Holding other factors constant, the 
childlessness rate of the non-religious is about double that of Catholics and 
Protestants in Switzerland. This result contradicts the findings of Baudin (2008) for 
France: that (non-)religiosity has a significant effect on family size, but not on the 
likelihood of remaining childless. The differential between Catholics and those with 
no religion is not quite as marked in Austria (Vienna) as in Switzerland, but it is still 
significantly large.
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Vienna is a very heterogeneous city in which all the major religions are repre-
sented. In the 2001 census the level of childlessness for 45–54-year-old women was 
20 % for both Catholics and Protestants. Among Muslim and Orthodox women the 
childlessness levels were significantly lower, at 8 % and 9 %, respectively. In con-
trast, the childlessness level for women with no religious affiliation was signifi-
cantly higher, at 26 %. When we take into account country of birth and education in 
our analysis, the distinctiveness of Muslim and Orthodox women becomes weaker, 
which suggests that the very low levels of childlessness among these women is 
attributable in part to their migration background and low educational attainment. In 
Vienna, the factors of education and country of birth have greater effects on child-
lessness than religion per se.
In a recent study that focused on women scientists in Austria, Buber-Ennser and 
Skirbekk (2015) found that education (along with age and marital status) was the 
most important determinant of actual childlessness; and that religious affiliation, 
whilst still having significant explanatory power, had a weaker effect. In contrast to 
actual childlessness, differentials by religiosity in the intention to remain childless 
were large. However, there were no significant differentials in fertility intentions by 
education when religion was taken into account (but a significant proportion of 
highly educated women fail to achieve their fertility ambitions). The same pattern 
was found for men and women in the FGS in Switzerland: i.e. the non-religious 
were much more likely than the religious to say they did not want to have a child, 
but the differentials in actual childlessness were smaller.
In Switzerland, the effects of having a higher education and no religious affilia-
tion are multiplicative: for women born in the 1960s, almost 45 % of those who 
were both tertiary educated and had no religious affiliation were childless. From the 
1920s cohort to the 1960s cohort an increasing proportion of the population (4–12 % 
of women) embraced the “no religion” position. At the same time, their fertility 
behaviour, perhaps surprisingly, became increasingly differentiated from that of 
women who were traditional Catholics/Protestants. But among younger cohorts 
there are indications that the patterns in Switzerland and Austria are becoming 
increasingly similar to those observed in Britain (Dubuc 2009): i.e. as the lower 
educated increasingly describe themselves as having no religion, the historical asso-
ciation between having no religion and a high rate of childlessness is starting to 
break down.
In contrast to the traditionally Christian background of the local population, the 
Muslim (predominantly immigrant) communities are distinctive in their partnering 
and fertility behaviour (Fig. 6.6). Almost all Muslims marry, and within marriage 
childlessness is rare; probably around the biological minimum. There is a norm of 
early marriage and childbearing: at age 30 (in 2000) only 6 % of Muslim women 
were still unmarried, and 84 % had had at least one child.
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6.3.4  Childlessness by Country of Birth
In Switzerland, and to a lesser extent in Austria, very high proportions of the young 
adult population were born outside of the country. Their reasons for being in the 
country, as well as the strong influences of education and religion, as already dis-
cussed, affect their levels of childlessness.
On average, immigrants have a lower rate of childlessness than the native-born. 
However, closer investigation reveals that there are big differentials by country of 
origin. Censuses record either current citizenship (Austria in 1981 and 1991) or 
country of birth (Austria in 2001); or they record both (Switzerland in 2000). These 
categories are not directly equivalent, as the relative ease or difficulty of naturalisa-
tion determines how many immigrants acquire citizenship; it is easier to become a 
citizen in Austria than in Switzerland, and it is easier for some nationalities than 
others to acquire citizenship in both countries. In both Switzerland and Austria, 
being born in the country does not confer the automatic right to that country’s citi-
zenship. Table 6.1 shows the proportion of the total population by citizenship, and 
by whether they were born in the country.
In general, people with foreign citizenship have a younger age profile than all 
people “born abroad”, because immigrants who stay in the country longer often 
aspire to citizenship. Having children in the country also tends to be associated with 
settling or remaining for a longer period of time. The outcome of these factors in 
terms of childlessness is illustrated in Table 6.1 for Austria. The 1981 census showed 
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Fig. 6.6 Proportion of Muslim men and women who are single or childless by cohort, Switzerland 
(Source: Census 2000, own estimates)
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that the childlessness level of women with foreign citizenship was ten per cent 
higher than that of Austrian women. This reflects the fact that in the 1960s and 
1970s many immigrants came from Western Europe for short- and medium-term 
work, and they made up a very small share of the population (1.5–3 % of the 1920–
1940 cohorts). In the 2001 census, when country of birth was recorded, the differ-
entials were much lower, and among women younger than age 50 there was a 
reversal, with immigrants having lower levels of childlessness than the native-born. 
The reason for this shift is that in the 1990s more immigrants came from the war- 
torn countries of former Yugoslavia, and later from Turkey; and these migrants, who 
were especially likely to settle and have a family in Austria, had higher fertility rates 
than the native population. These immigrants also made up a much larger share of 
the population than other groups of foreign citizens (10–14 % of the 1920–1940 
cohorts) (Fig. 6.7).
For Switzerland, we have more detailed information on childlessness rates by 
country of birth from the 2000 census. Table 6.2 shows the rates for a selection of 
countries and regions to illustrate certain factors that have a bearing on childless-
ness. A higher rate of childlessness is associated with coming from a culture in 
which childlessness is quite common, especially amongst highly educated women. 
This can explain the high rates for women from the Anglo-Saxon countries, Finland, 
Germany, and the Netherlands; as well as from the developed countries of the Far 
East, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In contrast, childlessness is low 
among women from southern Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey, as in those countries 
childlessness is rare. However, the high rates of childlessness among women from 
the ex-communist countries are surprising, as the rates were traditionally very low 
in these countries.
For some immigrants, the constraints imposed by their specific work conditions 
in Switzerland can have a significant impact on their rates of marriage and child-
bearing. The high levels of childlessness among women from the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Latin America is likely attributable to the fact that many come to 
work as maids or nannies. The childlessness rates are significantly lower for men 
from these countries than for women. Immigrants from some countries find a 
restricted “marriage market” in the country, caused by a gender mismatch in the 
number of immigrants from the same culture. As was already mentioned, this mis-
match partly explains the higher rates of childlessness for women than men from 
Table 6.1 Proportion of population (men and women) in 2013 by current citizenship and country 
of birth
Switzerland Austria
Swiss/Austrian citizenship, born in the country 67.2 % 82.0 %
Foreign citizenship, born in the country 4.6 % 1.8 %
Swiss/Austrian citizenship, born abroad 9.0 % 6.1 %
Foreign citizenship, born abroad 19.2 % 10.1 %
Sources: Swiss data from Population and Households Statistics, STATPOP (Federal Statistical 
Office, 2015b), Austrian data from Statistics Austria (2013b)
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less developed countries. Similarly, it explains why childlessness is higher for men 
compared to women coming from Spain and Italy. Many single young men come 
from these countries to work in physically demanding jobs, often on a short- or 
medium-term basis; if they marry, they often return to their home countries.
We can see the influence of these factors playing out if we compare German, 
French, and Italian speakers by their respective places of birth: i.e., Switzerland, 
Germany, France, or Italy (Figs. 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10).
As we noted earlier, the childlessness level for Germans is rather high, and the 
differential between native Swiss-Germans and immigrant Germans is getting larger 
with younger cohorts. Childlessness is particularly common for German women 
living in Switzerland: it is nearly 35 % for the 1960 cohort, compared to “only” 
25 % for the Swiss-Germans of the same cohort.
The graph for French speakers (Fig. 6.9) is quite different from that for German 
speakers in Switzerland. The childlessness rates for French speakers are lower than 
the rates for German speakers, and the differences by country of birth (France or 
Switzerland) are much smaller. For men the gap between the two groups is insignifi-
cant, although for women immigrating from France, the rate is a couple of percent-
age points higher.
Figure 6.10, which shows the patterns of childlessness for Italian speakers, is 
different again. Immigrants from Italy have very low levels of childlessness; lower 
even than those of native Italians in Italy. The proportion of native-born Italian 
speakers–most of whom live in the canton of Ticino–who are childless is even 
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Fig. 6.7 Proportion of women who were childless by birth cohort, citizenship, and migration 
background, Austria (Source: Census 1981 and 2001, own estimates)
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higher than in the German-speaking parts of the country. In this Alpine region, there 
is a long-established tradition of marrying late, and a high rate of singlehood. This 
may be an adaptation to life in a rugged region, where population pressures were 
mitigated by a division into high-fertility “family” women and men, and those who 
remained single and had other specific roles to play in society (Viazzo 1989). 
The low, though steadily increasing rates of childlessness among Italian immigrants 
may be explained by their origin in southern Italy, where fertility behaviour follows 
the southern European pattern.
6.3.5  Geographical Variations in Childlessness 
and the Process of Concentration
Childlessness has traditionally been considerably higher in Vienna than in the rest 
of Austria, for two main reasons: first, a large proportion of the city’s population are 
single, many of them students or seasonal migrants; and, second, there is selective 
outmigration of young families to the periphery of Vienna, which is mostly in 
the province of Lower Austria. Table 6.3 gives the proportion of women who are 
Table 6.2 Proportion of childless women (cohort 1930–1960) and childless men (cohort 1930–
1950) by country of birth, Switzerland
Country of birth
Women Men
Per cent childless N Per cent childless N
Far East developed* 26 % 1565 17 % 277
Philippines & Thailand 25 % 4858 18 % 3217
Anglo-Saxon* 24 % 12,894 20 % 5060
Finland 24 % 1887 14 % 191
Germany 23 % 58,107 19 % 29,790
Netherlands 21 % 5193 17 % 2162
Latin America* 20 % 8185 15 % 1485
Ex-communist* 20 % 14,680 19 % 8586
France 20 % 27,914 17 % 12,605
Switzerland 19 % 961,364 18 % 576,147
Austria 17 % 21,499 17 % 9075
Italy 9 % 65,973 10 % 60,440
Spain 9 % 17,636 13 % 10,302
Ex-Yugoslavia & Albania 8 % 40,875 6 % 17,671
Portugal 8 % 12,095 6 % 3406
Turkey 5 % 8273 6 % 4301
Source: Census 2000, own estimates
Note: *Far East developed = Japan, South Korea, Taiwan; Anglo-Saxon = UK, Ireland, USA, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand; Latin America = Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru; Ex-communist = Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Russia, Bulgaria
M. Burkimsher and K. Zeman
129
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 c
h
ild
le
ss
Birth cohort
Male born in CH
Female born in CH
Male born in D
Female born in D
Fig. 6.8 Proportion of German-speaking women and men in Switzerland who are childless, 
whether born in Switzerland or Germany (Source: Census 2000, own estimates)
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Fig. 6.9 Proportion of French-speaking women and men in Switzerland who are childless, 
whether born in Switzerland or France (Source: Census 2000, own estimates)
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childless at ages 45–54 (i.e., the birth cohorts of 1958–1967) by province 
(Bundesland) based on the micro-census Q4/2012 data. Most of the regions have a 
childlessness level of around 11–15 %, whereas in Vienna it is nearly 26 %. Another 
region with high rates of childlessness is Burgenland, a small region of mixed eth-
nicity in the Vienna outer commuter belt bordering Hungary and Slovenia: there, the 
childlessness level is nearly 20 %.
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Fig. 6.10 Proportion of Italian-speaking women and men in Switzerland who are childless, 
whether born in Switzerland or Italy (Source: Census 2000, own estimates)
Table 6.3 Proportion of 
women who are childless, by 
province (Bundesland), 
cohorts 1958–1967 (aged 
45–54), Austria
Bundesland Childlessness
AUSTRIA 15.4 %
Styria 11.2 %
Upper Austria 12.7 %
Carinthia 13.2 %
Vorarlberg 13.6 %
Tyrol 14.4 %
Salzburg 15.4 %
Lower Austria 15.6 %
Burgenland 19.8 %
Vienna 25.6 %
Source: Mikrozensus Q4/2012, own estimates
Note: The childlessness level of 15.4 % for 
Austria as a whole, as shown in this table, is 
lower than that estimated from census and 
Geburtenbarometer data due to the specificity 
of the micro-census respondents
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Using data from the Geburtenbarometer (2014), and extrapolating the trends in 
age-specific fertility rates, we can project that any increase in childlessness will be 
modest, reaching perhaps 19 % for Austria as a whole. In Vienna, on the other hand, 
childlessness is forecast to decline, from 27 % to 21 %. Figure 6.11 shows this 
expected convergence. Among the 19–29 age group, the mean intended family size 
for women in Vienna is identical to that of Austria as a whole, at 1.8; and the propor-
tion of women who intend to stay childless is also the same, at 12 % (Mikrozensus 
Q4/2012).
When we analyse variations by type of settlement, we can see that for women 
aged 45–54 the childlessness rate was around 8–9 % in agricultural areas, 12 % in 
rural areas, 15 % in small towns, 19 % in larger towns, and 27 % in Vienna. A simi-
lar pattern has been found in Switzerland (Wanner 2000). The 2013 FGS showed 
that the proportion of women aged 45–54 who were childless was 27 % in the major 
cities (Zürich, Geneva, Basel, Lausanne, Bern, and Winterthur), 20 % in other 
towns, and 18 % in rural areas. Among men of the same age, the childlessness rate 
was 43 %, 22 %, and 20 % for the respective areas. When we look at the map 
derived from the Swiss census data of 2000, which shows the relative levels of 
childlessness for 45–49-year-old women (Fig. 6.12), we can see clear concentra-
tions of childlessness in the major urban areas, especially around Zürich and Bern, 
across much of the canton of Ticino, and in some pockets of the high Alpine areas.
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Fig. 6.11 Childlessness among women in Vienna and Austria as a whole: Known rates and pro-
jections extrapolating current trends of age-specific fertility rates, Austria and Vienna (Source: 
Geburtenbarometer (2014), own estimates)
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6.4  Fertility Intentions
Respondents are asked about their ideal family size in many social surveys, and the 
results indicate that the two-child family ideal is still widespread across Europe 
(Sobotka and Beaujouan 2014). However, for many young people this is a hypo-
thetical question, with a distinction between general family ideals and individual 
fertility intentions or desires. There are several major hurdles individuals have to 
clear before they can consider having a child: finding a (suitable) partner, resolving 
any conflicts between life goals, and being able to offer a child a good start in life 
(by having access to, for example, adequate housing, sufficient income, employ-
ment security, and child care). For women, all of these conditions have to be met 
while they are still in their reproductive years. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
expressed desires are fluid until the reproductive clock has finally stopped ticking. 
Even if a significant proportion of children are still unplanned, most people will 
seek to fulfil at least some of the pre-requisites before becoming parents.
From the 1994 Fertility and Family Survey (FFS) of Switzerland it was apparent 
that the desire to have children changes as people move through their adult life 
(Gabadinho and Wanner 1999). While 7 % of female respondents in their early 
twenties said they intended to remain childless, this figure fell to 2 % for respon-
dents aged 25–29, before rising again for respondents in their 1930s. Among male 
respondents, the proportion who said they plan to remain child-free was slightly 
Fig. 6.12 Relative proportion of women who were childless at age 45–49 by local area, Switzerland 
(Source: Map prepared by Christoph Freymond (Swiss Federal Statistical Office) and Tom Hensel 
(MPIDR))
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higher than that of women until they reached their late thirties. At that life stage, 
most of the women who had not had children accepted that they were unlikely to 
become a mother because of the path their life had taken; whereas some men, who 
are fecund for longer, indicated that they still hoped to become a father. The Swiss 
census confirmed that a few men do become first-time fathers even in their sixties 
and seventies.
The results of the Families and Generations Survey (FGS), which was under-
taken in Switzerland in 2013, confirm these patterns and provide additional insights. 
As was shown by Mosimann and Camenisch (2015), having a low educational level 
appears to be associated with a reduced desire to have a child among young men, or 
it may reflect their limited potential for finding a partner. Among women, there is no 
difference based on educational level in the expressed intention to remain childless. 
Although women with a tertiary education are much more likely to end up childless, 
this does not reflect their stated aspirations when they were younger.
In Austria, family size ideals are below replacement level (Goldstein et al. 2003), 
with a relatively high proportion of women opting to remain child-free. According 
to the Eurobarometer 2011 survey, the mean intended number of children at ages 
15–39 was 1.78, far lower than in any other country of Europe: the mean number 
was 1.9 in Romania and was two or more in all other countries, with an average of 
2.3 across all of the surveyed countries (OECD 2014). For young men in Austria the 
intended number was even lower, at 1.55. At 11 %, the share of women in Austria 
who said they intend to remain childless was the highest among all of the countries 
in the survey. Educational level has been found to have a significant effect on fertil-
ity desires. Data from the micro-census Q4/2012 show that, at ages 19–34, the pro-
portion of women who said they intend to stay childless was 7 % for those with low 
education, 10–12 % for those with completed secondary education, and 15 % for 
those with tertiary qualifications. By contrast, the final rates of childlessness for 
women aged 45–54 for these educational levels were 13–14 %, 16 % and 27 % 
respectively. This indicates that the differences in fertility intentions by level of 
education are smaller than the differences in fertility outcomes. A study by Buber 
et al. (2011) showed that, amongst a sample of 196 female scientists aged under 35 
(PhD diploma holders who had applied for a grant at the Austrian Academy of 
Sciences), 11 % said they intended to remain childless, while the actual level of 
childlessness of similar women at age 45 was 44 %. Among the most important 
obstacles to childbearing cited were strong work commitment, the need to be geo-
graphically mobile, and the high prevalence of living-apart-together (LAT) relation-
ships. The same sentiment was expressed by women in the Swiss Family and 
Fertility Survey, that their primary reason for not wanting to have a child was the 
problem of having to reconcile work and family (Coenen-Huther 2005).
The Swiss Household Panel survey sheds more light on the ambivalent fertility 
desires of individuals. From 2002 onwards the same group of respondents have 
been asked each year how many children they would ideally like to have. As they 
have been followed, it has become apparent that stated fertility intentions are vola-
tile across the life course. Out of a sample of over 4000 respondents, for whom at 
least three survey waves were available and who were under age 38 in 2002, only 4 
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(0.1 %) stated they wished to have no children across all of the survey years. There 
was more stability in the responses of those who said they wanted to have at least 
one child, with over 57 % of the respondents falling into this category. However, a 
significant minority sometimes express the desire to have children and at others 
times say they do not (this does include some who actually have children). We can 
therefore deduce that while, on average, 11 % of respondents in any specific survey 
wave say they want no children, this is not a fixed trait: the blossoming (or breakup) 
of a romantic relationship may change their opinion (see Kuhnt et al. in this 
volume 11). The approach of menopause may increase the desire to have a child for 
some women, or extinguish it for others. The conflicting appeal of career versus 
motherhood—when there is a perception that these roles are incompatible—will 
influence the choice of a significant number of childless women (Mosimann and 
Camenisch 2015).
6.5  Conclusions and Discussion
Austria and Switzerland (along with Germany) share a pattern of low rates of fertil-
ity and high rates of childlessness which distinguishes them from other countries of 
Europe. Not all (developed) countries with relatively high levels of childlessness 
have low overall fertility. In some countries, such as the Nordic countries and the 
UK, the significant proportion of larger families compensates for the rather high 
levels of childlessness (see Berrington in this volume 3). In a western context, the 
countries that have a wide range of family forms and family sizes (including child-
lessness), and that allow for flexibility in the timing of childbearing, currently have 
higher fertility rates than countries in which fertility behaviour is more uniform. In 
Austria and Switzerland traditional norms tend to dominate.
Medical advances have changed patterns of childbearing, as women are able to 
postpone parenthood with the use of efficient contraceptives, and older women are 
able to have children using ART. However, many constraints remain, as the previous 
sections in this chapter have shown. Among these constraints are the varying degrees 
of desire to have a child. For example, German speakers are somewhat less family- 
oriented than French and Italian speakers. Moreover, the desire to have a child is not 
always fulfilled: for example, people who live in the Italian-speaking part of 
Switzerland apparently find it more difficult to meet their fertility goals. They have 
a low desire for childlessness, yet actual levels of childlessness are similar to those 
of the German-speaking region. It is unclear whether this gap is mainly attributable 
to the limited childcare facilities in Ticino, or to the legacy of traditional Alpine 
family formation patterns, as described by Viazzo (1989). In contrast, marriage 
rates in the French-speaking parts of Switzerland are lower than in the German- and 
Italian-speaking areas, yet childlessness is also less common: this reflects the higher 
incidence of extramarital fertility in the French-speaking region, which resembles 
that of France to some extent.
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Men and women who classify themselves as having “no religion” have a much 
lower desire to have children than the religiously affiliated, and have lower marriage 
rates; as a consequence, they are more likely to remain childless. In addition, the 
Swiss census shows that a very high proportion—about one-third—of non-religious 
married men and women (secondary- and tertiary-educated) are childless. It would 
appear that the declaration of having no religion reflects life priorities that are dif-
ferent from those of people who are affiliated with religion to some degree. However, 
in Austria level of education and country of birth are more important explanatory 
characteristics of childlessness than religion itself, at least amongst women. In 
Switzerland, the influence of having no religion on childlessness has varied across 
cohorts, with the largest effect seen in women born in the 1950s, for whom the influ-
ence of being non-religious was even greater than that of having a tertiary educa-
tion. Among men, education has a much smaller effect on the likelihood of being 
childless, with religion being the primary determinant across all cohorts.
At younger ages, the majority of women, regardless of their level of education, 
say they want two children (Mosimann and Camenisch 2015). It appears, however, 
that as life passes, highly educated women in particular face mounting constraints 
on their ability to fulfil their earlier expectations: they experience difficulties in find-
ing a suitable life partner, reconciling the demands of a career and motherhood, and 
managing the practical issues of childcare.
The future trajectory of fertility in Austria and Switzerland will depend on 
whether women and men maintain their fertility intentions; whether partnering, 
marriage, and divorce patterns evolve; and whether the current hurdles faced by (for 
example) highly educated women can be overcome. The trends in the United States 
would suggest that the future could be brighter than is sometimes anticipated, as 
childlessness has been declining and fertility has been increasing amongst the 
highly educated (Livingston 2015 and Frejka, Chap. 8 in this volume). Where 
America is trending today, will Europe follow tomorrow? The projections for child-
lessness, calculated by Sobotka (in this volume), suggest that childlessness will 
indeed decline in Switzerland if current trends are maintained, and will rise only 
modestly in Austria, to around 20 %. Whether the differentials by sub-population 
are sustained remains to be seen.
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Chapter 7
Childlessness in Finland
Anna Rotkirch and Anneli Miettinen
7.1  Introduction
“– Well, life didn’t turn out as expected.”
Recently, I (the first author of this chapter) attended a school reunion where I 
caught up with former classmates, many of whom I had not seen for decades. When 
I spoke to one of the attendees, I was intrigued by her frank answer, quoted above, 
to my general question about how she was doing. Finns have preserved the touching 
habit of taking small talk seriously. So I asked her what she meant.
“– For a start, I have no children.”
Since my former classmates are now approaching 50, it was clear that the child-
bearing years were over for the women in the room. Most of the people gathered had 
a couple of teenagers at home, while some had older children who had already 
moved out. Some of the men had paired up with younger women and had toddlers. 
As so often in such social situations, how the children are doing emerged as the easi-
est, safest discussion topic in the noisy room. Even if the children have problems, 
they can be shared anecdotally, or glossed over by a superficial answer.
The topic of childlessness is much more sensitive. Finns are liberal and secular 
in their attitudes towards family life. As early as in the 1980s, over 70 % of Finnish 
women surveyed said they did not believe that a woman has to have children in 
order to be fulfilled (Nikander 1992), and only 20 % said they thought that a person 
could not be completely happy unless he or she has children (Paajanen et al. 2007). 
Although there is no strong stigma associated with childlessness in Finland, it is still 
not easy to ask people why they are childless, in part because the reasons they might 
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give are so varied. Did my acquaintance have a partner? She indicated that she had 
been in a stable relationship for a long period of time. Was her partner unwilling to 
have children? Or had they experienced medical problems? Or, like the “perpetual 
postponers” found across Europe, had they avoided the decision about whether to 
have a child until it was biologically too late for her to conceive (Berrington 2004)? 
Had she acknowledged long ago that she was never going to become a mother, or 
had she only recently recognized that she would be childless?
I did not find out, as we were soon interrupted. Still, it may be the brevity and 
vagueness of our conversation that best captures the essence of childlessness in 
contemporary Finland. Like most Finns, my former classmate indicated that she had 
expected to become a mother. Indeed, most of our peers had two or three—or, more 
rarely, only one—child. But for my former classmate and a substantial and growing 
minority of the Finnish population things had not “turned out as planned” when it 
came to childbearing. Currently, 25 % of men and 20 % of women aged 40–45 do 
not have a child of their own.
In this chapter we describe the general trends in childlessness among both 
women and men in Finland, focusing on the generations born after the Second 
World War. In particular, we are interested in investigating how the prevalence of 
lifetime childlessness among people of different educational levels has changed, 
and how marriages and cohabitations relate to childlessness. We also discuss the 
childbearing intentions of childless Finns, and the extent to which these intentions 
are reflected in their actual childbearing behaviour. The term childless is used for all 
adults who have no children of their own, whether through birth or adoption. We 
recognise that this definition excludes important family ties individuals may have to 
a child, e.g., through step-parenting or foster care.
7.2  Data and Methods
Two types of data are used: register data obtained from Statistics Finland, and 
nationally representative survey data collected by the Population Research Institute 
at Väestöliitto. The survey data were also linked to register data on subsequent 
births.
7.2.1  Register Data
Statistics Finland provides register data on births and family life indicators. Some 
indicators span more than a century, and many are available at the Statistics Finland 
website, www.stat.fi. Birth statistics are collected for children born to women resi-
dent in Finland; we refer to these children and their parents as “Finns”. The majority 
of residents of Finland are ethnically Finnish and Finnish nationals. When we cite 
Statistics Finland as the data source, the data cover the entire Finnish population.
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We also use the FINNUNION dataset, an 11 % sample drawn from the popula-
tion registers by Statistics Finland. The register database covers the entire popula-
tion of Finland from 1970 to 2010, and links data from a longitudinal population 
register, including data on vital events with registers of employment and educational 
qualifications. From 1987 onwards, the register-based union histories cover not only 
marriages, but also cohabitations, which is widespread in Finland (Coleman 2014). 
FINNUNION contains data on around 471,000 individuals born in 1930–1990 and 
their marital and cohabiting partners. When we cite the FINNUNION dataset as the 
data source, it refers to this particular register dataset. We divide individuals into 
5-year birth cohorts, and denote each cohort—unless otherwise specified—by the 
first year of the 5 years. Thus, for example, a reference to birth cohorts 1950 and 
1965 would refer to the birth cohorts 1950–1954 and 1965–1969, respectively.
7.2.2  Survey Data
The Well-Being and Social Relationships Survey is a nationally representative 
Finnish survey that was conducted in 2008 by the Population Research Institute at 
Väestöliitto (the Finnish Family Federation). The questionnaires were mailed to 
7000 Finnish residents aged 25–44 years who had no or only one child (Miettinen 
and Rotkirch 2008; Miettinen 2010). The response rate was 44 %. The question-
naire asked the respondents about various aspects of their personal and marital well- 
being, attitudes and expectations towards work, relationship quality, family and 
social relationships, and childbearing ideals and intentions.1 Here we use only the 
answers provided by the childless respondents (N = 1244). For more details, see 
Miettinen (2010) and Miettinen et al. (2011).
In 2011, these survey data were combined with register data from the Population 
Register Centre of Finland for those respondents who gave their permission. The com-
bined data enabled us to examine the effect of fertility intentions and other survey 
measures including relationship quality on actual births during the period 2008–2011. 
The number of respondents in the combined data is 1981, of whom 922 were childless 
at the time of the survey in 2008; for more information, see Lainiala (2011, 2012).
7.3  General Trends in Fertility and Childlessness: Finland 
as the Northern European Outlier
Compared to other European countries, Finland has relatively high overall fertility 
levels: completed cohort fertility has remained quite stable and even risen, from 
1.86 for women born in 1950 to 1.90 for the 1970 birth cohort (Myrskylä et al. 
1 The questionnaire is available in English at http://www.vaestoliitto.fi/in_english/population_
research_institute/family_research/late_fertility/
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2013). However, compared to elsewhere in Europe, the share of the population who 
are childless is very high in Finland (see Sobotka, Chap. 2, in this book). A recent 
study that compared the childlessness rates of 40–44-year-old men and women 
across 20 European countries found that men in Finland had the highest level of 
childlessness, while women in Finland had the third-highest level of childlessness, 
after Italy and Switzerland. Finland has also seen its childlessness levels increase 
more rapidly in recent decades than most other European countries (Miettinen et al. 
2015).
Finland’s fertility regime and childbearing patterns are similar in many respects 
to those of the other Nordic countries (Andersson et al. 2009). Thus, the cohort 
fertility rate in Finland is close to the rate in Denmark of around 1.90 (for women 
born in 1950–1970), and is somewhat lower than the rates in Norway and Sweden 
of slightly higher than two (Myrskylä et al. 2013). These Nordic welfare states share 
a number of historical and social policy characteristics, and are the global leaders in 
social and gender equality (Kautto 2001). However, when we look at the distribu-
tion of the number of children born to each woman, we can see that the polarization 
of fertility, or the reproductive skew, is pronounced in Finland (Fig. 7.1).
As Fig. 7.1 shows, around 30 % of Finnish women currently in their 40s have 
three or more children. Together, these high-parity women produce half of the chil-
dren born. By contrast, throughout the twentieth century, 15–25 % of Finnish 
women had no children. This distinguishes Finland from Scandinavia, where the 
reproductive skew is milder, mothers with more than two children are more scarce 
(Eurostat 2015) and childlessness is also lower (Andersson et al. 2009).
Among the women who were born in the early twentieth century in Finland, the 
proportion who were childless was as high as 25 % (Fig. 7.1). This share then 
declined to around 15 % among women born in the mid-twentieth century, and has 
since risen to around 20 % for the last cohort of women who have reached the end 
of their childbearing years. By comparison, among the women born in 1935–1949 in 
Norway, the share who were childless at age 40 was less than 10 %, and the corre-
sponding figure for Sweden was 12 % (Andersson et al. 2009: 323).
Across the cohorts, lifetime childlessness in Finland has clearly been more prev-
alent among men than among women. Figure 7.2 shows the proportions of both 
women and men born between 1930 and 1975 who were childless at ages 40–44.
Although men can have children at later ages, very few of them do, as most 
Finnish men have a partner who is around the same age. Around 80 % Finnish 
couples have an age difference of 5 years or less, and less than 0.5 % have an age 
difference of 20 years or more (Nikander 2010). Consequently, men of the 1940–
1950 birth cohort reached a 95 % level of achieved cohort fertility by ages 41–42 
(Nisén, Martikainen et al. 2014: 127). It is of course possible for a man to have 
fathered a child even though his paternity is not recognised by the authorities. 
Currently, only 1.9 % of all children born have no registered father (THL 2015). 
Since not all of these cases involve men who are otherwise childless, the current 
proportion of men who have sired children but are not recognised as the father of 
any of those children—and are thus considered childless—can be estimated at no 
more than 1 %.
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Fig. 7.1 Proportions of women by numbers of children, in per cent, female cohorts born in 1906–
1970 (women at age 45/50). Note: Asterisk indicates cohorts who are still of reproductive age 
(Source: Statistics Finland and Population Research Institute, Väestöliitto (own calculations based 
on register data))
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Fig. 7.2 Proportions of childless men and women in Finland at ages 40–44, in per cent, cohorts 
born in 1930–1975. Note: The last two cohorts have not reached the end of their childbearing years 
(Source: Statistics Finland, FINNUNION register dataset, and Population Research Institute, 
Väestöliitto (own calculations))
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The historical data suggest that in preindustrial Finland childlessness was com-
mon among both men and women. Among agrarian Finns, who were largely neo- 
local, couples were not supposed to marry and have children until they were 
sufficiently independent to live and manage on their own (Therborn 2004). 
Consequently, the ages at marriage and first birth were relatively high, at around 
25–26 years for women and a couple of years higher for men (see Lahdenperä et al. 
2004 for the eighteenth century, Liu et al. 2012 for the nineteenth century). Data 
from four Finnish parishes in 1760–1849 indicate that among individuals who 
reached adulthood, lifetime childlessness was 34 % among men and 26 % among 
women. Among ever married adults, childlessness was 15.5 % among men and 14 
% among women (Courtiol et al. 2012; Pettay, personal communication).
In European societies of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
it was not unusual for 20–25 % of women to be childless. However, unlike in most 
of the rest of Europe, in Finland childlessness rates remained high throughout the 
twentieth century (Rowland 2007). While in most countries childlessness rates fell 
among the cohorts born in 1940–1950, in Finland the decrease was less marked. 
The lack of a “low dip” in childlessness levels in the mid-twentieth century can be 
attributed in part to the huge losses the country experienced during the Second 
World War and the ensuing relocation of a large share of the population. Finland lost 
82,000 men in battle, a figure that is 13 times larger than the corresponding figures 
in the other Nordic countries. Moreover, 410,000 Finnish Karelians, or 12 % of the 
population, had to be relocated from Karelia to other parts of the country after 1940. 
In the 1960s, emigration especially to Sweden meant the loss of over half a million 
Finns from the population.
When the first cohorts studied were born (1940–1950), Finland was a relatively 
poor country that had only recently been industrialised, and was suffering from the 
effects of the Second World War. In the decades that followed, living standards 
improved, and the country made a rapid transition to being a post-industrial and 
wealthy welfare state. Traditionally, the labour force participation rates of Finnish 
women, including of mothers with children, have been high, and both women and 
men tend to work full-time (see, e.g., Haataja and Nyberg 2006).
7.4  Increase in Childlessness in Unions
While family formation and reproduction patterns have changed considerably in 
Finland in recent decades, being in a partnership continues to be an important pre-
requisite for childbearing (Spéder and Kapitány 2009; Miettinen et al. 2015). Like 
in many other developed countries, in Finland men are more likely than women to 
remain outside a marital or cohabiting union throughout their life. For both men and 
women, having socio-economic resources—such as high educational attainment, 
steady employment, and a reliable source of income—promotes union formation 
(Jalovaara 2012).
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The age at first union formation in Finland appears to have changed little in 
recent decades. Among the cohorts who were born in the 1970s, half of the women 
were cohabiting or married by age 22, and almost half of the men were in a union 
by age 25. By the age of 33, 90 % of women and 83 % of men had formed a union 
(Jalovaara 2012: 75).
These relatively young ages at union formation are supported by the welfare 
state, which provides housing benefits and income support, and by the prevailing 
cultural ethos, which favours early independence from the family home. By con-
trast, the mean age at entering parenthood increased in recent decades: women who 
were born in the 1960s had their first child 2–3 years later than those who were born 
in the 1950s, and the mean age at first birth is now around 28.6 years (Official 
Statistics of Finland 2014). Thus, it appears that today Finns live in unions for lon-
ger periods of time before having a child. Does this mean that the association 
between having a partner and having a child has weakened?
Childlessness is indeed less tied to formal marriage today than it was in the past. 
Figure 7.3 shows how marital status (i.e., being never married, married, divorced, or 
separated) is related to being childless in different birth cohorts. We can see that 
among individuals who are in their early forties, childlessness is much more com-
mon among those who never married than among those who married, but that 
among men and women who never married the shares who were childless have 
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steadily declined across birth cohorts: 88 % of never married men and 76 % of never 
married women born in 1940–1944 were childless in their early forties, compared 
to 66 % of men and 54 % of women born 20 years later, in 1960–1964.
The decreasing levels of childlessness among never married individuals across 
cohorts is related to the popularity of cohabitation in Finland. Nowadays the first 
union is usually cohabitation, and the first birth is typically to cohabiting parents. If 
cohabiting couples do not break up, they usually marry at some point in their life 
span. However, the wedding may be postponed considerably. Most couples with one 
child go on to have a second child, and they often get married at that stage, if they 
have not done so earlier (Miettinen and Rotkirch 2008). Thus, unlike in more tradi-
tional countries where cohabitation is less common, in Finland parenthood leads to 
marriage, rather than the other way around.
Being married is known to promote childbearing, especially compared to being 
single, but also compared to cohabiting (Coleman 1996). Also in Finland, married 
individuals have stronger intentions to become parents than cohabiting couples 
(Miettinen and Rotkirch 2008). However, even among married individuals child-
lessness has increased, from around 6 % to 8 % among men and from 5 % to 7 % 
among women (Fig. 7.3). This increase of around 2 % among married individuals 
accounts for less than 1.5 % of the overall rise in childlessness. Changes in the pro-
portions of childless individuals among those who were married but later divorced 
or separated across birth cohorts have been even more modest, especially among 
women, for whom no time trend can be observed.
7.5  Childlessness Increases Among the Less Educated
In Finland as in many other countries, the relationship between socio-economic 
status and number of children is positive among men, largely because childlessness 
is more common among less educated men (Barthold et al. 2012). Figure 7.4 shows 
the proportions of men and women who are childless by level of education across 
birth cohorts. Among Finnish men, the proportion who are childless has clearly 
increased in all educational groups, while the educational gradient has persisted 
over cohorts (Fig. 7.4a).
Among Finnish women, the situation differs compared to men (Fig. 7.4b). In the 
oldest cohorts studied here, born during or immediately after World War II, the 
proportions of childless individuals are highest among women with a high level of 
education. Beginning with the female cohorts born in 1950, however, childlessness 
is highest among the least educated. In a wider context, this pattern is unusual: 
highly educated women are often the most likely to remain childless (see the chap-
ters on the US and the UK in this book). However, in the Nordic countries mother-
hood has become increasingly common among highly educated women. Thus, the 
correlation between female educational levels and childbearing has become mixed 
or even positive in these countries (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; Persson 2010), 
including in Finland.
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Figure 7.4b illustrates how women with a high level of education are somewhat 
more likely to be childless at age 42 than are women with a middle level of educa-
tion in all birth cohorts. Childlessness slightly decreases among women with a high 
level of education, from 20 % in the 1945–1949 birth cohort, to around 18–19 % in 
the younger cohorts. By contrast, childlessness is most common among women 
with the least education during the last decades. Being childless has also increased 
twofold in this group during the period studied, from around 15 % to over 30 %. 
Also among women with mid-level education, childlessness has increased, but more 
moderately, from 13 to 18 %.
A comparison of childlessness levels across the entire population over the past 
decade shows a similar pattern to our analysis above: between 2004 and 2012, 
childlessness rates have increased the most among the least educated men and 
women (Fig. 7.5a and b).
When interpreting these results, one should keep in mind that the average level 
of education in Finland has increased: 26 % of men and 21 % women born in 1943–
1972 and 18 % of men and 10 % of women born in 1973–1982 are in the lowest 
educational group (MED 2010).
It is also important to note that despite statistical associations between educa-
tional levels and childlessness, education is probably rarely the direct “cause” for 
childbearing behaviour. A study of childlessness among Finnish twins born in the 
1950s found that the factors linking education to both male and female childlessness 
were shared by twins, and that these factors were genetic rather than environmental. 
For instance, cognitive abilities, personality traits or attitudes to parenthood may 
influence both the educational pathways and childbearing behaviour of individuals. 
The study found no evidence for a direct causal pathway linking childlessness in 
this cohort to lower education among men and higher education among women 
(Nisén et al. 2013).
7.6  Associations of Having a Spouse, Education 
and Childlessness
Is the increase in childlessness among less educated men and women associated 
with the lack of a partner? Above, we showed that being married remains linked to 
the probability of becoming a parent (Fig. 7.3). We further investigated how having 
ever had a spouse was associated with remaining childless in different educational 
groups. Having a spouse is defined as having lived in cohabitation or marriage at 
least once.
Never having had a spouse was clearly more frequent among men and women 
with little education compared to other educational groups (Table 7.1). Among 
those with least education, 24 % of men and 17 % of women had had no spouse. The 
more educated the men were, the more often they had had at least one spouse, so 
that only 7 % of highly educated men had not had any spouse. Among women, by 
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contrast, those with highest education had somewhat more often not had any spouse 
than those with mid-level education.
Lifetime childlessness is strongly linked to not having had any spouse. Among 
men with no spouse ever, over 90 % were childless in all educational groups. Among 
men who had had a spouse, proportions of childless individuals ranged from 11 to 
17 % in different educational groups and were most common among those with 
least education. Among women with no spouse, proportions of childlessness varied 
between 79 % among those with mid-level education to around 85 % among those 
with either low or high education. Of women who had ever cohabited or been mar-
ried, those with mid-level education had the lowest proportions of childless indi-
viduals while women with either low or high education had similar levels of 
childlessness. Table 7.1 further shows that the concentration of childlessness among 
individuals with no spouse, compared to the overall childlessness in a particular 
educational group, also varied. Among men and women with middle or high 
 education, between 40 and 50 % of childlessness was found among individuals with 
no spouse. Among men and women with low education, however, around 60 % of 
childless individuals had had no spouse.
We also entered these same variables into a regression (not shown in table; con-
trolling for the effect of birth cohort). When taking into the account the effect of 
having had any spouse, differences in male childlessness by educational groups 
diminished, but remained highly statistically significant. Also among women, the 
educational differences in childlessness in women remained after controlling for 
having had any spouse, albeit less accentuated and only marginally statistically sig-
nificant for the difference between women with low and high education. In other 
Table 7.1 Childlessness by having ever had a spouse (through marriage or cohabitation), Finnish 
men (N = 95,331) and women (N = 91,528) born 1945–1964, column per cent
Having 
had no 
spouse
Childlessness 
among 
individuals with 
no spouse
Childlessness 
among individuals 
with at least one 
spouse
Proportion of 
childless 
individuals with 
no spouse of all 
childless 
individuals
Men Low 24.1 92.1 17.0 63.3
Middle 12.6 93.3 14.6 47.8
High 6.5 94.8 11.3 37.8
All men 14.8 92.8 14.3 53.0
Women Low 17.4 84.1 12.2 59.2
Middle 7.0 79.1 9.9 37.6
High 9.5 86.4 12.2 42.6
All 
women
10.8 83.6 11.3 47.3
Source: FINNUNION register dataset, Population Research Institute, Väestöliitto (own calcula-
tions)
Note: Educational level: Low = ISCED 1–2; Medium = ISCED 3–4; High = ISCED 5–6
A. Rotkirch and A. Miettinen
151
words, the lack of spouse explains much but not all of differences in childlessness 
between educational groups. Having ever had a spouse accounts for most of the dif-
ferences between women with high and low education.
Thus Finnish men with a low level of education were most likely never to have 
had a spouse, and also to be childless if they had had at least one spouse. Women 
with low education were also most likely never to have had a spouse, but as likely 
as those with a high level of education to have a child with or without a spouse. If 
having ever had a spouse would not affect childbearing, women with a low and 
women with a high level of education would be about as likely ever to become 
mothers. In this respect, it is Finnish women with a mid-level education who appear 
to be unusual, since they have lower levels of childlessness whether they had ever 
married or cohabited or not.
7.7  Regional and Occupational Effects
Region of residence and occupational status also affect the likelihood that an indi-
vidual will enter a union or start a family. Finland has a small population, and the 
density of the population is low: there are around 5.5 million Finnish citizens and 
only 18 inhabitants per square kilometre. Thus, the population density in Finland is 
much lower than in Sweden and Denmark, although still higher than in Norway and 
Iceland. As a consequence of urbanisation and the high proportion of women who 
are educated, the sex ratios at age 20 in Finnish municipalities have become more 
skewed over the last three decades. Currently, half of the 20–29-year-olds live in a 
sub-region with a male surplus in that age range; with 10 out of 18 sub-regions hav-
ing a sex ratio above 1.1 (Lainiala and Miettinen 2013).
Sex ratios are associated with childlessness. Higher sex ratios or a male surplus 
in a certain age group appears to accentuate the reproductive skew, especially among 
Finnish men. In Finnish municipalities where the proportion of young males is 
higher than the proportion of young females, a larger share of women are likely to 
partner earlier, and go on to have children earlier, than in areas with less skewed sex 
ratios. This may raise overall fertility levels in those municipalities. However, a 
larger share of men remain unmarried in these municipalities, contributing to 
increased male childlessness (Lainiala and Rotkirch 2015).
Childlessness has also been shown to be more common among some occupa-
tional groups. In a study of Finnish men and women born between 1940 and 1950 
that used register data, Nisén, Myrskylä et al. (2014) investigated the effects of fam-
ily background on fertility, including on childlessness. They found that women who 
were from families headed by an administrative or professional worker were more 
likely to have remained childless than women who were from a family headed by a 
manual worker or farmer. After various family background variables, such as the 
number of siblings and the family type, were taken into account, having a manual 
labour family background was still shown to be associated with female childless-
ness (ibid.).
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7.8  Low Voluntary Childlessness
Is the growth in childlessness due to a preference for a childfree lifestyle? It is 
widely assumed that voluntary childlessness, or the decision to have a childfree 
lifestyle, is the main explanation for the increase in childlessness in contemporary 
western societies. While there is some evidence that young adults feel more free to 
express less traditional views on having children today than in the past, recent stud-
ies have shown that voluntary childlessness is still relatively rare in most countries. 
This seems to be the case in Finland, as well (Miettinen and Paajanen 2005).
We here define voluntary childlessness as a personal ideal and intention to have 
no children (Miettinen 2010). We also distinguish between childless individuals 
who say they intend to have children in the future, and those who say they do not 
expect to have children, whether voluntarily or not.
The results of several national and international surveys indicate that most Finns 
want to have children, and seldom choose to be childless. The average ideal and 
intended numbers of children cited by respondents in Finland have been around 2.5 
since the 1970s (Miettinen and Rotkirch 2008). In the Eurobarometer 2011, the 
average ideal number of children cited was 2.5 among Finnish women and 2.1 
among Finnish men (Testa 2011). The average intended number of children was, at 
2.3 among women and 2.1 among men, somewhat lower than the average ideal 
number, but was still clearly higher than the actual fertility rate. In the same survey, 
0 % of the women aged 25–54 said their ideal number of children was to have none, 
while 6 % of the 15–24-year-old women and 2 % of the women above age 55 said 
they did not wish to have children. Among men, childlessness as an ideal declined 
with age: from 10 % among 15–24-year-olds, to 6 % among 25–34-year-olds, to 5 
% among 50–54-year-olds, and, finally, to 2 % among those aged 55 and above. 
Compared to the childbearing ideals expressed in other Nordic countries, Finnish 
fertility ideals Finland tend to be similar or somewhat higher (Testa 2011).
The Well-Being and Social Relationships Survey conducted by Väestöliitto in 
2008 had a larger sample of childless individuals than the Eurobarometer. In this 
survey, the fertility intentions among the childless respondents aged 25–44 were as 
follows: among men, 4 % had a pregnant partner, 9 % had a partner who was trying 
to get pregnant, 38 % wanted to have children at some point, 22 % were unsure, and 
27 % did not intend to have a child. Among women, 3 % were pregnant, 15 % were 
trying to become pregnant, 36 % wanted to have a child at some point, and 25 % did 
not plan to have children at all (Lainiala 2012).
Among those who did not intend to have children, the personal ideal number of 
children was often larger than one, indicating that voluntary childlessness was not 
very common (Fig. 7.6). Among the 25–29-year-old respondents who were child-
less, 5 % of the women and 3 % of the men stated that they did not intend to have 
any children, and preferred to have a life without children. Among the 35–44-year- 
old respondents, 14 % of the women and 10 % of the men were classified as volun-
tarily childless using the same criteria (Miettinen 2010).
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If we take into account the proportion of all 40–44-year-olds who are childless, 
we can estimate that less than 3 % of Finnish men and women who have reached or 
are close to reaching the end of their reproductive age span can be said to be volun-
tarily childless.
7.9  Delays in Planned Childbearing
While fertility intentions feed into actual behaviour, there is a gap between ideals 
and intentions, on the one hand, and actual childbearing, on the other hand. In 
Finland, this gap is among the highest in Europe, mostly due to the proportions of 
childless people who would have wished for around two children (Goldstein et al. 
2003). We combined data from the Well-Being and Social Relationships Survey 
with register data on births to find out whether the fertility intentions expressed by 
the childless respondents had been realised during the 3 years following the survey 
(Lainiala 2011, 2012). The results showed that of the 25–44-year-old men and 
women who had not yet had a child in 2008, 35 % had become a parent by 2011. Of 
the respondents who had said they intended to have a child within 2 years, 44 % had 
realised their plans. Thus, the majority of childless Finns who had wanted to have a 
child in the near future had not been able to do so.
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Parenthood intentions in %
Voluntarily childless Relinquished parenthood Intentional parent
Men
Women
Fig. 7.6 Parenthood intentions among childless 25–44-year-old men and women in Finland in 
2008, in per cent, N = 1244. Note: Reprinted from Miettinen (2010) (Source: Finnish Well-Being 
and Social Relationships Survey 2008, Väestöliitto)
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The probability of becoming a parent was, unsurprisingly, positively related to 
fertility intentions. Among those who already tried to achieve pregnancy at the time 
of the survey, around two thirds had succeeded in having a child during the next 
years. Among those who were uncertain about having a child, however, less than 10 
% had become a parent during the follow-up period. Finally, among those who said 
they did not want to have a child, only very few had nevertheless become a parent; 
this was the case among 0 % of men and 2 % of women (Lainiala 2012: 26). Why 
would this last group have changed its mind? Lainiala (2012) found that having a 
spouse who wanted a child in some cases changed a woman’s (but no man’s) fertil-
ity plans, so that they became parents although they had earlier declared they did not 
intend to do so.
Lainiala (2011) also investigated how relationship satisfaction at the time of the 
survey related to childbearing intentions, and to actually having a first child. For a 
male respondent, relationship satisfaction was a stronger predictor of actual father-
hood than his own fertility intentions. For a female respondent, relationship satis-
faction was not as important for fertility, as a high degree of satisfaction with the 
spouse was related to both increased and decreased actual childbearing.
Other factors that negatively influenced the transition to a first child were age, 
being in education or unemployed, and for men, lack of a permanent job (Lainiala 
2012).
7.10  Infertility
Of the Finnish men and women studied who remained childless in the Relationship 
and Wellbeing Survey, the share who had no children because they were suffering 
from primary infertility was around 10 % (Miettinen and Rotkirch 2008). This 
would represent around 5 % of the whole adult population. Notkola (1995), using 
retrospective data on female cohorts born in 1938–1965, found that 3 % of women 
remained childless due to primary infertility. However, the proportion of couples 
who suffer from infertility may have increased in recent years due to both the post-
ponement of family formation and the spread of health conditions that can lead to 
infertility, such as obesity. On the other hand, assisted reproduction technologies 
have become increasingly sophisticated and available, countering the rise in child-
lessness due to primary infertility (Miettinen 2011). As the efficacy of treatments 
has improved, more couples will be able have the child they want with the help of 
technology. In 2013, 13,500 IVF-treatment cycles were started in Finland. From 
these treatments, 2473 live children were born, representing 4.4 % of live births in 
Finland in that year (National Institute for Health and Welfare 2015).
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7.11  Conclusions: Many Shades of Childlessness
For decades, Finland has had some of the highest rates childlessness in Europe 
among both men and women. An unusual feature of childlessness in Finland is that 
it is particularly prevalent among both men and women from the least educated 
groups of society. This pattern has become even more pronounced in recent decades, 
as we have shown here. Part of the explanation is that men and women in the least 
educated group are also less likely to have had any spouse.
Like the other Nordic countries, Finland has generous family policies and high 
levels of gender equality—characteristics that are often associated with compara-
tively high fertility levels (Rønsen and Skrede 2010, see also Section 2.5). The 
availability of childcare has also been shown to increase fertility at all parities 
(Rindfuss et al. 2010). It has also been suggested that during the severe economic 
recession in the early 1990s in Finland, family policies that provided child homec-
are allowances helped to sustain fertility levels (Vikat 2004). Whereas in the UK 
and the US childlessness rates are low among less educated women because 
unwanted pregnancies are common, the Nordic welfare state is highly successful at 
preventing unwanted pregnancies. Nevertheless, both overall and involuntary forms 
of childlessness have increased in Finland, even as cohort fertility has been rising 
and family benefits have become increasingly broad and generous.
There are some clear-cut reasons for not becoming a parent: the lack of partner, 
not wanting to have a child, or being unable to conceive. Of these reasons, not hav-
ing a partner remains the strongest single reason for not having children, in Finland 
and elsewhere. When we compare European countries, we can see that the propor-
tion of the population who have ever married remains positively correlated with 
lower levels of childlessness, and the results for Finland are in line with this broader 
picture (Miettinen et al. 2015). It is also increasingly more common for an individ-
ual to be childless even though he or she has a partner.
Most childless Finns approaching the end of their reproductive lives are not 
childless by choice or through infertility. Around 4–5 % of the whole population say 
they do not want to have children. At the other “extreme” of the childlessness spec-
trum, infertility affects about the same proportion of the population. Thus, for most 
Finns who are not parents, childlessness is not attributable to a single, clear-cut 
reason, but rather appears to result from various choices about love, work, and con-
traceptive use made at different stages of life.
Finland’s history of having higher levels of childlessness than the other Nordic 
countries may be attributable to both geographical and historical factors. Although 
comparative data are lacking, it is likely that Finland had more skewed national and 
local sex ratios because of the country’s losses in the Second World War, mass emi-
gration, and the low density of the population. These demographic challenges com-
bine with the diverging educational trajectories of young men and women. Compared 
to the other Nordic countries, Finland has had a larger proportion of women with 
tertiary education, and this gap has widened over time.
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The policies that successfully promote family formation may not be identical to 
those that would be most effective in preventing childlessness. Most worrying is the 
finding that childlessness—and consequently, proportions of persons without any 
close relatives in the old age—is increasing among the least educated men and 
women, who may be disadvantaged in terms of their access to health services, infer-
tility treatments, and counselling.
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Chapter 8
Childlessness in the United States
Tomas Frejka
8.1  Introduction
In recent decades, childlessness among women in the United States has attracted a 
considerable amount of attention in the professional literature, and is frequently 
discussed in newspapers and on radio and television talk shows. This does not come 
as a surprise, as the percentage of women who do not have any children by the end 
of their reproductive years doubled between the mid-1970s and the mid-2000s, 
from about 10 to 20 %. Since then, however, the share of women who remain child-
less has been declining: in 2010–2012, the share was around 15 % (Table 8.1).1 
While establishing the levels of and the trends in childlessness is relatively simple, 
determining the circumstances and reasons which lead women and couples to 
remain childless is more complex.
Three different sources of statistical data on childlessness are available in the 
U.S. This wealth of data is almost as much a curse as it is a blessing. However, using 
data from all three sources one can obtain a good approximate idea of the levels of 
and the trends in childlessness. Yet because each source provides somewhat differ-
ent data, it is difficult to determine which one most closely reflects reality. On bal-
ance the positive aspect of good approximate information prevails. Moreover, the 
overall perception provided by the three sources of data is consistent. Not only that. 
The available sources offer various types of information, including some kinds 
which are relatively rare. One of the sources contains a time series spanning an 
1 The levels of and trends in childlessness among women are based primarily on data from the 
Current Population Surveys in Table 8.1, which is generally corroborated by data from the cohort 
fertility tables (Fig. 8.2, 1970 cohort) and from the National Surveys of Family Growth (Table 8.2, 
latest years).
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entire century, which is also broken down by race. Another source provides data not 
only by race, but also for Hispanics. A third source contains data on whether women 
are temporarily, voluntarily, or non-voluntarily childless, as well as information 
about women’s personal characteristics and selected attitudes to work and family. 
These data are available for a span of close to four decades. Knowledge which can 
be gleaned from all three sources of data is likely to be expanded in the future.
Following this introduction, the sources of data are discussed. In Sect. 8.3 levels 
of and trends in childlessness are outlined. Section 8.4 deals with motivations and 
reasons for childlessness. Section 8.5 discusses trends and circumstances of black 
childlessness. The chapter concludes with an epilogue.
8.2  Sources of Data
The three sources of statistical data on childlessness are cohort fertility tables 
(National Center for Health Statistics of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention), the biannual supplements on fertility of the Current Population Survey 
(Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics), and the National Survey of Family 
Growth (National Center for Health Statistics of the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention [NCHS]).
Table 8.1 Shares of childless women at ages 40–44, all, white, white non-Hispanic, black, and 
Hispanic women, 1976–2012, United States
Survey 
year
Percent of women childless
Effect of Hispanic on White 
childlessness (in % points)All White
White 
non-Hispanic Black Hispanic
1976 10.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1980 10.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1985 11.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1990 16.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1994 17.5 18.0 n.a. 14.3 13.0 n.a.
1995 17.5 18.1 n.a. 15.1 10.1 n.a.
1998 19.0 19.5 20.1 17.0 14.5 −0.6
2000 19.0 19.2 20.3 17.7 10.9 −1.1
2002 17.9 17.9 18.5 19.2 13.1 −0.6
2004 19.3 19.1 20.0 21.3 13.8 −0.9
2006 20.4 21.2 22.5 16.4 14.4 −1.3
2008 17.8 18.0 17.9 18.0 18.9 0.1
2010 18.8 19.1 20.6 17.2 12.4 −1.5
2012 15.1 15.3 16.4 15.4 10.9 −1.1
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey for selected years, June 1976 to June 
2012
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8.2.1  The Cohort Fertility Tables
The Cohort Fertility Tables consist of two sets. The first set is based on recorded 
period fertility data for the years 1917–1973, and was prepared by Robert L. Heuser 
(1976). It provides information on childbearing of complete and incomplete birth 
cohorts of 1868–1959. The second set uses period data for 1960–2005, and was 
prepared by Brady E. Hamilton in collaboration with Candace M. Cosgrove (2010). 
Hamilton and Cosgrove updated this set with period fertility data for 2006–2009. It 
provides information on childbearing of complete and incomplete birth cohorts of 
1911–1995. The Heuser tables can be linked with the Hamilton and Cosgrove tables 
to create a series of data on childlessness for 93 consecutive birth cohorts.
8.2.2  The Fertility Supplement of the Current Population 
Survey
The Fertility Supplement of the Current Population Survey is one of 20 supple-
ments sometimes included in the Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly sur-
vey of households conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The CPS collects and maintains a comprehensive body of labor force 
data, including information on employment, unemployment, hours of work, earn-
ings, and other demographic and labor force characteristics. The periodic fertility 
supplement provides data on the number of children women aged 15–50 have ever 
had, and their characteristics. It is usually conducted every 2 years, but the intervals 
have varied from 1 to 4 years (see Table 8.1 and Fig. 8.3). Since the mid-1990s data 
on the U.S. Hispanic population2 have been provided (Bachu 1995).
8.2.3  The National Survey of Family Growth
The National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) gathers information on family life, 
marriage and divorce, pregnancy, infertility, use of contraception, and men’s and 
women’s health; i.e. data on fertility and on the intermediate factors that explain 
fertility. The NSFG was conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics 
(NCHS) in 1973, 1976, 1982, 1988, 1995, and 2002. The most recent NSFG cov-
ered the years 2006–2010 (Martinez et al. 2012). In these surveys childless women 
2 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines Hispanic or Latino as “a person of Cuban, 
Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless 
of race.” In data collection and presentation, federal agencies are required to use a minimum of two 
ethnicities: “Hispanic or Latino” and “Not Hispanic or Latino.”
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are comprised of three categories defined as follows (Abma and Martinez 2006; 
Martinez et al. 2012):
Temporarily Childless women are those who have not had any live births and 
expect a birth in the future.
Involuntarily Childless women are those with a fecundity impairment who 
reported to be sterile for non-contraceptive reasons; subfecund, i.e. they reported 
difficulty conceiving or delivering a baby or difficulty for partner to father a baby; 
or a doctor advised the woman never to become pregnant because of a medical dan-
ger to her, her fetus or both; married or cohabiting women that have had a 3 year 
period of unprotected sexual intercourse with no pregnancy.
Voluntarily Childless women are those who do not expect to have any children, 
and are either fecund or surgically sterile for contraceptive reasons.
Note that the cohort fertility tables are based on data from administrative birth 
records, whereas the other two data sources are based on sample surveys. The sam-
ple surveys provide information on the characteristics of mothers and their children 
which are not available in birth records. However, the estimates of common 
 measures based on the sample surveys are not precisely the same as those based on 
administrative birth records.
8.3  Levels of and Trends in Childlessness
8.3.1  Cohort Fertility Tables
In any given birth cohort, the youngest women bear few children. With each passing 
year, these women will have borne more children, and the share of women who 
remain childless declines. To ensure the comparability of the rates of childlessness 
between cohorts, the data on the proportion of childless women at the end of their 
childbearing years are assembled for each cohort. Figure 8.1 depicts the shares of 
all U.S. childless women, and of white and black women at age 50 in the Heuser 
(1976) and in the Hamilton and Cosgrove (2010) cohort fertility tables.
Among the 40 cohorts born between the late 1860s and the early 1910s, around 
20 % of white women remained childless. Women who lived through the main years 
of their childbearing period during the core years of the historic economic depres-
sion of the 1930s—cohorts born between 1906 and 1911—experienced relatively 
high rates of childlessness, about 21 %. However, this was not dramatically more 
than most of the preceding 40 cohorts. A rapid decline in the share of childless 
women started with the 1913 birth cohort and lasted through the 1925 cohort that 
reached a childless rate of 9 %. A low share of childlessness among white women 
fluctuating between 8 and 10 % was retained for almost 20 cohorts from the 1925 
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through the 1943 birth cohort. A pronounced increase in the shares of childless 
women ensued, from 10 % among the 1943 cohort to 18 % among the 1953 cohort. 
The childless rate at age 50 was close to 18 % for a few cohorts and then started to 
decline to around 17 % in the 1959 and 1960 cohorts (Fig. 8.1).
The long-term trends in the shares of childless black women differed from those 
of white women. For about 60 cohorts, starting with those of the mid-1880s through 
those of the mid-1940s, black women experienced higher rates of childlessness than 
white women. Notably, almost one-third of black women who were in their most 
fertile years during the Great Depression of the 1930s remained childless. With a 
time lag of about five cohorts shares of childless black women declined from 29 % 
among women born in 1916 for more than 30 cohorts to a low of 6 % in the 1948 
birth cohort. Thereafter, the share of childless black women increased reaching a 
share of 11 % in the 1960 cohort (Fig. 8.1).
Although numbers of births after age 40 have increased in recent years (Sobotka 
2009), these still tend to be relatively small. Consequently, trends in the shares of 
childless women at age 40 are essentially the same as trends in the shares of child-
less women at age 50 (Fig. 8.2). Thus the delineation of trends can be extended for 
10 additional cohorts, namely for U.S. women trends of childless women can be 
obtained by observing trends of shares at age 40 for the 1960s birth cohorts. These 
women concluded their childbearing during the 2010s, and their principal period of 
childbearing was during the mid- to late 1980s and early 1990s.
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Fig. 8.1 Shares of childless women at age 50, all, white and black women, birth cohorts 1867–
1960, United States (Sources: Heuser (1976); Hamilton and Cosgrove (2010))
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Among white women the declining trend of childless women extended into the 
1960s cohorts. The share of childless women in the 1960 birth cohort at age 40 was 
17.7 % and declined to 14.6 % in the 1970 birth cohort (Fig. 8.2). This implies that 
around 13 % of white women in the 1970 cohort will be childless at age 50. The 
rising trend in childlessness among black women of the 1950s cohorts stalled among 
the 1960s cohorts. The share of women who were childless at age 40 was 11.9 % 
among the 1960 birth cohort, and 12.1 % among the 1970 birth cohort (Fig. 8.2). 
This implies that around 11 % of black women in the 1970 cohort will be 
childless.
It appears that shares of white and black childless women in the 1970 cohort will 
be quite similar. The difference in the shares of white and black childless women in 
the 1950 cohort at age 40 was 10.2 percentage points which declined to 5.8 points 
in the 1960 cohort and to 2.5 points in the 1970 birth cohort.
Levels and trends of overall shares of childless women follow the levels and 
trends of white women quite closely. This is not surprising, as the majority of the 
U.S. population was and still is white, although the percentage of whites has been 
declining. In 1900 about 88 % of the U.S. population was white and 12 % was black 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975). These percentages were essentially maintained 
through 1970. As of 2000, whites comprised about 82 % and blacks 13 % of the 
population (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). The effect of black childlessness on the 
overall levels and trends is nonetheless discernable. When black childlessness is 
high the overall curve is above the white one, and vice versa.
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Fig. 8.2 Shares of childless women at age 40 (in per cent), all, white and black women, birth 
cohorts 1877–1970, United States (Sources: Heuser (1976); Hamilton and Cosgrove (2010))
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The share of all childless women at age 50 in the 1960 cohort was 15.5 % and at 
age 40–16.5 %, a difference of exactly 1.0 percentage point. The share of all child-
less women at age 40 in the 1970 cohort was 13.8 %. Thus it is virtually assured that 
the overall share of childless women in the 1970 cohort at age 50 will be below 
13 %, because the difference in the 10 years younger cohort was 1.0 percentage 
point and this difference of childlessness between ages 40 and 50 in a particular 
birth cohort was growing.
8.3.2  Fertility Supplements of the Current Population Survey
In the fertility supplements of the Current Population Surveys parity distributions—
and thus also the shares of childless women—are provided for 5-year age groups. 
Until recently the oldest age group for whom these data were available was 40–44. 
Since 2012 the age group 45–50 has been added. Table 8.1 and Fig. 8.3 are based on 
data for the 40–44 age group. Although childbearing does not end at age 44, this cut 
off was necessary to obtain long-term time series.
According to these data the average share of all childless women aged 40–44 in 
the United States increased from 10 % around 1980 to almost 20 % in the 2000s, i.e. 
the proportion of childless women increased almost twofold within 20 years. 
Toward the end of the 2000s and the early 2010s, childlessness declined (Table 8.1). 
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Fig. 8.3 Shares of childless women ages 40–44, white, black, and Hispanic women, 1976–2012, 
United States (Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey for selected years, June 
1976 to June 2012)
8 Childlessness in the United States
166
In the mid-1990s the shares of white childless women were almost 10 % higher than 
those of black women. By 2008–2012 the differences between white and black 
women in the rates of childlessness had diminished (Fig. 8.3 and Table 8.1).
When comparing childlessness of Hispanic women with childlessness among 
white and black women one has to keep in mind that in U.S. statistics Hispanics are 
included in the categories of “white” and “black.” Hispanics are considered an eth-
nic minority, not a race. It is nonetheless possible to get an idea of the effect of 
Hispanic childlessness on overall levels of childlessness of the race categories. Even 
though the Hispanic childlessness rate (5th numerical column in Table 8.1) is on 
average about 30 % lower than childlessness of non-Hispanic white women (3rd 
col.), the difference between the shares of all white childless women (2nd col. which 
includes white Hispanic women) and non-Hispanic white women is relatively small, 
on average this difference is only 0.9 percentage points (last col. in Table 8.1). The 
reason for such a small difference is that in 2010, for instance, Hispanic women 
constituted only about 18 % of white women, although the share of Hispanics in the 
population was increasing (U.S. Census Bureau 2011: Table 6). The effect of 
Hispanic black childlessness on total black childlessness was even smaller as the 
proportion of Hispanics among blacks was only about 5 % in 2010.
8.3.3  The National Surveys of Family Growth (NSFG)
Shares of childless women ages 40–44 rose from 7 % in the 1973–1976 rounds to 
18 % in the 1995 round of the NSFG. In the rounds conducted during the 2000s, the 
shares of childless women had settled at 15 % (Table 8.2 and Fig. 8.4). Among 
childless women ages 40–44 the smallest shares were experienced by the temporar-
ily childless. If the measurements had been taken at the end of women’s reproduc-
tive period, as was done in the cohort fertility tables, there would not be any 
temporarily childless women. As women ages 40–44 is the oldest category that can 
be analyzed, the temporarily childless women have a significant impact on the over-
all trends in childlessness. Since women are postponing births to higher ages, a 
larger amount of births are borne by older women; thus, an increasing proportion of 
women in the 40–44 age group still expect to bear children. While the share of tem-
porarily childless older women has been increasing steadily, it still represents only 
3 % of all women and around one-fifth of all childless women. The share of all 
women who are involuntarily childless has been relatively stable at an average of 
5 %. In the 1973–1976 rounds, the share of involuntarily childless women as a pro-
portion of all childless women was 60 % because the overall numbers of childless 
women were relatively small. In the latest rounds, about one-third of childless 
women would probably want to have children, but for one reason or another—pri-
marily related to a health issue—they have been unable to achieve this goal.
The NSFG definitions used to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary 
childlessness appear to be straightforward and clear (see Sect. 8.2.3 above). 
However, scholars have pointed out that an unknown segment of the women who at 
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Table 8.2 Women aged 40–44 and their childless status, National Survey of Family Growth, in 
per cent, United States
All women 1973–1976 1982 1988 1995 2002 2006–2010
One or more children 93 88 86 82 85 85
Childless 7 12 14 18 15 15
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
All women 1973–1976 1982 1988 1995 2002 2006–2010
One or more children 93 88 86 82 85 85
Voluntarily childless 2 5 8 10 6 8
Involuntarily childless 4 4 5 5 6 5
Temporarily childless 1 1 1 3 2 3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Childless women 1973–1976 1982 1988 1995 2002 2006–2010
Voluntarily 31 53 55 59 44 49
Involuntarily 60 38 36 26 40 30
Temporarily 9 9 10 16 16 21
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Abma and Martinez (2006), Martinez et al (2012), Mosher and Bachrach (1982), author’s 
calculations
Note: Sub-categories of childless do not add up to total due to rounding
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Fig. 8.4 Percent distribution of childless women aged 40–44 by childless status, National Survey 
of Family Growth, United States (Sources: Abma and Martinez (2006); Martinez et al (2012); 
Mosher and Bachrach (1982), author’s calculations)
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the end of their reproductive period report being voluntarily childless or having 
become involuntarily childless were postponing childbearing for various reasons 
until it became too late for them to bear children (Rindfuss et al. 1988: throughout). 
In other words, some, possibly many, women wind up being unintentionally child-
less as a result of having postponed childbearing. Regardless of how the childless-
ness occurred, using NSFG definitions, the percentage of the voluntarily childless 
increased from one-third in the 1970s rounds to approximately one-half of childless 
women in subsequent rounds (Table 8.2).
8.3.4  Personal Characteristics and Attitudes of Childless 
Women
There is ample evidence from several rounds of the NSFG that childless women, 
and particularly the voluntarily childless, are disproportionately white, are employed 
full-time, and have a higher education; and are less likely to be currently or formerly 
married and are less religious (Abma and Martinez 2006). For example, data from 
the 2002 round show that among women aged 35–44, 69 % of the voluntarily child-
less had some college or higher education, compared to 17 % among all women of 
that age; 76 % of the voluntarily childless were working full-time, compared to 51 % 
among all women; 79 % were non-Hispanic white, compared to 71 % among all 
women; and 35 % never attended religious services, compared to 17 % among all 
women (Abma and Martinez 2006).
Among the women aged 35–44, the voluntarily childless also differed from the 
temporarily and involuntarily childless in terms of economic characteristics. They 
had the highest individual and family incomes, the most extensive past work experi-
ence, and were the most likely to be employed in professional and managerial occu-
pations. For example, according to the results of the 1995 round, 57 % of the 
voluntarily childless had individual annual earnings of over US$25,000, compared 
to 41 % of the temporarily childless and 36 % of the involuntarily childless; and 
84 % had worked more than 15 years, compared with 72 % of the temporarily child-
less and 77 % of the involuntarily childless (Abma and Martinez 2006).
On the whole, the voluntarily childless tend to differ from women who have 
children and from the temporarily or the involuntarily childless in terms of their 
attitudes regarding gender egalitarianism, work, and family. For example, in their 
responses to questions in the 1995 round, 82 % of voluntarily childless versus 72 % 
of women with children disagreed with the statement “a man can make long-range 
plans, a woman cannot;” and 84 % of the voluntarily childless versus 75 % of the 
women with children agreed with the statement “young girls are entitled to as much 
independence as boys.” The voluntarily childless also stood out in their response to 
the question of whether “women are happier if they stay at home and take care of 
their children;” 87 % of them disagreed, compared with around 76 % of the women 
who had children or were temporarily or involuntarily childless (Abma and Martinez 
2006).
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8.4  Reasons and Motivations for Remaining Childless
In a discussion of the biological factors which contribute to childbearing motiva-
tions, Foster (2000: 227) argued that because of their genetic predisposition to nur-
ture and the effects of hormones, “most women, motivated by a genetically 
developed desire to nurture, will choose to have at least one child, given reasonably 
favorable circumstances.” Moreover, McQuillan et al. (2008: 17) established that 
motherhood is valued by mothers and non-mothers alike, and that “there is no evi-
dence that valuing motherhood is in conflict with valuing work success among non- 
mothers, and among mothers the association is positive.” Yet for prolonged periods 
a fifth of U.S. women, i.e. around 20 %, remained childless. Why?
In the first place about 5 % of women cannot or should not bear children; they are 
involuntarily childless, mostly due to fecundity impairments or health issues 
(Fig. 8.4 and Table 8.2). Then there are the temporarily childless, i.e. those that are 
still expecting to have a child. However, these women can no longer be considered 
temporarily childless once they have reached the end of their childbearing period. 
The remainder of women remains childless for a wide variety of reasons.
People grow up and live in differing social, cultural, and economic circumstances 
which influence their decisions regarding childbearing. They live aided or obstructed 
by a material world, and are affected by an array of social norms. They may also 
have their own independent reasons for not having children. Both the material con-
ditions and the norms affecting their decisions may change over time. If we were to 
accept the notion that every woman has a natural desire to have children, irrespec-
tive of her surroundings, there would not be any voluntary childlessness. Indeed, 
there was a time in U.S. history when only around 8 % of white women and only 
about 5 to 6 % of black women were childless. Among these women, the rates of 
voluntary childlessness must have been negligible. The 1973–1976 round of the 
NSFG found that only 2 % of women reported being voluntarily childless, which 
implies that this share might have been even lower during the 1960s among white 
women. Moreover, the 5–6 % rate of childlessness among black women leaves very 
little room for voluntary childlessness. On the other hand, as was pointed out above, 
at certain points in time around 20 % of white women and almost 30 % of black 
women were childless, which implies that the shares of “voluntary” childlessness 
were large.
The basic explanation for these extreme high and low childlessness rates is the 
fact that the former occurred at a time of economic hardship and psychological 
stress for large strata of the population affecting family life during the Great 
Depression which started in 1929 and lasted through the early to mid-1930s. 
Conversely, the low childlessness rates occurred when a majority of the population 
experienced favorable economic and social conditions for childbearing after the 
Second World War. In his recently published book, Labor’s Love lost: The Rise and 
Fall of the Working-Class Family in America, Cherlin (2014) masterfully describes 
in great detail changes in American family life over the past two centuries. He char-
acterizes “the Great Depression [as] a cataclysmic event in the United States in its 
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depth and duration” (Cherlin 2014: 60). Based on contemporary sociological 
research of Komarovsky (1940), Cherlin discusses the effect of the Depression, 
inter alia, on reproductive behavior.
Their sex lives often deteriorated: in twenty-two out of thirty-eight families for which ade-
quate information was collected, the frequency of sexual relations declined--including four 
families in which sex stopped altogether. In some cases, however, couples reduced sexual 
activity not because of emotional strain but in order to lower the chance that the wife would 
become pregnant. Without modern means of birth control such as the pill or the IUD, finan-
cially struggling couples did what they could to avoid having another mouth to feed. One 
parent said, “It is a crime for children to be born when the parents haven’t got enough 
money to have them properly” (Cherlin 2014: 79).
The low shares of childlessness make clear sense in light of Cherlin’s characteriza-
tion of the living conditions of American families in the post-World War II years.
Why did young couples have so many children? One reason lay in the unique life histories 
of the generation who were in their twenties and thirties. They experienced the Great 
Depression as children or adolescents and then a world war erupted as they reached adult-
hood. After enduring these two cataclysmic events, the “great generation,” as they are 
sometimes called, was pleased in peacetime to turn inward toward home and family. … 
Family life was the domain in which they found … security. Raising children provided a 
sense of purpose to adults who had seen how fragile the social world could be. … Moreover, 
conditions were favorable for family formation and fertility: unemployment rates were low, 
wages were rising, and the government had enacted the GI Bill, which offered low-interest 
home mortgage loans to veterans so that they could buy single-family homes. … Employers 
in the rapidly expanding American economy were forced to offer higher wages in order to 
attract new workers because they were in short supply (Cherlin 2014:115).
What remains to be clarified are the social, cultural, and economic circumstances 
shaping childlessness levels and trends prior to the Great Depression of the 1930s 
and the levels and trends unfolding during the two to three last decades of the twen-
tieth century, as well as the peak and subsequent decline in childlessness in the early 
twenty-first century.
It could be considered odd that for 40 years (or 40 birth cohorts, i.e. 1867–1907) 
childlessness was at a similar level as during the Great Depression (Fig. 8.1). 
Morgan (1991) has argued that the period of high childlessness in late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries was mainly due to a strong motivation to delay mar-
riage and childbearing, which eventually resulted in many women remaining child-
less, even though that was not their initial intention. Childbearing delays were 
significantly more pronounced in the economically more advanced states of the 
northeast. Many young women working in mills “may have been important income 
earners. Pressure for them to marry may have been replaced by pressure to continue 
supporting the family” (Morgan 1991: 801). Furthermore, the harsh conditions of 
the economic depression of the 1890s might have had an impact similar to that of 
the Great Depression of the 1930s, even though it was not as long or as deep. In 
addition, the risk of remaining childless would have been greater when childbearing 
was delayed, as sub-fecundity and sterility increases among women in their thirties. 
Finally, growing numbers of women were entering professions during this period, 
T. Frejka
171
and these women tended not to marry; or, if they married, they often remained 
childless.
Turning our attention to the end of the twentieth century and the early twenty- 
first century, numerous societal developments have been taking place simultane-
ously, each of which has played a role in shaping contemporary childbearing 
behavior, and has thus contributed to trends in childlessness. These include:
• The re-emergence of marriage and childbearing postponement (Kohler et al. 
2002; Hašková 2007; Goldstein et al. 2009; Frejka 2011)
• Rising female labor force participation rates, which are now almost as high as 
those of men (Oppenheimer 1994; Bianchi 2011)
• The work-family dilemma for employed women (Bianchi 2011)
• The status of the childcare infrastructure (Laughlin 2013)
• The increase in women’s earnings, and the growth in their income relative to that 
of men (Cherlin 2014: 126; Wang et al. 2013)
• The growing empowerment of women (Anonymous 2009)
• High rates of incarceration (Tsai and Scommenga 2012)
• The deployment of men and women in wars (Adams 2013)
• Technological developments in production and communication, and their impact 
on the composition of the work force (Karoly and Panis 2004; Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2014)
• The hollowing out of the work force (Cherlin 2014: 124–125)
• Changes in the class structure of society, with education playing the decisive role 
(Cherlin 2014)
• Growing job insecurity, particularly among the less educated (Farber 2010)
• Changing marriage and cohabitation patterns (Cherlin 2009)
• Changing income and wealth distribution patterns (Saez and Zucman 2014)
• Income stagnation among a large share of the population (Krugman 2007; Fry 
and Kochhar 2014)
The above developments may influence women and their partners—in various 
ways, at different stages, and to differing degrees—in their inadvertent or conscious 
deliberations about whether to remain childless.
On the other hand there are those, including professionals such as psychologists 
and physicians, who have argued that some women and men decide to remain child-
less for their own subjective reasons. These individuals presumably engage in an 
independent decision-making process in which they focus on their personal motiva-
tions and preferences, rather than allowing themselves to be influenced by their 
circumstances. Scott (2009: 75–110; 222) reported the results of a survey of 
 childless individuals which found that the six most compelling motivation state-
ments for not having children were:
• I love our life, our relationship, as it is, and having a child won't enhance it.
• I value freedom and independence.
• I do not want to take on the responsibility of raising a child.
• I have no desire to have a child, no maternal/paternal instinct.
8 Childlessness in the United States
172
• I want to accomplish/experience things in life that would be difficult to do if I 
was a parent.
• I want to focus my time and energy on my own interests, needs, or goals.
Taking into account the wide range of circumstances and personal subjective rea-
sons which can affect people’s decisions about whether to have children can help us 
to better understand the increase in the share of women who remained childless 
which occurred during the final decades of the twentieth century and into the 
twenty-first century. However, the reasons for the apparent reversal in this trend in 
the early years of the twenty-first century have yet to be explored. That is a topic for 
discussion and research in the near future, especially if this trend continues.
8.5  Black Childlessness: Trends and Explanations
For almost 60 birth cohorts (1883–1942) childlessness was higher among black 
than among white women (Fig. 8.1). At its peak black childlessness was 2.4 times 
higher than it was among white women – in the 1924 and 1925 birth cohorts. 
Starting with the cohorts born in the early 1940s, this trend was reversed, and black 
women became less likely than white women to be childless. Among the youngest 
cohorts, those born in the late 1950s and the 1960s, the shares of black and of white 
Americans who are childless are converging at around 12–15 % (Figs. 8.1 and 8.2). 
The relatively low childlessness among black women and the convergence with 
white childlessness since the end of the twentieth century is generally confirmed by 
data from the Fertility Supplements of the Current Population Survey as well as the 
National Surveys of Family Growth.
The basic reasons for high black childlessness were analogous to those shaping 
white childlessness, namely difficult economic and social settings, psychological 
stress and social norms. In addition, living conditions of black Americans were 
incomparably more difficult than those of whites. Racial segregation, discrimina-
tion, and inequalities have been basic features of American society throughout its 
history (Massey 2011), and are reflected in virtually all aspects of life, such as eco-
nomic opportunities, remuneration, schooling, housing, and access to health and 
reproductive services.
Farley (1970: 217–226) was the first to analyze deteriorating health conditions of 
blacks systematically, and their effect on reproductive behavior during the first three 
decades of the twentieth century. An increase in the prevalence of venereal diseases, 
such as syphilis and gonorrhea may have been an important factor generating the 
fertility decline and the increase in childlessness among blacks, which culminated 
in the 1930s. Farley was criticized by McFalls (1973: 18) and others who argued in 
favor of “a more conservative interpretation of the importance of VD in the natality 
history of the black population.” Yet McFalls (1973: 18) conceded that “health fac-
tors undoubtedly played a more significant role” than other societal factors.
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But what explains the decline in black childlessness and the crossover from rela-
tively high to relatively low levels of childlessness from the 1941 to the 1942 birth 
cohorts? The decline in the childlessness rate of black women started with the 
cohorts most affected by the Great Depression, namely those born around 1915, and 
lasted until the 1948 cohort, from a share of 30 % to 6 % (Figs. 8.1 and 8.2). The 
childlessness decline among blacks took more than twice as long as that for white 
women, 33 compared to 14 cohorts. The childlessness descent for white women 
also started with the cohorts most affected by the depression of the 1930s, but 
stopped when living conditions started to improve significantly after the Second 
World War and essentially settled at that level for over 20 birth cohorts. Among 
black women childlessness stopped declining temporarily for a few birth cohorts – 
those born between 1926 and 1931 – but then resumed its decline with new force. 
Black childlessness declined from 20 % in the 1931 cohort to 6 % in the 1948 cohort.
The passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 strengthened government support 
for health activities (Farley 1970: 230–235). Title VI of that act appropriated money 
“for the purpose of assisting States, counties…. in establishing and maintaining 
adequate public health service, including the training of personnel for State and 
local health work…” This was an important element in the development of the 
health system. The resulting improvements in the health of the black population in 
turn led to declines in childlessness.
Moreover, there may be some justification to assume that improvements in living 
conditions and educational attainment levels among the black population during the 
second half of the twentieth century were associated with the long-term decline in 
childlessness. This progress was both absolute as well as relative to that of the white 
population. While living conditions for blacks remained inferior to those of whites, 
the disparities were narrowing as blacks were catching up. On average, incomes of 
blacks were rising faster than those of whites, especially during the 1990s (Fig. 8.5). 
Rates of poverty among blacks were also improving. Based on the definition of 
poverty of the U.S. Census Bureau, the ratio of blacks to whites who were living in 
poverty declined from 3.4 in 1970 to 2.1 in 2010 (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2012: Table 
B-1). In addition, educational attainment levels of blacks were increasing faster than 
those of whites. Between 1960 and 2009, the shares of blacks aged 25 and older 
who had graduated from high school rose from 20.1 to 84.1 %, whereas the corre-
sponding shares of whites increased from 43.2 to 87.1 % (U.S. Census Bureau 2012: 
Table 225). Over the same period, the shares of blacks aged 25 and older who had 
graduated from college grew from 3.1 to 19.3 %, while the corresponding shares of 
whites increased from 8.1 to 29.9 % (U.S. Census Bureau 2012: Table 225).
What might be the reasons for the most recent turnaround – the doubling in black 
childlessness from 6 % in the 1948 birth cohort to 12 % in the 1968 cohort? The 
numerous societal developments shaping childlessness that have been taking place 
around the turn of the century listed above, together with the subjective motivations 
of women for not having children, surely played a role in influencing contemporary 
childbearing behavior and thus contributed to the increase in childlessness of black 
women.
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Other important factors which might have influenced the recent rise in black 
childlessness are changes in union formation and marital trends, and in fertility 
trends within unions. According to Cherlin (2009: 169), “the larger story for African 
Americans is a sharp decline in marriage that is far greater than among other 
groups.” In 2010 the share of black married women over age 18 was a mere 31 % 
compared to 61 % in 1960. In contrast, among white women this share declined 
from 74 to 55 % (Cohn et al. 2011). These developments are in line with the findings 
of Espenshade (1985: 209), who concluded that “at least since 1960 in the United 
States, a weakening of marriage has been under way. The fading centrality of mar-
riage in the lives of American men and women is more noticeable for blacks than 
for whites.” Only 24 % of black women aged 15–44 were married compared with 
46 % of white non-Hispanic women according to the NSFG 2006–2010 round 
(Copen et al 2012: 12).
A comprehensive, albeit complex, set of explanations for declining marriage 
rates among blacks has been revealed by research conducted by Banks (2011). Most 
black women want to marry and have children, as getting married is seen as a marker 
of status and social prestige, and remains an aspiration. Almost all black women 
would prefer to have a partner of the same race, as they are acculturated to date and 
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marry black men, and rarely marry across racial lines. In the African American 
community, however, there is a considerable shortage of successful black men who 
are educated, employed, and have respectful earnings. One reason for this shortfall 
is the extraordinarily high rate of incarceration of black men (Massey 2011:10; Tsai 
and Scommenga 2012). Second, black men are up to three times more likely than 
black women to marry a person of a different race. Third, at all educational levels 
men’s attendance and attainment rates are far below those of women. In these cir-
cumstances, many black women remain single or marry less educated black men. In 
such unions, women tend to be better educated and earn more money than their 
spouse, which can result in tensions over gender roles. Such marriages have a high 
potential to dissolve. Hence a high divorce rate among blacks is another reason why 
their marriage rates are low.
Data on trends in the types of first unions for women aged 15–44 confirm the 
decline in percentages of women who are married. Shares of marriages in first 
unions declined from 25.2 % in 1995 to 12.5 % in the 2006–2010 round of the 
National Survey of Family Growth (Table 8.3). Over the same period, the share of 
unions which were cohabitations increased from 35.4 to 49.2 %. Consequently, the 
percentages of black women of reproductive age who were not in any union hardly 
changed between the 1995 and the 2006–2010 NSFG rounds, i.e. instead of getting 
married a large share of black women were living in a consensual union. That 
implies that the recent increase in childlessness of black women does not appear to 
be associated with a decline in the percentage of women who are in a union. The 
combined shares of cohabiting and married women were 60.6 and 61.7 % in 1995 
and 2006–2010, respectively.
What did change dramatically between 1995 and 2013 was the fertility rate of 
unmarried black women; it declined by 17 %, from 74.5 to 61.7 births per 1000 
unmarried black women (Table 8.4). It was this significant decline in the fertility 
rate which was associated with the rise in black childlessness between the 1948 and 
the 1968 birth cohorts (Fig. 8.2). It is worth noting that the fertility rate of unmarried 
black women was almost twice the rate of unmarried white non-Hispanic women. 
Nonetheless, the decline in black fertility, overall and especially of unmarried – 
Table 8.3 Type of first unions, women ages 15–44, United States
Year No union Cohabitation Marriage Total
1995 39.4 35.4 25.2 100
2006–2010 38.4 49.2 12.5 100
Source: Copen et al. (2013) and Martin et al. (2015)
Table 8.4 Births per 1000 women ages 15–44, by race, United States
Year All black women Black unmarried women White non-Hispanic unmarried women
1995 71.0 74.5 28.1
2006 71.4 70.7 32.4
2013 64.7 61.7 31.7
Source: Copen et al. (2013) and Martin et al. (2015)
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cohabiting and never married – women, was apparently the decisive factor in the 
recent rise of black childlessness.
8.6  Epilogue
More than ever in U.S. history, women and couples can regulate their fertility. They 
have access to a wide variety of means to prevent childbearing, and there is over 
20 years of experience with assisted reproductive technologies (ART) which can 
alleviate the burden of infertility. A Division of Reproductive Health at the Centers 
for Disease Control has a long history of surveillance and research in women’s 
health and fertility, adolescent reproductive health, and safe motherhood. In response 
to a congressional mandate, CDC has started to strengthen existing data collection 
efforts initiated by the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and 
the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), and to develop a national 
system for monitoring ART use and outcomes.
The facts, i.e. the childlessness levels and trends since the late nineteenth cen-
tury, are reasonably well known. But often the mechanisms that shaped the facts 
have not been thoroughly deciphered, although some of the basic circumstances 
affecting levels and trends of childlessness are quite obvious, namely the concurrent 
economic and social conditions and cultural norms.
The U.S. population has experienced periods of very high and very low child-
lessness. The challenging living conditions in the 1930s appear to have been the 
main cause of the high levels of childlessness observed in that period. In contrast, 
the favorable living standards and enlightened public policies of the 1940s, 1950s, 
and 1960s were instrumental in maintaining low levels of childlessness.
Living conditions of African Americans were far more difficult than those of 
white Americans; hence higher black than white childlessness during much of the 
twentieth century. Subsequently black childlessness declined to levels below those 
of whites which in part was likely to have been due to improvements in the health 
and living conditions of blacks, even though these conditions continued to be infe-
rior to those of whites.
In the recent past, i.e. since the 1970s through the late 1990s/early 2000s, the 
three independent sources of data indicate that the overall childlessness rate doubled 
(Figs. 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 and Tables 8.1 and 8.2). This was the case among white 
as well as among black women, although not quite for identical birth cohorts 
(Fig. 8.2).
While history provides a general understanding of the principal causes of child-
lessness, the experience of the past few decades points to the complexity inherent in 
identifying more specific factors shaping levels and trends of childlessness. In 
Sect. 8.4 above, 15 such societal factors discussed in the literature are listed. In 
addition, people claim to have personal motivations and preferences for not having 
children. Six of the most compelling ones were also listed above. What appears 
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lacking is an overall picture of the interaction of the elements which shape child-
lessness, and how these change over time.
As of the early 2010s, around 12–16 % of U.S. white and black women over age 
40 remained childless. Among Hispanic women this share was lower, about 11 % 
were childless. Whether these percentages will increase or decline is impossible to 
predict. It depends on whether the material world will be aiding or obstructing fam-
ily formation, and how cultural norms and personal attitudes will change over time.
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Chapter 9
Education and Childlessness: The Influence 
of Educational Field and Educational Level 
on Childlessness among Swedish and Austrian 
Women
Gerda Neyer, Jan M. Hoem, and Gunnar Andersson
9.1  Introduction
Demographic research has long paid considerable attention to the connections 
between education and childlessness. For western countries it has regularly been 
shown that ultimate childlessness increases with a woman’s educational level (see, 
e.g., Berrington et al., or Kreyenfeld and Konietzka in this volume). Researchers 
normally focus on individual-level explanations for this pattern, and there are com-
peting interpretations of it. Economic theory holds that for women with more edu-
cation, motherhood entails increased opportunity costs: i.e., compared to less 
educated women, highly educated women lose more income and human capital by 
concentrating on motherhood and on caregiving tasks. As a consequence, econo-
mists expect childlessness to increase with a woman’s educational level (Becker 
1960; Cigno 1991). Some feminist demographers have argued that having more 
education provides women with more economic independence and personal auton-
omy, and that highly educated women are therefore less likely to marry than less 
educated women (Oppenheimer 1994). Since unmarried women are more likely to 
remain childless than their married counterparts, the share of women who are child-
less should be higher among those who are highly educated (Kiernan 1989; Blossfeld 
and Huinink 1991; Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995). Theories that focus on changes in 
This contribution is a modified version of the German texts by Neyer et al. (2013) and Neyer 
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our graphs, tables, and other materials which we previously published in their journal or book.
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culture, values, and norms provide a third type of explanation. Researchers who 
take this perspective regard increasing childlessness as a consequence of a broaden-
ing range of life choices (van de Kaa 1996; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). They 
maintain that having more education offers women a wider spectrum of opportuni-
ties for organising their life, and that having children may thus become less impor-
tant than other options (Rindfuss et al. 1996). The life course perspective offers yet 
another type of reasoning to explain the same general pattern: i.e., that because they 
spend longer periods of time in education and start employment later, women post-
pone motherhood, possibly up to an age at which physical fecundity may be reduced. 
Thus, childlessness may be expected to be higher among women who spend longer 
periods of time in education (Rindfuss and Bumpass 1976; Gustafsson 2001; 
Kravdal 2001).
However, empirical findings on childlessness for the former communist coun-
tries of Eastern Europe call into question the assumption of a monotonic relation-
ship between educational level and childlessness. In these countries, women with 
more education do not necessarily have higher rates of childlessness than women 
with less education (Kantorova 2004; Kreyenfeld 2004). A similar conundrum is 
found in the Nordic countries (Andersson et al. 2009). Studies of the relationship 
between educational field and childlessness further complicate the picture. Findings 
for Sweden (Hoem et al. 2006), Norway (Lappegård and Rønsen 2005), Spain 
(Martín-García and Baizán 2006), Greece (Bagavos 2010), the Netherlands (Begall 
and Mills 2012), Germany (Maul 2012; Rösler 2012), the U.S. (Michelmore and 
Musick 2014), and European countries in general (Van Bavel 2010) indicate that 
women who have been educated to work in the education or health sector are sig-
nificantly less likely to be childless than women who have been educated to work in 
other fields. In some cases the connection between educational field and childless-
ness is even stronger than the association between educational level and childless-
ness (Hoem et al. 2006; Van Bavel 2010).
We argue in this paper that a purely individual-level approach is not sufficient to 
resolve these apparent discrepancies. To find a valid explanation for the similarities 
and the differences in patterns of childlessness across educational groups and across 
countries, we need to take an institutional approach. We furthermore show that the 
demographic focus on family policies as the core institutional factor shaping child-
bearing patterns in highly developed countries is also not sufficient for explaining 
patterns of childlessness. We call for a comprehensive view of institutions that con-
siders the educational system, the labour market, and family and gender policies, as 
well as the interactions between these institutions.
Based on this reasoning, we compare the ultimate levels of childlessness of 
women born in 1955–1959 in Sweden and in Austria, according to their educational 
level and their educational field.1 While the institutions of Sweden and Austria are 
similar in a number of ways, there are also essential differences in the educational 
1 In this contribution we use the terms educational field, educational orientation, and type of educa-
tion interchangeably. The same applies to level of childlessness, rates of childlessness, and per cent 
childless.
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systems and in the labour market, in gender and family policies of the two countries. 
We contend that these differences have contributed to the marked differences we 
observe in the rates of childlessness among Austrian and Swedish women. To pro-
vide background information in support of this position, we briefly sketch in the 
following section the relevant country-specific aspects of the Swedish and the 
Austrian educational systems, and of the two countries’ labour market, gender, and 
family policies (Sect. 9.2). We limit the information presented to the period 1970–
1990s, when the women who were born in 1955–1959 were 15–40 years old, and 
were thus in their main childbearing years. In Sect. 9.3 we briefly describe the data 
and the methods we use in our analysis, and we present our main findings. We con-
clude the paper with our reflections on the possible institutional and individual-level 
explanations for our empirical results, and the implications of our findings for fur-
ther research (Sect. 9.4).
9.2  Sweden and Austria – Institutional Commonalities 
and Differences
Because of their similarities and differences, Sweden and Austria are particularly 
suitable for a comparison of women’s childlessness according to educational attain-
ment. Both countries have small populations, a factor that influences their politics 
and policy formation process (Katzenstein 1985). Both have a long welfare tradition 
and can be regarded as strong welfare states in which social policies have had con-
siderable influence on social structures. Both countries have coordinated market 
economies with strong employment protections for workers and employees 
(Estévez-Abe et al. 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001). In the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
Austrian federal social democratic government looked to Sweden’s welfare state as 
a model in its efforts to modernise Austrian society (Hoem et al. 2001). The two 
countries have also undertaken similar family policy reforms. For example, both 
countries have introduced individual (rather than family-level) taxation, established 
legal equality between marital and non-marital children, legalised abortion in the 
first months of pregnancy, amended their parental leave regulations to increase 
women’s employment, and actively promoted gender equality in many areas of pub-
lic life. Moreover, in the late 1960s and early 1970s both countries reformed their 
educational systems to make higher education available to all social groups.
Despite these commonalities, the educational, gender, family, and social policies 
in Sweden and in Austria differ fundamentally in terms of their content and their 
aims. In political science, Sweden is classified as a proto-typical universalistic wel-
fare state whose public policies are designed to achieve greater social and gender 
equality (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 2000). By contrast, Austria is seen as a 
proto-typical conservative welfare state whose policies are designed to preserve 
social status differentials and perpetuate gender inequality (op cit., Marten et al. 
2012). These basic orientations permeate all of the policy areas relevant to 
childbearing.
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9.2.1  Sweden
Since the 1960s, Swedish labour market and social policies have actively promoted 
the integration of all adults into the employment system, and particularly of mothers 
with (small) children. Institutional day-care facilities for children of all age groups 
were gradually expanded to guarantee each child a place in public child care. As a 
consequence, for the past 50 years Sweden has been among the European countries 
with the highest public childcare coverage rates for children of all age groups 
(Bergqvist and Nyberg 2002; Neyer 2003). Maternity protection was replaced by a 
gender-neutral system of parental leave which grants both parents an individual 
right to paid parental leave. The (paid) leave was extended successively from 6 
months (1974) to 12 months (1989), and an extra non-transferable “daddy month” 
was added in 1995 to promote a gender-equal division of care (for details, see 
Duvander and Ferrarini 2010). Until the child’s eighth year of life, each parent has 
the flexibility to take this leave on a part-time or a full-time basis, continuously or 
in segments, or even as individual days. Parental leave may also be combined with 
periods during which the parent is attending (further) education. While on parental 
leave, each mother or father receives an income-dependent benefit which replaces a 
large percentage of his or her previous income. The income replacement rate was 
about 90 % in the 1970s and 1980s and was 80 % thereafter, up to a fixed income 
ceiling. In addition to making it easier for parents to combine employment and fam-
ily, Sweden has implemented comprehensive regulations to enhance gender and 
economic equality across all social groups. This includes the active promotion of 
equality in employment, wages and salaries, career advancement, professional and 
political representation, and education (Bergqvist et al. 1999).
The Swedish educational system is designed to be open, flexible, and supportive 
of social equality. It is oriented towards life-long learning (for details see Henz 
2001; Halldén 2008). To ensure that as many people as possible have access to 
higher education, the system does not channel pupils into segregated educational 
streams early in their educational career. It is also relatively easy for pupils to later 
revise their early educational choices. Swedish primary schools provide 9 years of 
compulsory comprehensive education for children between the ages of seven and 
16. The curriculum is largely the same for all pupils at this level. After primary 
school the majority of pupils enter (voluntary) upper-secondary education. If there 
is competition for places in certain upper-secondary programmes, the pupils’ grades 
determine which programmes they can choose from (Erikson and Jonsson 1996). 
For the cohorts born in 1955–1959, upper-secondary education still encompassed 
both 2-year and 3-year lines of education; the 2-year lines were converted into a 
3-year line in the 1990s. The focus of the 3-year line is on theoretical knowledge. 
After successfully completing upper-secondary school pupils are entitled to enrol in 
tertiary education. The focus of most of the 2-year (and now converted 3-year) lines 
is on occupational and semi-occupational training. However, to ensure that students 
have the opportunity to change to other lines of education, a large share of the 
coursework is in general subjects, while practical vocational training in firms makes 
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up only a small part of the course of study. By taking additional courses pupils in 
2-year lines could earn the 3-year qualification needed to enrol in the tertiary edu-
cational system (Halldén 2008). Since the 1970s, admission to tertiary education 
has been regulated by a numerus clausus. Standardised eligibility and admission 
regulations are applied to all tertiary programmes and to all levels (Erikson and 
Jonsson 1996). Tertiary education has three levels: (1) 2- to 3-year lines of study 
that mainly offer advanced vocational education, (2) lines of study of at least 3–4 
years that lead to a bachelor’s or a master’s degree, and (3) further studies that lead 
to a licentiate or a doctoral degree. The third level is intended to prepare the student 
for a scientific career.
Despite the selection process applied to upper-secondary-level and tertiary-level 
programmes, the Swedish educational system aims to equalise educational attain-
ment and reduce class differentials (Erikson and Jonsson 1996). It is flexibly organ-
ised, highly permeable, and has special procedures to allow for late entry into 
(higher) education. Interruptions in education, moves out of and back into educa-
tion, and changes in the educational line are always possible, and are often used. 
Individuals have a right to interrupt their employment to further their education. An 
extensive system of adult education and of active labour market policies facilitates 
and promotes (re-)education, training, and skill enhancement. Education is tuition 
free. A generous system of financial support, consisting of grants and loans, for 
individuals in higher education encourages and facilitates educational participation 
throughout the life course. This has resulted in high levels of educational participa-
tion and the widespread use of opportunities to earn new or improved qualifications 
on a flexible basis (Tesching 2012).
9.2.2  Austria
Austria has remained a conservative corporatist welfare state in spite of the reforms 
of the 1970s and early 1980s (Neyer 2003; Obinger and Tálos 2010). The education, 
employment, and welfare systems are not aligned as closely with the equality prin-
ciples as the Swedish systems are. Austrian labour and social politics have focused 
more on securing the branch- and occupation-specific rights of workers and employ-
ees and on supporting the male breadwinner model than on ensuring the gender- 
equal integration of women into the labour market or on reducing gender, social, 
and economic inequality (Biffl 1997). Fertility-related family policies were designed 
to make it easier for mothers to leave the labour market and focus full-time on car-
ing for their children. Until 1990, parental leave lasted until the child’s first birthday, 
and was for mothers only. In 1990, parental leave was extended to the child’s second 
birthday, and restricted options for part-time leave and father’s leave were intro-
duced. Under a 1996 amendment 6 months of the parental leave were reserved for 
fathers. During the leave, previously employed mothers and fathers received a low, 
flat rate benefit which was independent of their previous income, but dependent on 
their partnership status. Because of the low benefit level and the complicated 
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regulations on part-time work and on how the leave could be split between the 
mother and the father, parental leave was almost exclusively taken by women as 
full-time leave (Hoem et al. 2001; Neyer 2010).2 Until recently, there were very few 
childcare places for children under age three or for children of school age (Statistik 
Austria 2014: Table 19). Thus, many women leave their job after taking parental 
leave or interrupt their employment for several years.
The Austrian school system has three distinct features: the early streaming of 
pupils into a complex set of educational paths, the “dual system” of apprenticeship 
and its separation from the main educational system, and the limited options for 
revising previous educational choices. As in Sweden, compulsory education in 
Austria lasts 9 years. However, in Austria the common primary school lasts only 4 
years, up to the age of ten. Thereafter, the educational lines separate, with pupils 
being channelled into an upper level of primary school or a lower secondary school 
(Hauptschule), both lasting 4 years; or into an 8-year high school (Gymnasium) 
with a lower-secondary and an upper-secondary level. Pupils’ grades determine 
which type of school they can attend. To attend a Gymnasium, the pupils of our 
cohorts also had to pass an entrance exam. The Gymnasium and the Hauptschule are 
further subdivided. In the Hauptschule the pupils are grouped according to educa-
tional attainment (usually grades). In the Gymnasium pupils have to choose a spe-
cific subject line for their upper-secondary level education, such as a concentration 
on humanities, natural science/mathematics education, or home economics.
Pupils who have completed the Volksschule or Hauptschule or who have left the 
Gymnasium after completing its lower-secondary level have several options for 
continuing their education: (1) They can go on to a vocational middle school 
(berufsbildende mittlere Schule), which generally lasts 3–4 years and offers both 
vocational and general courses. (2) They can choose an apprenticeship (Lehre), 
which usually takes 3 years. The programme consists primarily of vocational train-
ing in firms, complemented by occupation-specific theoretical education in special 
vocational schools (“dual system”). Apprenticeships are not integrated into the 
“regular” educational system.3 (3) Pupils with good grades can transfer to an upper- 
secondary high school (Oberstufenrealgymnasium), which is a Gymnasium that 
only offers the upper-secondary level.4 (4) Pupils can transfer to a vocational upper- 
secondary high school (Berufsbildende höhere Schule) that takes 5 years to com-
plete, and that offers vocational training together with a programme of general 
2 In 2002 a 3-year childrearing benefit for all mothers (or fathers) replaced the 2-year parental leave 
benefit for working mothers (or fathers). The regulations were subsequently amended several 
times, so that parents can now choose between five different variants of payment length with four 
flat rate benefits and one income-dependent benefit. The longest variant is the most popular one, 
and fathers on leave are still a minority (for details, see Marten et al. 2012).
3 Unlike the general school system, which is under the auspices of the ministry of education, educa-
tion for apprentices is governed by the ministry of economic affairs and the social partners, particu-
larly the regional economic chambers (Graf et al. 2012).
4 In principle, a pupil can also transfer to the upper-secondary level of a Gymnasium, but due to the 
different curricula in the Hauptschule and the lower-secondary level of a Gymnasium, this is rarely 
done.
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education equivalent to that of the upper-secondary level of a Gymnasium. (5) 
Pupils who do not make use of any of the options above can attend a 1-year poly- 
technical school that offers a preparatory vocational education programme. Upon 
completion of the Gymnasium, the Oberstufenrealgymnasium, or the berufsbil-
dende höhere Schule students take a special maturation exam (Matura). After earn-
ing their Matura qualification, students can enrol in a tertiary education institution 
(a university or a post-secondary vocational college).
Austria has an open university system. Most tertiary education programmes have 
no numerus clausus, entrance exams, or other selection processes; and students are 
free to choose any line of study (irrespective of their Matura grades). There are also 
no formal restrictions on doctoral studies. Universities do not charge tuition, and 
students may qualify for financial support in the form of a non-repayable scholar-
ship, depending on their own and their parents’ income. While there have been 
efforts to provide special scholarships to former students to resume their studies, 
these programmes have been less systematically developed in Austria than in 
Sweden.
Having the Matura diploma is an important pre-requisite for many subsequent 
educational options. Not only does it open the way to tertiary education; it is also a 
precondition for many kinds of qualified work, particularly in the public sector. The 
Matura thus serves as a marker that keeps educational groups and classes apart. 
Individuals who have completed a course of study that did not finish with the Matura 
have the option of attending special schools or programmes which prepare them for 
taking the Matura examination. Individuals may also be admitted to specific lines of 
tertiary education without having earned the Matura, provided they can prove (e.g., 
based on their employment history) that they have the qualifications for the chosen 
line, and pass a special admission examination. However, the availability of prepa-
ratory courses for the Matura (outside of high schools) or for the special admission 
examination varies from region to region, and taking them often involves consider-
able effort and cost.
9.2.3  Sweden and Austria – A Comparison of Their 
Institutions
There are certain aspects of the Swedish and the Austrian institutions that should be 
highlighted here because they appear to have especially strong effects on the rela-
tionship between education and childlessness:
First, the Austrian educational system segregates pupils at an early age, and is 
not organised with the purpose of giving as many people as possible access to higher 
education. This is mirrored in the distribution of Swedish and Austrian women born 
in 1955–1959 across educational levels (Table 9.1). In Austria, 31 % of all women 
in these birth cohorts have completed no more than compulsory education. In 
Sweden the corresponding figure is as low as 17 %. Conversely, 80 % of the Austrian 
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women have no upper-secondary (Matura), post-secondary, or tertiary education, 
while in Sweden the corresponding figure is 53 %. Only 13 % of the Austrian 
women of these cohorts have completed post-secondary or tertiary education, while 
among Swedish women the corresponding figure is 33 %.
Second, in Sweden vocational education is integrated into the educational sys-
tem. It prioritises the transmission of general, “transportable” skills over occupation- 
specific vocational training. A considerable share (30 %) of vocational education is 
at the tertiary level (Culpepper 2007). Having transportable and higher-level skills 
makes it easier to move between the various lines of study, and facilitates occupa-
tional mobility in the labour market (Estévez-Abe et al. 2001). By contrast, the 
Austrian apprenticeship system is largely segregated from the general school sys-
tem (Graf et al. 2012). It offers a high level of occupation-specific vocational train-
ing, but little general, non-occupation-specific or transportable coursework. Thus, 
pupils in Austria have difficulties moving from an apprenticeship to a general course 
of study or switching between apprenticeships. Only 4 % of vocational education is 
offered at the tertiary level (Culpepper 2007). On the other hand, having firm-based 
training, which tends to be high-quality and standardised, can greatly ease a pupil’s 
transition from school to work. As a consequence, unemployment rates among 
young people, and particularly among those who complete apprenticeships, have 
been much lower in Austria than in Sweden (Lindahl 2011; Lassnig 2013).
Third, the Swedish educational system is oriented towards life-long learning, and 
therefore provides a broader spectrum of flexible options for participating in educa-
tional programmes, for leaving and re-entering education, and for earning new qual-
ifications or enhancing existing qualifications over the life course. Austria has a 
more closed system, and limits participation in education to children and young 
adults to a much greater extent than Sweden.
Fourth, the Swedish school system is oriented towards promoting class and gen-
der equality, and towards minimising corresponding differentials. Despite this aim, 
Table 9.1 Distribution of Swedish and Austrian women born in 1955–1959, by educational level
Sweden Percentage Austria Percentage
Compulsory schoola 16.6 Primary Schoolb 31.3
Upper-secondary school, 2 years 36.0 Apprenticeship 27.1
Vocational middle school 20.7
Upper-secondary school, 3 years 14.7 Gymnasiumc 7.9
Post-secondary vocational college; 
shorter university
20.6 Post-secondary vocational 
college
6.2
University leveld 12.1 Universitye 6.7
Sources: Neyer and Hoem (2008) and Neyer (2009)
Note: 
a Comprehensive school up to age 16
b Primary school, lower-secondary school (Hauptschule), poly-technical school (up to age 15)
c Gymnasium proper, upper-secondary high school (Oberstufenrealgymnasium), vocational high 
school (berufsbildende höhere Schule)
d University, upper tertiary and research degree
e University, all levels of completion
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levels of sex segregation by field of education have remained high (Jonsson 1999). 
Sex segregation is even more pronounced in Austria, where special educational 
lines directed at women were maintained for much longer than in Sweden. Almost 
one-third of all of the women who attended the Gymnasium in the 1970s and early 
1980s, and more than half of all of the women who attended a vocational middle 
school or enrolled in an apprenticeship, were in an educational stream in which 
almost all of the pupils (95 %) were female. These streams had curricula with 
gender- stereotypical content oriented towards family work (Lassnig and Paseka 
1997).
Finally, Austrian family, social, and labour market policies have been designed 
to encourage women to leave the labour force when they have children. Yet employ-
ment protection, social security rights and benefits, and opportunities for promotion 
in the labour market have largely been tied to having an uninterrupted (and mostly 
full-time) career. By contrast, Sweden has more consistently pursued policies aimed 
at helping both parents balance family and work, and at ensuring that men and 
women have equal career opportunities throughout the life course.
We might expect to find that such national differences influence the connection 
between educational attainment and childlessness. In particular, we would expect to 
observe that rates of childlessness are higher in Austria than in Sweden, simply 
because it is harder to have children and pursue employment in Austria. On the 
other hand, we might also expect to find that childlessness rates are lower in Austria 
than in Sweden because of the large share of highly educated women in Sweden and 
the prevalence of feminised educational fields in Austria. Moreover, it is not clear 
whether women with similar educational paths in the two countries have similar 
levels of childlessness. Rates of childlessness among women with all types of edu-
cation may differ between the two countries because of institutional differences. But 
if we assume that preferences are more important than institutional conditions, we 
would expect to observe the same levels of childlessness by educational field in both 
countries. In the following chapters, we investigate these assumptions by analysing 
childlessness by educational field and educational level in greater detail.
9.3  Childlessness According to Educational Field 
and Educational Level in Sweden and in Austria
For our empirical investigation we make use of Swedish register data and of Austrian 
census data.5 Both provide individual-level information. We concentrate on the 
cohorts born in 1955–1959, because at the point in time when we carried out our 
analyses this was the “youngest” cohort for whom we could get data that allow us 
to determine whether women were childless at the end of their reproductive years 
(age 40 or above). The Swedish data are extracts from the country’s national educa-
5 For details of data content and data handling, see Hoem et al. 2006; and Neyer and Hoem 2008.
9 Education and Childlessness: The Influence of Educational Field and Educational…
192
tional and population registers. The educational register contains data on all of the 
levels of education by field that each woman completed up to 1998. The population 
register lists all births through 2002. For Austria, we used the national census of 
2001. It contains (self-reported) information on each woman’s field and highest 
level of education, and on her births. For both countries, our datasets contained the 
entire resident female population; the datasets were large enough to allow us to also 
study the ultimate levels of childlessness among women who had chosen educa-
tional lines with comparatively few graduates. We combined the roughly 2600 
Swedish and 650 Austrian educational fields into 60 educational groups for each 
country.6 The groups largely correspond to the International Standard Classification 
of Education (ISCED) of 1997. This process made our Swedish and Austrian edu-
cational groups generally comparable.7 Because of the differences in the educa-
tional systems, the levels of education were not harmonised. In particular, Sweden 
does not have the Austrian differentiation between vocational middle school 
(berufsbildende mittlere Schule) and apprenticeship (Lehrberuf). Conversely, the 
Austrian data contained no differentiation of degrees at the tertiary level, while the 
Swedish data allow us to make this distinction.
9.3.1  Educational Field and Childlessness
In Figs. 9.1 and 9.2 we present the percentages of women who were childless (at 
ages 40+ and of the cohorts 1955–1959) in Sweden and in Austria according to their 
educational orientation and educational level. In both countries, women who were 
educated to work in the education or health care sector are less likely to be childless 
than women with other types of education. In Austria, only women with an educa-
tion in agriculture have lower rates of childlessness than women who were educated 
to work in the education or health care sector at all educational levels. On the whole, 
women who were educated to work in the education or health care sector are not 
only less likely to be childless than other women with the same level of education 
but in a different field; they are also less likely to be childless than women who were 
educated in a different field but at a lower level. For instance, Austrian women with 
a post-secondary degree that qualifies them to teach in primary and lower-secondary 
6 Austria has many more educational fields than these 650, but in many of these fields not a single 
woman from the cohorts born in 1955–1959 had completed a course of study. The smaller number 
of educational fields in our Austrian data reflects the strong concentration of women in a select 
group of educational fields.
7 There were a few types of education in Sweden (e.g., library science and law enforcement) that 
did not exist (in a similar and recorded form) in Austria, and vice versa (for example, tourism stud-
ies are common in Austria, but there was no corresponding category in our Swedish data). We 
chose to retain educational fields in our analysis if they had been chosen by a sufficiently large 
number of women; or if their inclusion contributes to our understanding of the connection between 
education and childlessness, even if they were present in the data of only one of the two 
countries.
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schools (Volks- und Hauptschule) are less likely to be childless (16 %) than women 
who had completed an apprenticeship in the beauty business, in the insurance or 
bank sector, or in book selling; or women who completed high school (Gymnasium) 
or who earned an upper-secondary vocational diploma that qualifies them to work 
in the textile or chemical industry, in communication technology, or in tourism. We 
get similar results when we compare the childlessness rates of women who were 
educated to work in the health care sector with the childlessness rates of women 
who were educated in a different field.
In Sweden, we see much larger differentials in childlessness than in Austria 
between women who were educated to work in the education or health care sector 
and women who were educated in other fields, even if they spent less time in educa-
tion. Thus, Swedish women with a tertiary education that qualifies them to teach 
home economics or pupils with special needs (14 %) or to practice medicine as a 
medical doctor (14 %) have the same level of childlessness as women who left 
school after the compulsory minimum, or who left after earning a 2-year upper- 
secondary qualification without any particular vocational education.
By contrast, women who were educated in journalism, the social sciences, the 
humanities, theology, or the fine arts have high rates of childlessness in both 
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 countries. A woman who was educated in one of these fields (e.g., as artist or histo-
rian) is more likely to be childless than a woman with an education degree in the 
same field of study (e.g., as arts teacher or history teacher). Similarly, women who 
studied in fields closely aligned with the humanities, such as book selling (in 
Austria) or library science (in Sweden), are much more likely to be childless than 
women who were educated in other fields at the same level.
9.3.2  Educational Level and Childlessness
In both Sweden and Austria, the cohorts of women born in 1955–1959 have the 
same ultimate level of childlessness; namely, 15.7 %. This is somewhat surprising 
since we would expect to see different levels of childlessness given the institutional 
and educational differences in the two countries. However, national differences 
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become evident when we take the level of educational attainment into account. If we 
only consider the three most commonly used educational levels – namely, compul-
sory education, secondary education, and tertiary education – we see no marked 
differences in childlessness between these three groups in Sweden, although the 
highly educated women tend to have their children later than less educated women 
(Fig. 9.3). Even more surprising is the finding that women with only a compulsory 
education have a slightly higher level of childlessness (15.8 %) than the most edu-
cated women (15.0 %) (Andersson et al. 2009).
In Austria, differences in rates of childlessness by education do not level out over 
the life course of women. The gap in the childlessness rates of women with only a 
compulsory education (13.0 %) and women with a tertiary education (23.2 %) was 
ten percentage points. When we use more refined groups of educational attainment 
(Fig. 9.4), the differences in the patterns in the two countries become even more 
striking. In Sweden, there are hardly any differences in rates of childlessness 
between women at the various levels of attainment below the advanced university 
levels. Only women with a master’s degree (19 %) and women with a licentiate or 
doctorate (25 %) have higher rates of childlessness than other educational groups, 
but the rate of childlessness among these very highly educated women is still much 
lower than the rate among all tertiary-educated women in Austria (29 %). While in 
Sweden only women with the highest educational attainment are more likely than 
other women to remain childless, in Austria rates of childlessness are elevated even 
among women who have an upper-secondary school qualification (Matura). One- 
fifth (22.2 %) of the women for whom the Matura is their highest level of education 
remain childless; this rate is eight percentage points higher than the rate among 
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Austrian women who completed vocational middle school or an apprenticeship, and 
eight percentage points higher than the rate among Swedish women with the same 
educational attainment. As Figs. 9.1, 9.2, and 9.4 show, childlessness increases 
more strongly with educational level in Austria than in Sweden. There seems to be 
a clearer differentiation by educational attainment in Austria at each level of attain-
ment, with the Matura being the boundary between women with average levels of 
childlessness and those with much higher levels of childlessness.
The distinctly higher rates of childlessness among Austrian women with an 
advanced education than among the corresponding Swedish women can be seen in 
Table 9.2. In the table, the childlessness rates of select groups of Swedish and 
Austrian women with equivalent education (level and field) are presented. The pat-
terns of childlessness among women who were educated to work in the education or 
health care sector most clearly demonstrate the fundamental differences between 
Austria and Sweden. At each level of education, Austrian women with this educa-
tional background are more likely to be childless than similar women in Sweden, 
even though some of the requirements for these educational levels are higher in 
Sweden than in Austria (e.g., for kindergarten/pre-school teachers). The most obvi-
ous differences are among women at the university level. More than one-quarter of 
all Austrian women with a university-level degree in education or health are 
 childless at age 40. Their childlessness rate is more than ten percentage points 
higher than that of Swedish women with the same educational background, and ten 
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percentage points higher than that of Austrian women who were educated in the 
same field but at a lower level of attainment.
There are similar differentials by educational attainment in other areas of educa-
tion, such as in fields of education that prepare women to work in the textile, leather, 
or clothing industries; in hotels and restaurants; in tourism, or in social work. For all 
of these fields the fraction of Austrian women who are childless increases from 
around 10 % among women who have completed an apprenticeship, to 15–18 % 
among women who have a vocational middle school qualification, and to 25 % 
among those who have a higher vocational school qualification. In Sweden childless-
ness also increases with educational level, but this relationship is less strong than the 
relationship between educational field and childlessness (Hoem et al. 2006).
In some areas of education, the results for Austria and Sweden diverge from our 
initial expectations. This is particularly the case for work in the hotel and restaurant 
sector, in home economics, or in agriculture. Swedish women who were educated in 
Table 9.2 Childlessness of select groups of women by educational field and level in Sweden and 
Austria (per cent childless, women born 1955–1959)
Austria Sweden
Education
Pre-school teacher child carers 13.5 11.0
Primary school teacher 16.5 10.3
High school teacher 29.1 17.3
Health
Midwife 10.6 6.4
Nurse 14.5 13.0
Medical doctor 25.4 15.9
Education without Matura/ 2-year upper- 
secondary education
Beautician/hairdresser 12.7 9.6
Textile specialist 10.6 13.9
 Apprenticeship 9.3
 Vocational middle school 15.2
Hotel/restaurant business 12.7 22.4
 Apprenticeship 11.7
 Vocational middle school 17.9
Home economics 11.4 21.6
Agriculture 7.4 15.5
University
Social sciences 37.3 32.9
Theology 33.9 30.9
Humanities 33.1 30.4
Psychology 32.5 32.7
Technical university/natural sciences
Engineers/technical professions 14.6 19.0
Natural sciences 26.2 22.0
Source: Hoem et al. (2006) and Neyer and Hoem (2008)
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these fields are considerably more likely to be childless at age 40 than their counter-
parts in Austria (Table 9.2, Neyer and Hoem 2008). It is not clear why this is the case. 
These differences may be attributable to the number of women who pursue these 
courses of study, or to the structure or nature of the occupations associated with these 
courses. For instance, more than twice as many women in Austria as in Sweden fin-
ished a middle-level certificate that qualifies them to work in the hotel and restaurant 
industry. The hotel and restaurant sector is much larger in Austria than in Sweden, 
and the vast majority of businesses are small and family-owned. Thus, many Austrian 
women work in their own family business. In Sweden, an education in home eco-
nomics prepares students to administer large (institutional) households, while in 
Austria education in home economics aimed at preparing women for housekeeping 
and motherhood. An apprenticeship or vocational middle school qualification with 
an agricultural orientation is also three times more common in Austria than in 
Sweden, and these courses often cover home economics, as well.
As we mentioned above, the rates of childlessness among women educated in the 
humanities, arts, psychology, and theology are similar in Austria and Sweden. The 
low rates of childlessness in both countries among women who have a university 
degree in engineering are surprising, particularly as in Austria these women have 
the lowest rates of childlessness among all university graduates (15 %); even lower 
than those among women in the same field but with a lower qualification, and con-
siderably lower than women with a degree in the natural sciences. (Fig. 9.2 and 
Table 9.2).
9.4  Education and Childlessness: Discussion 
and Conclusions
The differences and the similarities in the patterns of childlessness in Sweden and 
Austria lead us to ask the question of what factors produced them. The present 
investigation cannot give a definitive answer, because the available data only con-
tain information about whether a woman is childless, and not about the determi-
nants of childlessness. Nevertheless, we will outline what we believe are the most 
important potential determinants, with a focus on institutional aspects, especially on 
the educational system, the links between education and labour market, as well as 
on the role of individual choice and self-selection.
9.4.1  Educational System and Childlessness
As we have outlined, the Austrian and Swedish educational systems have very dif-
ferent goals and structures. The Swedish system is oriented towards promoting the 
educational advancement of each individual throughout her/his life course. A 
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woman therefore has the flexibility to arrange her educational career so that it fits 
with her other life goals, including having children. It appears that women often 
make use of this flexibility: in almost one-third of the 60 types of educational fields 
we analysed, women completed their (final) educational qualification after the birth 
of their first child (Hoem et al. 2006). More than half of these women were educated 
to work in the education or health sector, or in another public sector. From the data 
we have available, we cannot conclude whether it is easier to combine motherhood 
and education in these fields than in others, or whether the effect we see is attribut-
able to re-education or to continued education after the arrival of the first child. 
Tesching (2012) showed that in Sweden childless women are twice as likely as 
mothers to change their educational field. She also showed that mothers who were 
educated in a female-dominated field that leads to stable employment with strong 
job protections, mostly in the public sector (e.g., education, health care, and wel-
fare), have much lower risks of changing their field of education than mothers in 
general and/or mothers who were educated in another field. The risk of pursuing a 
course of study in another field after becoming a mother is very high among women 
who were educated in the humanities, the social sciences, journalism, law, and the 
fine arts and media (Tesching 2012). These findings suggest that women who were 
educated in these fields find it difficult to continue to work in their chosen occupa-
tion after they have become a mother. The findings also indicate that the flexibility 
of the Swedish educational system, which offers women the option of continuing 
their education later in life or of retraining for a job that can be more easily com-
bined with raising children, explains at least in part the lower rates of childlessness 
among Swedish women with specific educational backgrounds and higher educa-
tional attainment.
By contrast, as we have noted repeatedly, the Austrian educational system is 
closed, and is organised in a rather fixed sequential order in which education pre-
cedes employment and family formation. Thus, the educational system does not 
accommodate childbearing. For instance, for apprentices (of our cohorts) who were 
pregnant or had a child, the maternity and parental leave regulations in the work-
place were not coordinated with the rules for vocational school attendance. As a 
consequence, it was often impossible for female students to complete their appren-
ticeship if they became pregnant and had a child. At all levels of education, the only 
way for most women to avoid dropping out was to postpone motherhood until they 
had completed their desired level of education.
Overall, our results suggest that a flexible educational system is more conducive 
to parenthood than a closed system: it seems to reduce childlessness among women 
with long courses of study, as becoming a parent does not threaten the student’s 
possibility to take her final examinations. It allows women (and men) to adapt their 
educational field to the demands of childrearing, and it makes it easier for them to 
update their qualifications following interruptions. It can therefore reduce the risk 
that women will remain childless for educational or occupational reasons.
9 Education and Childlessness: The Influence of Educational Field and Educational…
200
9.4.2  Education and Labour Market
The outcomes of our investigation lead us to believe that the ways in which educa-
tion and the labour market are intertwined may influence childbearing behaviour. 
All of these connections are underpinned by family and gender policies. On the 
basis of their findings for Swedish women Hoem et al. (2006) identified five clusters 
of education, each of which is connected to specific labour market and occupational 
areas. They analysed how each of these clusters leads to a different level of child-
lessness. The results were later partly confirmed in a cohort study for Norway by 
Rønsen and Skrede (2010). With our Austrian data, we can check whether the clus-
ters hold for a conservative welfare state, as well.
 Educational Fields of Study That Lead to Jobs in the Public Sector
In both Sweden and Austria, educational fields that prepare students to work in 
education, health, social work, and law often lead to jobs in the public sector. In 
both countries, the public sector offers increased job protection, a more stable and 
secure income, and better parental leave conditions than the private sector. We 
would therefore expect to find that women who were educated in fields that lead to 
jobs in the public sector have lower levels of childlessness. However, we find that, 
first, childlessness rates are lower only among women who are educated to work in 
female-dominated occupations in the public sector, such as education, health, and 
social work; whereas women who were educated to work in more male-dominated 
public sector areas – like law (Austria and Sweden), law enforcement, and library 
science (Sweden) – do not have childlessness rates that are much lower than those 
of other women with the same level of education (see also Ohlsson-Wijk 2015). 
Second, Austrian women with an upper-secondary (Matura), post-secondary, or ter-
tiary degree in educational fields that lead to female dominated jobs in the public 
sector (such as a degree in high school education) are more likely to be childless 
than we would expect. This may be in part because for our cohorts, tenure and 
careers in the public sector were tied to uninterrupted, full-time employment. Taking 
parental leave or moving to a part-time schedule was incompatible with these 
requirements.
 Fields of Education That Lead to Feminised Occupations in the Private 
Sector
Many fields of education lead to jobs in private sector industries in which most of 
the employees are female: e.g., the food production industry, the textile industry, 
business administration, personal services (such as the beauty and hairdressing 
business), and the hotel and restaurant industry. In both Austria and Sweden, women 
with these educational backgrounds are rarely childless, although there are some 
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differences in childlessness rates between the countries (see Figs. 9.1 and 9.2). It 
appears that Swedish women are more likely to be childless if they are educated to 
work in an occupational field with high levels of employee turnover and with non- 
standardised working hours, such as the hotel and restaurant industry; and they are 
less likely to be childless if they are educated to work in sectors with more stan-
dardised working conditions. In Austria these relationships seem to be inverted. 
One reason for this difference could be that in Austria jobs with standardised work-
ing conditions usually have higher social status, better working conditions, and 
higher wages. We generally find that Austrian women with educational backgrounds 
that lead to occupations with these characteristics are more likely to be childless 
than women who were educated to work in occupations with lower levels of social 
prestige and professional gratification.
 Gender-Mixed Lines of Education with Little Occupational Specialisation
In both countries childlessness rates are above average among women who chose a 
gender-mixed line of education without a specific occupational profile. This cate-
gory includes women who left the educational system after primary school or after 
a general upper-secondary education without a vocational specialisation. It also 
includes women with a (non-education) degree in the humanities, fine arts, or gen-
eral social sciences. Women who have completed educational lines with no specific 
vocational qualifications tend to find it harder to enter the labour market than women 
who chose an occupation-specific field of education (Korpi et al. 2003; Lassnig 
2013). These uncertainties seem to discourage childbearing.
 Gender-Mixed Lines of Education with a High Degree of Occupational 
Specialisation
A broad spectrum of educational lines are assigned to this category, including prep-
aration to work in secretarial and administrative occupations, and in sectors such as 
banking and insurance, business administration, business economics, law, journal-
ism, and tourism. These women have been educated for jobs with very different 
employment prospects, career paths, income levels, and degrees of occupational 
feminisation. In both countries, women with these educational backgrounds have 
higher rates of childlessness than comparable women with other educational back-
grounds. We assume that women who work in an occupation with a balanced gender 
distribution face more competition from men and greater (direct or indirect) dis-
crimination at work than women in a more female-dominated occupation, and that 
these factors may discourage them from having children.
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 Male-Dominated Lines of Education
Male-dominated educational lines frequently provide students with the skills needed 
to work in the private sector, such as in occupations related to engineering, technology, 
and the natural sciences. Women who are educated in these fields face greater difficul-
ties in entering the labour market than women with other educational backgrounds: 
specifically, they tend to have a longer job search after completing their education, 
fewer secure job offers, and fewer opportunities to maintain their employment (Smyth 
2003). Contrary to expectations, we find that women who were educated in a male-
dominated – and especially in a technical – field are slightly (Sweden) to decidedly 
(Austria) less likely to be childless than women who were educated in a gender-
balanced field. Job uncertainties and the experiences associated with being a “token 
woman” may account for the particularly low result in Austria, but studies in this 
country have also shown that women with a technical education often have highly 
educated parents (Fischer-Kowalski 1985). It is possible that women with university-
educated parents find it easier than other women to combine work and family.
9.4.3  Choice of Education, Self-Selection, and Social 
Environment
The observed variations in childlessness by type of education in both Austria and 
Sweden suggest that women factor in their plans for having a family when they 
choose a specific educational line. Scholars often assume that women who want to 
have children tend to choose an educational field that will enable them to combine 
work and motherhood in their preferred form (Hakim 2000). This process may be 
expected to result in a concentration of women who want to have children in spe-
cific educational and occupational fields, which may in turn promote a social envi-
ronment and social norms which support childrearing (Elster 1991). However, 
historical investigations of childlessness among women with specific types of edu-
cation have shown that individual preferences play out differently in different con-
texts. As a consequence, the levels of childlessness among women with the same 
educational backgrounds may vary considerably depending on the circumstances in 
which these women live (Jensen 1973; Cookingham 1984). This leads us to take a 
more nuanced view of how self-selection and social norms may work:
First, because of the structural differences in the educational systems, the selection 
processes into educational lines may be quite different in Austria and in Sweden. For 
instance, the stronger segmentation of the educational system in Austria may mean 
that not every type of (secondary) education or apprenticeship was available in every 
region. In these circumstances, parents may send their children to the closest school, 
and pupils may choose an apprenticeship based on availability.
Second, differences in the organisation of the educational system, in parental 
leave, in childcare availability, and gender policies may lead to different selection 
processes. For example, in Austria women (of our cohorts) who wanted to have 
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children may have tended to opt for shorter educational lines and to avoid longer 
courses of study. By contrast, in Sweden fertility considerations may play a smaller 
role in women’s educational choices.
Third, the social environment during education and thereafter may lead women 
to change their preferences regarding childbearing, and to adjust their childbearing 
behaviour to the norms in their respective educational or occupational field. These 
shifts in attitudes and behaviour may partly explain the high rates of childlessness 
among women who were educated in the humanities, the fine arts, or the social sci-
ences; as well as in library science or book selling. In the 1970s and 1980s, these 
disciplines generated feminist theories which raised fundamental questions about 
whether reproduction should be the norm for women.
Fourth, differences in social norms may explain the different distributions of 
childlessness in Sweden and in Austria. The largely uniform pattern of childlessness 
across educational levels in Sweden suggests that having children is the social norm 
for all women (and men) in this country, while in Austria remaining childless is a 
socially acceptable behaviour for highly educated women. Social pressure to have 
children appears to be stronger and more universal in Sweden than in Austria (Oláh 
and Bernhardt 2008; Prskawetz et al. 2008). The Swedish education, family, and 
gender policies tend to encourage conformity with the norm of having children. In 
Austria, there seems to be more leeway to opt out of or resist the social norm of 
having children, at least for the highly educated (Oláh and Hobson 2006).
9.4.4  Education and Childlessness: Should There 
Be an Individual-Level or an Institutional Approach?
As we noted in the introduction, the bulk of literature on education and childless-
ness stresses individual choices over institutional conditions. This may be attribut-
able in part to the dominance of particular theories (like rational choice), but it may 
also be a consequence of empirical restrictions. Surveys usually contain too few 
cases to allow scholars to differentiate sufficiently by educational attainment, and 
comparative research across many countries does not allow researchers to ade-
quately consider differences in educational systems. For our study, we had detailed 
information about the educational and childbearing histories of all of the women of 
certain cohorts in two countries. Thus, we had a dataset that was sufficiently large 
to allow us to distinguish between many educational lines. Focusing on two coun-
tries provided us with the opportunity to factor in the structures and the aims of the 
institutions that are assumed to shape childbearing behaviour. Our results clearly 
show that commonly reported findings on the link between education and childless-
ness should not be taken at face value and accepted as being indicative of universal 
patterns. In line with other scholars, we do not find that highly educated women 
have always had higher rates of childlessness than less highly educated women. Our 
results also do not provide unconditional support for the assumption that prefer-
ences regarding children guide women’s educational choices. Instead, our findings 
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support the view that institutional conditions modify preferences and behaviour. 
Our results also underline that an institutional approach which focuses only on fam-
ily policies is too narrow to explain differentials in childlessness and fertility pat-
terns. It is essential that one adopts a life course perspective on the role of institutions 
in family formation; i.e., that one considers the different institutions which shape 
childbearing behaviour over a person’s life course. This calls for both a broadening 
of the institutional approach beyond family policies, as well as a more detailed con-
sideration of institutions beyond the concept of the welfare state. Such an approach 
would allow scholars to link individual behaviour and institutional conditions with 
greater confidence, and in ways that provide us with a deeper understanding of 
childbearing decisions and of the variation in fertility patterns across social groups 
and across countries.
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Chapter 10
Childlessness and Fertility Dynamics 
of Female Higher Education Graduates 
in Germany
Hildegard Schaeper, Michael Grotheer, and Gesche Brandt
10.1  Introduction
This paper examines the process of family formation, defined as the birth of the first 
child, of female higher education graduates belonging to different graduate cohorts. 
Focusing on this particular population allows us to take a closer look at a phenom-
enon which, although known to exist for some time, has only recently started to 
receive significant attention in the media and in research: namely, the declining and 
low birth rates among women with a higher education degree.
For a long time, exact figures for Germany on the proportion of female graduates 
who were permanently childless were not available. The number of actual births 
among this group was first recorded by the microcensus of 2008, which provides a 
more accurate picture of childlessness among women than was previously available 
(Pötzsch 2010). Analyses of these data have concluded that the share of female 
graduates who are childless is 29.5%, and far higher than the 19.5% share among 
other women. There is little indication that this difference is chiefly attributable to a 
lower desire for children among university graduates. Although there is some evi-
dence suggesting that female higher education graduates are slightly less likely than 
women with lower educational levels to want children (Dorbritz and Ruckdeschel 
2013), and that they have a tendency to subordinate this desire to other aspirations 
(Passet 2011), women of different educational levels vary much less in their desire 
to have children than in their actual childbearing. In other words, the gap between 
The more detailed German version of this paper was published under the title “Familiengründung 
von Hochschulabsolventinnen. Eine empirische Untersuchung verschiedener Examenskohorten” 
(Schaeper et al. 2013).
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desire and reality is especially large among highly educated women (Eckhard and 
Klein 2012).
Both theoretical analyses and empirical studies have pointed out a number of 
factors which explain why large shares of German women are failing to realise their 
desire to have children, e.g., the lack of childcare options (especially in western 
Germany), the lack of a partner (especially among highly qualified women), and the 
growing significance of paid employment. Whereas in the past a woman’s life 
course tended to be organised predominantly around the family, the social institu-
tions central to the typical female life course now also include career and the labour 
market. Decisions in one of these spheres are not made in isolation, but depend on 
developments, decisions, aspirations, and structures in the other sphere.
Thus, in this paper we investigate how and to what extent employment and the 
labour market affect the transition to motherhood among higher education gradu-
ates. Based on theoretical considerations presented in Sect. 10.2, we examine these 
questions empirically using the graduate studies undertaken by the German Centre 
for Higher Education Research and Science Studies (DZHW). In Sect. 10.3, we 
provide further information on these datasets and on the applied statistical methods 
and variables. The results of the empirical analyses are presented in two parts in 
Sect. 10.4. First, we examine the process of family formation from the age of 14 
onwards. Second, we examine in detail the relationship between occupational career 
and family formation, focusing exclusively on the period after the first degree was 
awarded.
10.2  Theoretical Basis
10.2.1  General Theoretical Assumptions from a Life Course 
Perspective
The analysis of the transition to motherhood is based on life course theory. According 
to this perspective, actions which are biographically significant and associated with 
status changes are, like all actions, embedded in the life course and have multiple 
time references. Such actions take place in the present and are shaped by the current 
context. But they also refer both subjectively (“in-order-to motives”, Schütz 1971: 
80) and objectively (intended and unintended consequences) to the future, and in 
particular to the past: i.e., to biographical experiences, accumulated resources, and 
decisions and circumstances of the preceding life history. These factors shape biog-
raphies and subjectively prompt action (“because motives”, ibid.).
From a diachronous perspective, the life course resembles a sequence of events, 
states, or status passages. However, in view of the multidimensional nature of life 
courses or their synchronous integration in several life domains, it is more appropri-
ate to follow René Levy’s (1996: 73) conceptualisation of the life course as a 
“sequence of participation-position-role configurations.” Assuming further that 
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developments in various areas of life are interdependent (Huinink 1995: 154), fam-
ily formation can be regarded as a process which depends on the woman’s occupa-
tional career, as well as other factors, such as her educational and union history.
Furthermore, the life course is part of a social multi-level process (Huinink 1995: 
154–155). The actors are situated at the micro level, where they act in relation to 
their individual, but nonetheless collectively shaped aspirations and preferences; as 
well as in response to the prevailing opportunities and restrictions. The conceptuali-
sation of these actions as rational—i.e., driven by cost-benefit deliberations and the 
objective of maximising utility—has become a dominant paradigm in analyses and 
explanations of fertility decisions. Empirical studies have indicated that the model 
of rational action has, indeed, a role to play in explaining behaviour (Schaeper and 
Kühn 2000) and that especially among female graduates family formation is to a 
large extent the result of a deliberate process of planning, decision-making, and 
evaluation (Herlyn et al. 2002). In this process, women weigh not only the direct 
economic costs and the psychological costs (e.g., stress, emotional burdens) of hav-
ing children, but also the indirect (opportunity) costs, which are related to the for-
gone benefits of alternative uses of time (e.g., time spent in employment). Women 
may also consider the benefits of having children: While in modern societies chil-
dren are seldom seen as sources of income or old-age insurance, they are especially 
thought to provide psychological and emotional benefits (e.g., personal fulfilment, 
life enrichment, affection).
When choosing a course of action, individuals refer to their immediate social 
context; i.e., to partners, peers, and members of their family of origin. This implies, 
for example, that actors are required to coordinate their life course, decisions, and 
plans with those of other people (“linked lives”). Furthermore, the individual’s 
actions are embedded in a regional context which provides a variety of opportunity 
structures (e.g., labour market opportunities, childcare options) and socio-cultural 
orientation patterns. Finally, actions are framed by the structural and cultural condi-
tions of the society through generally applicable opportunity structures, overarching 
norms, and interpretive schemes; as well as through largely binding institutions, 
such as school/university, labour market/occupation, and family.
10.2.2  Specific Assumptions About the Transition 
to Motherhood Among Female Higher Education 
Graduates
The effects of general structural and cultural changes on the timing of family forma-
tion and the extent of childlessness are usually assessed by taking the birth year as 
a proxy variable. Several studies (e.g., Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995) have demon-
strated that the transition to motherhood was taking place at progressively higher 
average ages among women born after the middle of the twentieth century. 
Accordingly, we would also expect a trend towards fertility postponement among 
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higher education graduates. However, the graduate cohorts included in our study 
represent only a relatively short historical period. Furthermore, Blossfeld and 
Rohwer (1995) found that the cohort effect disappears entirely if educational par-
ticipation is controlled for. Given the brevity of the historical observation window 
and the small degree of variability in terms of both the participation in and the dura-
tion of education among the graduate cohorts studied, we expect to see only slight 
cohort differences.
The studies which have investigated the influence of participation in education 
on family formation have all found that the transition to motherhood is unlikely to 
take place as long as the prospective mother is in education (e.g., Blossfeld and 
Rohwer 1995; Schröder and Brüderl 2008; Buhr et al. 2011; Maul 2012). Research 
has shown that since 1991 the share of higher education students who have children 
has been around 6–7 % (Middendorff 2008). There are two main reasons why so 
few students have children. First, because of insufficient economic resources family 
formation during education appears to be inopportune (Huinink 1995). Second, 
most young people do not occupy themselves with family-related questions while in 
education, as they are concentrating on education-related biographical tasks (ibid.). 
If students give any thought to such matters, they generally associate family forma-
tion with high opportunity costs and competing demands on their time. Education 
calls for a large investment of time, and is therefore difficult to reconcile with family 
commitments (ibid.). Students who have children, and especially female students, 
can expect to take longer to complete their education, or may even be forced to drop 
out (Middendorff 2008; Heublein et al. 2010). As dropping out of education can 
have far-reaching negative implications for an individual’s future income and career 
opportunities, having children while in education can give rise to high indirect costs.
These general observations apply to the social conditions prevailing in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). We therefore expect to find a significantly 
reduced inclination towards childbearing during the period of study among both 
western German respondents and eastern German study participants of the more 
recent cohorts. It should be noted, however, that the policies of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) attenuated the resource, compatibility, and prospects 
problems, and, according to Huinink (2000: 216), may have even incentivised start-
ing a family early. In the GDR, several measures were specifically designed to sup-
port female students with children. In addition, the financial burdens of supporting 
a child in the GDR were negligible given the low cost of living, the availability of 
affordable childcare and housing, and the financial security provided by scholar-
ships, which were augmented by a child benefit (Leszczensky and Filaretow 1990). 
For these reasons, we can expect to find that the institution effect was much less 
pronounced among eastern German female higher education graduates who belong 
to earlier graduate cohorts and began their studies before 1990 or shortly thereafter 
than among their western German counterparts.
Comparisons of the family formation process and family forms in eastern and 
western Germany clearly illustrate that significant differences persist, even though 
alignment processes are taking place in many spheres (Goldstein et al. 2010). A 
larger proportion of eastern German than western German women have children, 
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and easterners tend to make the transition to motherhood earlier than westerners 
(Buhr et al. 2011). However, the proportions of childless women who do not wish 
to become mothers, and perceptions concerning the ideal family size, have started 
to converge between east and west (ibid. 187). We therefore assume to find persist-
ing differences, but also increasing similarities between the family formation behav-
iour of women of the more recent eastern German graduate cohorts and those of 
their western German counterparts.
Our hypothesis that behaviour patterns are converging is based on the fact that 
after German reunification, the “gender order” (Pfau-Effinger 1998) and institu-
tional environment of western Germany were introduced in eastern Germany, 
implying a “structural incompatibility” or, at best, “sequential compatibility” of 
family and career (Dornseiff and Sackmann 2003). The hypothesis of the enduring 
difference is supported by the persistence of a specifically eastern German “gender 
culture”. According to the prevailing role model of the “working housewife and 
mother”, for example, a woman was expected to be in continuous full-time employ-
ment, with only brief interruptions for family leave, while simultaneously maintain-
ing her traditional responsibilities in the home. The transfer of the western German 
gender order gave rise to a cultural lag in eastern Germany; i.e., the gender culture 
lagged behind structural change. According to the literature cited by Maul (2012), 
the “cultural heritage” of the GDR continues to exert an influence up to today.
For western Germany as well, we can assume that the cultural and social struc-
tures did not develop in parallel. The FRG’s organisations and institutions of the 
welfare state, the labour market, and the family have long lagged behind the modern 
paradigm of womanhood—which is oriented towards independence, employment, 
and a “double conduct of life” (Pfau-Effinger 1998; Born 2001). This “structural 
lag” and corresponding “compatibility dilemma” especially applied to well- 
educated western German women with high career ambitions who consider the 
usual models for reconciling work and family life, such as taking career breaks and 
moving to part-time work, as being hardly compatible with their aspirations.
Because of this compatibility issue we can expect to find that a woman may 
postpone the decision about whether to have a family until the time-consuming 
process of establishing and consolidating a career, which calls for flexibility and 
mobility, has been completed; and that this postponement can easily lead to unin-
tended or deliberate childlessness. In view of the resource problem and the problem 
of prospects, we, in addition, can assume that for a highly educated woman, having 
a stable and sustainable professional position may be seen as a prerequisite for mak-
ing the transition to motherhood. We would therefore expect to find, for example, 
that having a permanent employment contract would positively influence the incli-
nation to form a family. However, the results of empirical studies examining this 
hypothesis, which is based on educationally diverse samples, is ambiguous. Schmitt 
(2008) found on the basis of data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) 
that fixed-term contracts have a negative effect on the entry into motherhood. The 
analyses of Gebel and Giesecke (2009), on the other hand, indicated that having a 
temporary employment contract does not have an impact on the transition to 
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 parenthood for either men or women; and Brose (2008) came to the same conclu-
sion for women only.
However, according to the theory of the value of children proposed by Friedman 
et al. (1994), insecurity or a lack of certainty concerning biographical prospects can 
also have the opposite effect. To reduce uncertainty, women whose chances of hav-
ing a stable professional career are poor could have children earlier and more fre-
quently. This assumption is substantiated in family economics by the argument that, 
for women with diminished career resources, the opportunity costs associated with 
motherhood—i.e., the temporary loss of earnings and the long-term detrimental 
impact on a career and social security—are relatively low. Both arguments imply 
that a mismatch between occupational position and education, or the experience of 
downward occupational mobility, tends to accelerate family formation; and that 
having full-time gainful employment and an elevated professional position tends to 
delay the transition to motherhood. It is, however, possible that the influence of 
biographical prospects differs depending on educational attainment. Kreyenfeld 
(2010) found, for instance, that perceiving the economic situation to be uncertain 
and having concerns about job security has negative effects on family formation 
among women with high levels of education, but positive effects among women 
with lower levels of education.
Women’s orientations regarding family and career generally are not directly 
included in quantitative analyses because they are rarely measured before the start 
of the process being examined. In many cases, researchers can use only rough indi-
cators which are known to correlate with the phenomenon of interest, such as social 
origin (see below), religious affiliation, educational attainment, or subject area. A 
number of studies (e.g. Heine et al. 2005) have, for example, found that students 
who pursue a degree in medicine or teaching tend to have a strong social orientation 
and relatively weak career ambitions; whereas students who study law, business, or 
economics tend to be highly materialistic and career-oriented. At the same time, 
different types of degrees open up different career opportunities. These observations 
suggest that family formation rates among graduates in different disciplines are 
likely to vary considerably. Indeed, research conducted in other countries has shown 
that the field of study is a better predictor of fertility behaviour than the level of 
education (Neyer et al. in this volume). In light of sometimes competing theoretical 
arguments and opposing effects of career orientations and resources in some fields 
of study, it is difficult to put forward a hypothesis regarding the direction of the 
differences.
Occupational careers continue to be influenced by social origin, irrespective of 
the level of qualification attained. With respect to higher education graduates, stud-
ies have shown (e.g. Hemsing 2001) that parents’ social status and education not 
only have an indirect effect on career success of their children (resulting from the 
association between choice of subject, higher education institution and social ori-
gin); they also have a direct, independent effect. In addition, the social position of 
the family of origin exerts an influence on the children’s career orientation, aspira-
tions, and expectations. We can therefore assume—in line with previous studies 
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(Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995)—that graduates whose parents have a high social 
position are more likely than others to postpone family formation.
In recent years, a series of policy measures have been introduced which were 
designed to alleviate the resource, incompatibility and prospects problems, and thus 
to increase the birth rate. However, the impact of these policies may take one to two 
decades to become apparent (Bujard 2011: 37). We therefore do not expect to 
observe an effect of these measures on the cohorts of female graduates who are the 
subject of the present study.
10.3  Data and Methods
10.3.1  Data
The analyses of the family formation process among female higher education grad-
uates are based on the panel studies of higher education graduates conducted by the 
German Centre for Research on Higher Education and Science Studies (Deutsches 
Zentrum für Hochschul- und Wissenschaftsforschung, DZHW). The DZHW gradu-
ate studies cover the entire range of subjects, and include all state-run and state- 
approved higher education institutions, with minor exceptions.
The survey programme currently spans six graduate cohorts with up to three 
panel waves. In the survey of the 1989 cohort (who graduated in winter semester 
1988/1989 or summer semester 1989 from a higher education institution in the pre- 
unification territory of the Federal Republic of Germany), 2898 women were 
observed over an average period of 42 months after graduation. The survey of the 
1993 cohort, which for the first time included graduates from eastern Germany, 
yielded data of 2617 women for an average period of 66 months after graduation. In 
the surveys of the 1997, 2001 and 2005 cohort, 2739 respectively 3307 and 3828 
women were observed over an average period of 70 months after graduation. Finally, 
in the first and only survey to date of the 2009 cohort, 2980 female graduates who 
completed a bachelor’s degree course were surveyed alongside 3418 female gradu-
ates who attended traditional courses which concluded with either a state examina-
tion, a Diplom degree, or a Magister degree. The observation period of this cohort 
covers an average of 14 months after graduation.
10.3.2  Approach and Method
In order to obtain a descriptive overview of the process concerned, the survival 
functions for all of the graduate cohorts were estimated using the Kaplan-Meier 
method. The multivariate analyses used techniques of event history analysis. We 
estimated exponential models assuming a constant rate over time. The 
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time-dependence of the processes being analysed was taken into account by inte-
grating time-varying covariates (such as current age and educational participation). 
First, we estimated separate models for eastern Germany and western Germany. 
Second, we tested the east-west effect in a joint model. All of the results presented 
here were preceded by a comprehensive examination of theoretically possible inter-
action effects. In the interests of parsimony and simplicity, only significant interac-
tion effects were included in the final models. Since the DZHW surveys consist in 
part of disproportionately stratified random samples of graduates, the analyses were 
performed with Stata statistical software using sampling weights.
10.3.3  Model Specification
Two perspectives are adopted in the analysis of the transition to motherhood. The 
first strand of analysis looks at all of the graduate cohorts and examines the transi-
tion to motherhood from the age of 14 onwards. The process time is therefore the 
age of the woman. Because of their particular biographies, graduates who belonged 
to older birth cohorts (pre-1960 cohorts in the west and pre-1965 cohorts in the east) 
or who qualified for entry into higher education abroad were disregarded. After 
application of these selection criteria, the sample for the survival analyses consists 
of 16,233 western German and 3835 eastern German women. The following vari-
ables were included in the multivariate models:
Graduate Cohort For the most part, the graduate cohorts correspond to specific 
birth cohorts. In the vast majority of cases, the women in the 1989 graduate cohort 
were born between 1960 and 1964, and the women in the 1993 graduate cohort were 
born between 1965 and 1969. However, the subsequent graduate cohorts are some-
what less homogeneous in age. The 2009 cohort also includes graduates of the new, 
shorter bachelor’s degree programmes. These bachelor’s degree graduates are on 
average 2 years younger than the graduates of traditional degree courses. For rea-
sons which will be explained later, the results for the 1989 and 2009 graduates are 
reported in the survival analyses only.
Participation in Education We use two indicators for measuring the effect of 
being in education: (1) the annually adjusted time-dependent variable “studying for 
a first degree” (labelled “in first degree course”), which assumes the value one for 
as long as the respondents meet this criterion (and the value zero upon completion 
of the first degree); and (2) the annually adjusted time-varying variable “pursuing 
further higher or professional education (after having completed the first degree)” 
(labelled “in further education”). Because the effects did not differ, studying for a 
doctoral degree, studying for a second degree, and participating in professional 
training were grouped together in this variable.
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Subject of First Degree and Degree Type For the type of degree, university 
degrees are distinguished from degrees awarded by universities of applied sciences. 
For the subject or field of study, three groups are distinguished: (1) social work 
(universities of applied sciences), teaching, and human medicine; (2) law, business, 
and economics; and (3) all other subjects.
Parents’ Education This variable is defined as the educational attainment of the 
higher status parent. It is represented by three dummy variables: (1) lower second-
ary school leaving certificate/no school leaving certificate; (2) intermediate school 
leaving certificate/higher education entrance qualification; and (3) higher education 
degree.
Regional Origin Women graduates who obtained their higher education entrance 
qualification in the western German federal states are compared with their counter-
parts from the eastern German states.
Age To control for the well-known non-monotonic, bell-shaped age dependence of 
the rates of entry into first motherhood, two time-varying age variables—log(current 
age–13) and log(45–current age)—are included.
The method of episode splitting is used to introduce time-varying covariates into 
the model. The process time is measured in annual intervals only, and the age vari-
ables are adjusted annually. The imprecise measurement of the process time may 
give rise to an underestimation of the events in the right-censored survey years. For 
this reason, the models of the first strand of analysis are estimated for the 1993, 
1997, 2001, and 2005 cohorts only, as their observation windows are of similar 
length (number of cases: 9074 western German and 2284 eastern German female 
respondents providing data for all variables).
The second strand of analysis looks at higher education graduates of the years 
1997, 2001, and 2005 who were childless when they finished their studies, and who 
were born after 1960 for western German women or after 1965 for eastern German 
women (number of cases: 6470 western German and 1866 eastern German study 
participants with complete data). The subject of this analysis is the transition to 
motherhood after graduation, with a focus on the impact of career development and 
employment situation. In this case, therefore, the process time starts with gradua-
tion, and is recorded on a monthly basis. The cohort 1989 and 1993 had to be 
excluded from the analyses because the questionnaires addressed only the current 
employment situation. The 2009 cohort was excluded because the observation win-
dow of 14 months was too short to allow us to adequately examine the influence 
exerted by the graduates’ employment history and employment situation.
Career progression and the employment situation are represented by the follow-
ing characteristics:
Economic Inactivity (time-dependent), which is contrasted with economic activ-
ity and takes on different values: (1) periods of economic inactivity before starting 
the first job or commencing further training or education (“transitional phase”), (2) 
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further higher or professional education (further training phases, studying for a doc-
torate or second degree; labelled “further education”), (3) other periods of economic 
inactivity lasting no more than 3 months (“interruption of up to 3 months”), and (4) 
other periods of economic inactivity lasting more than 3 months (“interruption of 
more than 3 months”). Women in gainful employment who were simultaneously 
participating in education are deemed to be economically inactive during such peri-
ods; those who are formally participating in an apprenticeship or an internship were 
likewise classified as economically inactive.
Education-Job Mismatch at Labour Market Entry (time-constant variable 
“negative start”), which is given when the first employment position after gradua-
tion clearly had a lower status than is warranted by the graduate’s educational quali-
fications (e.g., unpaid family worker; unskilled, semi-skilled, or skilled worker; 
lower or middle-grade civil servant; low-level employee).
Length of Time Between Graduation and First Permanent Employment 
Contract (time-constant variable “permanent contract”), for which we distinguish 
four categories: (1) no permanent contract throughout the entire observation period, 
(2) first permanent contract obtained in the first 12 months after completion of stud-
ies, (3) first permanent contract obtained in the second or third year after graduation, 
and (4) first permanent contract obtained at a later date.
Self-Employment (time-constant) with two categories: never self-employed, and 
self-employed at least once during the observation period.1
Full-Time Gainful Employment (time-varying), contrasted with part-time 
employment.
Career Development (time-varying), for which we distinguish between lateral 
career paths, upward mobility, downward mobility, and discontinuous career pat-
terns. Career development is reconstructed by arranging the employment positions 
in a hierarchical order: Unpaid family workers; unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
(Level 1), skilled workers, lower and middle-grade civil servants, low-level employ-
ees (Level 2), skilled employees, self-employed individuals with a contract for ser-
vices/fee contract (Level 3), academically qualified employees without managerial 
responsibility, high-grade civil servants (Level 4), academically qualified profes-
sional employees with intermediate managerial responsibility, self-employed pro-
fessionals, senior civil servants (Level 5), executive employees, independent 
entrepreneurs (Level 6).
1 Self-employment (excluding contracts for work and services and fee contracts) ranks among the 
types of employment which—at least during the initial period—entail a certain degree of bio-
graphical uncertainty, and which are, as a rule, very time-consuming. It is to be assumed that this 
time pressure also applies in periods preceding, and during interruptions of, self-employment. The 
self-employment variable was therefore included as a time-constant characteristic.
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Upward and Downward Mobility are defined as a job change that was accompa-
nied by an increase or a decrease in rank or position. The initial attainment of a 
higher ranking position following a mismatch between educational qualification 
and job status at the time of labour market entry is not, however, classified as an 
upward move. The time-varying dummy variables retained the value one if the first 
upward move (downward move) is followed by a second upward move (downward 
move), or the professional position is no longer subject to change. If a downward 
move was followed by a step up the career ladder, or an upward move was followed 
by a downward move, the career was thereafter deemed to be erratic; the variables 
“upward/downward move” and “downward/upward move” are coded one, irrespec-
tive of the subsequent career development. Lateral career paths are therefore 
employment histories with neither upward nor downward moves.
Employment Position (time-varying) based on the results of estimates using the 
multi-level ranking of occupational positions and for the sake of a clear presentation 
of results, a distinction is made between only two aggregated categories: the extreme 
levels 1, 2, and 6; and the intermediate ranks on the career ladder (levels 3, 4, and 5; 
compare the career levels described above).
Region of Work (time-varying). This variable distinguishes between the western 
German states, the eastern German states, and other countries.
Work Experience This control variable has to be included to ensure that for all time-
constant variables of the employment history, the reference category consisted exclu-
sively of women who were economically active at least once in the observation period.
Graduate Cohort, Subject Area and Type of Degree, Parents’ Education, Age 
and Regional Origin These variables are constructed as described above.
All of the covariates of the employment history and career path that are designed 
as time-varying characteristics are adjusted on a monthly basis. Since the focus of 
the analysis of the transition to motherhood is on the moment of decision-making, 
consideration is given not to the graduate’s current employment situation, but to the 
situation 9 months earlier.
10.4  Empirical Findings on the Transition to Motherhood 
of Higher Education Graduates
10.4.1  Family Formation in Different Cohorts
Figure 10.1 depicts the survival functions for different graduate cohorts, which pro-
vide information on the probability of the graduates remaining childless up to a 
given age. The graph reveals that there are relatively small differences between 
cohorts of western German female graduates. However, these differences become 
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pronounced for the 1997 cohort onwards. Almost 25 % of the “quickest” graduate 
cohorts—namely, those of 1989 and 1993, for whom the survival functions do not 
differ significantly—had made the transition to motherhood up to the age of 30, and 
almost 40 % (1993 cohort) up to the age of 32. In the subsequent graduate cohorts, 
childbearing was increasingly delayed. In the cohorts 1997, 2001, and 2005, only 
around 20 % of the women had given birth to a child at the age of 30, and only 
around 30 % had made the transition to motherhood at the age of 32 (measured 
against the 1993 cohort, the differences are significant with an error probability of 
less than .05). The significantly delayed family formation of western German 
women who graduated from a traditional degree programme in 2009 is particularly 
striking. An estimated 80 % of them were still childless at the age of 32. We can 
assume, however, that the differences will be reduced once the observation period 
for the 2009 cohort more or less matches those currently available for the older 
cohorts.2 In the 2009 cohort, no differences can be observed between western 
2 Given the imprecise process time, events which took place at the time of the survey (i.e., at right-
censored ages) are underestimated. The second panel waves have shown that, at the ages which 
were right-censored at the time of the first survey, a series of further events (births) occurred. In 
addition, the number of births increased sharply in the observation period of the second panel 
waves. Since the 2009 cohort has been surveyed only once thus far, this means that, for instance, 
women who were 30 years old at the time of the first survey 1 year after graduation (2009 cohort) 
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Fig. 10.1 The transition to motherhood of western German higher education graduates in differ-
ent graduation cohorts (Kaplan-Meier survival function) (Source: DZHW graduate surveys 
1989–2009)
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German graduates with a traditional degree and with a bachelor’s degree, despite 
the fact that the majority of women who earned a bachelor’s degree subsequently 
undertook a further period of study.
The trend towards fertility postponement was stronger among higher education 
graduates in the eastern German states than among their western German counter-
parts (Fig. 10.2). Only the differences between the 2001 and 2005 cohorts are insig-
nificant. It follows from this finding that, as expected, the first birth rates of eastern 
and western German graduates are becoming more similar. The changes which took 
place between the 1993 and 1997 cohorts are striking. Between these two cohorts 
the probability of giving birth to a first child by the age of 27 dropped from more 
than 30 % to 20 %. Between the 1997 and 2001 graduate cohorts, a further reduction 
of six percentage points can be observed. Despite the convergence of cohorts, the 
east-west differences within cohorts were highly significant for all cohorts. Among 
the eastern German bachelor’s degree graduates in the 2009 cohort, who are even 
more likely than their western German counterparts to have undertaken a second 
course of study, family formation was a rare event in the observation period.
had given birth to fewer children to date than women who were 30 years old at the time of the 
second survey 5 years after graduation (other cohorts). These considerations also apply, albeit to a 
lesser extent, to the 1989 cohort (average observation window of three and a half years). In view of 
these data artifacts, the 1989 and 2009 cohort were excluded from the multivariate models.
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Fig. 10.2 The transition to motherhood of eastern German higher education graduates in different 
graduation cohorts (Kaplan-Meier survival function) (Source: DZHW graduate surveys 
1993–2009)
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According to the multivariate analysis (Table 10.1, Model I) the cohort differ-
ences for western German graduates are similar to those estimated by survival anal-
ysis (only the difference between the 1993 and 1997 cohort is not significant). 
However, the marked differences between the eastern German graduates in the 1993 
Table 10.1 The transition to motherhood of higher education graduates in different cohorts 
(exponential rate models), beta coefficients
Western 
Germany  
Model I
Eastern 
Germany  
Model II
Combined  
Model III
Combined  
Model IV
Graduate cohort (ref.: 1993)
1997 −0.09 −0.01 −0.12 * −0.09
2001 −0.15 * −0.24 −0.19 ** −0.18 **
2005 −0.15 * −0.15 −0.17 ** −0.16 **
In first degree coursea (ref.: 
no)
−0.67 ** −1.09 ** −0.72 **
In first degree coursea × 
cohort 1993
−0.11 1.24 **
In first degree coursea × east 
× cohort 1993
1.19 **
In first degree coursea × law/
business/economics
−0.58 ** 0.41 −0.32
In further educationa (ref.: 
no)
−0.47 ** −0.35 ** −0.44 **
Subject of first degree (ref.: other subjects)
Teaching/medicine/social 
work (univ. of appl. sciences)
0.43 ** 0.32 ** 0.40 **
Law/business/economics −0.06 −0.29 * −0.11
University degree (ref.: 
awarded by univ. of appl. sc.)
−0.05 0.27 ** −0.05
University degree × east 0.34 *
Parents’ education (ref.: lower secondary school leaving cert./no school leaving cert.)
Intermediate school leaving 
cert./Higher education 
entrance qualification
−0.06 0.19 0.08
Higher education degree 0.13 * 0.19 0.13 **
Log(age-13)a 5.41 ** 4.32 ** 5.42 ** 5.08 **
Log(45-age)a 2.55 ** 2.14 * 2.31 ** 2.36 *
Regional origin eastern (ref.: 
western)
0.73 ** 0.46 **
East × cohort 1993 0.41 0.02
Constant −25.03 ** −20.41 ** −24.42 ** −23.57 **
Cases 9074 2284 11,398 11,358
Events 2979 1032 4022 4011
Log likelihood initial model −4650 −914 −5645 −5623
Log likelihood final model −2146 −312 −2700 −2473
Source: DZHW graduate surveys 1993–2005
Note: a time-varying; * p < .05, ** p < 0.01
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cohort and those in the later cohorts disappear (Table 10.1, Model II). This result is 
attributable to the conditional effect of studying which varied in eastern Germany 
with the year of graduation. While this institution effect is highly significant in the 
west and has the expected negative sign—indicating that the inclination to make the 
transition to motherhood is significantly reduced during a period of study—a simi-
lar effect in the east is observable only in the more recent graduate cohorts. As 
indicated by the highly positive interaction effect “in first degree course × cohort 
1993”, the institution effect among those in the 1993 graduate cohort—the majority 
of whom began their studies before German reunification—did not play a role. The 
second institution effect, which refers to a further phase of education after the first 
degree, is significant and negative for all eastern German graduates, but is less pro-
nounced than among western German graduates.
As anticipated, graduates from different fields of study have very different family 
formation rates. Graduates in western and eastern Germany who earned a teaching 
or a medical degree, or a degree in social work awarded by a university of applied 
sciences, tend to make the transition to motherhood far sooner than graduates in 
other subjects. This result, which is in line with analyses of other datasets for 
Germany (Maul 2012) and for other countries (synoptic overview in Maul 2012, see 
also Neyer et al. in this volume), is found even without controlling for the birth- 
postponing effect of undertaking a further phase of education.
As we also expected, graduates of law, business, and economics have signifi-
cantly lower transition rates. However, in western Germany the reduced inclination 
of these graduates to form a family exists only for the period of study for the first 
degree (see the negative and significant interaction effect “in first degree course × 
law/business/economics”). Once they have completed their studies, western German 
law, business and economics graduates give birth to their first child only marginally 
later than graduates of the study programmes grouped together in the reference 
category. However, the difference to graduates who studied social subjects remained 
significant. By contrast, among eastern German law, business, and economics grad-
uates, the transition rates are a little higher during the period of study for the first 
degree, and are significantly lower afterwards. In this case as well, the family for-
mation rates are much lower than among graduates of social subjects.
Contrary to our assumption that, given their greater career resources and aspira-
tions, women from a family with a higher social status would postpone family 
 formation to a greater extent, parents’ qualifications actually produce only a slight 
and sometimes even an opposite effect among higher education graduates. For 
example, western German graduates born to parents with a higher education degree 
make the transition to motherhood slightly, but still significantly more often than 
other western German women.
In keeping with all of the other known studies, the age of higher education gradu-
ates has the expected non-monotonic effect on the family formation rate. This age 
dependence reflects a conglomeration of different factors which influence the tim-
ing of family formation. Apart from the biological limits of fertility, they include 
social and milieu-specific age conventions, the current state of career development 
(more on this below), and, finally, psychological preconditions. Personal maturity 
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appears to be a major prerequisite for motherhood: for example, the reasons stu-
dents give for not starting a family while studying include that they are “too young 
and inexperienced, and were still developing their personalities or finding their way 
in life”, and are thus not yet “ready or able to accept the responsibility for a child” 
(Middendorff 2003: 22). The increasing participation in education may therefore 
have triggered an increasing postponement of family formation, not only because it 
is considered difficult or inopportune to have a baby while in education and training, 
but also because prolonged participation in education has contributed to an exten-
sion of adolescence.
Although the survival analyses detected an east-west difference in family forma-
tion among higher education graduates as well, they also showed that a partial align-
ment has taken place over time. This finding is confirmed by the multivariate 
analyses: higher education graduates from the eastern German federal states, even 
if they belong to the younger graduate cohorts (from 1997), continue to have their 
first child earlier than western German graduates (Table 10.1, Model III). The fertil-
ity behaviour of eastern and western German degree holders has, however, con-
verged. As indicated by the positive interaction effect “east × cohort 1993”, the 
east-west difference in the transition rate is significantly larger in the older graduate 
cohorts than in the more recent ones. To a large extent, however, this convergence is 
a result of a marked decrease in the inclination of women to make the transition to 
motherhood while in education. This insight was provided by the fourth estimation 
model, which took into account the fact that in the east the institution effect varies 
with the year of graduation, and therefore included the interaction “first degree × 
east × cohort 1993”. In this model, the interaction effect “east × cohort 1993” was 
no longer significant. Once they had completed their studies, eastern German gradu-
ates belonging to the more recent graduate cohorts were not making the transition 
to motherhood any later than women in the older cohorts. Although the east-west 
effect itself was smaller in the combined model that included all of the variables 
(Table 10.1, Model IV), it remained significant at the one per cent level.
10.4.2  Family Formation and Employment History
Theoretical approaches which refer to one of the rational choice models of behav-
iour, and which posit that parenthood can be a strategy for reducing uncertainty, 
have suggested that because of economic uncertainty or lower opportunity costs 
associated with family formation, women with fewer career resources and opportu-
nities have their first child earlier than women with good career and income pros-
pects. This hypothesis is supported by our finding that the women in the sample of 
the western German degree holders who experienced downward occupational 
mobility or were unable to obtain a permanent employment contract were more 
inclined to start a family (Table 10.2, Model I). Also in line with these theoretical 
predictions is the finding that the transition to motherhood is delayed among women 
who have a very high professional position (level 6 on the career ladder). On the 
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other hand, upwardly mobile women do not have lower transition rates than female 
higher education graduates with lateral employment paths. Interruptions of employ-
ment and a career start which do not match the graduates’ level of education did not 
accelerate family formation. Women who have a low professional position do not 
have their first child earlier than those who were employed in a higher position. 
These findings tend to support the hypothesis that the reliability of both career and 
economic prospects is a precondition of motherhood for highly qualified women 
(Kreyenfeld (2010) reached a similar conclusion).
Even after the characteristics of the employment history and professional situa-
tion are controlled for, the analysis indicate that the 2001 and 2005 graduate cohorts 
had their first child a little bit later than the 1997 cohort; however, the effect was not 
always significant.
The overall effect of economic inactivity on the timing of the first birth is nega-
tive: employed women are the first to make the transition to motherhood. When 
looking at the reasons for interruptions in employment, we find that participation in 
education is the most important factor in the west. Among female higher education 
graduates from eastern Germany, however, this “institution effect” is considerably 
and significantly weaker. This is indicated by the interaction effect “further phase of 
education × east Germany” estimated in the combined model (Table 10.2, Model 
III). For eastern German graduates, participation in education do not delay family 
formation to the same extent as it do among western German women. The transition 
to motherhood is similarly unlikely to have taken place in the transitional phase 
between graduation and starting a first job or a further phase of education. Relatively 
brief periods of economic inactivity for other reasons do not significantly reduce the 
inclination to form a family, but prolonged interruptions in employment for other 
reasons have a strong negative effect.
It has been shown that the transition to fatherhood is not affected by uncertainty 
in the employment biography arising from temporary employment contracts (Tölke 
2005; Schmitt 2008). For highly qualified women, the situation appears to be differ-
ent. The transition to motherhood is fostered by both very insecure employment 
conditions (no permanent employment contract throughout the entire observation 
period) and an early stabilisation of the employment situation.
Our analysis shows that the sooner graduates from both western and eastern 
Germany are in permanent employment, the more likely they are to start a family. 
Family formation is also positively influenced by the attainment of an intermediate 
professional position. By contrast, self-employment, which generally entails a sub-
stantial time commitment and—at least in the initial start-up period—biographical 
uncertainties, exert a negative influence.
Furthermore, the transition rate is lower among western German women who are 
working full time 9 months before giving birth, possibly because of high opportu-
nity costs. In the eastern German federal states, however, the number of hours 
female higher education graduates were working does not play a significant role. 
Compared with western German graduates, the family formation behaviour of east-
ern German women was less dependent on their career path and employment pat-
tern. The east-west effect estimated in the combined model (Table 10.2, Modell III) 
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Table 10.2 The transition to motherhood after graduation in different cohorts: the effect of career 
development (exponential rate models), beta-coefficients
Western 
Germany
Eastern 
Germany Combined
Model I Model II Model III
Graduate cohort (ref.: 1997)
2001 −0.11 −0.22 −0.13 *
2005 −0.07 −0.12 −0.09
Economic inactivitya (ref.: economic activity)
Transitional phase −1.25 ** −0.97 ** −1.18 **
Further education −1.64 ** −0.88 ** −1.63 **
Interruption of up to 3 months −0.29 −0.04 −0.24
Interruption of more than 3 months −1.03 ** −0.93 * −1.00 **
Further education × east Germany 0.63 **
Negative start (ref.: no) 0.02 −0.23 0.04
Permanent contract (ref.: never)
Within 12 months after graduation −0.28 ** −0.41 ** −0.31 **
2–3 years after graduation −0.43 ** 0.68 ** −0.5 **
Later −1.00 ** −1.31 ** −1.06 **
Self-employment (ref.: no) −0.31 ** −0.30 −0.30 **
Full-time employmenta (ref.: part-time) −0.25 ** 0.06 −0.18 **
Intermediate occupational positiona (ref.: 
levels 1, 2 & 6)
0.32 ** 0.26  0.30 **
Career developmenta (ref.: no change)
Upward move 0.15 0.05 0.13
Downward move 0.33 * −0.26 0.22
Upward/downward move 0.17 0.69 * 0.28
Downward/upward move −0.12 0.32 0.01
Region of worka (ref.: western Germany)
Eastern Germany 0.47 ** 0.31 ** 0.33 **
Abroad −0.21 −0.53 −0.29
Subject of first degree (ref.: other subjects)
Teaching/medicine/social work (univ. of appl. 
science)
0.41 ** 0.17 0.35 **
Law/business/economics 0.02 −0.26 −0.05
University degree (ref.: awarded by univ. of 
appl. science)
−0.07 0.23 * −0.00
Parents’ education (ref.: lower secondary school leaving cert./no school leaving cert.)
Intermediate school leaving cert./Higher 
education entrance qualification
0.16 ** 0.04 0.14 *
Higher education degree 0.18 ** −0.10 0.15 *
log(age–13)a 7.08 ** 1.67 ** 6.29 **
log(45–age)a 3.96 ** ––b 3.56 **
No work experience (ref.: work experience) 2.25 ** 2.05 ** 2.20 **
(continued)
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is significant even after controlling for all of the included career characteristics. In 
other words, the transition to motherhood among the female graduates from eastern 
Germany continues to be more natural and less dependent on the fulfilment of pre-
conditions than among their western German counterparts.
In terms of career development, the effects of downward mobility are most nota-
ble: compared with other mobility patterns, western German graduates make the 
transition to motherhood much earlier if they experience a downward move without 
a subsequent or prior upward move. Among eastern German graduates, the transi-
tion to motherhood is more likely when a downward move was preceded by an 
upward move.
Finally, we comment on the region of employment. While being employed 
abroad tends to reduce the transition rate, the differences between working abroad 
and working in western Germany are not significant. For both eastern and western 
German female higher education graduates, economic activity in eastern Germany 
increase the inclination to start a family. It appears plausible that this finding is 
related to the more favourable opportunity structures in the east, especially the 
greater availability of public childcare.
Our empirical findings on the association among female higher education gradu-
ates in Germany between fertility behaviour on the one hand and the occupational 
career and the employment situation on the other are inconsistent with several theo-
retical explanations. They are not in line with arguments originating from family 
economics, the claim that family formation reduces uncertainty, or the argument 
that family formation depends on secure career and economic prospects. Instead, 
the results suggest that there is a more differentiated explanation for fertility behav-
iour: in the years immediately after graduating, women tend to focus on consolidat-
ing their career and securing their occupational and economic positions. In the 
current conditions, career-minded women—and, as a general rule, female graduates 
are career-oriented—risk the long-term impairment of their employment opportuni-
ties if they have a child before embarking on a career or entering permanent employ-
ment. In order to establish a career path that can be taken up again after family 
Table 10.2 (continued)
Western 
Germany
Eastern 
Germany Combined
Model I Model II Model III
Regional origin eastern Germany (ref.: 
western Germany)
0.42 **
Constant −35.75 ** −9.24 * −32.41 **
Cases 6470 1866 8336
Events 1744 747 2491
Log likelihood initial model −4939 −1218 −6198
Log likelihood final model −4168 −1021 −5205
Source: DZHW graduate surveys 1997–2005
Note: a time-varying, b not useful to estimate because of the small age range observed; * p < .05; 
** p < .01
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formation, women hold off on motherhood until they have attained a stable employ-
ment position. Only if there appears to be little or no prospect of consolidating and 
stabilising their employment situation—or if it seems unlikely that further post-
ponement of family formation will result in the desired employment security—will 
graduates make the transition to motherhood more frequently and quickly.
10.5  Summary and Discussion
Adopting a multi-level life-course perspective and using quantitative analyses, this 
paper has examined the relationship between the fertility behaviour of highly quali-
fied women and their educational and employment histories, as well as their current 
employment status and career situation.
Reflecting the general trend, we found that female higher education graduates 
were delaying the birth of their first child to an increasing extent. At first glance, the 
results for the 2009 graduate cohort, which suggest a considerably lower propensity 
to make the transition motherhood, were particularly striking. It is, however, impor-
tant to note that the analyses were based on a very short observation period, and that 
the imprecise process time, which was measured in years, resulted in an underesti-
mation of the family formation rate.
While we found that differences between the family formation processes of east-
ern and western German women persist, we also observed a convergence. However, 
the approximation was solely attributable to the behaviour of eastern German grad-
uates who entered higher education after German reunification, and who were much 
less likely to have had their first child while enrolled in higher education. This 
institution effect played only a marginal role among eastern German higher educa-
tion graduates who began their studies during the GDR era. However, for subse-
quent generations of students it appears to be as relevant as for western German 
students. As a consequence of this relationship of interdependence and mutual 
exclusion between participation in education and family formation, highly qualified 
women are not starting to plan a family until they reach an age when the most bio-
logically opportune time for the transition to motherhood has already ended.
To some extent, the sharp decline in the inclination of eastern German students 
to start a family before graduating can be attributed to the increased opportunity 
costs of family formation while in education. As the forms of support provided to 
students with children in the GDR have been eliminated, and the financing of par-
ticipation in higher education has become less secure, many student parents in 
 eastern Germany now also have to shoulder not only the double burden of attending 
university and childcare, but often the triple burden of studying, raising a child, and 
having a job. The increased uncertainty of the career prospects of higher education 
graduates is likely another contributor to the cautious attitude towards starting a 
family among eastern German undergraduates. As they are no longer guaranteed a 
job upon graduating, they must prepare for the possibility of unemployment. Thus, 
students face an exacerbated resource problem which threatens the economic basis 
of family formation.
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Despite the greater uncertainty of their career prospects, graduates from eastern 
Germany still make the transition to motherhood more quickly and frequently than 
western German higher education graduates. This finding can be explained by the 
persistence of the eastern German gender culture, in which working mothers and 
institutional childcare are viewed as normal, and by the greater availability of child-
care in eastern Germany.
Qualitative analyses have shown that women’s deliberations concerning family 
formation are shaped to a large extent by this question of how to reconcile work and 
family. They have also described how this compatibility problem can give rise to an 
ambivalent attitude among career-focused women, and ultimately to fertility post-
ponement (Kühn 2004). A solution to the reconciliation issue is complicated not 
only by inadequate childcare services and the expectation that highly qualified 
employees will be flexible and mobile, but also by the prevailing labour market 
conditions governing career development. Part-time employment has negative con-
notations, and is associated with a lack of commitment, availability, and motivation; 
as well as by a lack of professional or career ambition. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that women with elevated professional aspirations or abundant career resources 
postpone family formation, or even forego having children; or that, conversely, 
women reduce their career development efforts in anticipation of the transition to 
motherhood. This relationship between family formation on the one hand and pro-
fessional ambition and career development and resources on the other was also 
reflected to some extent in our results on the fertility decisions of female higher 
education graduates. However, our findings also pointed to another, more important 
aspect of the timing of family formation: namely, the issue of career consolidation 
and the establishment of stable professional prospects. A woman’s decision about if 
and when to make the transition to motherhood essentially depends on whether she 
has achieved a stable employment status and has been able to accumulate sufficient 
work experience. Only if these conditions are met is she likely to assume that her 
career ambitions can again be pursued after having a child. On the other hand, atten-
tion may turn to family formation if over a prolonged period of time a women has 
had negative experiences in the labour market which indicate that her outlook for 
attaining stable employment is poor, and that attaining a secure and challenging 
occupation is likely to remain out of reach. Unless a highly qualified woman clearly 
prioritises having a family, the tendencies mentioned above, together with participa-
tion in further qualification phases, may mean that family formation will not become 
a focal point of her biographical reflections until several years after graduation.
It remains to be seen whether family policy measures that have been adopted will 
have the desired impact on female degree holders as well, motivating and allowing 
them to have children earlier and more often. Given the very significant role career 
consolidation plays in shaping the fertility behaviour of women (and men), and the 
growing prevalence of fixed-term employment contracts (Rehn et al. 2011), a scep-
tical view of the ability of family policy measures alone to halt or even reverse the 
trend towards the progressive postponement of family formation appears to be 
justified.
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Chapter 11
Fertility Ideals of Women and Men Across 
the Life Course
Anne-Kristin Kuhnt, Michaela Kreyenfeld, and Heike Trappe
11.1  Introduction
“Ich möchte niemals Kinder sind für mich das Größte” (“I do not want children are 
the most important thing to me”) was a slogan of the insurance company Swiss Life 
in 2015. The slogan ridicules the volatility of people’s preferences regarding chil-
dren and family life. Having children may evolve from being a subordinate issue to 
being the focal point of attention in a person’s life. In our paper, we explore the 
volatility of women’s and men’s fertility ideals across time. In particular, we exam-
ine how fertility ideals evolve as people age, how patterns differ by gender, and 
whether other factors—such as changes in an individual’s partnership or employ-
ment domain—lead to changes in fertility ideals. Our study contributes to the large 
body of literature that has explored different concepts of fertility desires and inten-
tions in Germany (e.g., Buhr and Kuhnt 2012; Heiland et al. 2008; Keim et al. 2009; 
Kuhnt 2013; Kuhnt and Trappe 2013; Lutz et al. 2013; Marbach and Tölke 2013; 
Rost 2005; Ruckdeschel 2007), for other countries (e.g., Bernardi et al. 2015; 
Iacovou and Tavares 2011; Klobas and Ajzen 2015; Liefbroer 2009; Miller 2011; 
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Morgan 1982; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2004; Spéder and Kapitány 2015; 
Thomson 1997; Thomson and Hoem 1998; Vignoli et al. 2013) or across countries 
(e.g., Balbo and Mills 2011; Kapitány and Spéder 2013; Philipov et al. 2006; Puur 
et al. 2008; Régnier-Loilier et al. 2011; Testa 2007; Testa and Basten 2014).
While there are a large number of studies on this issue, little research has been 
done on the stability of fertility preferences. Most of the existing literature on fertil-
ity preferences has focused either on short-term fertility intentions (e.g., Billari 
et al. 2009; Dommermuth et al. 2011; Goldstein et al. 2003; Gray et al. 2013; 
Hayford 2009) or on the extent to which fertility intentions are realised (e.g., 
Berrington and Pattaro 2014; Schoen et al. 1999; Spéder and Kapitány 2009, 2015; 
Toulemon and Testa 2005). In our study, we investigate how the fertility ideals of 
women and men in Germany of the cohorts 1971–73, 1981–83, and 1991–93 
evolved over a 5-year period spanning 2008/2009–2013/2014. Thus, our study cov-
ers a longer time period than most previous research. Fertility preferences are mea-
sured using the following question: “Under ideal circumstances, how many children 
would you like to have?” The aim of this question is to survey personal fertility 
ideals, rather than societal family size ideals, which were, for example, surveyed in 
the Eurobarometer (Testa 2007). The concept of personal fertility ideals is also dif-
ferent from the concept of fertility intentions, which is usually measured by asking 
respondents about their concrete plans for having a child within a narrowly defined 
time frame of, for example, 2 years (Miller 2011; Thomson 2001). It is, however, 
related to the widely used concept of fertility desires, which is usually measured by 
asking respondents how many children they wish to have (Thomson 2001: 5347). 
Compared to fertility intentions, fertility desires or ideals are probably more stable 
across time (Miller 1994, 2011). This is particularly the case given the first part of 
our question: the qualifier “under ideal circumstances” prompts the respondents to 
disregard the current conditions. We test whether significant changes in a person’s 
life, such as the loss of a job or of a partner, affect his or her fertility ideals. We also 
examine whether the birth of a child (or the lack thereof) leads a person to adjust his 
or her fertility goals upwards or downwards. Here we draw upon the psychological 
literature that shows that people tend to revise their long-term goals if they are 
unable to accomplish them. For the sake of readability, we use the terms “fertility 
ideals” and “fertility preferences” interchangeably. The paper is structured as 
 follows. In Sect. 11.2, we provide the theoretical background and review prior 
research findings. In Sect. 11.3, we describe the data we use, which come from 
the German Family Panel (pairfam) and cover respondents of the birth cohorts 
1971–73, 1981–83, and 1991–93. Furthermore, we present our method and analyti-
cal strategy in this section. In Sect. 11.4, we present our descriptive results. In Sect. 
11.5, we discuss our findings from the multivariate analyses, which consist of a 
pooled OLS regression and fixed-effects modelling. The dependent variable is the 
respondent’s ideal number of children, and the main covariates are the respondent’s 
partnership status, employment status, and number of children. In Sect. 11.6, we 
discuss the implications of our findings.
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11.2  Theoretical Considerations and Prior Findings
The life course has been described as a self-referential process within which an 
individual acts or behaves based on his or her prior experiences and resources 
(Mayer 2004). Values, convictions, and emotions are part of the internal opportunity 
structure that guides individual behaviour (Huinink and Feldhaus 2009). Fertility 
ideals can be seen as fundamental and quite general value orientations, or as expres-
sions of family size norms (Iacovou and Tavares 2011; Thomson 2001). However, 
there is some debate among researchers about how stable such value orientations 
are across the life course. According to the socialisation hypothesis, convictions and 
values are formed in late childhood and adolescence, and remain relatively stable 
thereafter. These values can be viewed as the concepts and scripts that guide an 
individual’s future life plans (Inglehart 1977), or as mere lifestyle preferences 
(Hakim 2003). Others have raised concern over the stability of preferences across 
the life course. A person’s values measured at a given moment in time not only 
influences action, but that action affects attitudes, values, and aspirations. The only 
way researchers can separate the causal linkage between attitudes and behaviour is 
by using panel data (Lesthaeghe and Moors 2002).
An important behavioural model that is often employed in the study of fertility 
preferences is the model of reasoned action developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (Ajzen 
1991; Fishbein and Ajzen 2010). This concept distinguishes between desires and 
intentions (e.g., Bühler 2012; Miller 2011; Thomson 2001). Desires are “internal 
factors”, such as motivations, attitudes, and beliefs (Miller 1994: 228). If desires 
become more manifest, they materialise into intentions, which will in turn be trans-
lated into behaviour if conditions are favourable. In our study, we analyse “fertility 
ideals”, which are not examined as a distinct category in the Ajzen and Fishbein 
model. While it is clear that ideals are not the same as intentions, it is important to 
note that although fertility ideals are related to fertility desires, ideals and desires 
are not identical. Thus, previous findings on the volatility of fertility intentions and 
fertility desires may not be transferable to the study of the volatility of fertility ide-
als. We assume that fertility ideals, as measured by the phrase in our survey question 
“under ideal circumstances”, are more stable than intentions, because ideals do not 
depend on actual living conditions (Miller 2011). Thus, a change in partnership 
status or economic circumstances may lead to a change in fertility intentions, but 
not necessarily in fertility ideals. However, if the adaptation argument applies, we 
can assume that the individual’s achieved biographical status will affect his or her 
fertility ideals, as a person’s current circumstances rarely align with his or her initial 
ideal scenario. For example, a woman might increase her ideal number of children 
so that it corresponds with the number of children she already has. Miller and Pasta 
(1995) have suggested that the birth of a first child can trigger in the parent an 
increase in his or her positive motivations for childbearing, as there is a biological 
mechanism that enhances the parent’s positive responses to the baby, and thus 
strengthens his or her desire to have another child. Fertility preferences may also be 
adjusted upwards if an individual has an unplanned birth, or if his or her children do 
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not have the desired gender. These scholars have also posited that there are mecha-
nisms that counterbalance this positive feedback loop, such as delays or negative 
motivations. Fertility ideals might be adjusted downwards if, for example, a woman 
who is growing older perceives that it is unlikely that her initial ideals will be ful-
filled (Gray et al. 2013).
11.2.1  Previous Findings
Relatively few studies have examined the stability of fertility ideals, desires, or 
intentions. Of the studies on the evolution of fertility expectations that exist, the most 
comprehensive was conducted by Hayford (2009) for women in the US. Hayford’s 
analysis of 10 years of panel data collected between 1979 and 1994 showed that 
women tend to have relatively stable fertility expectations across their life course. 
For Europe, longitudinal studies on the stability of fertility desires or intentions have 
been conducted for the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands 
(Buhr and Kuhnt 2012; Heiland et al. 2008; Iacovou and Tavares 2011; Liefbroer 
2009; Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan 2011; Ní Bhrolcháin et al. 2010). However, 
most of these studies covered only two survey waves, and thus did not examine the 
evolution of fertility preferences across a longer period of time. These studies also 
differed considerably in terms of the concepts they used to measure fertility prefer-
ences. For example, some used fertility desires, while others used fertility expecta-
tions or intentions in assessing the “ideal family size”. Despite the many conceptual 
differences between these studies, the following commonalities emerge.
Demographic factors, and especially age, have been shown to influence the sta-
bility of fertility intentions across an individual’s life course. Fertility preferences 
seem to decline with increasing age (Gray et al. 2013; Hayford 2009; Heiland et al. 
2008; Ní Bhrolcháin et al. 2010). Buhr and Kuhnt (2012: 291) found for Germany 
that over a period of 1 year, women and men in their early thirties are more likely 
than women and men in their early twenties to adjust the number of children they 
expect to have. Using data from the Netherlands, Liefbroer (2009: 363) showed that 
among both women and men, there is a downward adjustment in fertility intentions 
with increasing age. Using British panel data, Ni Bhroichain et al. (2010: 14) and 
Iacovou and Tavares (2011: 119) found a similar pattern: i.e., that the expected fam-
ily size declines with increasing age. An intervening variable in this context may be 
fecundity, which also declines over time. Individuals who realize that they are infe-
cund may adjust their fertility preferences in recognition of their biological con-
straints (Heiland et al. 2008; Liefbroer 2009; Régnier-Loilier 2006).
There is also longitudinal evidence that having a child leads to changes in fertil-
ity preferences. Heiland et al. (2008: 150) found that the fertility expectations of 
parents increase after the birth of an additional child. Similarly, Iacovou and Tavares 
(2011: 119) found that having a child is associated with upward and downward revi-
sions in fertility expectations. However, their findings did not indicate that the birth 
of a first child has a greater effect on expectations than a subsequent birth.
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There is also consistent evidence that changes in the partnership domain of the 
life course lead to changes in fertility preferences (Buhr and Kuhnt 2012; Iacovou 
and Tavares 2011; Spéder and Kapitány 2009). Buhr and Kuhnt (2012: 288) found 
considerable changes in the fertility intentions of men and women whose partner-
ship situation had changed in the preceding year. Meanwhile, Hayford (2009: 777) 
found that married women have more stable fertility expectations than women who 
are single. Similarly, Heiland et al. (2008: 148) found that divorce or separation has 
a negative effect on the stability of the number of desired children among women. 
The findings of Iacovou and Tavares (2011: 119) indicate that having no partner or 
being separated from a partner is associated with a downward revision of fertility 
expectations across time.
Other studies have explored how changes in the employment domain of the life 
course relate to changes in fertility preferences. Heiland et al. (2008: 147) reported 
that unemployment has a negative, but insignificant effect on changes in the desired 
number of children. Buhr and Kuhnt (2012: 290) were unable to produce any statis-
tically significant results supporting the notion that changes in labour force status 
affect fertility expectations. Iacovou and Tavares (2011: 119) studied the effect of 
income on fertility preferences. Their results show that while a man’s income is not 
correlated with changes in the expected number of children, if a woman has a high 
income she tends to adjust her expected number of children downwards.
In summary, fertility preferences seem to be quite sensitive to changes in partner-
ship status, but less sensitive to changes in economic circumstances. However, the 
psychological literature tells us that people may adjust their long-term goals based 
on the likelihood that they will achieve them. We therefore assume that the birth of 
(further) children may lead individuals to adjust their fertility ideals upwards.
11.3  Data and Analytical Strategy
This study uses data from the first six waves (2008/09–2013/14) of the German 
Family Panel (pairfam) and its supplement DemoDiff, release 6.0 (Brüderl et al. 
2015). The German Family Panel (pairfam) is a panel survey that provides data on 
the formation and development of intimate relationships and families in Germany 
(Brüderl et al. 2015; Huinink et al. 2011). DemoDiff is a survey of residents of east-
ern Germany that is designed to complement the German Family Panel (Kreyenfeld 
et al. 2012). The pairfam and DemoDiff interviews are conducted annually with 
individuals from eastern and western Germany of the cohorts 1971–73, 1981–83, 
and 1991–93. The total number of respondents in wave 1 was 13,891. Overall attri-
tion from wave 1 to wave 6 was about 46 %, which is within the normal range for 
panel studies in Germany with this duration (Müller and Castiglioni 2015). In our 
investigation, we have omitted respondents with invalid information on our key vari-
ables of interest, and especially those who failed to provide valid information on the 
ideal number of children or who said they were uncertain if they wanted children. 
The final sample includes 13,645 observations and 51,653 person-years of data.
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11.3.1  Method & Analytical Strategy
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. In a first step, we provide descriptive 
statistics that depict the development of fertility preferences by age and gender. 
Moreover, we employ OLS-regression that examines the determinants of fertility 
preferences. The dependent variable is the reported fertility ideal. In order to account 
for the multiple observations of individuals in the sample, we calculate robust stan-
dard errors. Moreover, we employ fixed-effects modelling to gain a better under-
standing of the causal determinants of fertility preferences. The great advantage of 
using fixed-effects modelling is that it allows us to account for individual-specific 
time-constant heterogeneity (Allison 2009; Andreß et al. 2013; Schmidt 2013; 
Brüderl and Ludwig 2014). The drawback is that only characteristics that vary over 
time may be included in the analysis as covariates. Our main focus in the multivari-
ate analysis is on the effects on fertility preferences of the respondents’ employment 
status, partnership status, subjective financial situation, and number of children. A 
further control variable is the respondents’ age. In the OLS-regression, we also 
include region, and migration status.
Our main variable of interest is the response to the fertility ideals measured by 
the following question: Under ideal circumstances, how many children would you 
like to have? The dependent variable has a mean of 2.2 and ranges from zero to 
seven children.1 Figure 11.1 shows that a majority of the respondents reported that 
they prefer to have two children. This finding is in line with those of previous  studies 
on western Europe that showed that most people report that their ideal number of 
children is 2 (Goldstein et al. 2003; Testa 2007). The differences between women 
and men were minor: Men were more likely than women to say they prefer to have 
two children (men: 60 %; women: 55 %), while women were slightly more likely 
than men to say they prefer to have three or four children. Among both men and 
women, just six per cent reported that they see childlessness as the ideal (see Fig. 
11.1).
The independent variables in our analysis are the respondent’s age, partnership 
status, employment status, number of children, and subjective assessment of the 
financial situation of his or her household. Age is treated as a categorical variable 
broken down by the following age groups: 14–19, 20–29, 30–39, and 40–42. 
Partnership status is a dummy variable that distinguishes between being single and 
being in partnership, regardless of whether the respondent is living with the partner. 
We also control for the number of children, and distinguish between respondents 
who are childless, have one child, have two children, or have three or more children. 
Employment status is distinguished using the following categories: in education, 
full-time employment, part-time employment, unemployment, and other activities. 
The subjective assessment of the financial situation is an ordinal scaled variable that 
1 A few of the respondents in the initial data set reported an ideal number of children that was 
higher than seven. Since there were only a few such observations, and because they may have 
biased our analyses, we excluded them from our analytic sample.
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ranges from zero (not satisfied) to 10 (absolutely satisfied). While unemployment is 
an objective variable used to measure economic conditions, the perception of finan-
cial satisfaction is a more subjective variable. In the OLS-regression, we also con-
trol for (largely) fixed covariates, such as region (eastern or western Germany), 
migration background (born in Germany or born in a different country), and level of 
education. In generating the level of education, we use the ISCED-97 classification 
to distinguish between respondents with low (ISCED 0–2), medium (ISCED 3–4), 
and high levels of education (ISCED 5–6). Table 11.1 reports the sample statistics.
11.4  Descriptive Results
In a first step, we analyse the mean ideal number of children by age for men and 
women (see Fig. 11.2). Please note that we do not yet exploit the within variation, 
and that the graphs in Fig. 11.2 merely give the mean values of fertility ideals by the 
age of the respondents. We have separated the graphs by birth cohorts and gender. 
Among men in their early twenties, the average ideal number of children is 2.1. 
These values increase modestly to 2.2 children over the life course. On the whole, 
however, the fertility ideals of men do not seem to change much with age. Likewise, 
we see little variation in the ideal number of children among women. Whereas the 
ideal number of children increases slightly across the life course among men, the 
number decreases slightly among women. When they are in their twenties, women 
have an ideal number of children that is slightly higher than that of men. This num-
ber increases to 2.3 when they are in their thirties, and then declines to 2.1 when 
they are in their forties. However, the fluctuations are modest and are within the 
range of the statistical error margin of 95 %. We conclude that fertility ideals at an 
aggregate level of the cohorts under study are relatively stable, even though some 
variation exists.
In a second step, we examine the within variation of fertility ideals. Table 11.2 
reports the between and within variation for fertility preferences by gender and 
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Fig. 11.1 Ideal number of children by gender (Source: German Family Panel (pairfam) wave 1–6, 
Release 6.0, weighted estimates)
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region. The most important finding displayed in this table is that variation between 
individuals is much larger than variation within an individual. But there is still 
 substantial within variation, which suggests that a considerable fraction of the popu-
lation under study change their fertility ideals over survey waves. While men and 
women do not seem to differ, some differences are found between eastern and west-
ern Germany. On average, fertility ideals are higher in western than in eastern 
Germany, and are more stable in eastern than in western Germany.
Table 11.1 Composition of the sample by person-years, column per cent
Men Women
Ideal number of children (Mean & std. error) 2.17 (0.07) 2.23 (0.06)
Satisfaction with financial situation of household 
(Mean & std. error)
6.57 (0.02) 6.45 (0.02)
Age
14–19 26 % 24 %
20–29 33 % 31 %
30–39 31 % 35 %
40–42 10 % 11 %
Region
West 72 % 73 %
East 28 % 27 %
Country of birth
Born in Germany 91 % 89 %
Not born in Germany 9 % 11 %
Number of children
Childless 68 % 53 %
1 child 13 % 18 %
2 children 14 % 20 %
3 and more children 6 % 9 %
Partnership status
No Partner 41 % 29 %
Partner 59 % 71 %
Level of education
Low 40 % 37 %
Medium 39 % 42 %
High 21 % 21 %
Missing 0 % 0 %
Employment status
In education 3 % 3 %
Employed full-time 85 % 56 %
Employed part-time 3 % 22 %
Unemployed 6 % 5 %
Other 3 % 15 %
Person years 24,586 27,067
Subjects 6,628 7,017
Source: German Family Panel (pairfam) wave 1–6, Release 6.0
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11.5  Multivariate Results
Table 11.3 displays the results from the OLS models, separately for men and 
women. We start by discussing our findings on partnership status and economic 
conditions. With respect to partnership status, we find that men with a partner have 
a significantly higher fertility ideal than men without a partner. This association 
does not hold for women, however. Respondents who are (still) in education have 
higher fertility preferences than those in full-time employment. This finding might 
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Fig. 11.2 Ideal family size by age, cohort and sex, mean and 95 % confidence level. (Source: 
German Family Panel (pairfam) wave 1–6, Release 6.0, weighted estimates)
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be a reflection of the respondents’ life course stage, rather than of their economic 
situation. Unemployment does not seem to be associated with lower fertility prefer-
ences, as we do not find statistically significant differences in the preferences of 
respondents depending on whether they are employed. We also find that fertility 
preferences do not appear to be associated with satisfaction with the household’s 
financial situation. In addition, we find that the level of education matters for fertil-
ity preferences: The respondents who are highly educated are more likely to prefer 
having a large family than their less educated counterparts. This result for women is 
particularly surprising, as we know from other studies that highly educated women 
in Germany are more likely than other women to remain childless (see Kreyenfeld 
and Konietzka in this volume).
When we look at the effect of age, we find that fertility preferences decline sig-
nificantly across the life course. On average, men’s fertility preferences at age 40–42 
are by 0.36 units lower than at ages 14–19. Among women, there is even a reduction 
by 0.59 units, which may be indicative of a stronger awareness of biological con-
straints. Please note that this stands in some contrast to the descriptive findings that 
did not show a strong age-gradient. Thus, the control variables seem to be suppres-
sors in the relationship between age and fertility preferences. The ideal number of 
children is lower among eastern than western Germans. This result is consistent 
with previous descriptive findings indicating that most eastern Germans prefer to 
have a smaller family (Buhr and Huinink 2010). In line with previous studies on the 
fertility behaviour of foreigners and migrants in Germany, we find that ideal number 
of children is higher among foreign-born than native-born respondents (Helfferich 
et al. 2011; Schmid and Kohls 2011). The number of children also has a very strong 
effect on preferred fertility, as men and women who already have three or more 
children have a higher ideal number of children than other respondents. This finding 
is not surprising. First, we can assume that  respondents who are more family-ori-
ented and have a large number of children at the time of the interview will also 
report that they have a high “fertility ideal”. Second, as their number of children 
increases, respondents will adjust their ideal to their family situation. These two 
mechanisms cannot be disentangled in the OLS-regression, but they can be 
addressed in the fixed-effects models below. Taken together, the findings from the 
Table 11.2 Within and between variation of fertility ideals
Mean St. Dev. Person-years
Overall Between Within
All 2.20 0.96 0.87 0.49 51,653
Gender
Men 2.16 0.93 0.85 0.50 24,586
Women 2.23 0.98 0.89 0.49 27,067
Region
West Germany 2.24 0.97 0.89 0.51 37,230
East Germany 2.08 0.90 0.82 0.45 14,423
Source: German Family Panel (pairfam) wave 1–6, Release 6.0
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Table 11.3 Results from OLS regression, dependent variable: fertility ideals, beta coefficient and 
standard errors, (standard errors are adjusted for clustering in id)
Men Women
b
Std. 
err. b
Std. 
err.
Age
14–19 1 1
20–29 0.02 0.02 −0.06 0.02 **
30–39 −0.20 0.03 *** −0.42 0.04 ***
40–42 −0.36 0.04 *** −0.59 0.04 ***
Region
Western Germany 1 1
Eastern Germany −0.13 0.02 *** −0.14 0.02 ***
Migration status
Born in Germany 1 1
Born in other country 0.19 0.04 *** 0.08 0.04 **
Number of children
Childless −0.17 0.03 *** −0.25 0.03 ***
1 child 1 1
2 children 0.32 0.03 *** 0.39 0.03 ***
3 or more children 1.35 0.05 *** 1.33 0.05 ***
Partnership status
No Partner 1 1
Partner 0.04 0.02 *** −0.02 0.02
Level of education
Low −0.14 0.03 *** −0.11 0.03 ***
Medium 1 1
High 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.03 ***
Other/Missing 0.86 0.05 *** –
Employment status
In education 0.15 0.07 ** 0.16 0.05 ***
Employed full-time 1 1
Employed part-time 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.03
Unemployed 0.01 0.07 −0.05 0.04
Other/Missing 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.03
Satisfaction with financial situation of 
household
0.002 0.00 0.007 0.00 *
Constant 2.24 0.07 *** 2.40 0.05 ***
R squared 0.17 0.19
N (Person-years) 24,586 27,067
Source: German Family Panel (pairfam) wave 1–6, Release 6.0
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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OLS-regression reveal only weak associations between current living conditions, 
partnership status, and fertility ideals.
Next, we turn to the results from the fixed-effects model (Table 11.4). Fixed- effects 
modelling accounts for unobserved heterogeneity by “de-meaning” the data. Because 
fixed-effects analysis only draws on the within variation of individuals, the power of 
the model is lower than that of OLS-regressions. It is therefore more  difficult to gener-
ate significant results with fixed-effects regressions than with OLS- modelling. 
However, even if we allowed for a very generous level of significance, the coefficients 
for partnership status or economic conditions do not come close to having an accept-
able level of statistical significance. From this analysis, we conclude that neither 
Table 11.4 Results from fixed-effects model, dependent variable: fertility ideals, beta coefficient 
and standard errors
Men Women
b
Std. 
err. b
Std. 
err.
Age
14–19 1 1
20–29 0.02 0.02 −0.01 0.02 ***
30–39 0.01 0.02 −0.06 0.02 ***
40–42 −0.02 0.03 −0.13 0.03 ***
Number of children
Childless −0.09 0.03 ** −0.09 0.04 ***
1 child 1 1
2 children 0.19 0.04 *** 0.13 0.03 ***
3 or more children 0.41 0.07 *** 0.48 0.06 ***
Partnership status
No Partner 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Partner 1 1
Employment status
In education 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04
Employed full-time −0.04 0.03 −0.02 0.02
Employed part-time −0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03
Unemployed 1 1
Other/Missing −0.02 0.04 −0.04 0.02 *
Satisfaction with financial situation of 
household
0.002 0.00 0.002 0.00
Constant 2.18 0.05 *** 2.24 0.04 ***
R square
Within 0.01 0.01
Between 0.14 0.19
Overvall 0.11 0.15
N (Person-years) 24,586 27,067
Source: German Family Panel (pairfam) wave 1–6, Release 6.0
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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changes in partnership status nor changes in economic conditions impact fertility 
preferences. What does seem to matter, however, is the number of children a respon-
dent has. Since fixed-effects models exploit the within variation, the coefficients tell 
us that the respondents whose number of children changed across the panel waves 
also changed their fertility preferences. As their number of children increased, the 
respondents adjusted their preferences upwards. This finding is fully in line with the 
argument by Miller and Pasta (1995) that the birth of a first child in particular increases 
the motivation for further childbearing. This may be attributable to a justification 
mechanism whereby each child born will be treated as if he or she was intended. 
Another potential explanation is that the respondents became more knowledgeable 
about the advantages and disadvantages of parenthood after the birth of a child, and 
that those who experienced parenthood as an overwhelmingly positive event came to 
associate having a larger number of children with more gains, and thus increased their 
fertility ideals. Interestingly, in the fixed- effects model the negative impact of age on 
fertility ideals disappears among men, and is found among women only. Among 
women, age has a negative effect on fertility preferences. This suggests that as women 
age they adjust their fertility ideals downwards, most likely because they become 
aware that it is unlikely that they will be able to achieve their initial goals.
11.6  Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the evolution of fertility preferences in Germany 
across six waves of panel data. Preferences were measured using the following 
question: “Under ideal circumstances, how many children would you like to have?” 
We find that, on average, men and women prefer to have 2.2 children. The average 
number of “preferred children” slightly declines with increasing age. We also find 
that there is some variation in fertility ideals within individuals across time. We 
examined if these individual-level variations in fertility ideals would be related to 
changes in the respondent’s partnership status or economic or employment situa-
tion. In a pooled OLS-regression, we show that satisfaction with the economic situ-
ation is positively related with fertility preferences among women, while having a 
partner has a positive impact on fertility ideals among men. However, the fixed- 
effects model that accounts for individual time-invariant heterogeneity did not con-
firm these findings. A major result of our analysis is therefore that fertility 
preferences, measured as “personal ideals,” are relatively unaffected by short-term 
changes in life circumstances. These results support the findings of previous studies 
that showed that economic conditions do not significantly affect fertility prefer-
ences (e.g., Heiland et al. 2008; Iacovou and Tavares 2011). However, they are at 
odds with the findings of studies that found that partnership dissolution affects the 
desired number of children (Gray et al. 2013). The discrepancies between these 
findings may be explained by how fertility preferences are operationalised in our 
study. We used “fertility ideals” as a dependent variable. In the interview, the 
respondents were asked to report their desired number of children “under ideal 
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circumstances.” Because the respondents were asked to disregard their current cir-
cumstances, they may not have factored in their current employment situation or 
their partnership status.
While our findings indicate that partnership and economic conditions do not alter 
fertility ideals, they also show that an increase in the number of children in the 
respondent’s family is associated with an upward adjustment of fertility prefer-
ences. Among women, increasing age is associated with a downward adjustment. 
This in turn suggests that individual-level variation in fertility ideals is largely 
explained by factors that are closely linked to goal achievement, such as the number 
of children already born and the woman’s age. These findings are consistent with 
psychological theories of goal adjustment: i.e., that individuals will revise their fer-
tility preferences if they perceive that it is unlikely that their initial goal will be 
realised, and that they will also change their preferences if they have more children 
than they had initially considered ideal. In sum, fertility ideals seem to be unaf-
fected by short-term changes in the respondents’ partnership status and employment 
situation, but they are sensitive to the achievement of long-term goals. In order to 
gain a more comprehensive understanding of the volatility of fertility ideals, we 
therefore need to have data that capture a long-term perspective. Only by using a 
sufficiently long-term panel will we be able to unravel the process through which 
people adjust their preferences based on their life course experiences. We were for-
tunate to have had access to 5 years of panel data. However, even this time horizon 
is short, as it captures only a snap-shot of the life course of an individual. For exam-
ple, we were unable to produce any statistically significant results on the effects of 
union dissolution or unemployment on fertility preferences. We were also unable to 
explore whether previous disruptions in an individual’s union or employment career 
affected the evolution of his or her fertility preferences. Unemployment or the lack 
of a suitable partner may not have an immediate impact on fertility preferences, but 
having a long history of economic hardship or complex partnerships may result in a 
downward or upward adjustment of fertility ideals at later ages. A direction for 
future research would be a systematic study of the long-term impact of the eco-
nomic and partnership situations of individuals on their fertility preferences based 
on different concepts, such as personal ideals, desires, and intentions.
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Chapter 12
Childless at Age 30: A Qualitative Study 
of the Life Course Plans of Working Women 
in East and West Germany
Laura Bernardi and Sylvia Keim
12.1  Introduction
In Germany, the low birth rate and the difficulties women face in reconciling work 
and family life are frequently discussed by policy-makers. At the heart of the cur-
rent debate on these issues is the legal entitlement of children under 3 years of age 
to a place in nursery school, which has been in effect on the national level since 
August 2013. The qualitative improvement in childcare and the increase in the 
uptake rate of Elterngeld (parental benefits) for both parents are also high on the 
political agenda. The aim of these policies is to facilitate the reconciliation of work 
and family life and the re-entry of mothers into employment as early as possible 
after childbirth, and thus to make it easier for young adults to pursue an employment 
career without having to forgo parenthood.
However, the interplay of employment history and fertility behavior, and the 
ways in which the subjective meanings attached to work trajectories are connected 
to thoughts and decisions about starting a family, are issues that have so far been 
little researched (Witzel and Kühn 2001: 56). Relatively few authors have examined 
the question of whether differences in meanings can explain the differences in 
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behavior between young adults in East Germany and their counterparts in West 
Germany.1 The work biographies and the family formation patterns of East and 
West Germans, especially of women, differed considerably. The focus of our analy-
sis is on young women who grew up in the two different systems, and were thus 
exposed to contrasting family models. How do these differences in upbringing influ-
ence the life course plans and arrangements of these women after unification? How 
do these women envisage combining family formation and employment? Do these 
women have the same values, norms, attitudes, and behaviors as those of their par-
ents’ generation? According to Bourdieu, this legacy of the past could be regarded 
as an “inertial effect”. He stressed that because socialization affects the formation of 
attitudes and values, as well as the meanings attached to certain behaviors and the 
range of action, values and behavior may persist after the macro-societal conditions 
have changed.
Our analysis in this chapter is based on the life stories of young employed women 
who were socialized in the former East and West Germany, experienced unification 
as teenagers, and were around age 30 at the time of interview. Over the course of 
four qualitative case studies we compare East and West German women who are 
still childless but who want to have children. We examine which family formation 
pathways these women prefer, the reasons why they have so far remained childless, 
and their attitudes and perceptions regarding the compatibility of motherhood and 
paid employment.
In the following section we briefly describe the institutional and demographic 
peculiarities of the two German states before and after reunification. In the third 
section we outline the theoretical background of our investigation and introduce our 
empirical data. In the fourth section we present four case studies of childless women 
from East and West Germany. In the concluding section we discuss our results and 
suggest topics for future research.
12.2  The Legacy of Different Socio-political Systems: 
Starting a Family in West and in East Germany
Before German unification, fertility behavior of East and West Germans differed 
profoundly; thus, we are dealing with two distinct demographic regimes. The term 
regime implies that these differences in family behavior were shaped by different 
institutional contexts. One of the most important differences in the realm of family 
behavior was that the East German government supported maternal full-time 
employment by providing extensive and easily accessible childcare services. 
1 Andreas Witzel and Thomas Kühn, for instance, examined the life courses of young adults from 
two regions in West Germany that have different labor market conditions. They found that women, 
especially after reaching age 30, experience an increased subjective pressure to have children. 
Career-oriented women “look for solutions which are compatible with family life via ‘decelerated’ 
careers” (Witzel and Kühn 2001: 78).
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The centrally planned economy guaranteed that both men and women would have 
reliable and stable employment. Most women had their first child early in their life 
course, and returned to full-time work after the so-called “Babyjahr”. In most cases 
mothers interrupted their employment for 1 year only. Women seldom had the 
option of taking a longer break from employment or of shifting to a part-time sched-
ule, and few women spent more than short periods of time as a full-time homemaker 
(Falk and Schaeper 2001: 188). In contrast, the institutional framework in West 
Germany supported the model of the married couple with a gendered division of 
work: i.e. the husband was the principal earner while the wife was a homemaker and 
mother who was employed part-time or not at all. On average, women in West 
Germany were considerably older than their counterparts in East Germany at the 
time of family formation. About 20 % of the women in West Germany remained 
childless, compared with just 10 % in East Germany (Kreyenfeld and Konietzka, in 
this volume).
Under the terms of the Unification Treaty, the East German institutional, eco-
nomic, and political systems were replaced by the West German systems. However, 
the eastern German Länder remained distinct from West Germany in a number of 
ways. In particular, in the eastern German Länder childcare services, organized and 
financed mainly by the municipalities, continued to be widely available (Kreyenfeld 
2003; Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder 2015). The annual birth rate 
fell dramatically in the years immediately after unification (Eberstadt 1994; Witte 
and Wagner 1995). Although the total fertility rate in East Germany converged with 
the West German rate after a few years, and even surpassed it slightly since 2008 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2012: 15), some differences between the two parts of the 
country in the average age at first birth remain. Moreover, women in East Germany 
are still less likely to be childless than women in West Germany. In addition to being 
younger when they have their first child, women in East Germany are more likely 
than women in West Germany to be living in a non-marital partnership at the time 
of family formation (Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2010; Huinink et al. 2012; 
Statistisches Bundesamt 2012). Meanwhile, women in West Germany, who tend to 
have negative opinions of working mothers, are considerably less likely than women 
in East Germany to be in full-time employment (Wenzel 2010; Huinink et al. 2012). 
Given these differences, we conclude that despite the convergence of the political 
and institutional frameworks of the two parts of the country, two distinct demo-
graphic regimes continue to exist. It can, however, also be argued that these differ-
ences are merely symptomatic of the critical transitional period, and that behavioral 
patterns in East and West Germany will eventually converge (Witte and Wagner 
1995; Beck-Gernsheim 1997; Kreyenfeld 2004). Yet when and how this assimila-
tion process might occur is currently unclear. The hypothesis of assimilation fails to 
provide an explanation for the persistent differences in behavioral patterns between 
the two parts of the country, such as the much higher ratio of unmarried births in 
East than in West Germany.
In this paper, we contribute to the debate surrounding this ongoing East-West gap 
in fertility behavior by focusing specifically on the attitudes and life course plans of 
women who were socialized in the former East and West Germany, and who reached 
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their teenage years around the time of German unification. How has the experience 
of being socialized in a particular regime shaped the life course plans of women in 
the two Germanies? Is there a legacy of the former East German regime that is 
visible in the attitudes and behavior of young East Germans, similar to an ‘inertial 
effect’ of socialization as described by Bourdieu (1984)? Or was German 
Reunification able to override particular features and attitudes of the “Reunification 
Cohorts”?
12.3  Theoretical and Empirical Background
Based on the concept of habitus, Pierre Bourdieu posited that socialization has an 
“inertial effect” (1984). Bourdieu used habitus to describe a permanent behavioral 
disposition that emerges through socialization in a given social environment. By 
means of his or her habitus, the individual is supposed to incorporate the social 
norms of the environment, to set his or her preferences, and to act accordingly. It is 
therefore assumed that the individual’s range of action is not restricted by material 
living conditions alone. Instead, the individual’s internalized norms regulate his or 
her perceptions of which actions are or are not appropriate. It is further assumed that 
the habitus is very stable, because the individual’s perceptual categories and prefer-
ences are largely shaped in an unconscious manner through the socialization 
process.
The concept of ideology developed by Göran Therborn points in the same direc-
tion. He emphasized that behavior is limited not just by external circumstances, but 
also by the imagination of “what exists,” “what is good,” and “what is possible and 
impossible” (Therborn 1980: 18); and that multiple ideologies may exist simultane-
ously within a single culture.
The inertial effect is also conceptualized in the schema theory by Roy D’Andrade. 
This theory seeks to explain how the socialization process (e.g., acculturation) 
within a certain social (or cultural) group translates into wishes, motivations, and 
strategies for action. D’Andrade also stressed the resistance to change: a schema is 
crystallized in the memory and appears to be prototypical (D’Andrade 1997: 29). 
Like the concept of habitus, the schema theory posits that the individual perceives 
socially determined dispositions on an individual basis only. All of these theories 
assert that the individual behavioral repertoire is restricted by (a) the availability of 
material resources; as well as by (b) subjective perceptions of possible and appro-
priate behavior, which originate from the individual’s experiences during socializa-
tion and in a certain social environment.
The availability of material resources can be analyzed empirically using indicators 
such as the individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics and access to infrastructure. 
Meanwhile, the complex interaction of consciously chosen and internalized behavior, 
as described by the term habitus, can be better captured by an interpretative analysis 
of unstructured interviews in which the individual reconstructs his or her own bio-
graphical experiences and makes predictions about his or her future development.
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As part of our research project on social influences on family foundation in East 
and West Germany, we conducted qualitative interviews with more than 100 young 
women and men in 2004 and 2005. The interviewees grew up in either Lübeck or 
Rostock, and had either an intermediate or a higher educational degree. We chose 
these two cities because they are similar in many respects, despite having been sub-
ject to two different political regimes for 40 years during the division of Germany. 
For example, both are port cities in northern Germany that were part of the Hanseatic 
League. The dominant religion in both cities is Protestant. Moreover, both Lübeck 
and Rostock have approximately 200,000 inhabitants, and the unemployment rate 
in both was relatively high during the period of our fieldwork (13.8 % in Lübeck 
compared to 7.6 % in West Germany; 18.2 % in Rostock compared to 17.7 % in 
East Germany in 2002). During the interviews, the respondents were encouraged to 
provide an account of their life up to that point, and to describe their plans for the 
future. The respondents were also asked systematic questions about the issue of 
family formation.2
Our analyses show that women who live in Rostock and Lübeck have very dif-
ferent ideas about what kinds of employment situations and levels of economic 
security are prerequisites for having a child (Bernardi et al. 2006). Of particular 
interest to us in this chapter are the views on starting a family and the reconciliation 
of work and family life among women who are highly qualified and in full-time 
employment. We focus on childless women who want to have children.3 Since 
socioeconomic characteristics, such as educational level and income, have a consid-
erable influence on both the material resources and the attitudes and perceptions of 
the individual, we restrict our study to women with similar socioeconomic profiles. 
Our sample selection allows us to attribute different narrations, especially those 
related to material life conditions, to different perceptions, attitudes, and values 
regarding family formation.
12.4  Childless Women from East and West Germany: 
A Comparison
How did these childless women, who were socialized in different fertility regimes 
and were about to enter their thirties, see their previous life experiences and their 
future life path? What similarities and differences are revealed in our interviews of 
women from East and West Germany? Based on our hypothesis of an inertial effect, 
is it possible to attribute these differences to differences in socialization in East and 
West Germany?
2 Detailed information on the selection of the interviewees and the data collection method can be 
found in Bernardi et al. (2014).
3 Only a few of our interviewees said that they definitely do not want to have children. We con-
ducted a separate analysis of these interviewees, and therefore excluded them from this essay.
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To allow us to focus on narrations of a complete life path, instead of on frag-
mented aspects of each story, we confine our investigation to four case studies: two 
women from Rostock and two women from Lübeck, who are similar in many ways. 
This approach helps to ensure that the differences in views on family formation are 
not primarily attributable to differences in living conditions. The first two women 
we compare both had a safe employment situation and moderate career ambitions. 
At the time the interview was conducted neither of the women was in a relationship 
suitable for starting a family (the interviewee from Lübeck was single while the 
respondent from Rostock was in a relationship which she considered unstable). The 
other two women we compared were similar in terms of their mobility experiences 
and career ambitions. At the time of the interview they had been in the same partner-
ship for multiple years and wanted to have children with their partner. Thus, while 
each woman has her own story, our case studies exemplify the main differences 
between all of the interviewees from Lübeck and Rostock.
12.4.1  Antje from Rostock: Refusal to Engage in Family 
Planning: “I Hate Planning”
Antje is 29 years old. She grew up in Rostock, and graduated from high school and 
university in the city. She would have preferred to have stayed there, but—like many 
other women her age—she moved to nearby West Germany 5 years previously to 
take a job. When her first employer went bankrupt 2 years later, she looked for and 
easily found a new job. She is currently employed full-time and has a high dispos-
able income. Although she does not consider her work to be exciting (“a lot of 
paperwork”), she describes her job as safe and her salary as appropriate. While she 
sometimes looks half-heartedly for another job, she expects to stay where she is for 
at least the next few years:
“It’s a rather safe place, but I do not really want to say that I want to grow old there. I feel I 
am still too young to stay in such an administrative position for years.”
Antje has been in a relationship for 3 years, but does not live with her partner, 
although he would like to cohabit. She describes her relationship as a “pending 
action” and is not certain how it will develop:
“I do not really have a plan, I honestly have to say. Maybe it’s because the relationship is 
not that good at the moment, or maybe I simply have a little tick, that I don’t want this 
[moving in together]. On the other hand I kind of like it this way [as it is].”
Antje states that having her own family will become an issue “certainly at some 
point in time,” but not at the moment: “I am only 29 years old.” Yet, she reports hav-
ing an increased interest in children:
“I find children very, very beautiful (…) maybe it’s my hormones; one likes to look [at little 
children]. Don’t ask why, it’s like that.”
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She takes it for granted that she will continue to work after becoming a mother. She 
complains about the poor “childcare in the West,” and hopes that in the future com-
panies will do more to help women balance work and family life. Antje’s image of 
a family coincides with the traditional family model in the former East Germany, 
which featured a full-time working mother. Antje’s demand for adequate public 
childcare and for more family-friendly company policies also draw on this family 
model.
Throughout her narration, Antje refuses to make long-term plans. This system-
atic rejection of planning for the future is evident in almost all parts of the interview 
in which she talks about her work life or her partnership:
“For the love of God, I hate planning. I would start panicking if things did not work out 
accordingly [laughs]. (…) Well, because then the people, if they plan, obviously also 
become frustrated eventually, if it doesn’t happen the way they hoped. And then the life 
crises start [laughs].”
Even when asked about a possible timeframe for starting a family, she refuses to 
make any specific plans:
“I don’t want to somehow choose a time now, but I also don’t want to be an old maid.”
Although she wants to have a child, Antje cites her age as the main reason for her 
childlessness, as she believes she can wait a few years before having a child. 
However, the instability of her partnership also seems to play a role in her indeci-
sion, as the following quote illustrates:
“I think if the circumstances were right, maybe I wouldn’t plan things that precisely. But at 
the moment, I wouldn’t like to have it [the child] by myself right now. (…) The partner 
should be right at least, I don’t just need some sperm donor (…) and I also think that one 
should also live together. Yes, I think the relationship should be in place.”
According to Antje, the “right circumstances” for motherhood include being in a 
harmonious partnership: if she had a suitable partner, she would not need to have a 
precise plan for starting a family. It is clear that she does not consider her current 
partner to be the “right” one. She does not, however, explain what bothers her about 
her current partner, or describe what qualities a suitable partner would have. She 
mentions her job as being another factor in her decision about when to start a 
family:
“In my current job, I think I could take a break at any point for a certain period of time and 
then go back. I wouldn’t worry too much about that.”
Since her current job allows her to take parental leave and come back afterwards, 
the criterion of having a job suitable for starting a family has already been met. 
Thus, for Antje the issue of how to reconcile work and family life has been resolved.
As a counterpart to Antje’s story, we now look at the story of a young woman 
from Lübeck. She has a very different image of the family, and describes a precise 
set of conditions under which she hopes to start a family.
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12.4.2  Miriam from Lübeck: Family Planning Based 
on the Main Breadwinner Model: “I Envision it 
Like This, That I Will Definitely Stay Home”
Miriam is single, 30 years old, and has an open-ended full-time job. Although she is 
proud of her occupational achievements, she ascribes them more to coincidence or 
to external pressure than to her own efforts. She sees herself as lazy, and is not inter-
ested in any career objectives. She has considered continuing her education, but has 
repeatedly postponed doing so because she believes it would be too arduous. She is 
very happy with her current job, and has become friends with her boss and some of 
her colleagues. She currently views her job as relatively safe, but given the high rate 
of unemployment in Lübeck, she is aware that this can change quite quickly.
Miriam has wanted to have children for some time, and the main topic in this 
interview is her lack of a partner with whom she can start a family. When she talks 
about family, Miriam has the traditional West German family model in mind: the 
woman is a full-time homemaker or works part-time, while the husband is the main 
breadwinner.
“If everything is great and all of the preconditions are met, I actually envision that I will 
definitely stay home and play mom as long as I feel like it. And then I can go back to work. 
I don’t think that these three years are enough for me. I think I could even go longer.”
This plan seems to reflect the experiences of her own mother, who raised four chil-
dren while her husband worked, and did not have a job until the youngest child 
became a teenager. Miriam believes that taking care of children is the responsibility 
of the mother. She rejects the idea of involving her male partner in childcare (e.g., 
paternity leave) or putting her children in day-care:
“If I actually give birth to a child, I would also like to enjoy it somehow.”
Since having a secure financial foundation is very important for Miriam, she wants 
her partner to have a salary that is large enough to allow her to stay home:
“By all means, if I actually plan this, if I plan to have children, then I absolutely would like 
to be financially secure so that I don’t have to sacrifice so much.”
Here it becomes evident that she would like to have a firm foundation before starting 
a family. Her planning also extends to the life of her partner: he is supposed to have 
career ambitions as well as a job (or the prospect of a job) which provides financial 
security and a good income. Her former partners were not suitable because they 
were not sufficiently career-oriented, they did not want to have children, or they did 
not want to take on the role of the main breadwinner:
“I would have provided him with all the opportunities; we could have moved into a smaller 
apartment so he could study. But he didn’t want to. (…) I have always, well we have also 
spoken about it, what we would do if we had children now, how would we finance this. I 
would have had to have gone back to work immediately. (…) That was another thing which 
bothered me, because it was never clear what happens then. (…) And yes, at this age, at 30, 
L. Bernardi and S. Keim
261
one starts to think. I thought about whether I really wanted to have a family, children with 
him. Nah! I didn’t.”
As she wants to have children, Miriam attributes her childlessness to the lack of the 
right partner. Her goal is to find a partner who shares her views concerning role 
allocation within the family and the preconditions for starting a family, and who is 
able to provide the desired financial security.
The case studies of Antje and Miriam illustrate that the family models that were 
dominant in the former East and West Germany persist after unification, and that 
views on long-term life course planning can differ considerably in the two parts of 
the country. The following two case studies of women who have been living in a 
partnership for years are similar to the first two case studies. They also show that 
women in the East and the West differ in their views on family models and long- 
term family planning. Both women are highly qualified university graduates with 
excellent career prospects. Now they are facing the issue of how to reconcile work 
and family life.
12.4.3  Kristin from Rostock: Egalitarian Gender Roles 
and the Impossibility of Reconciling Work and Family 
Life: “A Great Job and Family—How is that Supposed 
to Work Out?”
Kristin is 29 years old and grew up in Rostock. After graduating from high school 
she moved several times. First she moved to another town in East Germany to attend 
university, and then to a town in West Germany to attend a different university. After 
graduating from university she moved to yet another town to enroll in a doctoral 
program. She got a full-time job a few months previously, and again lives in a town 
in East Germany. She has been in a partnership for 7 years. She and her partner have 
lived together for certain periods of time, while in other periods they have had a 
long-distance relationship and saw each other only on the weekends. They have 
been living together for 9 months now:
“I have reached the point at which we have been living together for a longer period of time 
than we commuted, if I don’t move again [laughs].”
The main issue she raises in her interview is the difficulties she faces in combining 
the demands of her career, including the need to move frequently, with her desire to 
live with her partner:
“On the one hand I would like to have a great job, on the other hand I want to live together.”
She is always forced to make compromises. Although she lives with her partner, her 
workplace is relatively far (70 km) from their home, and she is not completely satis-
fied with her job:
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“It was clear to me beforehand that this isn’t my dream job, but rather an attempt to some-
how reconcile everything (…) Since we are living together at the moment, I am sticking 
with it for now. On the other hand if the job becomes very frustrating, at some point I will 
start thinking about living apart again.”
As she has so far failed to find a way to combine living with her partner with having 
the right job, starting a family seems even less possible to her:
“And if one wants to have something like a family, [should the parents then] travel? How is 
this supposed to work? Should the parents decide to live alone as ‘voluntarily single par-
ents’? (…) I find this very, I can’t, well I find this very, very difficult at the moment. (…) 
We actually want to have children. (…) And a relationship based on traveling, like I said: 
who takes the children? Me or you or maybe in the middle? How does one organize some-
thing like this?”
Like Antje from Rostock, Kristin takes for granted that she will continue to work 
and pursue her professional ambitions after becoming a mother. And like Antje, she 
does not want to have to plan to start a family, and lacks precise ideas about how and 
when to have a child. While she recognizes that the amount of time she has to 
become pregnant is limited, this thought does not inspire her to engage in more 
precise planning:
“So far I have always felt young enough, that the edge is still far away.”
The young woman from Lübeck we will introduce in the following case study has 
also faced challenges in reconciling her career ambitions and her desire to become 
a parent. However, unlike Kristin, she has developed a plan which incorporates the 
typical family model in West Germany.
12.4.4  Karen from Lübeck: Planning a Family with a Gender- 
Related Role Allocation: “It Will be One of Those 
Modern Relationships, Where the Husband Works 
Somewhere else During the Week and Comes Home 
Over the Weekend”
Karen is 30 years old and lives in a town in West Germany not far from Lübeck. She 
has been with her partner for 7 years, and after years of seeing each other only on 
the weekends they have been living together for the past 3 years. At the time the 
interview took place she was certain that he was going to take up a new post soon, 
and that they would again see each other only on the weekends.
After graduating from high school Karen attended a business school in Lübeck. 
She then attended university in another town in West Germany. As she was unable 
to choose a single field of study, she pursued multiple fields. With such broad quali-
fications it was easy for her to find a job after she had completed her studies. 
Although this job was not well paid, it offered her the opportunity for further train-
ing over several years, and was a very good career move. Nevertheless, she left the 
job after 3 months:
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“I did it for three months, and enjoyed it (…) but then I thought, nah, this way is somehow 
too long for me, again three, four years of further training, so little money the whole time 
(…) it was just such a long way, and slowly but surely the idea emerged that I want a family 
at some point. If I take this long before I can even start, then I am eventually 35 and then I 
want children, then I finally want to start having children.”
Karen then found another temporary job which promised to advance her career. 
However, she left this position as well after a short time as it seemed to be incompat-
ible with her desire to have a child in the near future. She now has an open-ended 
job which does not offer great career opportunities, but which provides the perfect 
conditions for having a child:
“One reason I took this job was because it was open-ended, which means I have a certain 
security and can switch to part-time anytime I want, and that I am staying here [in the town 
where I currently live], so the next thing in line is having children, planning a family. And 
I can foresee doing this within the next year, somehow. The next deadline—because it 
didn’t work out by 29—is now to have the first child by 32 at the latest.”
This ideal of working part-time (if at all) after becoming a mother is in line with the 
traditional family model in West Germany. Karen, like Miriam from Lübeck, has a 
precise plan for becoming a parent, and has already put a great deal of effort into 
pursuing this objective. She has adhered to her plan of finishing her studies, then 
securing the right job, and then becoming a parent. This applies to her partner as 
well. From his interview we know that initially he did not want to start a family, and 
did not plan his career with the goal of supporting a family. He gradually changed 
his attitude, in part because he was persuaded by his girlfriend. He made job-related 
changes to ensure that he could fulfill his role as the breadwinner of the family. He 
reports:
“It is really like this, that I was at least implicitly as well as explicitly raised to believe that 
the most important goal is to have a job and to have money. And actually I was opposed to 
this view in the 90s; previously I was afraid that I would become unemployed, because in 
school I was interested in subjects like history, which are not really relevant for work…I 
have always been a potential candidate for unemployment. And this has indeed left a mark 
on me, so I went back and forth [from fear of unemployment to opposing a well-paid and 
secure but boring job].”
After completing vocational training, he did not work in his profession, but became 
a freelance artist:
“And then it was actually important to me to live as an artist, well to get around a lot, but I 
haven’t thought that I could support a family, because it was obvious that I can only take 
care of myself then. But this has changed now, since I got together with Karen. Yes at first 
I was still a bit uncertain, but since I got together with Karen the model of having a family 
is there for me. That means responsibility for others, that also means that money has to be 
earned. (…) Now it is more important for me that I also earn money and that I am taken up 
on my duties as a father. This is my perspective, especially now. That is also the most impor-
tant to me. We want to start a family, and that is great.”
This interview excerpt shows how Karen’s partner came to accept the expectation 
that he would take on the role of the main breadwinner when he became a father, 
even though he had rejected the role for years after having grown up with it. He now 
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believes that he has found an opportunity to combine his desire to have an interest-
ing and varied job with his role as the family breadwinner by pursuing a career as a 
scientist. Under the couple’s long-term plan, Karen and the child will live in Lübeck 
or in the town where they are currently living, while her partner will live elsewhere 
during the week in order to pursue his career. At the center of the plan is the mother- 
child- home unit, which will remain in one place. Karen refers to it as “the principal 
life residence.” In contrast to Kristin from Rostock, Karen is not worried at the 
prospect of being a single mother during the week.
Karen has already talked to her parents and friends about her plans for having a 
family, and knows that she will be supported by them. In addition, the career and 
stable income of her husband are more important to her than being able to live with 
him. Using this approach, she expects to succeed in combining the traditional West 
German family model with the flexibility and mobility currently demanded in the 
labor market. Unlike Kristin from Rostock, who has been unable to find a way to 
follow the egalitarian family model by pursuing a career in science while being a 
parent, Karen has found a solution by modifying the traditional West German fam-
ily model. She is willing to give up her own career and living with her partner, and 
has asked her husband to focus on his career instead. Her husband’s willingness to 
sacrifice spending time with his children in order to pursue his career and fulfill his 
role as the family’s breadwinner is also in line with this model.
12.5  Shared Living Conditions: Differing Conceptions 
and Behavioral Patterns
The women from East and West Germany who were interviewed in this study were 
similar in terms of their initial positions and their current material living conditions: 
they described having difficulties related to their uncertain employment situations, 
including having to take temporary jobs and make frequent moves. The women also 
complained of challenges in figuring out how to reconcile having a family life with 
having an active and satisfactory work life. Nonetheless, we found that the women 
in the East and the West had very different ideas and behavioral patterns which, 
given these living conditions, could lead to childlessness.
Our comparison of four individual case studies sheds light on some behavioral 
patterns that have emerged from the different socialization contexts that prevailed in 
Germany prior to unification. In particular, we have been able to illustrate that the 
family models that were dominant in the former East and West Germany were still 
very present in the narrations of the women interviewed. While the East German 
women assumed that both parents would have a job, their West German counter-
parts assumed that there would be an asymmetric role allocation: i.e., that the man 
would be the main breadwinner and the woman would be primarily responsible for 
homemaking. It is thus apparent that women from East Germany see work and fam-
ily life as being two parallel tracks, neither of which should have priority. There was 
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no indication that they had even considered following the West German family 
model.
Given the current levels of economic uncertainty and the labor market demands 
that workers remain flexible as well as mobile, the East German family model 
has the potential to result in childlessness, as it is difficult to ensure under these 
conditions that both partners will be able to reconcile their work life with parenthood. 
Yet the West German model, in which the man’s job is the sole focus, could also 
lead to childlessness if the male partner is unable to be the main breadwinner due to 
adverse labor market conditions. Thus, the East German egalitarian model seems to 
be more advantageous because both partners are contributing to the family income.
Another difference between the interviewees from East and West Germany was 
the degree to which they had planned how they would start their family. The West 
German women developed clear ideas about how they would like to reconcile work 
and family life, and about the role their partner was supposed to play. The East 
German women, by contrast, considered having a family to be a project that was 
independent of their work life, and did not develop any special plans regarding their 
own career or their partner’s choice of profession or career (as was the case with 
Miriam and Karen from Lübeck). In line with the habitus concept, we reason that 
this difference may be traced back to the fact that women in the GDR did not have 
to engage in long-term planning to advance their own career and to ensure that they 
could reconcile employment and family life. The young women from Rostock 
lacked the experience of normative pressure, including the example of the preceding 
generation, which may have otherwise led them to formulate long-term plans even 
before they were ready to have children (Antje). Thus, they were not prepared to 
address the issue of how to reconcile work and family life when they were ready to 
start a family (Kristin). It is also conceivable that the absence of long-term planning 
was a response to unification and its consequences, as this event was both unex-
pected and uncontrollable for the individual. The fundamental social changes 
induced by unification shook up the current lives of many East Germans, as well as 
their expectations concerning their future lives. Having witnessed how quickly bio-
graphical continuity can be destroyed may have led them to avoid making long-term 
plans. Given the ongoing labor market uncertainties in Germany and the increasing 
demands for individual flexibility and mobility, following a long-term plan may 
seem difficult. Overly rigid biographical plans—e.g., setting subjective precondi-
tions which must be fulfilled prior to family formation—may cause women to post-
pone parenthood, and to end up childless. However, an absence of long-term 
planning can also hamper the spontaneous realization of parenthood. By hoping the 
circumstances will be better at some point in the future, starting a family may be 
perpetually delayed.
These results confirm our hypothesis that an inertial effect of socialization under 
different political regimes is having long-term effects on the life paths of the genera-
tion under study. Although their current life conditions are similar, their different 
socialization contexts lead women to cope with these conditions differently. To gain 
a better understanding of different paths to childlessness, we therefore have to take 
into account the different perspectives and behavioral patterns that have persisted in 
East and West Germany even after unification. The interesting question which fol-
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lows from these observations is how durable this inertial effect is likely to be. Will 
we see fundamental changes in the cohort who are currently thinking about family 
formation, and who have been raised in unified Germany? Or will the inertial effect 
linger until the following generation—i.e., the young adults whose parents have not 
experienced a divided Germany—start having children? These are interesting issues 
for future research.
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Chapter 13
Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
in Germany: A Review of the Current 
Situation
Heike Trappe
13.1  Introduction
As assisted reproductive technologies have become increasingly prevalent, and the 
issues surrounding the use of ART are discussed in the public media, a sweeping 
social change with ethical, cultural, and demographic consequences has been set in 
motion. According to some commentators, the decoupling of procreation and preg-
nancy seems to have suspended the “fundamental law of human reproduction” 
(Bahnsen and Spiewak 2008: 35). Other observers have noted that fertility treat-
ments have created the illusion of extended fecundity through the partial transcen-
dence of the limitations set by nature (Correll 2010: 36).
The first “test tube baby” was Louise Joy Brown, born in England on 25 July 
1978. Her birth represents the cornerstone in the development of assisted reproduc-
tion1 (Steptoe and Edwards 1978). The first “IVF baby” in Germany was born at the 
university hospital in Erlangen in spring of 1982 (Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung 
und Entwicklung 2007: 23). In 2010, Robert Edwards, a co-founder of the first 
in vitro fertilisation (IVF) programme, was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology 
or Medicine. Thus, reproductive medicine, a subfield of medicine which deals with 
human reproduction and its dysfunctions, is still quite young. Reproductive tech-
nologies have, however, been developing rapidly, and social acceptance of fertility 
treatments has been growing. Worldwide, more than four million individuals have 
1 The terms assisted reproduction and reproductive medicine are being used interchangeably in this 
chapter.
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been conceived through the use of ART (Beier et al. 2012). Since the systematic 
registration of ART began in Germany in 1997, there have been around 202,000 live 
births to parents who used these technologies – a figure which approximates the 
number of inhabitants of medium-sized German cities like Kassel or Rostock 
(Deutsches IVF-Register (DIR) 2014: 261).
Physicians of reproductive medicine in Germany seek to support both women 
and men, most of whom are in heterosexual partnerships, in fulfilling their desire to 
have a child. Freedom of reproduction is seen as a fundamental human right. 
Fertility treatment is usually preceded by the diagnosis of one or more biologically 
caused fertility limitations. In diagnosing these limitations, the physician distin-
guishes between sterility and infertility in both the male and the female partner. 
Infertility is defined as the inability to carry a pregnancy to term and to deliver a live 
birth, whereas sterility indicates the inability to conceive or to father a child. Most 
of the couples who undergo fertility treatment are not absolutely sterile, but have an 
unspecified restriction of fertility (Ludwig et al. 2013: 2). As a rule, subfertility is 
assumed after at least 1 year of regular sexual intercourse without contraception 
within which no pregnancy has been achieved (Beier et al. 2012). Since 1967 the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) has classified permanent involuntary childless-
ness as an illness with potentially severe psychological consequences (Robert 
Koch- Institut 2004). The extent of involuntary childlessness is difficult to estimate 
because of its age dependence, and because of the lack of clear boundaries between 
voluntary and involuntary childlessness (Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 2013: 18; 
Sobotka in this volume). Existing data tend to underestimate the extent of biologi-
cally based childlessness because it is assumed that an appropriate diagnosis has 
been confirmed.
13.2  Legal Framework and Rules for the Assumption 
of Costs for ART
The Embryo Protection Act (ESchG), which went into effect in Germany in 1991, 
established the legal framework for providers of reproductive medicine (Diedrich 
2008). The main purpose of the legislation was to ensure the preservation of the 
embryo, and to mandate penalties for noncompliance.2 ESchG also stipulated that 
ART should be used to optimise the success of a pregnancy, and not for other pur-
poses. “The core rule related to the realisation of these goals is the so-called ‘rule of 
three’: physicians are only allowed to fertilise the egg cells which will be transferred 
within a single treatment cycle, and the number of embryos which may be 
transferred in each cycle is limited to three” (Riedel 2008a: 11 – own translation). 
ESchG lists a number of misuses of ART, including egg cell donation (i.e., the 
2 An embryo is defined as “fertilized human egg capable of developing from the time of fusion of 
the two nuclei, and each totipotent cell removed from an embryo that is capable of dividing or 
developing into an individual human being if the necessary conditions prevail” (ESchG § 8 (1)).
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transfer of an unfertilised egg cell from one woman to another), surrogate mother-
hood, and the utilisation of egg or sperm cells after the death of the owner. The only 
major fertility treatments not mentioned in the legislation are the donation of sperm 
cells (Berlin- Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung 2007: 33) and the donation 
of “surplus” embryos (Ahr and Hawranek 2014) unless the ART treatment had been 
undertaken with the purpose to donate embryos (Möller 2013: 588).
Since the ESchG first went into effect, researchers in Germany have been calling 
for the passage of a comprehensive law which regulates all aspects of assisted 
human reproduction (Diedrich and Griesinger 2006; Riedel 2008b; DIR 2014). So 
far, these efforts have been unsuccessful (Riedel 2008a), most likely because the 
proposal of new legislation would incite another round of public debate on the status 
of embryos and the beginning of human life (Spiewak 2009). On the one hand, the 
fact that assisted reproduction in Germany is only partially regulated implies that 
there are no clear instructions to providers on how to manage some important 
aspects of ART, such as the handling of “supernumerary” embryos.3 On the other 
hand, a large number of directives and laws have been approved which regulate 
certain aspects of reproductive medicine. For instance, the standards of quality and 
safety for egg cells, sperm cells, oocytes, and embryos were established in the 
Tissue Act of 20 July 2007. The Stem Cell Act of 28 June 2002, which outlined the 
conditions for the import of and research on embryonic stem cells, mandated a high 
level of protection for human gametes. Meanwhile, German physicians of reproduc-
tive medicine have argued that, because of legal restrictions, the types of treatment 
they can offer their patients are not keeping up with the most recent developments 
in medical science and technology. For example, physicians have asserted that the 
prohibition on embryo selection, and thus of the elective transfer of a single embryo, 
often results in unwanted multiple pregnancies (Beier et al. 2012: 364).
As was noted above, the donation of sperm cells, including the use of sperm cells 
which do not come from the female patient’s male partner (heterologous or third 
party donation), is generally allowed in Germany. The only requirement for using 
donated sperm is a written declaration of consent by the future parents and the 
sperm donor. While the use of anonymous sperm or a mixture of sperm cells from 
different donors is not punishable by law, many people believe it is immoral because 
it violates a child’s right to know her or his genetic ancestry (Revermann and Hüsing 
2010: 199). To date, a sperm donor in Germany is not fully protected from legal 
claims that he is obliged to provide financial and other forms of support for any 
children who are conceived from his donation (Beier et al. 2012: 365). Two other 
laws are relevant in this context: the Transplantation Law of 2007 and the Children’s 
Rights Improvement Act of 2002. “The former law prescribes that all documents in 
relation to human tissue have to be stored for at least 30 years … The second law 
stipulates that paternity cannot be contested by the male partner or the mother if 
they have agreed to artificial insemination by a third party donor, but only by the 
child after she or he reaches the age of majority” (Wischmann 2012: 121 – own 
3 These are embryos which were produced through IVF and which were left over after the treat-
ment had been finished (Riedel 2008a).
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translation). This gives children conceived by third party sperm donation the option 
as adults to gain access to the data of the former donor, and thus to acquire full 
knowledge of their ancestry.
According to guidelines which are binding on all medical professionals, access 
to ART services is granted to all married couples, but it is granted to cohabiting 
heterosexual couples only under exceptional circumstances (No. 3.1.1. of the 
Guideline of the Medical Chamber, Bundesärztekammer 2006). The reasoning for 
this restriction is that a child’s welfare is best ensured within the legal bonds of 
matrimony. Some observers have called this restriction an example of the “power of 
the norm of heterosexual families with biological children” (Correll 2010: 36), 
while others have claimed it represents unconstitutional discrimination of same-sex 
couples and single women (Revermann and Hüsing 2010: 200; Möller 2013: 595).
The reasoning for the controversial prohibition of egg cell donation is to avoid 
ambiguity about who the mother is, and to prevent a separation of the genetic and 
gestational components which might result in identity problems for the child. The 
differences in the regulation of egg cell and sperm donation have been justified by 
the different “depths” involved in collecting male and female gametes (Revermann 
and Hüsing 2010: 200). From a social science perspective, it is relevant that ambi-
guity about the identity of the father of a child has long been tolerated, whereas 
uncertainty about the identity of a child’s mother has not. Meanwhile, reproductive 
medical professionals have been calling for a reasonable policy on egg cell donation 
in Germany to support the 3–4 % of women under age 40 who are unable to con-
ceive for genetic or other reasons (Kentenich and Griesinger 2013: 273).
The diagnostic options related to ART are also regulated under ESchG and sub-
sequent interpretations of the law. For example, polar body diagnosis, elective sin-
gle embryo transfer (eSET), and pre-implantation diagnostics (PID) are legally 
permitted in Germany, but only within strict limits. These procedures and the legal 
framework surrounding them cannot be described in detail here (see Revermann 
and Hüsing 2010; Beier et al. 2012). The law on PID (PräimpG) went into effect on 
21 November 2011, but the corresponding by-laws with important details (PIDV) 
did not become effective until February 2014. A PID procedure in connection with 
IVF is permitted only in specially authorised centres, and only after the couple have 
filed an application which has been approved by an interdisciplinary ethics panel. 
To qualify for a PID procedure, the couple must be able to show that they carry a 
serious genetic disease, or that the woman is likely to die or miscarry if she becomes 
pregnant (PräimpG § 3a(2) and PIDV).
“The reimbursement of the costs associated with ART varies between private and 
statutory health insurance. Overall, there are tendencies to limit reimbursement or 
to deny it” (Revermann and Hüsing 2010: 209 – own translation). “Until December 
2003, up to four treatment cycles were fully covered by statutory health insurance. 
Since January 2004, the law for the modernisation of statutory health insurance 
(GMG) applies. Since then only 50 % of the treatment costs for a maximum of three 
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treatment cycles are reimbursed.4 For couples to qualify for coverage they must be 
married; women must be between 25 and 40 years of age and men must be between 
25 and 50 years of age” (Passet-Wittig et al. 2014: 6). Before the treatment starts, 
couples have to undergo mandatory counselling on the medical and psycho-social 
aspects of ART with a physician who does not provide the treatment. For the rela-
tively small share of women and men with private health insurance, the situation is 
somewhat different. Generally, private insurance provides full coverage for three 
treatment cycles based on the costs-by-cause principle, which implies that in a cou-
ple the insurance of the person who is considered “responsible” for the fertility 
problems has to cover the full costs (Revermann and Hüsing 2010).
“Since the implementation of the GMG, some statutory health insurance provid-
ers have individually increased coverage of fertility treatments for their customers” 
(Passet-Wittig et al. 2014: 7). A few selected federal states, like Saxony, Saxony- 
Anhalt, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and Thuringia, support 
state residents who seek fertility treatments by limiting their co-payment to 25 % 
(Passet-Wittig et al. 2014). This means that a couple’s statutory health insurance 
provider and their place of residence have become significant factors in the size of 
their ART co-payments. The reduction in reimbursement by the GMG has had 
severe consequences for the great majority of couples with fertility problems.5 The 
number of fertility treatments fell sharply after the passage of the law, and is only 
slowly returning to previous levels (DIR 2014, see section 13.3.5). In the political 
realm, the public financing of ART treatments is a matter of dispute. Proponents 
argue that permanent involuntary childlessness is an illness, and point to the tenuous 
demographic situation in Germany. Critics question the assertion that fertility prob-
lems are an illness, and argue that the fulfilment of the desire to have children should 
not be considered a form of social security. Rauprich (2008: 46) offered a further 
perspective on public financing of fertility interventions, asserting that having a 
child is a fundamental need, and that the question of how to pay for these treatments 
is one of equality of opportunity.
Across Europe, the financing mechanisms for ART vary greatly. While the costs 
associated with fertility treatments are fully covered by insurance in some countries 
(e.g., Spain), couples must bear the full costs themselves in others (e.g., Switzerland). 
The legal framework and the regulation of the criteria for access also vary consider-
ably across Europe (Rauprich 2008; Revermann and Hüsing 2010; Küpker 2013). 
In Germany, some couples choose to pay for the fertility treatments themselves or 
to seek treatment abroad, presumably because of the legal restrictions in Germany 
and the challenges they face in gaining timely access to treatment. According to one 
4 A constitutional complaint about the reduction in reimbursement was rejected by the Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2009).
5 “The costs associated with fertility treatments are considerable. In Germany, the cost of a stan-
dard IVF cycle including medication is about 3000 euros. An intracytoplasmatic sperm injection 
(ICSI), which is necessary in cases of male subfertility, costs about 3600 Euro. The rate of success 
varies according to the age of the woman and other factors … Based on this, a rough estimate of 
the cost of a live birth is about 15,000 euro” (Rauprich 2008: 32).
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estimate, around 1000 German couples each year engage in “fertility tourism” in 
countries with less restrictive fertility treatment regulations (such as Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, and Spain) or with lower costs for ART (such as Hungary and 
Slovenia) (Revermann and Hüsing 2010: 221).6
13.3  Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART)
In this section, I provide brief descriptions of the medical procedures and technolo-
gies which are currently being used to help couples with fertility problems fulfil 
their desire to have a child. While these descriptions do not include medical details, 
they should make it easier to understand the temporal developments in their use, and 
the extent to which these procedures have been successful in Germany (see section 
13.3.5).
13.3.1  Intrauterine Insemination (IUI)
After the timing of a woman’s ovulation is determined through regular ultrasound 
monitoring, a “washed” sperm sample is placed directly inside the woman’s uterus 
using a sterile soft catheter. This procedure considerably shortens the distance the 
sperm must normally travel; i.e., from the vagina through the cervix and the uterus 
and into the fallopian tube. IUI can be performed with or without hormonal stimula-
tion to trigger ovulation. As this treatment usually does not cause any pain, it can be 
performed without the use of anaesthesia (Wischmann 2012: 75). As the fertilisa-
tion takes place within the woman’s body, it is a relatively simple form of ART. IUI 
has a long tradition (Dorn 2013), and has been practiced for a much longer period 
of time than the more extensive procedures that involve an extracorporeal 
fertilisation.
13.3.2  In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF)
IVF is the joining of an egg and sperm outside of the woman’s body. The actual 
fertilisation and the initial process of cell division take place in vitro in a nutrient 
liquid. This eliminates the need for the embryo to pass through the fallopian tube. 
IVF is the most basic form of all of the extracorporeal ART procedures, which can 
be understood as being special cases of IVF. “IVF can be described as follows: After 
6 Other sources cite much higher numbers (Spiewak 2011). An ethnographic study by Bergmann 
(2011) provides insights into the complex motivations for fertility tourism to Spain, Denmark, and 
the Czech Republic.
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a hormonal stimulation to trigger a woman’s ovulation, multiple eggs are retrieved 
using a transvaginal technique. In the laboratory, the identified and prepared eggs 
are incubated together with the washed sperm. After successful fertilisation, the 
resulting embryos are cultivated and transferred to the patient’s uterus” (Revermann 
and Hüsing 2010: 37 – own translation). It is important to note that the retrieval of 
mature follicles is done under conscious sedation or general anaesthesia, which has 
certain risks. In most cases, 6–10 eggs are removed from the woman at once, and the 
man’s semen is collected, prepared, and washed on the same day. To initiate the 
fertilisation, the egg and the sperm are incubated together, and the embryos are 
cultivated for about 2 days in an incubator. This process is monitored microscopi-
cally, and the quality of the embryos is judged according to morphological criteria.7 
No later than 5 or 6 days after fertilisation a maximum of three promising embryos 
are transferred into the woman’s uterus, in line with the rules set out in ESchG. Any 
“leftover” fertilised eggs which are at the stage prior to the fusion of the two nuclei 
(2-PN stage) are often cryopreserved in liquid nitrogen (Revermann and Hüsing 
2010: 37). Interestingly, over time there has been an extension in the duration of the 
period prior to the transfer of the embryo. The purpose of this “German compro-
mise”, which is based on a liberal interpretation of the ESchG, is to limit the number 
of transferred embryos to a maximum of two, while still achieving pregnancy rates 
comparable to those in other countries (DIR 2011).8 The decision about whether to 
use an IVF procedure often depends on the quality of the man’s sperm and medical 
indications of the woman.
13.3.3  Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI)
The intracytoplasmic sperm injection procedure was first developed in the early 
1990s. The only difference between ICSI and conventional IVF is the fertilisation 
itself. This technique involves the insemination of a mature egg cell by the microin-
jection of a single sperm cell into it. The steps before and after insemination are 
exactly the same as those in a conventional IVF procedure without ICSI. Therefore, 
the success of the treatment does not depend on the number and mobility of sperm. 
ICSI was originally developed to treat cases of male infertility or abnormalities in 
7 Judging the embryo’s stage of development according to morphological criteria is an indirect 
method, and is thus subject to prognostic vagueness. The selection and further culturing of the 
embryos has to be done at the stage of the impregnated fertilized egg, under the Embryo Protection 
Act (ESchG) (Revermann and Hüsing 2010: 41). Therefore, this morphological evaluation is not 
comparable to the eSET.
8 “In each individual case, the criteria for determining how many fertilized eggs should be culti-
vated longer so that after 5 days in vitro a maximum of three promising embryos can be transferred 
will depend on the characteristics and medical history of the couple (age, number, and outcome of 
previous treatments). However, more than three fertilized eggs may be kept prior to the fusion of 
the nuclei (2-PN stage). Thus, this practice is beneficial only for couples who have a certain num-
ber of fertilised eggs at their disposal” (DIR 2011: 12 – own translation).
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sperm, and since then has proved to be a major advance in the treatment of subfertil-
ity of male origin. In the application of this technique, healthy women need to 
undergo fertility treatment. Today, ICSI is routinely used to fertilise cryopreserved 
eggs or treat idiopathic infertility, or in cases in which conventional IVF has not 
been successful. Worldwide and in Germany specifically, ICSI is now used more 
often than conventional IVF. A basic disadvantage of ICSI relative to IVF is that 
natural selection of sperm in the fertilisation of the egg is replaced by artificial 
selection. This could be associated with an elevated risk of genetic disorders, 
although the different studies which have investigated this question have generated 
contradictory results (Revermann and Hüsing 2010: 39).
13.3.4  Cryopreservation
Human gametes and embryos can be preserved through a process of freezing at 
around −196°C. This process, called cryopreservation, is a widely used assisted 
reproduction technique. The cryopreservation of embryos and impregnated egg 
cells has become increasingly common in countries around the world, provided 
their legal norms permit the procedure. “In Germany, the cryopreservation of 
impregnated egg cells is practiced extensively, in particular because of the prohibi-
tion on creating and preserving ‘leftover’ embryos” (Revermann and Hüsing 2010: 
43 – own translation).9 The advantage to cryopreserving supernumerary fertilised 
egg cells at the stage prior to the fusion of the two nuclei (2-PN stage) is that there 
is no need for the repeated hormonal stimulation of women’s ovulation and a 
retrieval of mature eggs, or for the use of the expensive ICSI method. While today 
the cryopreservation of sperm is routinely done, the cryopreservation of unfertilised 
egg cells is still technically challenging because of their sensitiveness (Griesinger 
et al. 2008). But the new technique of vitrification, in which egg cells are frozen 
within a few seconds, appears to represent a breakthrough (Spiewak 2013). 
Cryopreservation can also be applied to female and male gametes, and is thus also 
a method for preserving fecundity in patients preparing to undergo radiation or 
chemo therapy. For social reasons, interest in the freezing of egg cells or embryos 
seems to be growing (Lawrence 2010): “More attention might be given to so-called 
social freezing (highlighted originally – H.T.), because many women feel pressured 
by their ‘biological clock’ and are concerned about the diminishing quality of their 
egg cells and the declining likelihood of motherhood” (Beier et al. 2012: 372 – own 
9 In the majority of European countries, the cryopreservation of leftover human embryos is the 
preferred procedure (Griesinger et al. 2008: 27). If the “rule of three” in the Embryo Protection Act 
(ESchG) is strictly followed, “supernumerary” embryos can be generated only exceptionally, 
while this is regularly the case if eSET or PID is being used (Riedel 2008b). In many countries with 
more liberal laws than those of Germany, the fate of a great number of frozen embryos currently 
poses complex problems (Grady 2008).
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translation).10 The cryopreservation of egg cells is legal in Germany, but the high 
costs of the procedure and the short optimal age span for extracting a supply of egg 
cells are obstacles to even wider use (Spiewak 2013).
13.3.5  Temporal Development of ART and Measures 
of Success
Among the aims of the German IVF registry is to ensure the quality of ART by col-
lecting data and setting national standards. The registry has been collecting data 
since 1982, the year when the first IVF baby was born in the Federal Republic of 
Germany.11 While participation by IVF centres in the collection of data for the reg-
istry was mandatory under the guidelines of the Medical Chamber from 1998 to 
2012, since 2012 clinics are no longer required to collect data (DIR 2013). 
Nevertheless, the registry will continue to provide IVF centres with a wealth of data. 
The German IVF registry collects electronically all of the data needed for a quality 
assessment of each initiated treatment cycle. “The prospective documentation as 
well as the cycle-by-cycle data collection are of particular value” (DIR 2014: 237). 
Unlike in some other countries (e.g., Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
in Great Britain), the IVF registry in Germany is an association which relies on the 
voluntary participation of professional organisations, and thus lacks a statutory 
basis (Griesinger et al. 2008). The registry collects data on extracorporeal fertilisa-
tion only, and not on intrauterine forms of insemination in which the fertilisation 
takes place within the woman’s body. So far, there is no insemination registry in 
Germany.12 In 2013, 130 out of 131 IVF centres which participate in the German 
IVF registry had exported their data into the registry (DIR 2014: 9).
Over the past 10 years, the practice of endocrinology and reproductive medicine 
in Germany has been moving out of the universities and into the private sector. The 
main reasons for this shift appear to be the lower remuneration of ART practitioners 
by the universities and increasing economic pressure. As a result, more than 80 % of 
ART treatments are taking place in the private sector (Beier et al. 2012: 351). 
10 This is the topic of the Dutch documentary “Eggs for later”, which was produced in 2010
(http://www.imdb.com/video/wab/vi1370856473/). A 2013 poll conducted by the Cologne 
market research institute YouGov in Germany found that 27 % of the 536 women surveyed said 
they could imagine having their egg cells frozen to ensure that they can fulfil their desire to have a 
child (YouGov 2013). The debate on social freezing gained momentum when in 2014 the large 
US-based companies Facebook and Apple announced that they would pay for the social freezing 
of their employees’ egg cells (Groll 2014).
11 In 1984 the first IVF baby was born in the German Democratic Republic (Revermann and Hüsing 
2010: 48).
12 Estimates indicate that since 1970 more than 100,000 children have been born in western 
Germany following insemination by third party donors. Currently, about 1000 children per year in 
Germany are conceived through this method (Katzorke 2008: 98).
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“International lab networks are on the rise, and the takeover of IVF centres by pri-
vate investors is nothing new” (DIR 2012: 13).
Figure 13.1 provides an overview of the development of ART over time since the 
beginning of reliable data collection. Up to 2003, the number of treatment cycles 
and the number of treated women13 rose continuously. Over the same period, the 
number of live births resulting from fertility treatments also increased. Growth was 
particularly strong between 2002 and 2003, as couples and physicians were aware 
of the upcoming reduction in reimbursement levels. Physicians thus appear to have 
been performing treatments in that period which otherwise might have been per-
formed the next year. The decline between 2003 and 2004 was especially large. 
Since then, the absolute numbers have reflected the consequences of the changes in 
reimbursement mandated in the GMG. In 2013, there were about as many treatment 
cycles as there were between 2001 and 2002. The mean age at fertility treatment 
among both women and men has increased rapidly: in 2013, it was 35.2 years for 
women and 38.6 years for men (DIR 2014: 28). In addition, some observers have 
argued that the rise in the use of treatments which are not covered by statutory 
health insurance is a sign that many couples are turning to privately financed treat-
ments.14 Since 2004, there has again been a steady increase in the number of treat-
13 Even in cases in which the male partner is the cause of subfertility, the registry counts only fertil-
ity treatments among women.
14 More detailed analyses of the reduction in reimbursement related to ART have shown that it is 
necessary to distinguish between short-term and long-term effects on use (Connolly et al. 2009).
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ment cycles and in the number of live births following ART. The number of treatment 
cycles was roughly proportional to the number of treated women; on average, the 
number of treatment cycles per woman was between 1.5 and 1.7. Particularly telling 
is the share of live births resulting from ART among all live births: the share was 
largest in 2003, when it reached 2.6 %; whereas by 2012, the share was 2.1 % (own 
calculation).15
The IVF registry data clearly show that the success of ART is age dependent: 
“The likelihood of a pregnancy following ART is about 27 % per cycle after age 35 
and it declines to 15 % per cycle at age 40” (Beier et al. 2012: 353 – own transla-
tion). This pattern is accompanied by increasing rates of miscarriage among women 
ages 35 and older (DIR 2014: 22–23). Overall, miscarriage rates have fallen over 
time. Another positive trend is that because of improvements in the quality of stimu-
lation and in oocyte treatment, along with changes in transfer technology, the mean 
number of transferred embryos decreased by about 25 % between 1998 and 2012.
This development is associated with a further reduction in the share of multiple 
deliveries. Between 1998 and 2012, the proportion of triplets among all IVF new-
borns decreased by almost 80 %. In 2012, an average of less than two embryos were 
transferred per treatment cycle, which may be expected to improve the chances of a 
successful pregnancy (DIR 2014: 18).16 The fact that transferring more than one 
embryo at a time increases the likelihood of multiple pregnancies is often seen as 
the most problematic aspect of ART. Compared with single pregnancies, multiple 
pregnancies are associated with higher morbidity and mortality risks for embryos 
and infants and increased health-related risks for women. Moreover, multiple births 
can have serious mental, social, and economic consequences for families.17 In many 
countries, the use of diagnostic options like eSET is encouraged in an effort to limit 
the number of multiple pregnancies. For instance, in Sweden eSET is widely used 
to transfer only one embryo in each cycle (Revermann and Hüsing 2010). Of the 
live births resulting from ART in Germany in 2012, 66.5 % were singletons, 31.9 % 
were twins, and 1.6 % triplets (DIR 2014: 31).18 Births following the use of ART 
therefore accounted for about 20 % of all multiple deliveries (own calculation).
The most common indicator of the success of ART is the pregnancy rate, defined 
as the percentage of clinical pregnancies per treatment. The data needed to track 
clinical pregnancies can be collected relatively quickly and completely, whereas the 
15 The last European comparison of data on ART for 2010, conducted by the European Society of 
Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE), found that in Germany the share of infants con-
ceived through ART relative to all births was about 2.1 %. The countries with larger shares were 
Denmark (5.9 %), Slovenia (5.1 %), and Iceland (4.4 %) (Kupka et al. 2014: 2104).
16 It is noteworthy that the trend towards transferring fewer embryos did not stop when the GMG 
took effect: “The decision about the number of embryos that should be transferred was influenced 
by personal, health-related, and economic considerations” (Revermann and Hüsing 2010: 98).
17 If there are strong medical reasons, multiple pregnancies have to be reduced. To prevent extreme 
preterm births and to limit related risks, fetal reduction is carried out via induced abortion of single 
embryos. In 2012 in Germany, this was done in 254 cases affecting 380 embryos (DIR 2014: 14).
18 Of all live births in Germany (2012), only 3.5 % were from multiple deliveries (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2014).
13 Assisted Reproductive Technologies in Germany: A Review of the Current Situation
280
data on births following ART are often incomplete because it is difficult to link the 
data on the women who received treatment to information on subsequent births 
(Revermann and Hüsing 2010).
Figure 13.2 shows a clear increase in pregnancy rates following ART between 
1998 and 2012. The rates rose for so-called fresh cycles (IVF, ICSI), but also for 
cryo transfers (frozen-thawed transfer, mostly in the 2-PN stage). It is important to 
note that pregnancy rates were higher following IVF and ICSI treatments than they 
were following cryo transfers. ICSI seems to have performed somewhat better than 
IVF from 1998 to 2004; thereafter, however, the pregnancy rates resulting from each 
of the two treatments can hardly be distinguished. Nonetheless, since 1998 ICSI has 
been used far more frequently in Germany than conventional IVF. Thus, the profiles 
of the patients who were treated with the respective methods might have shifted 
(Revermann and Hüsing 2010).
For couples and their attending physicians, a far more important indicator of the 
success of ART is the so-called “baby take-home rate”, or the percentage of live 
births per treatment cycle. This rate is considerably lower than the clinical preg-
nancy rate (Fig. 13.3).
The trend of the baby take-home rate more or less reflects the temporal develop-
ment of the pregnancy rates, but at a lower level. In 2012, a baby take-home rate of 
about 18 % after IVF or ICSI had been achieved. The rate was far lower following 
cryo transfers, as this method is associated with lower pregnancy rates and higher 
miscarriage rates. Overall, the baby take-home rate rose slightly between 1998 and 
2012. This is remarkable because the mean age of the women and the men seeking 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
C
lin
ic
al
 p
re
gn
an
cy
 r
at
e 
pe
r 
tr
ea
tm
en
t c
yc
le
 (
in
 %
)
In vitro fertilization (IVF) Intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) Cryo transfer
Fig. 13.2 The development of clinical pregnancy rates following ART in Germany, 1998–2012 
(Source: DIR 1999–2014 (own calculations))
H. Trappe
281
fertility treatment had been increasing rapidly and continuously during this time 
(DIR 2014: 28). Currently, the mean pregnancy rate after ART in Germany is only 
slightly below the European average, while the baby take-home rate corresponds to 
the European average.19 Internationally, the further decline in the share of multiple 
pregnancies and deliveries and the reduction in the proportion of preterm births are 
considered signs of success, particularly among physicians of reproductive medi-
cine (Wischmann 2012: 86). Due to improved medical and technical options, the 
use of ICSI and cryopreservation is increasing and the number of embryos trans-
ferred per cycle is declining, not only in Germany and across Europe, but also in 
other countries around the world (Revermann and Hüsing 2010).
The estimates of the rates of childlessness for bio-medical reasons vary widely 
for Germany. Revermann and Hüsing (2010: 18) have vaguely stated that between 
0.5 and 1.5 million, or between three and 10 % of German couples, are involuntarily 
childless. Meanwhile, other scholars have estimated that between 1.2 and 1.5 mil-
lion German couples are unable to conceive (Diedrich 2008). According to Sütterlin 
(2009: 1), every seventh German couple, or around 14 % of couples, experience 
involuntary childlessness. This value is closer to the figure mentioned by Michelmann 
(2008: 2), of between 10 and 15 % of all couples.20 It should be noted, however, that 
19 Compared to Germany, the baby take-home rate is higher in the UK, Slovenia, Sweden, Norway, 
Iceland, and some formerly socialist countries (Revermann and Hüsing 2010: 96; Kupka et al. 
2014: 2104).
20 Beier et al. (2012) calculated based on a microsimulation model that the increase in the average 
age of women at first birth between 1985 and 2007 in West Germany contributed to an increase in 
involuntary childlessness from 3.5 % to 6.5 %.
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all of these estimates of the extent of involuntary childlessness are based on data on 
the demand for ART, and are thus affected by the blurred lines between temporary 
and permanent childlessness. Given the lack of reliable data on involuntary child-
lessness, self-assessments by individuals of their own fecundity can be very infor-
mative. In the German Family Panel (pairfam), which covers certain birth cohorts 
(Huinink et al. 2011),21 both the male and the female respondents had been asked 
whether it was possible for them and their partner to procreate by natural means. In 
the first wave (2008/09), between eight and nine per cent of women and men aged 
35–39 replied that natural conception was probably or definitely not possible for 
them. Meanwhile, between 7 and 8 % of the respective partners of these respondents 
concurred with these assessments. Among the study participants who were 10 years 
younger, 3 % reported having fertility problems. Overall, it appears that the share of 
the German population who are concerned about their prospects for biological pro-
creation is sizeable.
The question of whether – and, if so, to what extent – ART can contribute to a 
stabilisation or an increase in cohort fertility is difficult to answer. Based on com-
plete fertility histories for Danish women, Sobotka et al. (2008: 95) estimated that 
for women of the birth cohort 1978 the net effect of ART is between 3 and 4 %. 
Among the factors which contribute to this relatively strong effect are easy access 
to ART treatments, public awareness of treatment options, increasing subfertility 
linked to the continued postponement of childbearing, and the relatively frequent 
use of ART among younger women and among mothers trying to have another 
child. At the same time, the authors expressed scepticism about suggestions that 
ART should be integrated into pronatalist policies, in part because they believe that 
promoting the illusion that fecundity is possible at higher reproductive ages could 
prove problematic.22 Based on their analyses for West Germany, Beier et al. (2012) 
concluded that if the provision of ART continues at around current levels, the extent 
to which these treatments can compensate for the postponement of fertility will be 
negligible from a demographic perspective. Nevertheless, as the data on the tempo-
ral development of the baby take-home rate (Fig. 13.3) have shown, reproductive 
medicine can make an important contribution at the individual level by helping 
couples fulfil their desire to have a child. This is particularly relevant because invol-
untary childlessness is still a social taboo which can have grave psychological and 
mental implications for individuals (Hyatt 2012).
21 This paper uses data from the German Family Panel pairfam, coordinated by Josef Brüderl, 
Karsten Hank, Johannes Huinink, Bernhard Nauck, Franz Neyer, and Sabine Walper. Pairfam is 
funded as long-term project by the German Research Foundation (DFG).
22 This argument has also been put forward by Rainer et al. (2011), who emphasised that if ART 
was widely available, women might be tempted to postpone the births of their children until even 
later in the life course. This “behavioural effect” of postponement is likely to reduce the fertility 
rate in countries with high fertility in particular.
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13.4  Discussion
“The declared ethos of reproductive medicine acknowledges the significance of the 
individual desire to have a child, and it affirms the right of couples to make their 
own procreation decisions” (Beier et al. 2012: 359 – own translation). Currently, the 
ability of German couples to make their own fertility treatment decisions is subject 
to legal restrictions, including prohibitions on the use of certain techniques, like egg 
cell donation, surrogacy, and reproductive cloning. However, in light of global 
changes in technologies and values, the debate about these legal obstacles may be 
expected to continue among experts and the public. Thus, in time, many of these 
restrictions will likely be challenged and overturned. A multifaceted societal debate 
is highly desirable, as it touches on fundamental aspects of the protection of human 
dignity, including questions about the beginning of human life and the essence of a 
life worth living. On the other hand, the freedom of individuals to make their own 
procreation decisions may be restricted in practice if access to ART services is lim-
ited. This is especially likely to be the case for economically disadvantaged popula-
tion groups. ART has been relatively expensive in Germany particularly since the 
passage of the GMG in 2004, which substantially increased the co-payments for 
fertility treatments. Moreover, the legally and professionally defined criteria for 
access to reproductive medicine tend to exclude some social groups, including 
unmarried couples, same-sex couples, and singles. This tendency towards exclusion 
is attributable in part to the fact that the legal status of a sperm donor relative to any 
children conceived through his donation has not been fully clarified, particularly if 
the children are born out of wedlock. But the main reason certain social groups are 
excluded is the continued dominance of traditional cultural ideals of the family, 
which dictate that children should grow up in a home with two married biological 
parents (Herrmann-Green 2008). Groups who are not permitted to access ART ser-
vices in Germany often have to seek out services in hospitals abroad.23 The alloca-
tion of access to ART services in Germany privileges particular living arrangements, 
and is based on the cultural ideal of a “normal family” rooted in the interrelation of 
marriage and procreation. The more this family ideal comes under pressure due to 
on-going social changes, the more people will demand a liberalisation of access to 
reproductive medicine. Thus, the debate over access to assisted reproduction has the 
potential to challenge well-established attitudes about the family, and in so doing to 
unsettle deeply entrenched concepts about reproduction, motherhood, fatherhood, 
and kinship. The extent to which this actually occurs depends on the specific social 
conditions. In the case of Germany, it is interesting from a social science perspective 
to observe that social fatherhood and motherhood are still perceived differently by 
23 Worldwide, the rising demand for and the increasing shortage of egg cells has led to an interna-
tional market in egg cells and fertility tourism. “The development of reproductive tourism is related 
to an extension of the supply as well as to the structural and economic inequities between countries 
and regions” (Berg 2008: 244 – own translation). Egg cell donation and surrogacy are aspects of 
the global commercialisation of the female body (Rudrappa 2012).
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the legal system, with sperm donation by a third party donor being allowed while 
egg cell donation is prohibited.
Reproductive medicine is barely 40 years old, and is thus a young discipline 
which is still developing extremely rapidly. Not surprisingly, certain problems 
related to reproductive medicine remain unresolved. These problems often result 
from particular legal situations and corresponding value conflicts (Riedel 2008b). 
The unintended consequences of certain ART treatments did not become obvious 
until the first generation of children conceived by ART grew older. Now, however, 
it is generally recognised that allowing children to know their genetic origin is 
essential, not only for medical reasons, but also for reasons of personal identity. 
This presupposes that children will be told about their conception, that reproductive 
donations will not occur anonymously, and that the relevant data on donors will be 
stored and preserved in a central location. Revermann and Hüsing (2010: 228) have 
pointed out that the safety, the risks, and especially the consequences of ART over 
time have not been subjected to the same investigative rigour as the medical tech-
niques. From an ethical standpoint, new courses of action always entail new respon-
sibilities (Kreß 2013).
To evaluate the potential of ART, a broad societal debate about the opportunities 
and implications of these technologies is certainly needed. At present, the success 
rates of fertility treatments tend to be overstated, while the emotional strain of 
undergoing these treatments is often underestimated (Revermann and Hüsing 2010). 
The desire to have a child at any age cannot be fulfilled. Education and counselling 
should help to lower the barriers to seeking fertility treatment, and to alleviate wide-
spread social biases regarding subfertility, particularly among men (Thorn 2008). In 
the future, topics like the “social freezing” of egg cells and new diagnostic options 
for preserving embryos may be expected to dominate the debate on the socially 
acceptable and desirable implications of ART. On the one hand, reproductive medi-
cine can be seen as expression of a deeply rooted human desire to achieve emanci-
pation from nature. But on the other, these technologies break taboos and call into 
question traditional ideas of what it means to be human (Rauprich and Siegel 2003).
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Chapter 14
Assisted Reproductive Technology in Europe: 
Usage and Regulation in the Context 
of Cross-Border Reproductive Care
Patrick Präg and Melinda C. Mills
14.1  Introduction
Involuntary childlessness, or infertility, is a condition that affects a sizeable number 
of couples around the world (Mascarenhas et al. 2012). Assisted reproductive tech-
nologies (ART) represent an important set of techniques for addressing involuntary 
childlessness. While it has always been difficult to make a precise distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary childlessness, the main reasons for childless-
ness, such as the perceived lack of a suitable partner or problems associated with 
balancing work and family, can be seen as both voluntary and involuntary (Sobotka 
2010). The current trend of fertility postponement in European societies (Mills et al. 
2011) has exacerbated the issue of involuntary childlessness. While it is clear that 
female fecundity declines sharply at higher ages, because the pace of fecundity loss 
varies greatly between women, it can be difficult for an individual woman to ascer-
tain how long she can postpone childbearing (te Velde and Pearson 2002; te Velde 
et al. 2012).
ART is increasingly perceived as being one way to alleviate the problems of 
involuntary childlessness. Between the birth in 1978 of Louise Brown, the first live 
ART baby (Steptoe and Edwards 1978), and the awarding of the Nobel Prize in 
Physiology or Medicine to Robert G. Edwards for the development of in vitro fertil-
ization in 2010, ART had become a standard medical practice and a profitable com-
mercial enterprise for thousands of firms in Europe. An estimated five million 
babies have been born with the help of assisted reproduction in the past four decades 
(Adamson et al. 2013), a sizable share of them in Europe.
ART generally refers to treatments in which gametes or embryos are handled in 
vitro (“in glass;” i.e., outside of the body) to establish a pregnancy. A key technique 
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of ART is in vitro fertilization (IVF). In IVF, oocytes are fertilized using sperm in a 
laboratory and the embryo is surgically implanted in the woman’s womb. IVF was 
invented to treat cases of female infertility. When only a single sperm cell is injected 
into the oocyte during IVF, the procedure is referred to as intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection (ICSI). ICSI was developed to tackle male fertility problems, such as a low 
sperm count or poor sperm quality, but has in recent years become a standard form 
of fertilization in ART. A frozen or thawed embryo transfer is an IVF procedure in 
which embryos that have been cryopreserved for storage are transferred (as opposed 
to a “fresh” transfer of never-frozen embryos). This procedure is often used because 
obtaining oocytes from a woman is a rather invasive act. Thus, after a hormonal 
treatment, several oocytes are collected at the same time, fertilized, and frozen for 
later use in case the first embryo transfer fails—which is likely, given the relatively 
low success rate of ART (Malizia et al. 2009). In an alternative collection strategy, 
immature eggs are collected from a woman and are then matured in a lab (in vitro 
maturation). This procedure may be indicated when a woman is at risk of reacting 
adversely to the fertility drugs given before the oocytes are collected.
Frozen oocyte replacement is a technique in which oocytes are retrieved, frozen, 
stored (oocyte cryopreservation), and fertilized only after they have been thawed for 
transfer. This technique provides women with the option of having genetically 
related children later in life, even if no suitable father is present at the time of cryo-
preservation. Frozen oocyte replacement was first used in cancer patients, who had 
oocytes retrieved and frozen before undergoing forms of chemo- or radiotherapy 
that could damage their ovaries. But because this technique can also be used for 
delaying motherhood for any reason, including the desire to pursue a career, it has 
attracted substantial public attention in recent years, and is sometimes referred to as 
“social freezing” (Mertes and Pennings 2011). Large companies, such as Facebook 
and Apple, have recently offered social freezing as a benefit for female employees, 
offering them up to $20,000 to cover the cost of egg freezing (Tran 2014).
When prospective parents are concerned about passing on hereditary diseases 
like cystic fibrosis, it can be useful to conduct preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD) or screening (PGS). PGD involves examining an embryo to determine 
whether specific genetic and structural alterations are present. In PGS, an embryo is 
examined to ascertain whether any aneuploidy, mutation, or DNA rearrangement 
has taken place. In cases of egg donation, an oocyte from a woman is fertilized and 
then transferred to another woman’s womb. Donation may be done in cases of sur-
rogate motherhood for prospective parents who are unable to carry a child, such as 
a gay male couple; or when a woman is unable to have her own oocytes fertilized, 
often because she is older. Another type of egg donation is called “egg sharing:” 
women who underwent ART can share any non-used frozen oocyte with other 
women, sometimes in exchange for a discount on their ART treatments.
Globally, Europe has the largest number of ART treatments. In 2005, the most 
recent year for which global data are available, 56 % of ART aspirations1 were in 
1 Aspirations are initiated ART cycles in which one or more follicles are punctured and aspirated, 
irrespective of whether oocytes are retrieved. See Footnote 2 for more details on the metrics with 
which ART treatments are recorded.
P. Präg and M.C. Mills
291
Europe, 23 % were in Asia, and 15 % were in North America (Zegers-Hochschild 
et al. 2014). As many European countries have been characterized as having 
“lowest- low” fertility (Kohler et al. 2002), ART represents not just a means of alle-
viating the suffering of individuals who are involuntarily childless, but also a poten-
tial policy lever for raising fertility rates in Europe. Thus, there is substantial interest 
in ART among policy-makers. Another key aspect of ART in Europe is the stark 
variation in the rates of ART uptake and in the regulation of ART, both across coun-
tries and over time. This variation in regulations between and within European 
countries allows us to make comparisons that could yield important insights into the 
antecedents and outcomes of ART usage and could have implications for ART 
across the globe.
The first aim of the current study is to present comparative data on ART usage in 
Europe, demonstrating the wide variability across European countries. In a second 
step, we will explore forms of ART governance across European countries, illustrat-
ing the variation in how ART is regulated and in who gets access to which tech-
niques. We then turn to the specific case of surrogacy, which often falls outside the 
scope of national ART legislation. We conclude with a related discussion on cross-
border reproductive care, which is sometimes characterized as “reproductive tour-
ism.” In the concluding section, we will summarize the findings, discuss the 
implications, and point to areas for future research.
14.2  Usage of Assisted Reproductive Technologies 
in European Countries
The usage of ART varies considerably across European countries. Although diag-
nostic and treatment services are currently available in all European countries, the 
variation in ART usage indicates that there are substantial differences in equity of 
access. To explore these differences, we analyze data collected by the European IVF 
Monitoring (EIM) Consortium of the European Society of Human Reproduction 
and Embryology (ESHRE). The EIM data go back to 1997, and are based on infor-
mation from national registries (with the voluntary or mandatory participation) of 
European countries; or, if those are not available, stem from information reported by 
clinics. In our analysis, we primarily focus on information from the most recent 
report, which contains data for the year 2010 (Kupka et al. 2014), and present infor-
mation from the countries that have complete or almost complete figures.
In Fig. 14.1, we can see the high degree of variation in ART usage across Europe. 
The figure shows the number of treatments2 by the main group of potential ART 
2 There are different metrics for recording ART treatments. The term “initiated ART cycle” refers 
to the menstrual cycle in which a woman receives ovarian stimulation (or, in the rare case of natu-
ral-cycle IVF, receives monitoring) with the intention of conducting ART, regardless of whether a 
follicular aspiration is attempted. The term “aspiration” refers to an attempt to retrieve oocytes 
from one or more follicles, regardless of whether oocytes are successfully retrieved. The term 
14 Assisted Reproductive Technology in Europe: Usage and Regulation…
292
patients in a country; namely, women between the ages of 15 and 45. Denmark, 
Belgium, Iceland, Sweden, and Slovenia are the countries where the largest num-
bers of ART cycles are initiated. A comparison of these four countries shows that 
there is substantial heterogeneity at the top of the distribution. ART treatments are 
considerably more common in Belgium and Denmark than in Iceland, Sweden, and 
Slovenia. It is also striking that the top group is not completely dominated by afflu-
ent western European countries. In addition to Slovenia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, and Serbia are also in the upper half of the distribution; well ahead of 
wealthy nations such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, or Germany. When we look 
at the bottom of the distribution, it is apparent that ART is no more widespread in 
Germany, Austria, or Ireland than it is in Ukraine or in Albania.
A number of studies have attempted to explain the very large differences in ART 
usage across countries. Several factors have emerged. ART costs and affordability 
appear to play an important role. Belgium and Denmark are known for their 
 comparatively generous reimbursement policies for couples and individuals under-
“transfer” refers to a procedure in which embryos are placed in the uterus or Fallopian tube, irre-
spective of whether a pregnancy is achieved (Zegers-Hochschild et al. 2009). However, for frozen 
embryo replacements, frozen oocyte replacements, and egg donations, cycles and aspirations are 
usually not recorded; here, thawings and transfers are the relevant metrics.
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going ART. In a cross-national study, Chambers et al. (2014) found that greater 
affordability of ART—measured as the net cost of an ART cycle in a country as a 
share of the average disposable income in that country—is associated with greater 
ART utilization. Remarkably, this finding holds even after accounting for important 
factors such as GDP per capita, the number of physicians, and the number of ART 
clinics in a country. Studies that have looked at variation within countries and over 
time (e.g., Hamilton and McManus 2012) have also found evidence that affordabil-
ity is an important driver not only of utilization, but also of the use of safer ART 
practices.
Norms and beliefs also seem to play an important role for cross-national differ-
ences in ART usage. Billari et al. (2011) found that there is a large positive associa-
tion between higher social age deadlines for childbearing—i.e., generally shared 
assumptions about when one is too old to have children—and the availability of 
ART in European countries. The higher the social age norm for childbearing, the 
greater the availability of ART clinics. Kocourkova et al. (2014) showed that ART 
use and the total fertility rate in a country are correlated, which they interpret as 
being a sign of increasing demand for children. This interpretation is plausible, as 
most studies have found that the net impact of ART on fertility rates is actually 
small (Präg et al. 2015). Mills and Präg (2015) have suggested that beliefs about the 
moral status of a fertilized egg—i.e., whether a human embryo is seen as a human 
being immediately after fertilization—are associated with ART utilization. 
Generally, in countries where the belief that an embryo becomes a human being 
right after fertilization is less widespread, ART is used more often.
In addition to the differences in the extent of ART usage in Europe, there is also 
considerable variation in the range of ART techniques that are utilized. Figure 14.2 
reports the share of single ART treatments among all ART treatments for selected 
countries in 2010. The classical form of ART, in vitro fertilization, is no longer the 
most popular type of ART procedure. The share of IVF treatments among all ART 
treatments ranges from less than 10 % in Spain to slightly more than 40 % in 
Denmark. ICSI, a method invented more recently (Palermo et al. 1992) to treat male 
factor infertility, has overtaken IVF in recent years as the method of choice for ART 
(Kupka et al. 2014). The reasons for this development are not fully understood, 
especially because the leading professional organizations of reproductive health 
providers discourage the routine practice of ICSI in the absence of male factor infer-
tility diagnoses (Boulet et al. 2015). It is likely related to what demographic 
researchers have called the “absent and problematic men” issue in fertility research 
and infertility diagnoses, as collecting data on men and establishing male factor 
infertility is difficult (Greene and Biddlecom 2000). Nonetheless, in virtually all of 
the countries displayed in Fig. 14.2, the share of ART procedures that are ICSI treat-
ments is larger than the share of procedures that are IVF treatments. Only in 
Denmark is the share of ART procedures that are IVF treatments slightly larger 
(42 %) than the share that are ICSI treatments (35 %). In the United Kingdom, IVF 
and ICSI are used to a similar extent (37 and 40 %, respectively). The substantial 
differences between countries have been noted in the literature, yet explanations for 
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these differences are still lacking (Nyboe Andersen et al. 2008). It is, however, clear 
that IVF and ICSI together make up the bulk of treatments in all countries.
The third-most popular form of ART treatment is frozen embryo replacement, 
making up between 6 % (Italy) and 31 % (Belgium) of ART treatments. The low 
uptake of FER in Italy is attributable to a national law that prohibited embryo cryo-
preservation (except under exceptional circumstances) from 2004 to 2009 
(Benagiano and Gianaroli 2010). The relative popularity of FER in Germany is 
surprising, as German regulations regarding embryo freezing are fairly restrictive: 
i.e., the non-emergency freezing of embryos is banned, and the freezing of fertilized 
eggs is allowed only in the earliest stages of development. Preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD), which has been practiced since the early 1990s (Simpson 2010), 
is likely the ethically most controversial form of ART. PGD has clear benefits, as it 
can help parents avoid passing on inheritable disorders to their children, and it is 
generally considered to be safe and to have a low rate of errors (Ory et al. 2014). 
However, fears about the creation of “designer babies” and moral concerns about 
the use of PGD for non-medical purposes (such as sex selection) are often expressed 
in public discussions about ART. The data show that very few ART procedures 
involve PGD: the share of all ART treatments in a country that involve PGD ranges 
from no reported cases (in Germany and Italy) to 4.7 % of cases (in Spain). The 
share is around 1 % in Denmark, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom; and is around 
2 % in Belgium and the Czech Republic. Given the controversy surrounding PGD, 
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it is interesting to note that the procedure is generally allowed in all of the countries 
listed in Fig. 14.2 (Ory et al. 2014); however, Denmark and Slovenia restrict its use 
to screening for specific hereditary disorders.
Egg donation is also a technique that is not practiced in all countries, as can be 
seen in Fig. 14.2. Germany and Italy report no cases, and in Slovenia and Denmark 
egg donation makes up less than 2 % of ART procedures. In the United Kingdom 
and Belgium, the shares are slightly higher (3.3 and 5 %, respectively). In the Czech 
Republic and Spain a significant share (9.7 and 22 %) of ART treatments involve 
egg donation. As we will discuss in more detail below, it is important to note that 
these differences between countries are attributable in part to cross-border repro-
ductive care. Couples and single women who are unable to obtain the desired treat-
ment in their home country are sometimes willing to travel abroad to obtain that 
treatment in another country. Frozen oocyte replacement (FOR), which builds on 
fertilizing thawed oocytes, is a relatively rare form of ART: FOR treatments are 
reported only in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy (0.1, 3.1, and 4.1 %, respec-
tively). One reason for the relative popularity of FOR in Italy is that the cryopre-
serving of embryos was banned, which created incentives to further develop and 
refine technologies for cryopreserving oocytes.
14.3  Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology 
in Europe
Europe is the only continent where the legal regulation of ART is widespread. Other 
major countries where ART is used, such as India, Japan, and the U.S., largely rely 
on voluntary guidelines. While ART regulation is sometimes portrayed as a novel 
phenomenon, there is a long history of government interference in the reproductive 
realm. For example, countries have long had laws pertaining to marriage and 
divorce, contraception, births out of wedlock, adoption, and abortion (Spar 2005).
There are three major ways of regulating the practice of and the access to 
ART. First, ART can be regulated via guidelines, or sets of rules that practitioners 
are expected to follow voluntarily. These guidelines are generally issued by profes-
sional organizations, such as associations of obstetricians and gynaecologists. 
Second, as an alternative or a supplement to these guidelines, ART is also often 
subject to governmental legislation. Thus, rules for using ART are codified in the 
law, and penalties for the violation of these rules are imposed. A third route that 
regulates access to ART is insurance coverage: given the high cost of infertility 
treatments, the level of coverage can be seen as an indirect regulation of access to 
ART. However, because infertility is now seen as a condition leading to disability 
(WHO and World Bank 2011), infertile individuals should have a right to 
treatment.
The International Federation of Fertility Societies (IFFS) provides information 
on ART guidelines, regulations, and insurance coverage in their triennial 
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“Surveillance Reports,” which have been published since 1999 (Jones and Cohen 
1999). The data in these reports are based on surveys of experts from national fertil-
ity societies. The IFFS data are organized into relatively broad categories, and are 
sometimes incomplete or inconsistent. Nonetheless, these reports provide a useful 
overview of the differences in ART governance across Europe. In the following, we 
present data from the most recent IFFS Surveillance Report (Ory et al. 2014), which 
refers to the year 2013. We include all of the European countries featured in the 
report, plus a number of contrasting non-European cases.
The left column of Table 14.1 reveals that in all European countries, ART is 
regulated under the law. In about half of the countries, governmental regulation is 
supplemented by voluntary guidelines. By contrast, for two of the three non- 
European cases listed at the bottom of the Table (India and Japan), ART is fully 
governed by voluntary guidelines. While the distinction between legislation and 
guidelines does not reveal the scope and extent of the actual regulation, it roughly 
illustrates how important ART is to the respective government. The second column 
shows that ART legislation is a salient issue for governments, as half of the coun-
tries have introduced new ART legislation in the relatively short period of 4 years.
When it comes to the financing of ART treatments, virtually all European coun-
tries offer some assistance. Only Belarus, Ireland, and Switzerland do not provide 
their citizens with any form of coverage. Whereas most countries provide coverage 
via national health plans, some mandate that private insurers provide coverage. Six 
countries—Denmark, France, Hungary, Russia, Slovenia, and Spain—offer com-
plete coverage through national health plans. A comparison with the results from 
Fig. 14.1 reveals that Denmark, Slovenia, and Spain are among the countries with 
particularly high ART utilization rates. In the countries where partial coverage is 
provided, the extent of the coverage varies considerably. For example, two-thirds of 
the costs are covered by the national health system in Austria, but only 40 % of the 
costs are covered in Finland. Furthermore, the level of insurance coverage usually 
depends on patient characteristics. In Spain, for example, coverage is only available 
for women up to age 40. Slovenia covers six cycles for the first child and four cycles 
after a first live birth, but only for women up to age 42. In some parts of the United 
Kingdom, women who are obese are being denied coverage. In the U.S., there is 
substantial heterogeneity in coverage across the states, with a few states providing 
rather generous coverage, and the vast majority providing no coverage.
Couple and sexuality requirements represent a socially relevant aspect of ART 
policies, as they govern access to ART treatments over and above the financial 
restrictions that infertile couples and individuals face. Table 14.2 lists the couple 
and sexuality requirements, as reported by Ory et al. (2014) for all European coun-
tries and India, Japan, and the U.S. It should be noted that these requirements can 
stem from both legislation and guidelines. The first column of Table 14.2 reveals 
that marriage is a requirement for ART treatment in most countries. Only six out of 
22 European countries in Table 14.2 report that marriage is not a requirement for 
ART access. However, apart from Turkey (and Japan), all of the European countries 
listed also provide treatment to couples who live in a stable relationship. Ory et al. 
(2014) acknowledged that “stable relationship” is a poorly defined concept open to 
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Table 14.1 Types of ART regulation in Europe, India, Japan, and the U.S., 2013
Country
Type of ART 
governance
New ART 
legislation since 
2009 Type of coverage
Extent of 
coverage
Austria Legislation and 
guidelines
No National health plan Partial
Belarus Legislation and 
guidelines
No No coverage None
Belgium Legislation only Yes National health plan 
and private 
insurance
Partial
Bulgaria Legislation only Yes National health plan Partial
Croatia Legislation only Yes National health plan 
and private 
insurance
Partial
Czech 
Republic
Legislation only Yes National health plan Partial
Denmark Legislation only Yes National health plan Complete
Finland Legislation only No National health plan Partial
France Legislation and 
guidelines
Yes National health plan Complete
Greece Legislation only No National health plan Partial
Hungary Legislation only No National health plan Complete
Iceland Legislation only No National health plan Partial
Ireland Legislation and 
guidelines
No No coverage None
Italy Legislation and 
guidelines
Yes National health plan Partial
Latvia Legislation and 
guidelines
Yes National health plan Partial
Norway Legislation and 
guidelines
No National health plan Partial
Portugal Legislation only Yes National health plan Partial
Russia Legislation and 
guidelines
Yes National health plan Complete
Slovenia Legislation only No National health plan Complete
Spain Legislation and 
guidelines
No National health plan 
and private 
insurance
Complete
Sweden Legislation and 
guidelines
No National health plan Partial
Switzerland Legislation and 
guidelines
No No coverage None
Turkey Legislation and 
guidelines
Yes National health plan Partial
United 
Kingdom
Legislation and 
guidelines
Yes Private insurance Partial
(continued)
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interpretation, yet it is widely embraced across countries. Countries are somewhat 
more restrictive in their rules regarding unpartnered women who want to undergo 
ART treatment. Only 10 of the 22 European countries, along with India and the 
U.S., permit singles to utilize ART services. Moreover, only seven European coun-
tries and the U.S. allow lesbian women to have access to ART.
Table 14.1 (continued)
Country
Type of ART 
governance
New ART 
legislation since 
2009 Type of coverage
Extent of 
coverage
India Guidelines only No No coverage None
Japan Guidelines only No National health plan Partial
United States Legislation and 
guidelines
No Private insurance Partial
Source: Ory et al. (2014)
Table 14.2 Couple and sexuality requirements for ART in Europe, India, Japan, and the U.S., 
2013
Marriage 
required
Stable relationship 
permitted
Singles 
permitted
Lesbians 
permitted
Austria Yes Yes No No
Belgium Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bulgaria Yes Yes Yes Yes
Croatia Yes Yes No No
Czech Republic Yes Yes No No
Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes
Finland No Yes Yes Yes
France No Yes No No
Greece No Yes Yes No
Hungary Yes Yes Yes No
Ireland No Yes No No
Italy Yes Yes No No
Latvia Yes Yes Yes Yes
Russia Yes Yes Yes No
Slovenia No Yes No No
Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sweden Yes Yes No No
Switzerland No Yes No No
Turkey Yes No No No
United Kingdom No Yes Yes Yes
India Yes Yes Yes No
Japan Yes No No No
United States No Yes Yes Yes
Source: Ory et al. (2014)
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To better illustrate how European countries vary in their approach to regulating 
forms of ART, we examine the particularly controversial ART variant of surrogacy. 
There are several forms of surrogacy (see the notes below Table 14.3). The most 
prominent form is a traditional variant that uses the surrogate mother’s egg. By 
contrast, in gestational surrogacy, the egg is provided by the intended mother or a 
donor, fertilized via IVF, and then transferred to the surrogate mother’s womb.
The first central difference between countries lies in whether they prohibit 
(Table 14.3, column 1) or heavily regulate surrogacy (Table 14.3, column 3). 
Surrogacy is prohibited in many countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal. Surrogate motherhood is explicitly allowed in Belgium, Belarus, 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United 
Kingdom. A second difference refers to compensation of the surrogate mother. 
When surrogacy is permitted, in some countries the prospective parents are not 
allowed to pay the surrogate mother beyond covering her “altruistic costs.” 
Conversely, commercial surrogacy is legal in certain U.S. states, as well as in India, 
Ukraine, and the Russian Federation. In countries where surrogacy is prohibited, 
stakeholders have produced evidence that prospective parents may travel to other 
countries that allow commercial surrogacy.3 A third difference between countries 
relates to access to surrogacy. Since some countries require that both partners pro-
vide gametes when surrogates are used, singles are generally unable to have a child 
via surrogacy in these countries.
Finally, due to the frequent cross-border nature of surrogacy, highly contentious 
ethical and legal debates have arisen about the citizenship and parental rights of sur-
rogate and adoptive parents. The media have recently reported numerous cases of 
babies who have been left without citizenship or parents. A famous case that dem-
onstrates the legal problems that can arise is that of twins who were born to a gay 
male British couple, of whom one was the biological father, with the help of an 
anonymous egg donor and a Ukrainian surrogate mother (Henderson 2008). Because 
of conflicts between British and Ukrainian laws, the British father was not treated as 
a parent of the twins, and his children were not allowed to enter the United Kingdom. 
Conversely, the Ukrainian surrogate mother had waived all rights to custody of her 
biological offspring in a surrogacy agreement, which was, however, only recog-
nized under Ukrainian law, and not under British law. In the end, the British couple 
were able to gain custody of the twins following a decision in a British court of law. 
Similar cases have been reported in Germany: for example, babies who were born 
outside of the country using surrogacy have been denied citizenship, even though 
the German parents were named on the birth certificate (The Local 2011). Concerns 
have been raised about the “Baby Gammy” case, in which a child with Down’s 
syndrome who was born to a Thai surrogate mother was abandoned by the intended 
Australian parents. The child was recently granted Australian citizenship, and 
remains under the care of the Thai surrogate mother (Farrell 2015). The legal mech-
anisms for granting parenthood status remain unclear and differ depending on where 
the surrogate mother is located, or on a court’s opinion regarding the best interests 
3 See, e.g., Surrogacy UK, http://www.surrogacyuk.org/
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Table 14.3 Overview of legal approaches to surrogacy, Europe and selected other countries, 2013
General 
prohibition
Commercial 
surrogacy allowed 
or prohibited?
Special law on 
surrogacy?
Adoption rules or 
recognition of 
citizenship of 
children from 
cross-border 
surrogacy
Austria Egg donation 
prohibited; 
gestational 
surrogacy 
allowed
No specific 
prohibition for 
traditional 
surrogacy
No for 
traditional 
surrogacy
No recognition of 
child’s citizenship
Belarus Allowed Unknown Unknown Unknown
Belgium Allowedb Prohibited on 
public policy 
grounds
No for altruistic 
surrogacy
Adoption required 
to transfer legal 
parenthood
Bulgaria Prohibited n/a No, but draft 
legislation under 
consideration
n/a
Cyprus Allowed Allowed/no 
prohibition
Yes Surrogate mother 
and biological 
father listed on 
birth certificate
Czech 
Republic
Allowed Allowed/no 
prohibition
Yes Unknown
Denmark Allowedb Prohibited No for altruistic 
surrogacy
Adoption required 
to transfer legal 
parenthood
Estonia Allowed Allowed/no 
prohibition
Yes Unknown
Finland Prohibited for 
IVF
No specific 
prohibition for 
traditional 
surrogacy
No for 
traditional 
surrogacy
Unknown
France Prohibited n/a n/a Unknown
Germany Prohibited n/a n/a No recognition of 
child’s citizenship
Greece Allowed Allowed/no 
prohibition
Yes: altruistic 
gestational 
surrogacy 
subject to 
restrictions
Surrogate mother 
and biological 
father listed on 
birth certificate
Hungary Allowed Prohibited No for altruistic 
surrogacy
(continued)
P. Präg and M.C. Mills
301
Table 14.3 (continued)
General 
prohibition
Commercial 
surrogacy allowed 
or prohibited?
Special law on 
surrogacy?
Adoption rules or 
recognition of 
citizenship of 
children from 
cross-border 
surrogacy
Ireland Allowedb Prohibited No for altruistic 
surrogacy but 
formal 
guidelines for 
cross-border 
surrogacy 
agreements
Adoption required 
to transfer parents; 
genetic intended 
parents’ names as 
legal parents on 
birth registry
Italy Prohibited n/a n/a/ Unknown
Latvia Allowed Prohibited No for altruistic 
surrogacy
Unknown
Lithuania Allowed Allowed/no 
prohibition
Yes Unknown
Luxembourg Allowed Allowed/no 
prohibition
Yes Unknown
Malta Prohibited n/a n/a Unknown
Norway Prohibited n/a No
Netherlands Allowedb Prohibited Yes altruistic 
gestational 
surrogacy 
required by law 
to abide by 
professional 
guidelines
No special law for 
parenthood: 
adoption required
Poland Allowed Allowed/no 
prohibition
Yes Surrogate mother 
and biological 
father listed on 
birth certificate
Portugal Prohibited n/a n/a Unknown
Russian Fed. Allowed Allowed/no 
prohibition
Unknown Unknown
Slovakia Allowed Allowed/no 
prohibition
Yes Unknown
Slovenia Allowed Allowed/no 
prohibition
Yes Unknown
Spain Prohibited n/a n/a Unknown
(continued)
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Table 14.3 (continued)
General 
prohibition
Commercial 
surrogacy allowed 
or prohibited?
Special law on 
surrogacy?
Adoption rules or 
recognition of 
citizenship of 
children from 
cross-border 
surrogacy
Sweden Prohibited for 
fertility clinics 
to make 
surrogacy 
arrangements
Prohibited No law for 
privately 
arranged 
surrogacy; 
Swedish Council 
Medical Ethics 
recently 
recommended 
altruistic 
surrogacy 
should be 
permitted
Adoption required 
to transfer 
parenthood
Switzerland Prohibited n/a n/a No recognition of 
child’s citizenship
Turkey Prohibited n/a n/a Unknown
Ukraine Allowed Allowed/no 
prohibition
Unknown Intended parents’ 
names on birth 
certificate
United 
Kingdom
Allowedb Prohibited No for altruistic 
surrogacy
Parenthood only 
transferred in 
certain 
circumstances
India Allowed Allowed/no 
prohibition
Yes Parents’ names on 
birth certificate, 
Indian surrogates 
cannot be named 
as mother
Japan Prohibited n/a n/a Unknown
Canada Allowedb Prohibited Unknown Unknown
United States Alloweda Allowed/certain 
prohibitions
Yes Parents’ names on 
birth certificate
Notes: In traditional surrogacy, the surrogate mother is the genetic mother, as one of her eggs is 
inseminated using the sperm of the intended father or donated sperm (either IVF or insemination). 
In altruistic surrogacy, the surrogate mother is paid nothing or only enough to cover her expenses. 
In commercial surrogacy, the surrogate mother is paid a fee that may exceed her expenses
Source: Brunet et al. (2013), Ory et al. (2014), Families Thru Surrogacy (2015). When expert 
interviews from IFFS data from Ory et al. (2014) differed from legal and clinical survey data 
reported by Brunet et al. (2013), the latter data were adopted over the expert interviews
aAllowed in California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Alabama, 
Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
and West Virginia
bAllowed only for non-commercial surrogacy (i.e., the mother is not paid or is paid only enough to 
cover her expenses)
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of the child. It appears that when many ART laws were initially written or amended, 
surrogacy was often excluded or barely acknowledged.
14.4  Cross-Border Reproductive Care in Europe
As we touched upon in our discussion on surrogate motherhood, the variation in 
regulations in Europe has given rise to the phenomenon of cross-border reproduc-
tive care (Shenfield et al. 2010; Nygren et al. 2010). Cross-border reproductive care 
refers to couples or individuals seeking assisted reproduction treatments in a coun-
try other than their country of permanent residence.4 Although practitioners, 
patients, and policy-makers appear to be aware of this phenomenon, there is little 
empirical research on the actual extent of cross-border reproductive care. The 
review article by Hudson et al. (2011) tellingly reported that the number of com-
mentaries on the topic greatly exceeds the number of empirical studies.
So far, researchers have been unable to generate reliable estimates of the inci-
dence of cross-border reproductive care. The most ambitious attempt to conduct a 
global survey of this form of care was by Nygren et al. (2010), who collected infor-
mation from experts in 23 countries. Virtually all of the reports were based on esti-
mates by informants rather than empirical data, and the authors concluded that their 
efforts yielded “little, if any, solid data” on cross-border reproductive care. The 
estimates of Nygren et al. suggest that most cross-border reproductive care in 
Europe involves traveling to other European countries, not to other continents.
The largest study of patients undergoing cross-border reproductive care in 
Europe was conducted in 2008/09 by Shenfield et al. (2010). They surveyed all 
women from other countries who were undergoing treatment in 44 fertility clinics 
in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Switzerland, Slovenia, and Spain. The 
main countries of origin of the women seeking care were Italy (32 %), Germany 
(15 %), the Netherlands (12 %), and France (9 %). Geographic and cultural proxim-
ity is a driving factor in the choice of treatment country: the majority of Italians 
traveled to Spain and Switzerland, most of the Germans traveled to the Czech 
Republic, the majority of the Dutch and French women went to Belgium, and most 
of the Norwegian and Swedish women traveled to Denmark. Shenfield and col-
leagues suggest that a conservative estimate of cross-border reproductive care (i.e., 
crossing country borders in order to undergo ART) in 2008/2009 would be one of 
11,000–14,000 patients and 24,000–30,000 treatment cycles in the six countries 
alone. When confronted with the number of ART cycles (2008: 532,000; 2009: 
537,000) counted in all of Europe at that time (Ferraretti et al. 2012; Ferraretti et al. 
2013), this is a small, yet substantial share of patients and cycles.
4 This phenomenon is also sometimes referred to as “reproductive tourism” or “reproductive exile” 
(Pennings 2005), but given the charged nature of both terms, we follow Shenfield et al. (2010) in 
their use of the more descriptive and neutral term “cross-border reproductive care.”
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The reasons for seeking cross-border reproductive care are diverse, with patients 
reporting a combination of factors (Culley et al. 2011). The main reasons cited were 
legal restrictions, difficulties in accessing ART treatments (e.g., long waiting lists), 
the expectation of better quality treatment in the destination country, and the failure 
of previous treatments in the patient’s country of origin. A number of studies have 
described the legal reasons why ART patients seek treatment in other countries. For 
example, egg donation is a form of assisted reproduction that is banned in some 
European countries, including Germany. Thus, some German couples travel to the 
Czech Republic or Spain for egg donation (Bergmann 2011). In France, single 
women and lesbian couples lack access to donor sperm (see Table 14.2). Thus, these 
women sometimes travel to Belgium to seek treatment (van Hoof et al. 2015; Rozée 
Gomez and de La Rochebrochard 2013). Certain countries, like the United Kingdom, 
have long waiting lists for donor gametes, and patients who wish to avoid lengthy 
waiting periods seek treatment in countries where donor gametes are more readily 
available (Culley et al. 2011). These long waiting periods have arisen for a number 
of reasons. For example, some countries (e.g., Finland, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom) have banned anonymous gamete donation, which tends to discourage 
donation. There is also considerable variation across countries in the amounts 
donors are paid. Patients from countries such as Italy hope to receive better quality 
treatments abroad (Zanini 2011; Shenfield et al. 2010), while other patients go 
abroad because the previous treatments they received in their country of residence 
failed (Shenfield et al. 2010; Culley et al. 2011). In their comparative study of 
patients seeking treatment abroad, Shenfield and colleagues (2010) found evidence 
that supports the assumption that differences in regulations are important drivers of 
cross-border fertility care. Between 57 and 80 % of patients from Italy, Germany, 
Norway, France, and Sweden cited legal restrictions as one of the reasons why they 
were seeking fertility treatment abroad. By contrast, only 32 % of patients from the 
Netherlands and 9 % of patients from the United Kingdom cited legal barriers. 
However, 53 % of patients from the Netherlands reported that they went abroad to 
obtain better quality treatment (compared to an average of 43 % across the six coun-
tries surveyed), while 34 % of the patients from the United Kingdom said they went 
abroad because of access difficulties (compared to an average of 7 % across the six 
countries surveyed).
While the extent to which European patients cross borders to obtain reproductive 
care appears to be limited, cross-border care has far-reaching consequences and 
implications for ART regulation, access, and treatment success rates. Because it is 
relatively easy and inexpensive for Europeans to travel across borders to obtain 
care, the value of legal restrictions on ART is largely symbolic (van Beers 2015). 
Furthermore, as patients can easily circumvent national regulations by seeking 
treatment abroad, patient groups and other national stakeholders may have reduced 
incentives to make their interests known in the policy-making process. This lack of 
pressure allows policy-makers to impose more onerous restrictions than they would 
have if they had been facing more resistance from stakeholders (Storrow 2010). 
Furthermore, cross-border reproductive care has implications for equity of access to 
ART. Rozée Gomez and de la Rochebrochard (2013) have reported that lower 
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income French patients seek fertility treatment in Greece for financial reasons. This 
might in turn affect access to ART within Greece, as local patients might be “priced 
out” of the market for ART services.
14.5  Discussion
This study has shown that there is marked variation in ART usage levels across 
Europe, and that the highest levels are not just in affluent countries such as Denmark 
and Belgium, but also in Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Serbia. The 
reasons for this variation include affordability, reimbursement levels, and the social 
and cultural norms surrounding childbearing. A striking shift has been the move 
away from IVF as the dominant form of ART, and toward ICSI, a method used pri-
marily to treat male infertility. We also show that the mix of treatments used varies 
across countries.
Currently, all of the European countries have laws on ART, and virtually all (with 
the exception of Belarus, Ireland, and Switzerland) provide some sort of financial 
assistance for treatments. The countries where the cost of treatments is completely 
covered by national health plans—such as Denmark, Slovenia, and Spain—have the 
highest ART utilization rates. Coverage also differs by patient characteristics, such 
as the age of the prospective mother and how many children she already has. In 
many countries, patients who seek ART treatments must be legally married or in a 
stable partnership. Currently only half of European countries permit single women 
to have ART treatments, and even fewer countries grant access to lesbian women.
We also looked at the increasingly relevant issue of surrogacy and cross-border 
reproductive care. Surrogacy is strictly prohibited in many countries, and where it is 
allowed, there are often restrictions on commercial surrogacy. Due to the frequent 
cross-border nature of surrogacy, there is considerable confusion about which laws 
apply when determining the citizenship of the child and the parental rights of the 
surrogate and the adoptive parents. The growth in cross-border reproductive care 
means that restrictive national regulations can be easily circumvented, but it raises 
questions about equity of access. Cross-border reproductive care is a transnational 
phenomenon that forces social scientists and policy-makers to think beyond the 
confines of the nation-state (Mau and Verwiebe 2010; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 
2002). Notwithstanding all of the problems related to patients crossing borders to 
achieve fertility treatment, it is important to acknowledge that women have been 
crossing borders in Europe for a long time to abort pregnancies, exploiting country 
differences in reproductive legislation.
Recently, there has been a rise in the uptake of techniques such as the “social 
freezing” of eggs, and it has even been suggested that ART could help countries 
raise their fertility levels. However, we would be reluctant to argue that it is an 
upcoming policy to reconcile career and family aspirations, such as measures that 
encourage flexible work schedules (Präg and Mills 2014) or improve access to pub-
lic childcare (Mills et al. 2014). Because ART treatments tend to have low success 
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rates at higher ages, they cannot be expected to reverse the “biological clock” (Präg 
et al. 2015; Wyndham et al. 2012).
This study also showed some strong limitations in what we are able to conclude, 
which is due to the lack of data about ART in Europe. In the future, researchers 
should first attempt to standardize the collection of data on ART treatments and their 
outcomes, as this would improve our knowledge of the individual antecedents and 
effects of ART. Second, researchers should develop national databases to collect 
quantitative information that can be linked across countries, as cross-border repro-
ductive care needs to be properly registered. Third, we need these initiatives to not 
only monitor cross-border reproductive care in Europe, but also to support caregiv-
ers in providing help for patients both undergoing and returning from cross-border 
fertility care in these often legally diffuse situations.
Although Europe is currently the biggest market for ART in the world, it is 
important to note that the demand for ART is relatively low in Europe. Paradoxically, 
involuntary childlessness is most prevalent (and is perceived by infertile women as 
most pressing) in Africa, where fertility levels are the highest in the world. Given 
the increasing international recognition of the problem and the push for the low-cost 
provision of ART (Ombelet 2014), the “globalization of ART” has yet to be achieved 
(Inhorn and Patrizio 2015).
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What’s a (Childless) Man Without a Woman? 
The Differential Importance of Couple 
Dynamics for the Wellbeing of Childless Men 
and Women in the Netherlands
Renske Keizer and Katya Ivanova
15.1  Introduction
Parenthood is often seen as being a core element of a “normal” adult life (Dykstra 
and Hagestad 2007). This notion has coloured both scientific and societal views on 
people who will never make the transition to parenthood. Childless individuals, 
especially childless women, are depicted as “others”, and even as deviants (Letherby 
2002). They are also perceived as being disadvantaged and as having weaker sup-
port networks. It is often assumed that childless adults are more likely than parents 
to suffer from isolation, loneliness, and physical and mental ill health (see for review 
Dykstra and Hagestad 2007).
Since being a parent is considered to be more central to the life of a woman than 
to the life of a man (Veevers 1980; Hird and Abshoff 2000; Letherby 2002; Bulcroft 
and Teachman 2003), the ramifications of not having taken on a parental role are 
generally assumed to be more disadvantageous for a childless woman than for a 
childless man. Scholars have often asserted that among men, circumstances and 
behaviours in the domain of paid employment have a much stronger influence on 
their identity and wellbeing than those in the domain of family life (e.g., Gilford 
1986; Thomson and Walker 1989). Most studies on the impact of childlessness have 
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therefore examined the effects on women only, and have overlooked or simply 
neglected men (for a review, see Greene and Biddlecom 2000). Recent studies 
which have investigated the extent to which men’s lives are affected by remaining 
childless have concluded that the implications of childlessness are no less signifi-
cant for men than for women, but that the effects may be different (e.g., Eggebeen 
and Knoester 2001; Keizer et al. 2010).
These studies have revealed that the impact of childlessness among men is con-
ditioned to a much larger extent by partner status than it is among women (Dykstra 
and Wagner 2007; Kendig et al. 2007; Wenger et al. 2007; Umberson et al. 2010). 
For example, Kendig et al. (2007) showed that never-married and formerly married 
childless men were more likely than married childless men to report being in poor 
physical health, whereas among women there were no significant differences in 
self-reported health among childless women based on partner status. Other studies 
have shown that the life outcomes of never-married childless women are much more 
favourable than those of their married counterparts (Koropeckyj-Cox and Call 
2007). Taken together, these findings suggest that the presence of a partner is more 
important to the wellbeing of childless men than of childless women. If the presence 
of a partner indeed plays a bigger role in the life outcomes of childless men than of 
childless women, then are childless men also more affected by couple dynamics 
than childless women? Moreover, does relationship satisfaction have a greater 
impact on the overall wellbeing of childless men than on that of childless women?
Understanding the importance of couple dynamics for relationship satisfaction 
and, subsequently, overall wellbeing is important, especially for middle-aged and 
elderly couples. With increasing age, the social network of an individual becomes 
smaller and the relative importance of the partner increases (Carstensen 1992). This 
may be particularly true for childless couples, whose social networks are already 
more limited because of the absence of children and grandchildren. By studying the 
potential gender differences in the effects of couple dynamics and relationship sat-
isfaction, our work addresses the pertinent issue of whether there are particular 
individuals within the childless population who are “at risk” of maladjustment.
Using a couple perspective, we investigate in the current study the differential 
importance of couple dynamics for relationship satisfaction among childless cou-
ples. Subsequently, we investigate whether relationship satisfaction has different 
effects on the well-being of the male partner and of the female partner in a given 
couple. As studies on the impact of parenthood on the wellbeing of adults have 
shown that the consequences of having or of not having children are not necessarily 
uniform across life outcomes (Dykstra and Wagner 2007; Kendig et al. 2007; 
Wenger et al. 2007), we focus on both physical and mental wellbeing. In our analy-
sis, we use of multi-actor data from the Netherlands Kinship Panel Study (NKPS), 
a nationally representative survey conducted in 2002–2004.
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15.2  Theoretical Background
15.2.1  Gendered Benefits of Marriage?
Being in a relationship is thought to be beneficial for individuals because a partner-
ship represents an important source of both social support and financial stability, 
factors which are linked to higher levels of physical and mental health (e.g., 
Stimpson and Peek 2005). Bernard (1972) was one of the first scholars to explore 
the idea that relationships are more beneficial for men than for women. Based on her 
belief that marriage oppresses women because the wife is subordinate to the hus-
band, she concluded that women tend to be less satisfied with marriage than men. 
Bernard (1972) also argued that men derive greater health benefits from marriage 
than women, and that marriage is harder on women than on men because women 
shoulder the majority of the household and childcare tasks.
In Bernard’s work, which was published in the 1970s, gender balance and an 
equal division of tasks were the key factors used to explain the differences between 
men’s and women’s levels of satisfaction with marriage. Today, however, there is a 
much greater degree of gender equality in relationships than was the case in the 
period in which Bernard wrote her seminal studies (Sullivan 2006). The overwhelm-
ing majority of contemporary mothers are no longer confined by the role of house-
wife, but are actively involved in the labour market. In addition, while women still 
shoulder the majority of childcare duties, men have taken on a greater share of 
household and childcare tasks (e.g., Hook 2006). These trends suggest that couples 
today are much more gender-equal than they were four decades ago. Thus, based on 
the argumentation of Bernard, we would expect to find that gender differences in 
marital satisfaction are weaker today than they were in previous generations. Indeed, 
recent meta-analyses (Jackson et al. 2014) have reported that within non-clinical 
samples, no gender differences in marital satisfaction could be found. In line with 
these findings, and given that childless couples are viewed as being more gender- 
egalitarian than couples with children (e.g., Grunow et al. 2012; Schober 2012), we 
should not observe any gender differences in relationship satisfaction levels among 
contemporary childless couples. However, the question of whether experiences 
within the partnership might affect the two partners differently remains.
15.2.2  Gender Differences in the Importance of Relationship 
Characteristics
Following up on the arguments of Bernard, numerous studies have investigated the 
implications of partner status for wellbeing (e.g., Coombs 1991; Kiecolt-Glaser and 
Newton 2001). Recently, however, scholars have shifted their attention to investi-
gating the impact on wellbeing of within-relationship dynamics. The majority of 
these studies have shown that positive marital relations (characterised by support 
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and closeness) are protective for relationship satisfaction and wellbeing, whereas 
negative marital relations (characterised by disagreement and distress) are associ-
ated with poor outcomes for one or both members of the couple (e.g., Acitelli and 
Antonucci 1994; Ducharme 1997; Miller et al. 2004; Henry et al. 2005; Whisman 
et al. 2006).
Scholars have argued that what is going on in the relationship tends to have a 
greater impact on the female partner’s than on the male partner’s satisfaction with 
the relationship (e.g., McRae and Brody 1989). They often explain this difference 
by claiming that women tend to do more of the emotional work in the relationship 
than men (Thomson and Walker 1989), i.e., that women are generally more aware 
than men of the emotional climate of the relationship, and are more likely to moni-
tor the relationship’s emotional quality. While it has been shown that the perception 
of problems is associated with lower levels of relationship satisfaction and higher 
levels of stress among both women and men, women have been found to be more 
likely than men to perceive problems in the relationship (McRae and Brody 1989). 
In line with these findings, other studies have revealed that women initiate relation-
ship therapy and file for divorce more frequently than men (e.g., Rokach et al. 
2004). Scholars have further observed that a woman tends to be at a double disad-
vantage in a relationship relative to her male partner, not only because she is more 
likely to perceive problems in their relationship, but because these problems are 
more likely to have a detrimental impact on her wellbeing (e.g., Gove and Hughes 
1979; McRae and Brody 1989). In other words, as Rae and Brody (1989) have put 
it: “Women’s marriages are more negative than men’s marriages and the negatives 
translate into more distress for women than men” (ibid.: 246).
Most studies which have examined the extent to which characteristics of the 
relationship affect relationship satisfaction have focused on negative marital rela-
tions, such as relationship problems and conflicts (for a critique, see Cramer 2004). 
Although the ways in which partners experience conflict and handle relationship 
problems are strong predictors of satisfaction with the relationship, recent studies 
have found that the ways in which partners provide emotional support to one another 
may be equally or even more important determinants of satisfaction (e.g., Cramer 
2004; Hilbert et al. 2013). Findings in this area complement the findings on the 
impact of conflict and problems in the relationship: i.e., a woman’s level of relation-
ship satisfaction is not only more likely than a man’s to be negatively affected by 
relationship conflict and problems; it is also more likely to be positively affected by 
partner support (e.g., Julien and Markman 1991).
Furthermore, scholars have argued that the physical and mental wellbeing of a 
woman is more strongly affected than that of a man by relationship quality because 
marriage is considered a more central component of a woman’s than a man’s life 
(Gilford 1986). Women are socialised to derive their wellbeing from close inter- 
personal relationships, whereas men are encouraged to derive their sense of self 
through more autonomous pathways, such as paid labour (Quirouette and Gold 
1992). It has therefore been posited that while men tend to benefit from marriage 
regardless of the quality of the relationship, women may derive mental and physical 
health benefits from marriage only if the relationship is satisfying (Hess and Soldo 
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1985). Some scholars have even found that positive relationship characteristics such 
as high levels of closeness, while beneficial for a woman, are actually detrimental to 
the wellbeing of a man, as intense intimacy with a partner may interfere with the 
man’s ability or desire to maintain his autonomy (Quirouette and Gold 1992).
15.2.3  Is the Picture Different for Childless Couples?
Although the literature has shown that childless couples exhibit higher levels of 
relationship satisfaction than parents (see Wagner et al. 2015 for a recent excep-
tion), it is not yet clear whether the previously described gender differences in the 
effects of relationship characteristics on relationship satisfaction – and, subse-
quently, on wellbeing – also apply to childless couples. Although childless couples 
(perhaps in part because of the greater degree of gender equality in their relation-
ship) may be expected to report having fewer relationship conflicts and problems, 
there is no basis for assuming that the existence of relationship problems or conflicts 
would have different effects on the relationship satisfaction levels of childless cou-
ples than on those of parents. Therefore, we hypothesise that the link between rela-
tionship satisfaction and both positive and negative relationship dynamics will be 
stronger for childless women than for childless men (H1).
In terms of the effects of relationship satisfaction on physical and mental wellbe-
ing, the literature suggests that previous findings for couples with children should 
not be extrapolated to childless couples. Compared to childless men, childless 
women are often better off economically and have substantially larger networks 
(e.g., Dykstra and Hagestad 2007). This might indicate that the overall wellbeing of 
childless women is less dependent than that of childless men on what is going on in 
their romantic relationship. We therefore hypothesise that the link between relation-
ship satisfaction and both physical and mental wellbeing will be stronger for child-
less men than for childless women (H2).
In the current study we address two main questions: (1) do relationship dynamics 
have different effects on the relationship satisfaction levels of childless women than 
of childless men; and, (2) does the link between relationship satisfaction and mental 
and physical wellbeing differ between childless men and childless women? These 
questions were investigated by estimating couple-level random effects models using 
data on 163 Dutch childless couples from the first wave of the nationally representa-
tive Netherlands Kinship Panel Study (NKPS). Our work therefore helps to answer 
the question of whether previous findings on the importance of relationship dynam-
ics and relationship satisfaction for couples with children also apply to the rather 
distinct population of childless partnerships.
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15.3  Method & Method
15.3.1  Data
The data used in this chapter come from the first wave of the Netherlands Kinship 
Panel Study (NKPS; Dykstra et al. 2005). The NKPS is a longitudinal, nationally 
representative study. In wave one of the NKPS, 8161 individuals aged 18–79 par-
ticipated. The respondents (also referred to as “anchors”) were selected from a ran-
dom sample of private addresses in the Netherlands. The first wave was conducted 
in 2002–2004 and had a response rate of 45% (Dykstra et al. 2005), which is not 
atypical for the Netherlands. Dutch response rates tend to be lower than elsewhere 
and have been declining over time, likely because the Dutch are particularly sensi-
tive about privacy issues (De Leeuw and De Heer 2001 (fehlt); Stoop 2005 (fehlt)). 
The anchor data were collected via computer-assisted face-to-face interviews, as 
well as through separately completed questionnaires. Data were also collected from 
a number of significant others (also referred to as “alters”), including the anchors’ 
current partner.
For our analyses, we focused on anchors who had partners at the time of the first 
wave of data collection, and whose partners were also participating in the NKPS 
(51.4% of the wave one sample, n = 4194). We further restricted our sample to cou-
ples in which neither partner was a parent (i.e., neither had children, including with 
an ex-partner) and the female partner was age 40 or older at the time of the inter-
view. This restriction was made because we were interested in the couple dynamics 
of permanently childless individuals. Earlier research has shown that the proportion 
of couples who make the transition to parenthood after the age of 40 is small (Landry 
and Forrest 1995; Garssen et al. 2001). These selections resulted in a final sample of 
163 childless couples. In our work, we used the data provided by both partners; 
thus, our sample consisted of 326 individuals nested in 163 couples.
15.3.2  Measures
Relationship Satisfaction Both partners provided answers to the following four 
items: “We have a good relationship”, “The relationship with my partner makes me 
happy”, “Our relationship is strong”, and “The relationship with my partner is very 
stable”. The responses were coded from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree. 
Developed specifically for the NKPS, the reliability and validity of this scale were 
tested during pilot studies (Verweij 2002), and it has been used successfully in other 
studies (Komter et al. 2012). The scale was created based on the mean of the items 
(α = .95 for anchors and α = .92 for alters). The items were recoded so that a higher 
value represented higher relationship satisfaction. The correlation between the part-
ners’ answers was r = .55, p < .05.
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Self-Reported Health The partners’ health was assessed based on the following 
question: “How is your health in general?” The respondents could choose from 
1 = excellent to 5 = very poor. Self-assessed health has been shown to be a strong 
indicator of general health (Ferraro and Farmer 1999; McHorney 2000), and this 
NKPS item in particular has been validated in previous research on the link between 
family of origin and health (e.g., Monden 2010). The question was recoded so that 
a higher value corresponded to better health. The correlation between the partners’ 
responses was r = .05, p > .05.
Mental Well-Being The partners’ mood in the past 4 weeks was assessed using the 
following five questions: “How often have you felt particularly tense in the past 
4 weeks?”, “How often have you felt so down in the dumps in the past 4 weeks that 
nothing could cheer you up?”, “How often have you felt calm and peaceful in the 
past 4 weeks?”, “How often have you felt downhearted and miserable in the past 
4 weeks?”, and “How often have you felt happy in the past 4 weeks?”. The answer 
categories ranged from 1 = all the time to 6 = never. Two of the items were recoded 
so that a higher value on this scale indicated a better mental wellbeing. The scale 
was created based on the mean of the items (α = .82 for anchors and α = .85 for 
alters). The correlation between the partners’ answers was r = .24, p < .05.
Support from the Partner Both the anchor and the alter provided information 
about the level of support they received from their partner by answering the follow-
ing five questions: “To what extent does your partner support you: (a) in decisions 
about your work or education; (b) when you have worries or health problems; (c) in 
your leisure time activities and social contacts; (d) with all kinds of practical things 
you need to do; and (e) in personal matters that are on your mind?” (1 = no support 
to 4 = a lot of support). The scale was created based on the mean of the items. The 
reliability of the measure was high both for the anchors and alters (α = .84 for both). 
The correlation between the partners’ responses was r = .30, p < .05.
Relationship Conflict The level of conflict in the relationship was assessed using 
the following three items: “Please indicate whether the following situations have 
occurred between you and your partner in the past 12 months: (1) heated discus-
sions between you and your partner; (2) one of you putting down and blaming the 
other; and (3) you didn’t want to talk to each other for a while”. Both partners 
responded to these questions on a scale from 0 = not at all to 2 = several times. The 
scale was created based on the mean of the items. The reliability of the scale in our 
analytical sample was slightly under the conventionally established .70 threshold, 
but was still acceptable (α = .63 for anchors and α = .66 for alters). The correlation 
between the partners’ answers was r = .48, p < .05.
Control Variables In all of our analyses, we controlled for the age of the reporting 
partner (in years), the highest attained level of education of the reporting partner 
(coded as 1 = (incomplete) elementary only/lower vocational/lower general second-
ary, 2 = intermediate general secondary/upper general secondary/intermediate 
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vocational, and 3 = higher vocational/university/post-graduate), and for the dura-
tion of the current relationship in years (from the start of the partnership to the date 
of the interview).
In the analyses focusing on self-reported health, we also controlled for the report-
ing spouse’s informal social capital and level of agreement with child-endorsing 
norms. The informal social capital of each partner was measured based on four 
questions which referred to the extent to which the anchor/alter was able to rely on 
his or her friends (“When I am troubled, I can always discuss my worries with my 
friends”, “I place confidence in my friends”, “Should I need help, I can always turn 
to my friends”, and “I can always count on my friends”; rated from 1 = strongly 
agree to 5 = strongly disagree). The items were recoded so that a higher value cor-
responded to a large amount of informal social capital. A similar scale based on the 
NKPS data has been successfully used in earlier works on the impact of social con-
texts on romantic relationships (e.g., Hogerbrugge et al. 2012). The reliability of the 
scale was high both for the anchor and alter (α = .92 for anchors and α = .93 for 
alters). Finally, our measure of child-endorsing norms was constructed based on the 
partners’ responses to the following four statements: “A person’s life is not com-
plete if s/he has not had children”, “People have a duty to society to have children”, 
“I believe that in this world a person can feel totally at ease only in his or her own 
family with children”, and “If a person never has children, s/he can never be really 
happy” (rated on a scale from 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree). The items 
were recoded so that a higher value corresponded to a higher level of agreement 
with the child-endorsing norm. The reliability of the scale was high for both part-
ners (α = .77 for anchors and α = .87 for alters). Table 15.1 displays descriptive infor-
mation about all of the variables used in the analyses.
Table 15.1 Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analyses
Female partners Male partners
n M (SD) n M (SD)
Relationship satisfaction 161 4.57 (0.53) 160 4.64 (0.56)
Self-reported health, 1 (lowest)-5 (highest) 163 3.91 (0.86) 163 4.03 (0.72)
Mental wellbeing, 1 (lowest)-6 (highest) 161 4.90 (0.70) 162 4.98 (0.74)
Support from partner, 1 (lowest)-4 (highest) 159 3.40 (0.55) 159 3.49 (0.48)
Relationship conflict, 0 (lowest)-2 (highest) 159 0.40 (0.42) 156 0.43 (0.41)
Age (in years) 163 51.29 (8.99) 163 53.02 (10.52)
Informal social capital, 1 (lowest-5 highest) 162 3.92 (0.67) 162 3.78 (0.71)
Child-endorsing norm, 1 (lowest-5 highest) 161 1.41 (0.54) 161 1.45 (0.63)
Duration of the partnership (in years) 163 24.92 (13.43) 163 24.92 (13.43)
n % of n n % of n
Educational attainment 163 163
Elem only, lower voc, lower general secondary 43.6 % 30.7 %
Intermediate, upper general secondary, interm. 
voc.
16.6 % 27.0 %
Higher voc., university, postgraduate 39.9 % 42.3 %
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15.3.3  Analytical Approach
We carried out our analyses in two steps. In the first step, we examined whether 
gender differences could be observed in the association between aspects of the rela-
tionship (i.e., conflict and support) and relationship satisfaction (H1). In the second 
step, we examined whether the link between relationship satisfaction and self-rated 
physical and mental health differed between the male and the female partners (H2). 
The research questions were addressed using linear regression models with couple- 
level random effects. We did not estimate fixed-effects models because there was 
little variation in the covariates of interest within couples (e.g., level of conflict, 
support from the partner), which could have resulted in standard errors which were 
too large (Allison 2009). The models were fitted using xtreg in STATA, Version 
13.1. In all of the models we included control variables for the age of the partner 
whose relationship satisfaction/wellbeing was being examined, as well as his/her 
educational level and the duration of the relationship. Additionally, in the models 
which addressed the link between relationship satisfaction and wellbeing we con-
trolled for the individual’s level of agreement with child-endorsing norms (as a 
proxy for whether the respondent’s childless status was (in)voluntary) and social 
capital.
To test the hypotheses, we included interaction terms in our models (i.e., between 
the gender of the partner and the covariate of interest, such as conflict, support, or 
relationship satisfaction). To facilitate the interpretation of the significant interac-
tion terms, we used the margins command in STATA to estimate and plot the mar-
ginal effects at representative values for the female and the male partners. All of the 
marginal effects were estimated for the reference categories of the categorical con-
trol variables, and the continuous variables were kept at the sample mean.
15.4  Results
Detailed descriptive information about the measures used in this study is displayed 
in Table 15.1. The table clearly shows that, by and large, the childless NKPS partici-
pants reported rather high levels of relationship satisfaction (M for female part-
ners = 4.57 (SD = .53) and M for male partners = 4.64 (SD = .56)). Furthermore, there 
were no gender differences in the mean levels of any of the central covariates of 
interest (i.e., relationship satisfaction, self-reported health, mental wellbeing, sup-
port from the partner, and relationship conflict).
In the first step of our analyses we focused on the question of whether there were 
gender differences in the association between relationship dynamics and relation-
ship satisfaction. The results addressing this question are displayed in Table 15.2. 
The first two models in the table display the main effects of gender (Model 1) and 
of support from the partner and relationship conflict (Model 2). As was mentioned 
earlier, the gender of the partner was not associated with the self-reported level of 
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relationship satisfaction, whereas the self-reported level of support received from 
the partner and the level of relationship conflict were associated with relationship 
satisfaction in the manner predicted (i.e., a one point increase in partner support was 
linked to a .45 point increase in the dependent variable, and a one point increase in 
relationship conflict was linked to a .19 decrease in relationship satisfaction). Our 
first research question is, however, addressed in the subsequent models, which 
Table 15.2 Estimates from relationship-level Random-Effects Regression Models with 
relationship satisfaction as dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Gender
Relationship 
dynamics
Interaction with 
support
Interaction 
with conflict
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Gender (ref. = 
female partner)
0.05 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) −0.17 (0.30) 0.10+ (0.06)
Support from  
partner
0.45** (0.05) 0.43** (0.06) 0.45** (0.05)
Relationship  
conflict
−0.19** (0.07) −0.19** (0.07) −0.09 (0.08)
Interactions
  Gender × support 
from partner
0.05 (0.09)
  Gender × relation- 
ship conflict
−0.21* (0.10)
Controls
  Age (in years) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01+ (0.00) 0.01+ (0.00) 0.01+ (0.00)
  Educational level 
(ref. = highest)
  Lowest 0.05 (0.07) −0.03 (0.06) −0.03 (0.06) −0.04 (0.06)
  Middle 0.00 (0.07) −0.01 (0.06) −0.01 (0.07) −0.02 (0.06)
Duration of 
relationship (in 
years)
−0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00) −0.00 (0.00)
Constant 4.23** (0.20) 2.80** (0.25) 2.88** (0.28) 2.77** (0.25)
Miscellaneous 
parameters
  Residual SD of 
random intercept 
(sigma_u)
0.42 0.31 0.31 0.31
  Residual 
intraclass 
correlation (rho)
0.58 0.47 0.47 0.47
  R2 within unions 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.17
  R2 between 
unions
0.01 0.39 0.39 0.41
  R2 overall 0.01 0.31 0.32 0.33
Note. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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included an interaction between the gender of the partner and the indicators of rela-
tionship dynamics (Model 3 for support and Model 4 for conflict). All of the results 
discussed below were found after accounting for the individual and relationship 
level control variables.
As can be seen in Model 3, the association between the level of support received 
from the partner and the level of self-reported relationship satisfaction did not differ 
between the male and the female childless partners. In other words, we did not find 
evidence that childless women were more strongly affected than childless men by 
the positive aspects of their relationship. While we did find evidence of gender dif-
ferences in the association between conflict and relationship satisfaction, these dif-
ferences were not in the expected direction (Model 4 of Table 15.2). For ease of 
interpretation, the estimated marginal effects at representative values are plotted in 
Fig. 15.1. A post-estimation examination of the slopes for the two groups showed 
that only the slope for the male partners (b = −.31, SE = .08, 95 % CI [−.47 – −.14]) 
was significant (slope for female partners: b = −.09, SE = .08, 95 % CI [−.25 – .06]). 
An additional check demonstrated that the difference between the partners was sig-
nificant (p < .05) only at particularly high levels of conflict (i.e., two), and that the 
magnitude of the difference was not large (i.e., a difference of .32 points at fre-
quency of conflict = 2).
The subsequent models addressed the second research question: namely, whether 
there were gender differences in the link between relationship satisfaction and the 
partners’ wellbeing. Our findings are displayed in Table 15.3, Model 2 and Fig. 15.2 
for physical health; and in Table 15.3, Model 4 and Fig. 15.3 for mental health. 
Model 2 of Table 15.3 and Fig. 15.2 show that relationship satisfaction was found to 
be positively associated with self-rated health, but only among the childless men. A 
post-estimation examination of the slopes indicated that whereas the slope for the 
male partners was significant (b = .25, SE = .11, 95 % CI [.03 -- .47]), the slope for 
the female partners was not (b = −.08, SE = .12, 95 % CI [−.30 – .15]). Our findings 
in Model 4 of Table 15.3 also demonstrated that there was a (borderline) significant 
gender interaction for the link between relationship satisfaction and self-rated men-
tal wellbeing. Once again, whereas the slope for the male partners was significant 
(b = .33, SE = .10, 95 % CI [.14 – .52]), the slope for the female partners was not 
(b = .09, SE = .10, 95 % CI [−.11 – .29]; also see Fig. 15.3). In other words, our 
results indicated that the link between (physical) wellbeing and relationship satis-
faction was stronger for the male than for the female childless partners.
15.5  Discussion
In this chapter, our goal was to test to what extent gender differences in couple 
dynamics exist within childless couples. In our analyses we found that male and 
female childless partners reported similar levels of relationship satisfaction, a result 
which is in line with the findings of recent studies on gender differences in marital 
satisfaction of partners with children (e.g., Jackson et al. 2014). The key 
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contribution of our work however, is our finding that there were gender differences 
in the link between relationship dynamics and relationship satisfaction and in the 
link between relationship satisfaction and wellbeing.
First, in contrast to our expectations, we found that the link between relationship 
conflicts and relationship satisfaction was stronger for the childless men than for the 
childless women. Interestingly, no gender differences were found in the link between 
partner support and relationship satisfaction. In other words, the positive aspects of 
the partnership were equally important for both the male and the female childless 
partners studied. These findings were surprising, as most of the previous literature 
has stressed that female partners are more strongly affected by both the positive and 
the negative aspects of their romantic relationships (e.g., McRae and Brody 1989). 
Our finding concerning relationship conflict could be interpreted in two ways. As 
we noted above, compared to childless men, childless women have been reported to 
be economically better off and, even more importantly, to have larger networks 
(Dykstra and Hagestad 2007). Therefore, it is possible that childless men depend 
heavily on their intimate partnerships, and are thus, more sensitive to the internal 
dynamics of these relationships than childless women. Another possible interpreta-
tion of this finding is that it is not the case that childless men are more strongly 
affected by relationship conflicts, but rather that childless women are less strongly 
affected by conflicts. In other words, we suggest that previous evidence that mothers 
are more sensitive than fathers to relationship conflict might be attributable to a 
heightened preoccupation among mothers with the potential impact of those 
 conflicts on the wellbeing of their children. As childless women do not face this 
concern, they might be less sensitive to conflicts. These interpretations are, how-
ever, highly speculative. Future research may want to examine whether the gender 
difference we found here is robust, and to investigate to what extent it is driven by a 
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Table 15.3 Estimates from relationship-level Random-Effects Regression Models with self- 
reported health and mental wellbeing as the dependent variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Gender
Relationship 
dynamics
Interaction with 
support
Interaction with 
conflict
B SE B SE B SE B SE
Gender (ref. = 
female partner)
0.16+ (0.09) −1.34+ (0.72) 0.12 (0.07) −1.00 (0.63)
Support from 
partner
0.09 (0.08) −0.08 (0.12) 0.22** (0.07) 0.09 (0.10)
Relationship 
conflict
0.33* (0.16) 0.24+ (0.14)
Interactions
  Gender × support 
from partner
0.06 (0.07) 0.07 (0.07) 0.20** (0.06) 0.20** (0.06)
  Gender × relation-
ship conflict
−0.17* (0.08) −0.16* (0.08) −0.12+ (0.07) −0.12+ (0.07)
Controls
  Age (in years) −0.01* (0.01) −0.01* (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
  Educational level 
(ref. = highest)
−0.09 (0.10) −0.09 (0.10) −0.06 (0.09) −0.05 (0.09)
  Lowest −0.16 (0.12) −0.15 (0.12) −0.09 (0.10) −0.08 (0.10)
  Middle 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Duration of 
relationship (in 
years)
4.13** (0.50) 4.90** (0.63) 3.07** (0.46) 3.65** (0.56)
Constant 4.23** (0.20) 2.80** (0.25) 2.88** (0.28) 2.77** (0.25)
Miscellaneous 
parameters
  Residual SD of 
random intercept 
(sigma_u)
0.18 0.20 0.27 0.24
  Residual 
intraclass 
correlation (rho)
0.06 0.07 0.17 0.14
  R2 within unions 0.10 0.12 0.04 0.04
  R2 between 
unions
0.04 0.04 0.14 0.18
  R2 overall 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.12
Note. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
heightened sensitivity to relationship dynamics among childless men or by a lower 
sensitivity to relationship dynamics among childless women.
The second main finding of our work concerned the link between relationship 
satisfaction and self-reported mental and physical wellbeing. In line with our 
hypothesis, we found that the association between relationship satisfaction and 
health was stronger for the childless men than for the childless women, and that this 
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difference was particularly evident when the levels of relationship satisfaction were 
low. These results indicate that when they are in unsatisfying romantic  relationships, 
childless men are at greater risk than childless women of physical and mental ill 
health. Again, future research should investigate in detail the mechanisms underly-
ing this pattern. Are childless men indeed more affected by being in an unsatisfying 
relationship because they rely on their wife as their chief source of social support 
(Pugliesi and Shook 1998), and are these men therefore especially vulnerable when 
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that support weakens or dissipates? Or is it the case that compared to fathers and 
childless women, childless men place a higher value on their romantic relationship 
than on other domains of life, and are therefore be more affected by what is going 
on in their relationship? Yet regardless of the underlying mechanisms, our study 
reveals that when childless men are dissatisfied with their romantic relationship, 
they are at risk of physical and mental maladjustment.
Some limitations of our study should be mentioned here. First, it is important to 
note that we did not strictly compare each childless man to his own female partner, 
who was also childless. As was previously stated, the optimal way to test for pos-
sible gender differences in the link between relationship dynamics and relationship 
satisfaction, and between relationship satisfaction and wellbeing, is to utilize 
couple- level fixed effects. However, given the very limited variability in the con-
structs of interest which we observed within our units of analysis (i.e., the partner-
ships) and due to concerns about the possibility of inflated standard errors, we opted 
to run random effect models (Allison 2009).
Another methodological concern which might be raised about our work is the 
fact that we did not address the question of possible reverse causality. In other 
words, we cannot exclude the possibility that what we are seeing is, for example, a 
gender difference in the impact of mental and physical wellbeing on relationship 
satisfaction. We chose to use data from the Dutch NKPS survey because they pro-
vide high-quality, dyadic information on the concepts of interest. However, as the 
data were cross-sectional in nature, we have taken great care throughout our work 
to avoid implying that we have found evidence of any causal links.
Despite these limitations, our results suggest that childless men may be more 
affected than childless women by negative couple dynamics. Using a rich couple- 
level data set, we showed that the link between relationship conflict and relationship 
satisfaction was stronger among the childless men than among the childless women. 
In addition, we found that the childless men who reported experiencing low levels 
of relationship satisfaction were also in worse physical and mental health than the 
childless women. Currently, approximately one in five men will remain childless 
(Keizer 2010), and divorce rates remain high. Thus, it appears that entry into father-
hood could become even more selective in the future (e.g., Rønsen and Skrede 
2006). Future studies should therefore investigate in greater detail how childless 
men of middle and older ages function in romantic relationships.
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Chapter 16
Fertility and Women’s Old-Age Income 
in Germany
Tatjana Mika and Christin Czaplicki
16.1  Introduction
In Germany, the average woman earns far less than the average man (Finke 2011). 
This large gender gap in earnings is attributable in part to the tendency of German 
women to work part-time and to take employment breaks. So far, however, there has 
been little research on the “motherhood penalty”: i.e., on the additional costs associ-
ated with having a child, relative to remaining childless (Waldfogel 1998). It is clear 
that the impact of having a child on a woman’s life course goes beyond an immedi-
ate reduction in income when she withdraws from labour market after giving birth. 
The shift to part-time employment that many mothers make not only reduces a 
woman’s gross income because she works fewer hours; it also damages her long- 
term career prospects (Brenke 2011). Moreover, even women who work full-time 
earn less on average than men, in part because they often choose to study disciplines 
that channel them into professions that are lower paid than those typically chosen by 
their male counterparts (Begall and Mills 2012; Busch and Holst 2011; Petersen and 
Morgan 1995; Trappe 2006).
The two regions of Germany have different histories with respect to female, and 
particularly maternal employment (Rosenfeld et al. 2004). In the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) women were expected to work full-time and to return to work after 
taking a single year of leave; the so-called “Babyjahr” (Rosenfeld et al. 2004). Part- 
time work was not common in the GDR, and not encouraged by the government 
(Drasch 2011). In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), by contrast, women of 
the cohorts born around 1930 often exited the labour market upon marriage 
(Lauterbach 1994). Until 1972, a husband was allowed to forbid his wife to work if 
he was able to provide sufficient household income from his own salary. This had a 
T. Mika (*) • C. Czaplicki 
Research and Development, German Pension Insurance, Berlin, Germany
e-mail: tatjana.mika@drv-bund.de; christin.czaplicki@drv-bund.de
332
negative effect on employment among married women in western Germany. 
Although western German women started entering the labour market in greater 
numbers starting in the 1970s, full-time employment continued to be rare among 
mothers (Allmendinger 2011: 47). Only a small minority of working-age women in 
western Germany were in continuous full-time employment (Simonson et al. 2011). 
Most women who had children returned to work after spending a shorter or a longer 
period of time raising children, or left the labour market permanently after having 
their first child (Stegmann and Mika 2013: 239). A large share of working mothers 
in western Germany were in “marginal” part-time employment. In most marginal 
employment arrangements, a worker’s hours and income are capped (currently at 
450 euros per month). Moreover, workers in these jobs accrue very little pension 
benefits.
After German reunification, the employment patterns of mothers continued to 
differ in the two parts of the country, as the full-time employment rates remained 
higher in eastern than in western Germany. In recent years, however, the rates of 
unemployment and of part-time employment among women have been increasing 
in the east, and women in eastern Germany have lower earnings than their western 
German counterparts. It is therefore very difficult to determine how the recent 
employment patterns of mothers in eastern and western Germany will affect their 
old-age pension benefits (Allmendinger 1994). In particular, it is unclear whether 
the welfare state will be able to buffer the adverse effects that career interruptions 
are expected to have on the old-age pensions of western German women.
Research on the effects of motherhood on employment has often focused on the 
years immediately after childbirth. In this paper, we focus on the lifetime employ-
ment and earning patterns of German women with and without children. We inves-
tigate the long-term effects of motherhood on women’s earnings during their 
working years, and on their income in retirement. Because the employment patterns 
of mothers in eastern and western Germany have long differed, we conduct the 
analysis separately for the two parts of Germany. The data for this analysis come 
from a unique dataset that contains linked survey and register data. In this dataset 
the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is combined 
with information from the pension insurance records (SHARE-RV). Using these 
data, we are able to examine the lifetime employment patterns and earning profiles 
of the cohorts born between 1919 and 1982; although most of the women in our 
sample were born between 1930 and 1965. We explore the question of whether 
eastern German women who are more likely than western German women to be 
employed face a less severe “motherhood penalty” than their western counterparts. 
We map each woman’s gross earnings (as recorded in the pension insurance data), 
as well as household information on her partner’s income and earnings record. The 
last and major step in our investigation is an analysis of the lifetime income of 
women according to the number of children they have and the region where they 
live. For 2 years after a child is born, the German state provides mothers with rela-
tively generous pension benefit subsidies. The benefits each woman accrues are 
equivalent to the national average income in those years. As most women earn less 
than the national average income, the benefits a mother accrues during this period 
T. Mika and C. Czaplicki
333
may supplement her pension entitlement more than if she had continued to work. 
We analyse the question of to what extent these subsidies bridge the old-age in- 
come gap between mothers and childless women. We also seek to determine whether 
the loss of income among mothers is offset at the household level by the higher 
earnings of fathers.
16.2  Institutional Background
In Germany, the size of each individual’s old-age statutory pension is mainly based 
on the compulsory contributions he or she has made while in paid employment. 
However, an individual may qualify for additional top-ups on the grounds of social 
hardship. For example, a person may be entitled to receive additional pension ben-
efits if he or she has a low income, is caring for a child or another family member, 
or is engaged in military and civil service. In Germany, women have been included 
in the old-age pension scheme since it first began in 1895. However, women’s pen-
sions have always been smaller than those of men because the average woman has 
always earned less than the average man. After the Second World War, pension 
funds were structured differently in the GDR and in the FRG. In western Germany, 
contribution levels were raised from 1957 onward to allow for increases in old-age 
pension benefits. In eastern Germany, contribution levels were considerably lower, 
and pension benefits were correspondingly low. The old-age income levels of 
women in eastern and western Germany also differed because of the differences in 
the employment patterns of women in the GDR and the FRG.1
Under the German Unification Treaty, the eastern and western pension systems 
were largely harmonized. However, the old-age income levels of women in eastern 
and western Germany who are now reaching retirement age still differ because of 
their different employment and earning histories. Particularly notable is the high 
share of western German women who have spent many years in marginal employ-
ment arrangements with very low gross income. The income a worker earns in these 
so-called “mini-jobs” is usually exempt from taxation and full social security con-
tributions, unless he or she makes these contributions voluntarily. Thus, mothers in 
western Germany who work primarily in marginal employment may be expected to 
have much lower old-age income levels than childless women who work full-time.
However, some of these differences in employment patterns are offset by the 
additional pension benefits women accrue after the birth of each of their children. 
The German pension insurance scheme awards mothers special benefits for each 
child they have. First, when each child turns 1 year old, the retired mother (or father) 
1 In the Federal Republic of Germany, a special provision in the social security code actually 
offered married women the option of cancelling their personal pension insurance account and get-
ting a refund of the contributions they made while in socially insured employment. As a result, a 
considerable number of western German women from the cohorts born around 1930 had no pen-
sion fund account in their own name.
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receives pension benefits equivalent to 2 years of the national average income (Dünn 
and Stosberg 2014). Since women’s earnings are usually lower than the national 
average income, this credit typically compensates the mother for more than 2 years 
of complete income loss. In addition, the mother usually qualifies for a top-up for 
low-income individuals from a social insurance employment fund. Through 1991, 
the maximum pension insurance credit was equivalent to 75 % of the national aver-
age income. After 1992, a similar top-up was introduced for parents who work 
while their child is under age 12. Until the child turns 12, one person in the family 
is considered the child’s main caregiver for the purposes of accruing pension insur-
ance benefits. This is usually the mother.
16.3  Data, Variables, and Methods
16.3.1  Data
The data for our investigation comes from SHARE-RV. SHARE-RV stands for the 
direct linkage of survey data of the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in 
Europe (SHARE: www.share-project.org) with administrative data of the research 
data centre of the German Pension Insurance (FDZ-RV). The combination of infor-
mation about different aspects of the respondents’ life with accurate administrative 
data has several advantages, and can provide scholars with a wide range of research 
options. The survey data of SHARE are used in Germany for the direct linkage. For 
data protection reasons, administrative records are collected only for those respon-
dents who gave their written consent during the interview.2
Launched in 2004, SHARE is an innovative and multidisciplinary panel survey 
that has so far collected micro-data on the health, the socio-economic status, and the 
social and family networks of more than 45,000 individuals aged 50 or older. Face- 
to- face interviews are conducted not only with each sampled individual, but also 
with each respondent’s partner or spouse who lives in the same household. Instead 
of relying on a standard questionnaire that only collects current information, in the 
third wave (called SHARELIFE) the survey has used a retrospective questionnaire 
that covers each respondent’s life from birth up to the time of the current interview 
(Schröder 2011). The longitudinal and multidisciplinary design of SHARE sheds 
light on how different areas of a respondent’s life interact as he or she ages. As they 
are central elements of social life and economic security, the survey focuses on the 
respondents’ family relationships and their level of integration into the labour mar-
ket. To learn more about lives of older people, SHARE collects information on the 
respondents’ partnership status, personal networks and intergenerational support, 
labour market participation, economic situation, and health (Malter and Börsch- 
Supan 2015).
2 For more details on linking procedures see Korbmacher and Czaplicki (2013).
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The FDZ-RV provides cross-sectional and longitudinal micro-data in areas such 
as retirement, disability, and rehabilitation. These data are available as scientific use 
files (SUFs) and as public use files (PUFs). The data are process-produced and were 
originally compiled for the purposes of administering pension insurance benefits. 
Because the statutory pension scheme is mandatory for all private sector employees 
and for some public sector workers, the FDZ-RV contains data on most German 
employees (Rehfeld and Mika 2006). The administrative data that are linked with 
SHARE have the same format and content, but refer only to those SHARE respon-
dents who agreed to the linkage. The FDZ-RV provides SHARE with two different 
datasets: namely, the longitudinal dataset constructed according to the so called 
sample of the insured population (Versichertenkontenstichprobe, or VSKT) and 
cross-sectional pension data (Versichertenrentenbestand, or RTBN) on people who 
have already retired. The VSKT is one of the longitudinal data sources of the 
FDZ-RV, and includes information on individuals insured under the statutory pen-
sion scheme, and on their pension entitlements.3 The data cover virtually all employ-
ees in Germany, with coverage being slightly higher in the eastern states because 
there are fewer civil servants and self-employed in this part of the country. As the 
VSKT contains information on all pension-relevant activities, it is the best source of 
information on the public pension benefits each individual has accrued. Moreover, 
because these activities are covered on a separate timeline, any overlapping activi-
ties can be analysed. The VSKT contains a wide range of information on each indi-
vidual, including on his or her contributions to the pension system; his or her 
employment or unemployment status by month; and periods the individual spent 
outside of the labour market because of sickness, childrearing responsibilities, and 
education and training.
The monthly earnings biographies included in the data make it possible to anal-
yse individual gross wages. The gross wages recorded in the VSKT are also linked 
to the official average income of the particular calendar year. Each pension insur-
ance credit point that appears in a pension insurance record in a given year is equiv-
alent to the national average income for the year. Because the official national 
average income is adjusted every year, the credit points are an adjusted measure of 
the individual’s personal gross income over time. These credit points can be accu-
mulated over the individual’s life course until retirement, and represent the person’s 
complete gross income from the start of his or her working career. However, the 
amount of income for which credit points can be earned is capped at about twice the 
national average income. Thus, on average men who retired in 2013 accumulated 40 
credit points. Among the women, who spent fewer years in employment and earned 
less than men, the average number of credit points accumulated for those who 
retired in 2013 was 23.
The longitudinal information ends when the individual transitions into retire-
ment, but it is supplemented with cross-sectional pension data. These data, which 
3 A few categories of employees, like civil servants, have their own pension systems, and thus do 
not appear in the social security data; or, like miners and employees of the federal railways, are 
treated differently from other insured individuals.
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include information on the pension payments made by the German pension insur-
ance and the concrete steps followed in the pension calculation, allow us to analyse 
the respondents’ pension income after they have retired. In particular, information 
on the size of each respondent’s pension is useful for evaluating the individual’s 
economic situation. With a few exceptions e.g., for individuals who were self- 
employed throughout their life and for people who refused to participate in the data 
linkage pension insurance data are available for all of the SHARE respondents who 
have a record, regardless of whether they are still actively insured or have retired.
SHARE-RV shows that combining survey and administrative data is useful, as 
doing so enables us to benefit from the advantages associated with different data 
sources. The administrative data enrich the survey data as they include very detailed 
information on, for example, lifelong earnings broken down by month. In addition, 
because some types of information are included in both datasets (like an individu-
al’s job history), combining the data make it possible to validate retrospectively 
collected data. The administrative data are also improved through the linkage with 
the survey data. Previous analyses focused on how the labour biography or accrued 
benefits of individuals influenced their income in old age. Important information is 
also added on all sources of individual and household income, partnership, or health 
status.
16.3.2  Variables
A great advantage of using SHARE-RV for fertility analysis is that it contains fertil-
ity, employment, and household information (Czaplicki and Post 2015). One of our 
key variables of interest in the analysis is the number of children per woman. A 
peculiarity of the information in the dataset on children is that in SHARE’s first, 
second, fourth, and fifth waves, only information on living children was gathered. 
Because deceased children were not reported, a fertility analysis may be expected to 
underestimate the number of children born. Moreover, the administrative data 
include information on the children in a given family for only one of the parents; in 
most cases the mother. Thus, in a first step we validate both types of information and 
create a valid number of children. Since the number of children in the register data 
is verified in the process of account clarification, we use VSKT’s information on 
children as basic information for the retirees as well as for the individuals for whom 
the data in SHARE indicate that they have more children, but for whom no account 
clarification has yet taken place. In all other cases, we determine the number of 
children based on information from SHARE.
In order to examine the effects of having children on the lifetime employment 
patterns and earning profiles of mothers, we use the employment and earnings infor-
mation from the longitudinal register data of the VSKT. We narrow our focus to 
women’s regular employment, as workers in regular employment make social insur-
ance contributions. We also include women’s lifetime income from employment. 
One pension insurance credit point is equivalent to the average annual income of a 
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full-time, year-round employee. On average, men earn one credit point per year, and 
women earn less than one point. The differences between the credit points earned in 
eastern and western Germany are harmonized in order to make the income analysis 
comparable.4
For the multivariate analysis, we also consider the highest level of education. As 
the information on education in the register data is often not available due to miss-
ing information from the employer, we take it from the survey. We distinguish 
between individuals with a low level of education (no degree, primary school, 
eighth-grade polytechnic high school), a medium level of education (secondary 
school), and a high level of education (high school). To control for work experience 
we use the years of employment, which are generated by counting the number of 
months of employment subject to social security contributions, and dividing this 
sum by 12.
The analysis is carried out separately for eastern and western Germany. The 
region is identified by the place of residence at the date of data collection. The 
SHARE-RV sample contains 3717 cases, or 1983 women and 1734 men born 
between 1919 and 1982. Thus, 40 % of the sample (1502) are western German 
women and 13 % (481) are eastern German women. While 54 % of the total sample 
are retired, the share is lower for the women in the sample because they are usually 
the younger partner in the relationship. The sample consists of 1121 couples, and 
register and survey data are available for both partners. In addition, we have data on 
862 women (43 %) and 609 men (35 %) who either have no partner in the linked 
dataset, or who have a partner who did not give his or her consent for the linkage. 
Table 16.1 shows the distribution of the number of children in the sample in western 
and eastern Germany: 11 % of the western German women and 6 % of the eastern 
German women are childless, 20 % of the western German women and 25 % of the 
eastern German women have one child, 40 % of the western German women and 46 
% of the eastern German women have two children, and 29 % of the western German 
women and 25 % of the eastern German women have three or more children.
4 The income ceiling (set roughly at double the national average income) for insurance contribu-
tions is lower in eastern Germany. Western German women therefore reach the highest income 
levels only. Since very few women in Germany earn double the national average income, the point 
at which the upper limit has been set, this difference does not affect our analysis much.
Table 16.1 Number of children, eastern and western German women
Western German women (%) Eastern German women (%)
No children 11  5
1 child 20 25
2 children 40 46
3 or more children 29 25
Source: FDZ-RV, SHARE-RV-3-0-0, n = 1,943, own calculations
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16.3.3  Methods
Our analysis consists of a descriptive part and a multivariate part. In the descriptive 
part, we map labour market participation rates and earnings across the life course. 
The labour market participation rate is defined as the ratio of individuals who are in 
the labour force to the total working-age population. Thus, this rate measures the 
extent to which an economy’s working-age population are actually working. In 
order to investigate the influence of childbearing on employment patterns, we group 
labour market participation rates by the number of children. In addition, we gener-
ate individual wage histories and group these histories by the number of children. 
We then compare these profiles with the reference average wage from 2013. In the 
multivariate analysis, we use OLS regression to investigate the effects of having a 
certain number of children on the number of points a woman earns over her lifetime. 
The dependent variable is the sum of the points earned over the woman’s whole 
employment career from spells of employment subject to social insurance contribu-
tions. To account for east-west differences in income dynamics and employment 
patterns, all of the models are estimated separately for eastern and western German 
women. The regression analysis consists of three parts. In the first step, we use OLS 
regression to study the effects of having children on women’s lifetime earnings. In 
a second step, we investigate how the results change if the pension insurance points 
women earn for childrearing periods are accounted for. In the final step, we also 
consider the income of the male partner.
16.4  Descriptive Results
16.4.1  Mothers’ Labour Market Participation in Eastern 
and Western Germany
Figure 16.1 maps the employment patterns of western German women between the 
ages of 25 and 60 by their final number of children. We have chosen to disregard 
periods under age 25 because most women are in education or training at this age, 
and are thus not employed. Similarly, we have chosen to disregard periods over age 
60, as most women at this age are retired.
Figure 16.1 shows that some of the women had already reached retirement age at 
the time of the SHARE interview. For the others, the calculation of the participation 
rate is shown until the actual age is reached. The four lines represent women with 
zero, one, two, or three or more children. The lines differ greatly by age. At ages 
25–45, the employment participation rate is around 75 % among childless women, 
and is around 60 % among women with one child. However, among women with 
two or more children the pattern is more irregular: their labour market participation 
rate declines until they reach their mid-thirties, and increases gradually there-after. 
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At age 35, only about 30 % of the women with two children and 20 % of the women 
with three or more children are working.
Figure 16.2 shows the labour market participation patterns for eastern Germany. 
Because fewer eastern than western German women participated in the SHARE 
survey, the line for eastern Germany fluctuates more than the line for western 
Germany. It is also important to note that the cohorts born from 1930 to 1950 had 
their children and spent most of their working years in the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). These parts of the life course are included in this analysis. In the 
GDR, a woman was entitled to a maternity leave (Babyjahr) of 12 months after the 
birth of a first or a second child, and of 18 months after the birth of a third or a sub-
sequent child (Drasch 2011). The labour market participation rates of women 
between the ages of 25 and 33 who had no children or fewer than three children 
were roughly the same in the GDR. Only women who had three or more children 
had lower labour market participation rates.
However, the proportion of eastern German women in employment decreased 
after age 55. This is because after 1990 unemployment was more common in east-
ern than in western Germany, and women with low qualification levels had difficul-
ties finding employment (Bielenski et al. 1995; Diewald and Sorensen 1996). This 
effect was particularly strong among childless women.
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Fig. 16.1 Labour market participation of western German women by number of children (Source: 
FDZ-RV, SHARE-RV-3-0-0, n = 1,486, own calculations)
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16.4.2  The Earnings of Mothers Compared to the Earnings 
of Childless Women
The statutory pension insurance records contain information on the gross income of 
each individual who works in socially insured employment. The income is then 
measured each year against the average income, which is set by the Ministry for 
Social Affairs based on national-level income trends. A worker with the average 
gross income earns one credit point in his or her personal record. These points are 
therefore not affected by inflation, and can be compared over the life course and 
between different birth cohorts. Figure 16.3 shows the development of income 
across the life course of western German women, by their number of children. The 
average income is represented as the dotted line. For the sake of illustration, the 
income is standardized by the average gross yearly income of 2013; the year the 
survey was conducted. The calculation for the average income of each group 
includes only those women who were participating in the labour market at this age. 
The women who were not employed were not included in the calculation. As the 
gross income is not adjusted for the number of hours worked, it is not a measure of 
hourly wages.
Childless women, who are represented by the top line, had the highest average 
annual income by far. The line shows that having a steady career path is associated 
with increasing wages. At age 30, the earnings of childless women had reached the 
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Fig. 16.2 Labour market participation of eastern German women by number of children (Source: 
FDZ-RV, SHARE-RV-3-0-0, n = 497, own calculations)
T. Mika and C. Czaplicki
341
level of the national average income. Moreover, at around age 45, childless women 
were earning as much as the average man (Fachinger and Himmelreicher 2008). 
Mothers with one child, whose labour market participation levels were not much 
lower than those of childless women, nonetheless saw their wages decline between 
the ages of 25 and 40, and increase slightly at later ages. They never came close to 
having the average income, which is represented by the dotted line. The income 
trajectories of mothers with two children were similar to those of mothers with one 
child, but their wages were lower. The steady decline in their income stopped at age 
35, and their wages increased from that point onwards. Mothers with two children 
reached their highest earnings level, of about 60 % of the national average income, 
between ages 50 and 55. Mothers with three or more children had a distinct income 
path. Their income declined steadily until they reached age 40, and then remained 
at a low level of around half of the national average income. This suggests that the 
relatively small number of mothers with three or more children who were working 
were mainly in low-income jobs or part-time employment (Fig. 16.4).
The dotted line is again an indicator of the set value of the average gross income. 
At first glance, the graph appears to show that earnings of women in eastern 
Germany hardly ever reached the level of the national average income, regardless of 
the number of children they had. This was particularly true among women who 
were working in the GDR. Thus, the income differences between mothers and 
childless women were rather small. Only women with three or more children had 
consistently lower levels of gross income.
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Fig. 16.3 Average income of western German women by number of children (Source: FDZ-RV, 
SHARE-RV-3-0-0, n = 1,486, own calculations)
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In the pension insurance records, income in eastern Germany is measured on a 
different scale than income in western Germany. This was done in order to raise the 
pension benefits of eastern Germans to those of western Germans. To help offset the 
lower income levels in the former GDR and in eastern Germany after reunification, 
the scale is roughly 20 % higher. The scale on the left-hand side of the graph there-
fore shows different gross income levels for 2013.
16.5  Multivariate Analysis
16.5.1  Determinants of Lifetime Credit Points
Model 1 in Table 16.2 shows the effects of having children on a woman’s lifetime 
gross income (measured in terms of credit points). The dependent variable is a mea-
sure of a woman’s gross income from periods of socially insured employment over 
her entire insurance record, starting at age 14 and ending at age 67, or at the time of 
the interview. One year of full-time employment resulted in one credit point. Among 
men, the average number of years spent in employment was about 40 in western 
Germany and was slightly higher in eastern Germany.
The regression was conducted separately for eastern and western Germany, and 
controlled for the level of education. Having children had a negative impact on 
women’s lifetime earnings. In western Germany, the lifetime earnings of a woman 
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Fig. 16.4 Average income of eastern German women by number of children (Source: FDZ-RV, 
SHARE-RV-3-0-0, n = 497, own calculations)
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declined significantly with the birth of each additional child. In eastern Germany, 
having children did not have a significant effect on a woman’s lifetime earnings. 
While the effect of education on lifetime earnings was more pronounced in eastern 
than in western Germany, it is important to note that the group of less educated 
eastern German women of these cohorts was still rather selective. Model 2 addition-
ally controlled for the duration of employment over the life course. After these 
variables were included, the effect of having children on a western German wom-
an’s earnings was greatly reduced. In eastern Germany, the negative effect of having 
three children disappeared after duration of employment was controlled for. This 
suggests that in eastern Germany the average woman with a large number of chil-
dren also had reduced earnings. The introduction of the length of employment into 
the regression also increased the effect of education. This shows that among the 
older cohorts of women in both parts of Germany, blue-collar workers spent more 
years in employment than white-collar workers. The fact that blue-collar workers 
were employed for more years helped to offset their lower gross wages.
16.5.2  Determinants of Lifetime Credit Points Including Child- 
Related Pension Points
In the next step, we explore how the results change if we consider the additional 
pension points women receive for having children (which we refer to as “child ben-
efits” in the following). For each child registered in the pension insurance records, 
the mother receives two credit points. Table 16.3 shows the results of this analysis. 
Table 16.2 Linear regression with the lifetime earnings of women, as recorded in the pension 
insurance registers, as the dependent variable
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Number of children
No children Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
 1 child −8.530*** −6.200*** 1.520 −1.986
 2 children −13.251*** −7.243* 0.016 −2.416*
 3 or more children −17.681*** −7.648*** −2.812 −3.024*
Education
 Low education −2.117** −4.189*** −7.223*** −10.652***
 Medium education 1.600 −1.763*** −5.490*** −6.901***
 High education Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Years of employment 0.799*** 0.905***
Years until retirement (65) −0.041 0.068
Constant 27.769*** 8.578*** 25.654*** 2.855
R2 0.20 0.76 0.08 0.69
Source: FDZ-RV, SHARE-RV-3-0-0, own calculations
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
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The findings indicate that having children had a negative impact on the lifetime 
credit points of women in Germany. However, the effect is more modest than in the 
prior analysis. For example, the previous analysis showed that compared to their 
childless counterparts, western German women with three or more children had 18 
fewer credit points. If we factor in the additional credit points these women received 
with the birth of each child, the difference shrinks to 11 credit points (see Model 1, 
western Germany). If we control for both length of employment and educational 
level (Model 2), we still find that the effect of having children was negative in west-
ern Germany. However, the coefficient for having three or more children is no lon-
ger significant, compared to the reference category of childless women. Thus, it 
appears that the old-age income of mothers with three or more children was boosted 
by the child benefits they received, and that their periods of non-employment and 
their lower income levels in times of employment were fully offset by these child 
benefits. However, the coefficient for one-child mothers in western Germany 
remains large and significant. These women suffered from a “motherhood penalty” 
on the labour market, but received little compensation for having raised a child.
For eastern Germany, the prior analysis showed that having children had a 
smaller impact on women’s credit points. Only women with three or more children 
saw a significant reduction in their accumulated credit points. In this analysis, which 
factors in the credit points for children, we see that having children actually had a 
positive impact on the overall number of pension points women received. On aver-
age, mothers with three or more children had three more points than childless 
women because they received child benefits. Thus, the average childless woman 
appears to have collected a smaller number of pension points than the average 
Table 16.3 Linear regression with lifetime earnings of women, as recorded in the pension 
insurance registers, by number of children and length of employment, including benefits for 
childrearing periods
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4
Number of children
No children Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
 1 child −6580*** −4.277*** 3.542 0.031
 2 children −9292*** −3.351*** 4.049 1.605
 3 or more children −10,653*** −0.731 4.386* 4.161***
Education
 Low education −1883 −3.963*** −7.017*** −10.490***
 Medium education 1588 −1.755*** −5.468*** −6.863***
 High education Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Years of employment 0.791*** 0.906***
Years until retirement (65) −0.047 0.058
Constant 27.693*** 8.754*** 25.554*** 2.803
R2 0094 0.72 0071 0.69
Source: FDZ-RV, SHARE-RV-3-0-0, own calculations
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10
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woman with children. It is important to note, however, that childlessness was very 
uncommon among the eastern German cohorts we consider here. We can therefore 
assume that many of the childless women of these cohorts had a health impairment, 
which may have also affected their employment career.
16.5.3  Couples’ Pension Income
Table 16.4 addresses the question of whether within a given family, a husband’s old- 
age income can compensate for the lower old-age income of his wife. It is important 
to note that this part of the analysis is descriptive, and is also restricted to women 
and men who were living as a couple at the time of the interview in 2014. As we can 
see in the table, in western Germany the average personal statutory insurance old- 
age pension of a childless woman was higher than that of the average mother (865 
euros versus 684 euros). These differences are hardly surprising given the higher 
lifetime income levels found among childless women in the regression analysis. The 
relationship between the number of children a woman had and the size of her pen-
sion appears to be almost linear: i.e., the more children that are registered in a wom-
an’s pension insurance account, the lower her statutory pension benefits. This is 
because the effects of low earnings are stronger than the effects of the childrearing 
benefits provided in the pension insurance scheme.
While having children had a negative impact on women’s statutory pension ben-
efits, this relationship did not exist for men. The average western German man with 
children had higher pension insurance benefits than the average childless man, even 
though he did not receive additional credit points from social insurance funds. 
Generally, the size of a man’s old-age pension varied little depending on the number 
of children he had. The personal old-age pension benefits of western German men 
ranged from 1295 to 1342 euros per month. The old-age income levels of couples 
with no children or with one or more children also did not vary much. In eastern 
Germany, the overall effect of having children on the pension benefits of women 
was considerably weaker than it was in western Germany.
Table 16.4 Couples statutory pension income by region, gender, and number of children
Western Germany Eastern Germany
Children registered in 
women’s accounts Women Men Couples Women Men Couples
No children 871 € 1117 € 1904 € (1012 €) (1089 €) (1971 €)
1 Child 713 € 1306 € 2025 € 893 € 1068 € 1954 €
2 Children 592 € 1249 € 1889 € 926 € 1074 € 1977 €
3 or more children 550 € 1231 € 1812 € 894 € 1017 € 1981 €
Number of cases 815 815 815 306 306 306
Source: FDZ-RV, SHARE-RV-3-0-0, own calculations, N = 1,121 couples. Pension calculation in 
Euro on the basis of pensions insurance credits points, including additional credit points granted 
after the “Mütterrente” reform in 2014. Numbers in brackets: Number of cases below 50
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16.6  Conclusion
For both men and women, the number of years they spent in employment and their 
earnings over the course of their career forms the basis of their personal retirement 
income. For mothers, the pension credits they accrue through employment are 
supplemented by credits for childrearing periods. In Germany, the pension bene-
fits of mothers have often been considered insufficient because they are on aver-
age lower than those of childless women. In this chapter, we examined the reasons 
why mothers tend to have a relatively small pension, and how having children 
affects their employment career. We also explored the question of whether public 
transfers are sufficient to offset the disadvantaged position of women with 
children.
The results of the descriptive analysis show that on average in western Germany, 
childless women had higher pension benefits than women with children, largely 
because their income increased more over their life course, especially up to age 
45. By contrast, western German mothers had relatively low labour market par-
ticipation levels and far lower average lifetime earnings. While the average mother 
with one child worked for most of her life course, she received just 60 % of the 
national average income. In many cases, this low earnings level was not just dif-
ficult to live on while the mother was employed; it also resulted in relatively low 
pension benefits. Thus, our first conclusion is that motherhood, even when the 
mother has only one child, exacts a high price in western Germany. Because most 
women earn less than the national average, they tend to be economically depen-
dent on either their partner or the welfare state, and this dependency continues 
into old age.
The results of our analysis of eastern German women indicate that their 
employment histories differed far less than those of western German women 
depending on the number of children they had. First, mothers in eastern Germany 
were more likely than mothers in western Germany to have been employed. The 
only group of eastern German women with below-average levels of employment 
during certain parts of their life course were women who had three or more chil-
dren; but even they had an employment level of nearly 85 % at age 35. The rates 
of participation in socially insured employment were consistently high among 
eastern German women. Thus, their biographies differ sharply from those of 
their western German counterparts. Moreover, the income levels of eastern 
German women were far less dependent than those of western German women 
on the number of children they had. However, while most eastern German women 
saw their gross income rise continuously over their life course, only a small share 
of these women were earning the national average income by the end of their 
career.
In the regression analysis, we explored the determinants of lifetime credit points. 
Our findings indicate that in the calculation of old-age pension benefits, western 
German women faced a heavy motherhood penalty. Between the ages of 25 and 40, 
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when most workers are making career advancements, western German mothers 
with two or more children worked very little. It is therefore not surprising that moth-
ers with two or more children had gross earnings that were one-third or one-quarter 
of the national average income. This gap is reduced if we consider the additional 
pension credit points women received for each childrearing period. On average, 
however, only women with three or more children were able to collect as many 
credit points as childless women. To a large degree, the old-age income of a mother 
with three or more children depended on the points she received from the statutory 
pension insurance fund for childrearing periods. Indeed, many of these women had 
little or no earned income across their life course. For these women, the points they 
received for childrearing periods represent not just a form of a compensation for 
their loss of income during the periods when their children were young, but an inde-
pendent source of old-age income.
In eastern Germany, we find that mothers and childless women had similar num-
bers of life-time credit points. If we consider the additional credit points women 
collected for each childrearing period, we find that the average mother had more 
credit points than the average childless woman. Women with three or more children 
were especially likely to have accumulated more credit points than childless women. 
The policy measure that awards mothers the equivalent of the national average 
income for each childrearing period appears to have imposed a childlessness pen-
alty on eastern German women. Thus, as a consequence of the latest pension 
 insurance reform, motherhood has become a positive factor in old-age income in 
eastern Germany. However, this surprising finding should be put into context. 
Earnings in eastern Germany were and are much lower than in western Germany, 
and there is a gender gap in earnings across Germany. Thus, in eastern Germany, the 
earnings of women including of those with very few interruptions in their employ-
ment career rarely reach the national average.
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Chapter 17
Childlessness and Intergenerational Transfers 
in Later Life
Marco Albertini and Martin Kohli
17.1  Introduction
After reaching a low point among the 1935–1945 birth cohort, childlessness has 
increased significantly in recent decades in most European societies (Rowland 
2007; OECD 2010; Tanturri et al. 2015). In previous research on childlessness, a 
recurring theme has been the consequences for an individual’s risk of social isola-
tion and insufficient informal support, particularly in later life (Kohli and Albertini 
2009). From the perspective of public policy, childless elderly people are usually 
seen as a problem group. It has been shown that parent-child relations are central to 
the social embeddedness of elderly people. Thus, it is generally assumed that com-
pared to adults who have children, childless adults are at higher risk of lacking the 
social and emotional support they will need when they become frail and dependent. 
Citing the negative effects of the absence of children on social inclusion, policy 
makers have expressed concerns that increasing rates of childlessness among the 
elderly population will lead to increasing demands for public social care and health 
services.
There are, however, two reasons why this assumption may be flawed. First, 
childless elderly people are not only on the receiving end of support; they also give 
to their families and to society at large by establishing strong linkages with next-of- 
kin relatives, investing in non-family networks, and participating in voluntary and 
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charitable activities. Taking these transfers and activities into account, we have 
found that the differences in the support exchange behaviours between parents and 
childless adults are small (Albertini and Kohli 2009). Second, childless elderly peo-
ple are not a homogenous group. Childlessness should be seen as a life course pro-
cess across a series of decision and bifurcation points (Kreyenfeld and Konietzka 
2007). The social consequences of being childless in later life depend on the specific 
paths into childlessness (Dykstra and Hagestad 2007; Keizer et al. 2010; Mynarska 
et al. 2015), and they may also depend on the specific family and kinship constella-
tions of each childless individual.
The aim of the present chapter is to address these two points. We report the 
results of a new study that deals with the social consequences of childlessness in 
later life by looking at the support given and received, and that examines parent-
hood and childlessness not as two exclusive alternatives, but as a continuum across 
a range of intermediate statuses. Thus, we analyse not only the financial and social 
support childless elderly people receive, but also the support they provide to their 
kin and friends, and to the society in which they live; and we map the patterns of 
support onto the different types of parental and childlessness status.
17.2  Social Consequences of Childlessness: Patterns 
of Support
The social consequences of childlessness in old age are multiple and complex. They 
vary with the specific institutional setting, and, at the individual level, with the spe-
cific motivation for and the pathway to childlessness. How someone ends up with no 
children may be more important than not having a child per se. Choosing not to 
have children, being unable to find a partner, not being fecund, surviving the death 
of one’s children, and being socially childless because of early divorce represent 
different paths to childlessness, and each of these paths has different connotations. 
Marital history and gender also mediate the consequences of childlessness for indi-
viduals, as do the usual cleavages of education, income, and health. 
Raising children requires the investment of substantial financial and time 
resources by parents, and there is a general recognition that the costs associated 
with parenthood outweigh the benefits, at least while children are young (for a lit-
erature review on the costs of children see Folbre 2008). At the same time, research 
on well-being in old age has shown that adult children have a positive impact overall 
on parents’ well-being (for a review of studies on parenthood and well-being over 
the last decade, see Umberson et al. 2010) and even on mortality: People tend to live 
longer if they have a surviving adult child. This effect of children on life expectancy 
is mediated by people’s perceptions of the emotional and social support that is avail-
able to them in case of need. The effect also extends to parents who have survived, 
abandoned, or lost contact with their children (Weltoft et al. 2004). One explanation 
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for parents’ higher life expectancy may be the healthier behaviour that parenthood 
encourages (Dykstra and Hagestad 2007).
According to an influential theory of the modern transition to low fertility, one of 
the main reasons why people had children in the past was because the children were 
expected to provide social and economic support when the parents became old and 
frail and were no longer able to be self-sufficient (Caldwell 1976); whereas today 
older people no longer depend on the support of their descendants in old age because 
they can now rely on pensions, health care, and social services provided by the wel-
fare state (Nuget 1985). Some authors have argued that such old-age security 
motives for having children – ensuring material support and care in old age – still 
apply today, not just in low-welfare developing societies, but to some extent also in 
affluent societies with extensive welfare states (Kreager and Schröder-Butterfill 
2004; Boldrin et al. 2005). While this controversy has yet to be resolved, it has been 
documented that elderly people in affluent societies continue to be embedded in 
dense intergenerational family networks of support, especially between parents and 
their children (Albertini et al. 2007; Kohli et al. 2010). Apart from providing direct 
support, children can serve as important intermediaries between their parents and 
health and social care services, and can thus help their parents gain access to the 
public resources available to the aged population (Choi 1994).
Given that adult children continue to represent an important source of support for 
elderly parents, we may assume that childless older people have a higher risk than 
parents of lacking social and moral support when they become frail and dependent. 
The evidence to date only partially confirms this expectation. Generally, the child-
less do not appear to have larger support deficits than parents (Albertini and 
Mencarini 2014). Childless people tend to compensate for the absence of exchanges 
with adult children by having frequent contact with neighbours and friends, and by 
developing strong ties with other family members, including with their parents, 
their siblings, and their nephews and nieces (Albertini and Kohli 2009; Schnettler 
and Woehler 2015). Moreover, despite the stigma that may still be attached to vol-
untary childlessness and the distress that may accompany involuntary childlessness 
(Dykstra and Hagestad 2007), recent empirical evidence does not support the 
assumption that childless older people have lower levels of economic, psychologi-
cal, or social well-being than their counterparts who have children (Hank and 
Wagner 2013).
However, the evidence also indicates that when intensive support is needed, 
these compensatory strategies work only partially. When they become frail and lim-
ited in their ability to carry out the activities of daily living, childless people receive 
less support and are more likely to enter residential care, and do so at lower levels 
of dependency compared with people who have children (Wenger 2009). If the 
share of the childless population increases, we may expect that the share of those 
who lack family support – and thus the demand for public health and social care 
services – will also grow. Given the constraints on welfare state spending, it is pos-
sible that this additional demand will not be met, and that childless older people will 
have to look to the private market for alternative solutions. Even in an advanced 
welfare state such as Sweden, public home help services have not been able to fully 
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compensate for the lack of family support among the childless (Larsson and 
Silverstein 2004).
At the same time, however, the debate about the effects of increasing levels of 
childlessness on the future demand for social care has neglected the opposite flows 
of support: How the absence of children affects what older people give. Contrary to 
widespread perceptions, on balance elderly people make more transfers and provide 
more support than they receive (Kohli et al. 2010). We have shown that although 
childless elderly people are less likely than parents to provide financial transfers and 
social support to others, these transfers and supports are still substantial (Albertini 
and Kohli 2009). A study conducted in the United States found that compared with 
parents, childless older people are more likely to make financial transfers to other 
kin, friends, and neighbours; and that they transfer larger amounts (Hurd 2009). A 
considerable share of these transfers still go to descendants such as nephews and 
nieces, and can therefore be considered intergenerational giving. Moreover, because 
they have a greater need to construct social networks outside of their families, child-
less people may be expected to give more of their time and money to charitable and 
community activities, and thus contribute more to society at large. Hurd (2009) 
shows that childless older people in the U.S. indeed donated larger amounts of 
money to charities than parents. To the extent that these organizations focus on 
young people, this type of giving is again intergenerational.
17.3  Parenthood as a Continuum
As we noted above, a large body of previous research on childless people has treated 
non-parents and parents as two homogeneous groups, distinguishing only between 
those who had and those who did not have living children at the time of the inter-
view. There is, however, increasing evidence that there are different pathways to 
childlessness, and that the consequences of childlessness vary depending on these 
pathways and their endpoints. The same is true for parents. There is no straightfor-
ward distinction between being or not being a parent: a person can become a parent 
as the result of having a natural child (with or without the help of assisted reproduc-
tion technologies), but also by adopting a child or becoming a stepparent of a part-
ner’s child. Thus, people can have children through different routes and at different 
points in their life course. A person can also cease to be a parent. The most obvious 
case in which this occurs is when a parent has survived his/her children. But there 
are also parents who, due to life events such as a divorce or an intense family con-
flict, have lost track of their children and no longer have contact with them. Other 
parents have children who live very far away (see Schnettler and Woehler 2015). 
These situations may have different effects on support networks and exchanges. Our 
empirical analysis is a first step towards taking these different situations into 
account. We distinguish between those who have natural children and stay in 
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contact with them; those who have had natural children but have survived them, 
have lost contact with them, or live far away from them; those who did not have 
natural children but have adopted, foster, or stepchildren; and, finally, those who 
never had any children, natural or otherwise. Thus, we conceptualise parenthood 
and childlessness not as two fully separate conditions, but as a continuum of paren-
tal statuses.
17.4  Analytic Approach, Data, and Variables
The data for this analysis is drawn from the first three regular waves of the Survey 
of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) collected in 2004, 2007, and 
2011; and from the retrospective third wave (SHARELIFE) collected in 2009. We 
use data from the 11 European countries that participated in the first wave of 
SHARE: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
SHARE is a longitudinal, cross-national survey representative of the population 
aged 50 and older; the partners of the respondents (regardless of their age) are also 
included. SHARE contains detailed information on the financial transfers and social 
support (including formal and informal care) given and received during the 12 
months prior to each interview. Using the combined information of SHARE and 
SHARELIFE, we were able to distinguish between different types of parenthood 
and childlessness. We created six subgroups of respondents: (a) those who never 
had natural children and had no adopted, foster, or stepchildren at the time of the 
interview (fully childless); (b) those who had natural children, but no living children 
at the time of the interview (survived all children); (c) those who never had natural 
children, but who at the time of the interview had adopted, foster, or stepchildren 
who were living less than 500 km away with whom they had contact at least once a 
month (social parents); (d) those who had natural children, and who at the time of 
the interview still had at least one child who was living less than 500 km away with 
whom they had contact at least once a month (natural parents); (e) those who had 
at least one living child at the time of the interview (natural, step, adopted, or fos-
ter), but who had lost contact with all of their children (i.e., less than one contact per 
month or no contact at all during the 12 months prior to the interview) (parents no 
contact); and (f) those who had at least one living child at the time of the interview 
(natural, step, adopted, or foster), but who were living more than 500 km away from 
their nearest child (parents geographical distance).
Our final sample consists of 50,358 person years of data. Table 17.1 provides the 
main descriptive statistics. Of the cases in the sample, 85 % are parents, 9 % are 
fully childless, and 4 % are social parents. A further 3 % can be considered “de facto 
childless”: those who had survived all of their children, those who had children but 
had no contact with them, and those who were living at a considerable geographical 
distance from their nearest child each make up around 1 % of the sample.
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First, we report some descriptive statistics on the support networks of the six 
types of parents/non-parents. The second step consists of multivariate analyses of 
support exchange. The previous literature has consistently shown that elderly 
 parents and non-parents differ systematically in their characteristics, such as eco-
nomic resources, health, and partnership status. These characteristics are also 
important factors that influence personal support networks. Therefore, in order to 
analyse the relationship between parental status and support exchange, we need to 
control for a number of possible compositional effects. We introduce the following 
control variables into our multivariate analyses: age, marital status (i.e., married or 
in a registered partnership, separated or divorced, widowed, never married), educa-
tional level (measured according to the ISCED-97 scale), health status (measured as 
the presence of at least one limitation on the Global Activity Limitation Index 
[GALI], or on the Activities of Daily Living [ADL] or Instrumental Activities of 
Daily Living [IADL] indicators, or on the indicator of mobility and fine motor limi-
tations), the natural logarithm of household equivalent income, household net per 
capita wealth, and the country of residence.
The multivariate analyses are carried out by using population-averaged logit and 
linear regression models for binomial and continuous variables, respectively, on the 
Table 17.1 Sample characteristics, column per cent
%
Female 40.9
Parental status
  Fully childless 9.1
  Survived all children 0.9
  Social parents 3.5
  Natural parents 84.7
  Parents who have lost contact with children 1.2
  Parents who live at >500 km away from children 0.7
Marital status
  Married or in registered partnership 73.0
  Separated/divorced 7.7
  Widowed 14.0
  Never married 5.4
Education
  None (ISCED 0) 4.7
  Low (ISCED 1 & 2) 43.7
  Intermediate (ISCED 3 & 4) 30.7
  High (ISCED 5 & 6) 20.9
Has at least one limitation 58.8
Age (mean, SD) 65.5 (10.0)
  Household equivalent income (ppp), (mean, SD) 23,311 (27,787)
  Household per-capita wealth (ppp), (mean, SD) 146,041 (309,684)
Person-years 50,358
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unbalanced sample of respondents taking part in at least one of the first three regular 
waves of SHARE. We consider several dependent variables: the likelihood of giv-
ing/receiving social support (i.e., help with paperwork, household chores, personal 
care) to/from non-coresiding individuals; the natural logarithm of the amount of 
social support given/received expressed as the estimated number of hours per year 
(this variable is only available for the first two waves of the survey); the likelihood 
of giving/receiving financial support to/from others; the likelihood of participating 
in the activities of charitable or voluntary organizations in the 4 weeks prior to the 
interview, and the likelihood of providing this support on a weekly or daily basis 
(these variables are only available for the first two waves of the survey); and the 
likelihood of receiving professional or paid home help, or of staying overnight in a 
nursing home in the last 12 months (this variable is only available for the first two 
waves of the survey). Because the previous literature has shown that the lack of 
children has different effects for men and women, we estimate separate models for 
these two groups. Due to space limitations we report below only the regression 
coefficients for the different parental statuses, while omitting those for the control-
ling variables.1
17.5  Results
Even though they are largely overlooked by the literature, the contributions of non- 
natural parents to family, friends, and society at large are far from negligible (Table 
17.2). Thus, for instance, while they were less likely than natural parents to have 
provided support to others, 17 % of the fully childless respondents in our sample 
gave financial support in the 12 months prior to the interview, and more than 30 % 
helped with household work or personal care – a share that is very close to that of 
natural parents. The shares of respondents who performed charitable or voluntary 
work were similar across the different parental status groups (with the exception of 
parents who had lost contact with their children), and the analysis of the amount of 
this work provided some surprising results: 70 % of the fully childless who partici-
pated in these activities contributed to their community on a daily or weekly basis; 
a share that is higher than the figure found among natural parents.
Moving the focus to the support received, Table 17.2 indicates that contrary to 
expectations, non-natural parents and parents who had lost contact with their chil-
dren were more likely than natural parents to have been receiving social support. 
These groups, together with the group of parents who were living more than 500 km 
away from their children, were also more likely to have been receiving formal care 
support.
Clearly, all of these differences between the types of parenthood or childlessness 
could be the result of systematic compositional differences. For instance, natural 
and social parents might, on average, be younger and/or in better economic and 
1 The full regression results are available from the authors upon request.
17 Childlessness and Intergenerational Transfers in Later Life
358
health conditions than the other respondents, and these differences could explain 
why they were less likely to be receiving formal and informal social support. For 
this reason, the next step of our analysis is to investigate the relationship between 
childlessness and support networks in a multivariate framework.2
17.5.1  What Childless People Give
One of the most overlooked topics in the study of childless elderly people is the 
extent to which they contribute to others (relatives and non-relatives) and to society 
at large. Most of the previous research on elderly non-parents has focused on the 
challenges they face later in life. As we have shown (Albertini and Kohli 2009), 
however, the amount of support provided by non-parents to others is far from 
2 Given the small size of some of our groups, the statistical power of the data set is low. We will 
therefore show and comment on coefficients that are significant at the 5 or 10 % level.
Table 17.2 Characteristics of the respondents’ support network by parental status
Childlessness typology
Fully 
childless
Survived 
all 
children
Social 
parents
Natural 
parents
Parents 
no 
contact
Parents 
geo 
distance
Support given
% Giving economic 
support
17.2 16.7 35.8 32.9 17.2 33.8
% Giving social support 31.4 26.5 32.8 33.5 23.5 31.1
Mean amount of social 
support given
484 326 468 563 1474 245
% Participating in 
charitable or voluntary 
work
14.7 13.6 14.8 15.0 9.7 12.4
% Participating in 
charitable or voluntary 
work on a daily or 
weekly basis
70.7 64.3 62.6 65.1 65.9 57.5
Support received
% Receiving economic 
support
4.5 3.6 4.9 6.1 4.9 8.0
% Receiving social 
support
23.6 25.3 16.5 18.8 29.2 19.4
Mean amount of social 
support received
279 596 280 495 531 354
% Receiving 
professional or paid care 
support (home care or 
nursing home)
8.8 10.3 4.2 5.1 14.9 13.8
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negligible. In the present section, we want to address this issue by examining the 
contributions of elderly people based on their parental status.
The multivariate analyses on the financial support provided to others confirm 
that, in general, the fully childless were giving less than natural parents (Fig. 17.1). 
Among fathers, only those who had step or adopted children were providing finan-
cial help to others to the same extent as natural fathers; those who had lost contact 
with their children or lived more than 500 km away were significantly less likely to 
have been providing financial support. Among women, only those who were fully 
childless or who had survived their children were less likely to have been doing so. 
In other words, among parents who lived far away from their children or had lost 
contact with them, the transfer behaviour of the mothers was similar to that of natu-
ral mothers, whereas the transfer behaviour of the fathers was in-between that of 
fully childless men and natural fathers.
With regard to social support provided to others, the differences between parents 
and non-parents were either very small or absent (Fig. 17.2). There is no clear polar-
isation of transfer behaviour between the fully childless and natural parents, and 
there is no clear gradient among the different parental statuses. Only two groups 
provided significantly lower levels of social support than natural parents: namely, 
social fathers and mothers who had lost contact with their children. Marginally sig-
nificant negative effects are also found for social mothers and mothers who were 
living more than 500 km away from their children. The weakness of the relationship 
between parental statuses and the provision of social support is further confirmed by 
Fig. 17.1 Effects of parental status (reference: natural parents) on the likelihood of making a 
financial transfer to others, by respondent’s gender. Beta coefficients and 90 and 95 % confidence 
intervals from logit models (Note: Further variables in the models are: marital status, educational 
level, health status, income, wealth, country of residence)
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the finding that in terms of the hours of social support provided, just one subgroup 
is significantly different from natural parents: Fully childless women transferred 
less time to others than natural mothers (Fig. 17.3).
Providing social or financial support to family and friends is not the only way in 
which individuals can contribute to society. As we have argued previously (Kohli 
and Albertini 2009), childless elderly people may be the pioneers of a new form of 
post-familial civic engagement in which they devote their resources to public instead 
of private concerns by donating to foundations, participating in the activities of 
charitable organizations, or doing voluntary work. However, the results of the pres-
ent analysis provide only weak support for this hypothesis. SHARE has no informa-
tion on charitable donations, so the analysis is restricted to participation in the 
activities of charitable or voluntary organizations. As is shown in Fig. 17.4, the 
behaviour of the different subgroups is similar. Only mothers who survived their 
children seem to be slightly more likely to have participated in the activities of 
charitable or voluntary organizations. Fathers who had lost contact with their chil-
dren tended to participate less than the other fathers. When we look at the intensity 
of support provided to others through this type of participation (Fig. 17.5), we find 
that – partially in line with our hypothesis and with previous findings – there is a 
marginally significant (10 % level) positive relationship between being a fully child-
less man and engaging in the activities of voluntary organizations on a daily or 
weekly basis. In other words, fully childless men may be the only group who com-
pensated for the absence of children by involving themselves more intensively than 
natural parents in these forms of post-familial civic engagement.
Fig. 17.2 Effects of parental status (reference: natural parents) on the likelihood of providing 
social support to others, by respondent’s gender. Beta coefficients and 90 and 95 % confidence 
intervals from logit models (Note: For further variables in the models, see Fig. 17.1)
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Fig. 17.3 Effects of parental status (reference: natural parents) on the amount of social support 
provided to others (as the natural log of hours per year), conditional on having provided at least 1 
h of support, by respondent’s gender. Beta coefficients and 90 % and 95 % confidence intervals 
from OLS regressions (Note: For further variables in the models, see Fig. 17.1)
Fig. 17.4 Effects of parental status (reference: natural parents) on the likelihood of participating 
in the activities of charitable or voluntary organizations in the 4 weeks prior to the interview, by 
respondent’s gender. Beta coefficients and 90 % and 95 % confidence intervals from logit models 
(Note: For further variables in the models, see Fig. 17.1)
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In sum, these results show that the likelihood of financial support to others is 
clearly associated with having or not having children, and that for fathers whether 
they had regular contact with their children is also a factor. Generally, the fully 
childless, those who had survived their children, and those who had lost contact 
with them are less likely to have been making financial transfers than parents. It 
seems that the two latter groups of fathers are located between the two extremes of 
the financial transfer behaviour of natural fathers and fully childless men. In con-
trast, social support is less clearly connected with the presence of children, except 
among fully childless women and mothers who had lost contact with their children. 
The results for participation in charitable or voluntary work are similar: while we 
find little evidence that the childless were playing a special role in these forms of 
social engagement beyond their immediate circle of family and friends, our findings 
do contradict the common assumption that childless people are ego-centred and 
isolated members of contemporary societies.
17.5.2  What Childless People Receive
As was mentioned above, most previous research on the social networks of the 
childless has focused on what they lack in terms of informal social support. Here 
we complement this approach by including in our analysis both the formal and the 
Fig. 17.5 Effects of parental status (reference: natural parents) on the likelihood of participating 
in the activities of charitable or voluntary organizations at least on a daily or weekly basis (vs. less 
often) in the 4 weeks prior to the interview, by respondent’s gender. Beta coefficients and 90 % and 
95 % confidence intervals (Note: For further variables in the models, see Fig. 17.1)
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informal types of support the childless receive, and by investigating how the 
 levels and the types of support they receive differ across the range of parental 
statuses.
Figure 17.6 shows that our results for the financial support given – namely, that 
the absence of children is negatively associated with it – also applies to some extent 
to the flow of resources in the other direction. We find a significant negative rela-
tionship between having received financial support and having been fully childless 
for both women and men, as well as for social fathers and for fathers who were 
living more than 500 km away from their children. This latter finding mirrors the 
finding that these fathers are also less likely to have been providing economic sup-
port to others. An opposite pattern is found for mothers: i.e., mothers who were 
living far away from their children are more likely to have been receiving financial 
support.
Regarding the likelihood of having received informal social support (Fig. 17.7) 
we find that the patterns differ between men and women. While both fully childless 
men and fathers who had lost contact with their children are more likely than natural 
parents to have been receiving social support, among women none of the subgroups’ 
coefficients is significant. In other words, motherhood status does not affect the 
likelihood of having received help from outside of the household. The picture 
becomes more complex when we also take into consideration the intensity of these 
time transfers (Fig. 17.8). For both fully childless men and fathers with no contact 
with their children we observe a significant negative coefficient; thus, while they are 
Fig. 17.6 Effects of parental status (reference: natural parents) on the likelihood of receiving a 
financial transfer from others, by respondent’s gender. Beta coefficients and 90 % and 95 % confi-
dence intervals from logit models (Note: For further variables in the models, see Fig. 17.1)
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Fig. 17.7 Effects of parental status (reference: natural parents) on the likelihood of receiving 
social support from others, by respondent’s gender. Beta coefficients and 90 % and 95 % confi-
dence intervals from logit models (Note: For further variables in the models, see Fig. 17.1)
Fig. 17.8 Effects of parental status (reference: natural parents) on the amount of social support 
received from others (as the natural log of hours per year) conditional on having received at least 
1 h of support, by respondent’s gender. Regression coefficients and 90 % and 95 % confidence 
intervals (Note: For further variables in the models, see Fig. 17.1)
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more likely than natural parents to have received help, among those who did receive 
it the number of hours of help was significantly lower. A marginally significant 
negative association is also observed for mothers who survived their children and 
for social fathers, whereas a positive association is found for fathers who survived 
their children and for social mothers. In sum, when we look at the likelihood of hav-
ing received support we can see that none of the different groups of parents and 
non-parents is disadvantaged relative to natural parents, with some even being more 
likely to have received help. On the other hand, some weakness in the support net-
works of the non-parents can be seen when we shift the focus to the intensity of the 
support received: fully childless men and women received a significantly lower 
amount of social support than natural parents.
It is clear from our results that some types of elderly non-parents are more 
likely than natural parents to lack informal social support when they become old 
and frail. This finding resonates with results from previous research. The question 
then arises whether someone else provides the non-parents with the help they 
need when they get old. The answer is given in Fig. 17.9. The fully childless men 
and women are more likely than natural parents to have spent some time in an 
old-age home or to have received some professional or formal care support 
(acquired on the market or received from public institutions). This is also the case 
for women who have survived their children, parents who do not have contact 
with their children any more and parents who live far away from their children[1]. 
For long-term care policies, it is thus not only the increasing number of fully 
Fig. 17.9 Effects of parental status (reference: natural parents) on the likelihood of receiving 
professional or paid home care or staying overnight in a nursing home, by respondent’s gender. 
Beta coefficients and 90 % and 95 % confidence intervals (Note: For further variables in the mod-
els, see Fig. 17.1)
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childless people that will challenge the supply of formal care services, but also 
the increasing number of parents who do not live close to their children or have 
lost contact with them.
[1] The latter finding confirms the results of a recent study of the elderly Dutch 
population by van der Pers et al. (2015) which showed that having children living 
close by was negatively associated with the likelihood of moving to a care 
institution.
17.6  Conclusions
Childlessness in later life is a topic that has been attracting increased levels of atten-
tion from researchers and policy makers. It is also still the subject of widely held 
misconceptions. Two of the most misleading ones are that childless elderly people 
are only or mainly at the receiving end of intergenerational exchanges, and that they 
are all of one kind. Contrary to these assumptions, we find that elderly childless 
people give as well as receive support, and that parental status is a continuum, rang-
ing from full childlessness across several intermediary conditions to full current 
natural parenthood.
In a study of the elderly population across 11 European countries, we have shown 
that non-parents make significant contributions to their social networks of family 
and friends through financial and time transfers, and that their contributions of time 
in particular differ little from those of natural parents. The same applies to participa-
tion in charitable and voluntary work. Different parental statuses are significantly 
associated with the various dimensions of giving and receiving. The patterns across 
these dimensions and statuses need to be examined in detail, but two general results 
stand out. The first is that social parents (i.e., people who have no natural children 
but who have adopted, foster, or stepchildren) are more similar to natural parents 
than to non-parents. Family recomposition thus does not seem to inhibit intergen-
erational exchanges as long as social parents have sufficient contact with their social 
children. The second result is that parents who have lost contact with their chil-
dren – natural or otherwise – are an overlooked group in terms of their heightened 
demand for formal care in later life. As this group may be increasing in size, it rep-
resents a special challenge for policy.
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